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PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
he political economy of agricultural and food policies 
remains a fascinating and important topic. This holds in 
general with many poor countries in the world taxing their 
farmers while many rich countries subsidise agriculture. It also 
holds for the European Union. Since the start of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU has spent a large share of its 
budget on supporting European agriculture. In 2013, it was decided 
to spend more than €400 billion over the remainder of the decade 
on the CAP. The 2013 decision ended years of discussion and 
negotiations on the future of the EU’s agricultural policies. It not 
only had major implications for the EU’s budget and farmers’ 
incomes, but also for Europe’s environment, its contribution to 
global climate change and to food security in the EU and elsewhere 
in the world.  
This book discusses the outcome of the decision-making and 
the factors that influenced the policy choices and decisions. It brings 
together contributions from academics and policy-makers, and 
from different disciplines.  
The precursor to this volume was our 2008 book, entitled The 
Perfect Storm: The Political Economy of the Fischler Reforms of the 
Common Agricultural Programmes, to which several of the authors in 
the present book also contributed. Since then several workshops 
and seminars have been organised on what was typically referred 
to as the ‘2013 CAP reform’. One workshop was organised in Zurich 
at the 2011 Congress of the European Association of Agricultural 
Economists (EAAE) and others in Brussels at the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) and in Ljubljana at the 2014 EAAE 
Congress. Many contributors to this book participated in numerous 
other discussions and panels on the CAP. Part of the chapters in this 
book are based on background analyses carried out for a study for 
the European Parliament entitled “The first CAP reform under the 
ordinary legislative procedure: A political economy perspective”.  
T
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The book is organised in several parts. The first part presents 
the key outcomes of the decision-making process and the CAP for 
2014-2020 and offers an assessment of the policy outcomes by 
leading academic analysts. The second part has perspectives from 
the European institutions, written by key participants in the process 
and negotiations from the European Commission and the European 
Parliament.  
The third part includes chapters that discuss key elements of 
the CAP reform negotiations and its political economy components, 
including the link with the budgetary negotiations, the negotiations 
on greening and the role of the WTO. The fourth part focuses 
specifically on how co-decision and the European Parliament 
influenced the CAP decision-making. The final part concludes and 
looks at the future, with several chapters discussing the likelihood 
and need for the next CAP reform.  
We include an Appendix at the end of the book that 
summarises the positions taken by the European institutions during 
the negotiations on specific CAP issues and the final regulations, 
which we hope will be a useful tool for reference purposes and 
further research.  
Many people and organisations contributed to the production 
of this book. The organisation of the workshops and the publication 
of the book were financially supported by CEPS and the LICOS 
Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance of the University 
of Leuven. Louise Knops, Maria Garrone and Kristine Van Herck 
provided invaluable support, both in terms of the actual analysis 
and research, and as organisers of various activities that preceded 
the book. Lee Gillette and Els Van den Broeck at CEPS did a 
wonderful job in copy-editing the book and on the lay-out. 
My final words of thanks go to Anne Harrington, CEPS 
Editor, who, as always, was a source of enthusiastic support and 
continuous encouragement, and a patient guide throughout the 
book publishing process.  
Johan Swinnen 
Brussels, June 2015 
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1. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
THE 2014-2020 COMMON 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY: 
INTRODUCTION AND KEY 
CONCLUSIONS 
JOHAN SWINNEN* 
fter an elaborate process, a decision on the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the 2014-2020 period was 
reached in 2013. The process involved the main European 
institutions: the European Commission (Commission), the Council 
of the European Union (Council), the European Council1 and the 
European Parliament (EP). It involved consultations with European 
                                                        
* I thank Giovanni Anania, Emil Erjavec, Imre Fertő, Maria Garrone, Louise 
Knops, Attila Kovacs, Alan Matthews, Alessandro Olper and Alan 
Swinbank for excellent comments on an earlier version of this chapter. All 
remaining errors and expressed opinions in this chapter are my 
responsibility.  
1 The European Council is the Council of the Heads of State and 
Government, whereas the Council of the European Union (sometimes 
called the Council of Ministers) is the institution representing the member 
states' governments. Also known informally as the EU Council, the latter is 
where national ministers from each EU member state meet in different 
configurations to adopt laws and coordinate policies. In the context of this 
book, these gatherings are called Agriculture and Fisheries Councils, which 
we shorten to Agriculture Council (see 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/agrifish/). 
Although both Councils played an important role in the 2013 reform of the 
CAP, the European Council is not part of the CAP decision-making process 
according to the legislative rules. It nevertheless had an important impact, 
as we will explain later. 
A
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citizens and ‘stakeholders’ and intense lobbying activities on the 
part of various interest groups. The process started informally as 
early as 2008 and more formally in April 2010, when the 
Commission launched a public debate on the CAP’s future. In June 
2013, a political agreement was reached between the Commission, 
the EP and the Council under the Irish Presidency.2 In the last 
months of 2013, the regulations were formally adopted by the 
Council and the EP. Delegated Acts to clarify technical 
implementation details were approved in April 2014. Afterwards 
member states went to work on how they would implement various 
policy areas where they had flexibility in implementing the 
regulations.  
The length and complexity of the process are not indicative of 
the reform outcome. Bureau & Mahé (ch. 3) even argue that 
comparing, for example, the 2003 CAP reforms with the recent CAP 
decisions, there appears an inverse correlation between the length 
of the process and the significance of the policy reforms. Many 
authors in this book share the opinion that the outcome of the 
decision-making process was disappointing. In fact, nobody seems 
to be very enthusiastic about the outcome – albeit not always for the 
same reasons.  
The subtitle of the book, and part of the title of my political 
economy analysis in chapter 17, “An Imperfect Storm”, refers to the 
contrast with the 2003 reforms where many different factors 
(economic, political, institutional, etc.) combined to create a ‘perfect 
storm’ triggering a radical reform of the CAP (see Swinnen, 2008a). 
In contrast, the factors that induced the policy discussions in 2008-
13 and that influenced the decision-making did not reinforce each 
other. On the contrary, they sometimes counteracted one another, 
yielding an ‘imperfect storm’ as it were, which was reflected in 
much less dramatic changes in the CAP and much more emphasis 
placed on the status quo in several important policy elements. 
                                                        
2 There were important intermediate events between April 2010 and June 
2013, such as the publication of the Commission’s proposals in 2011 and 
the MFF (multiannual financial framework) agreement in early 2013. 
Knops & Swinnen (2014) provide a detailed timeline and explanation of the 
various steps and procedures.  
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The CAP is a complex policy involving many different 
components and issues. Accordingly, the contributors to this book 
are recognised experts on their particular topics. I will therefore 
refrain from going into too much detail in this chapter and refer the 
reader to the specific chapters that deal with specific analyses and 
more details. Hence, my key conclusions here will be a rather brief 
summary, focused on what I thought were common themes and 
findings.  
Arguably the main common theme is the discussions and 
decisions on ‘greening’ of the CAP, i.e. reforms of the CAP to 
enhance its impact on the environment and climate change. It was a 
major element in the public debate, in the Commission’s proposals, 
in the ensuing negotiations on the future EU budget in the European 
Council, among and within the member states, and in the EP. It was 
the subject of intense lobbying by interest groups and of severe ex-
post critiques.  
Other common themes include the new role played by the 
European Parliament, the complex relationship between the CAP 
and the overall budget negotiations under the multi-annual 
financial framework (MFF), the impact of the Eastern enlargement 
and of the food price spikes on global markets, etc. In this chapter I 
attempt to present a set of conclusions from the many chapters and 
identify where there is consensus and where not.  
At the same time, this chapter is an attempt to guide the 
reader to the other chapters where more detailed arguments can be 
found. For the reader’s reference, I include a series of tables in 
Annex to the book (Kovacs et al.), which summarise the positions 
taken by the European institutions on specific reform elements, as 
well as the final decisions on the CAP for 2014-2020.3 I refer to 
chapters 2 and 3 for a detailed analysis and discussion of the 2013 
CAP decisions. 
                                                        
3 For complementary information and an excellent guide and review of the 
CAP process and its future, the reader is referred to the series of blogs and 
comments on www.capreform.eu by leading European experts including 
Alan Matthews, J.C. Bureau and Emil Erjavec, all of whom are authors in 
this book. The website also has a most useful archive of commentaries since 
before the start of the 2010-2013 CAP reform process. 
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1. A CAP ‘reform’? 
“Reform”  
(Oxford Dictionaries Online 2015) 
 
Verb:  
“Make changes in (something, especially an institution or practice)  
in order to improve it.” 
Noun:  
“The action or process of reforming an institution or practice.” 
 
In the conclusions of my edited volume on the 2003 CAP reform 
(Swinnen, 2008a), I addressed the question: Were the Fischler 
reforms radical reforms? (And the general consensus was that in 
several ways they were radical reforms.)4 The question with the 
2013 CAP decisions is not so much whether they are radical reforms 
(the consensus on this is “no”), but whether they are captured 
appropriately by the term ‘reforms’ at all.  
In answering this question, it is important to consider two 
sub-questions: How large are the (policy) changes? In what 
direction do the (policy) changes go? Reform means change, but 
change is, in itself, an ambivalent term because it hinges on the 
direction of the change. Many authors in this book struggle 
implicitly with this issue when they are trying to evaluate the policy 
decisions. Alan Matthews (ch. 19) acknowledges that “the 
discussion can get very confused” because people have very 
different interpretations of what they mean by ‘reform’. Some of the 
difficulties in interpretation and evaluation are also reflected in the 
categorisation of Anania & Pupo D’Andrea (ch. 2) of member states 
along a “more or less conservative” dimension and in the discussion 
in Erjavec et al. (ch. 9) discussion of “conservative member states” 
and the different discourses surrounding the policy measures.  
Anania & Pupo D’Andrea (ch. 2) as well as Bureau & Mahé 
(ch. 3) conclude that a general evaluation of the CAP decisions is 
“difficult” and arrive at a mixed evaluation, which differs for 
specific elements of the decision. Haniotis (ch. 5) summarises his 
view on how the targets set at the beginning of the process were 
                                                        
4 See Chapter 10.2 in Swinnen (2008b).  
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achieved as follows: “Fairer? Yes. Simpler? Definitely not. Greener? 
Still unclear.” 
The general assessments in this book seem to be that: a) there 
have been some policy changes (obviously); b) some of the policy 
changes are ‘new’ (e.g. it is the first CAP reform with explicit5 
redistribution of budgets between member states); c) that the policy 
changes are relatively minor; and d) the policy changes are not 
always coherent in terms of the perspective on the objectives of the 
CAP that they serve (e.g. some are consistent with the long run 
‘reform process’ of less market interventions; others are inconsistent 
with this).  
Bureau & Mahé (ch. 3) conclude that from many perspectives 
the process has been “a lost opportunity”, and Anania & Pupo 
D’Andrea (ch. 2) that “those who hoped the financial resources 
would not be severely cut ... and for the reformed CAP to bring as 
few changes as possible, are probably quite satisfied by the result”. 
As I already pointed out, some of the main critical evaluations relate 
to the ‘greening‘ aspects of the CAP, which leads Erjavec et al. (ch. 
9) to conclude that “the reform was an empty shell” – an assessment 
shared by many others in this book (see further). Perhaps 
illustrative of the overall assessment is that several authors consider 
one of the main ‘achievements’ of the reform the status quo outcome 
in the area of market orientation of the CAP (e.g. Bureau & Mahé 
(ch. 4) and Swinbank (ch. 8)).6  
In summary, this brief introductory review should make it 
clear that the 2013 decisions on the CAP for the 2014-2020 period are 
not very accurately summarised by the concept of ‘reform’. In fact, 
some observers object to the concept for the 2013 decision, arguing 
that it gives the outcome (and the process) too much credit – and 
would prefer to use ‘repackaging’ or ‘recalibration’. That said, 
                                                        
5 One should distinguish between “budget redistribution” and 
“redistribution” in general because decision-making on intervention 
prices, tariffs and quotas under the old CAP had important implications 
for rent distribution across member states.  
6 Obviously these evaluations depend on the perspectives of the authors 
and those who favoured more regulated markets see this as a negative 
element of the reform – or something to address in the future (see the 
discussion in De Castro & Di Mambo, ch. 5).  
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almost all authors in this book use the term ‘CAP reform’, as do 
many people who are not contributors to this book, mostly as a term 
of convenience rather than a value judgement.  
2. Public funds for public goods? Greening of the 
CAP?  
A factor that received a lot of attention both from economists and 
ecologists was the need to link the CAP payments much more 
strongly to ‘environmental’ or ‘public good’ objectives. Ecologists 
had long been arguing to use the payments to reduce the negative 
impact of EU agriculture on climate change, to enhance 
biodiversity, etc. (see chs 6, 10 and 20 by Potočnik, Hart and 
Buckwell, respectively). Economists saw this as the next step in the 
long-term reform path of farm support: from distortive 
interventions in the 1970s and 1980s to less distortive payments in 
the 1990s (after MacSharry), to decoupled payments in the 2000s 
(after Fischler), to (more?) targeted payments in the 2010s, as e.g. 
reflected in an early report by Bureau & Mahé (2008) and the 
statement of a group of ‘leading agricultural economists’ (Anania et 
al., 2010). These objectives were summarised in the ‘public funds for 
public goods‘ statement. 
However, farm organisations were mostly opposed to these 
arguments as they saw them as posing additional constraints and 
increasing their production costs. Opponents of specific greening 
measures also claimed that they would increase bureaucracy and 
would be costly to monitor and to implement.  
The 2013 decision on this part of the CAP is the one that has 
received the most critiques. Many authors in this book see this as a 
major weakness or failure of the reform – maybe best captured by 
the judgement of “greenwash instead of greening” by Erjavec et al. 
(ch. 9). Hart (ch. 10) refers to others who, despite the Commission’s 
claim that greening is now a permanent element of the CAP, even 
argue that the 2013 decisions take a step backwards instead of 
forward for the integration of environmental concerns in the CAP. 
A different perspective is presented by De Castro & Di 
Mambo (ch. 5) who argue that the “greening of the first pillar can be 
viewed as a reinforcement of the environmental cross-compliance 
… and is … necessary to strengthen the contribution of the sector to 
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the correct management of environmental resources”. They explain 
the position, which dominated the EP’s Committee for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (COMAGRI), that the Commission 
proposals did not sufficiently take into account the implementation 
problems for the farmers and the problems of compliance and 
payment controls, and measurements of environmental impacts of 
farmers’ obligations. This perspective (or the unofficial purposes 
that it served) was very influential in the end, not just in the EP but 
also in the Council.  
The explanations offered in several chapters why the 
requirements on ‘greening‘ in the final agreement were so weak is a 
combination of several elements. The first is that the reform 
proposals presented by Commissioner Dacian Cioloş (2010-14) were 
not very ambitious to begin with. This lack of ambition is explained, 
among other reasons, by a limited commitment to greening and the 
relative inexperience of the Commissioner and his cabinet. 
Anticipating opposition in the Council and the EP, they seemed to 
have wanted to minimise conflicts by proposing a compromise in 
the first proposal (Erjavec et al., ch. 9). Yet, despite this ‘weak’ 
proposal, Hart (ch. 10) explains that the reactions to the 
Commission’s greening proposals “were almost universally negative”. 
Farming organisations criticised the obligation to set aside land; 
environmental organisations were disappointed with the limited 
ambition; economists criticised it for proposing inefficient 
instruments; the Council claimed the proposals would lead to more 
bureaucracy; etc.  
Another factor is the role of the European Parliament where 
the COMAGRI was able to control much of the decision-making, 
with farm interests having more influence than environmental 
organisations (Roederer-Rynning, ch. 13; Hart, ch. 10; Knops & 
Garrone, ch. 16). At the same time, much of the positions of the EP 
were shared by the Council of Ministers, which joined the EP on 
many aspects that weakened the greening requirements (Bureau 
&Mahé, ch. 3; Fertő & Kovacs, ch. 15). Erjavec et al. (ch. 9) argue that 
the most important and effective opposition came from the member 
states in the Council. Sahrbacher et al. (ch. 11) also argue that on the 
issue of capping and degressivity it was the Council’s position that 
was dominant in the decision-making.  
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Yet another factor is the fact that the MFF negotiations were 
separated from the decisions on the greening details, and the 
farmers-environmental organisation coalition (see further) fell apart 
after the budget decision was made. This resulted in a no-holds-
barred, and successful attack on the greening conditions after the 
MFF budget was agreed (Matthews, ch. 8) without a strong and 
committed Commissioner to keep the coalition together and an 
institutional process that made sustaining coalitions more complex 
(Swinnen, ch. 17). The collapse of the coalition seems to have taken 
environment groups by surprise. Maybe they expected the same 
process as in 2002-03 and this time the surprise was on the ‘pro-
reform’ side, while in 2003 the surprise was on the ‘anti-reform’ side 
(Swinnen, ch. 17) or they overestimated their capacity to overturn 
the COMAGRI amendments in the plenary vote (Roederer-
Rynning, ch. 13).  
A final element is that the increase in food prices induced 
much interest and concern for global food security and gave 
ammunition to the political arguments that environmental 
regulations that would restrict agricultural production would lead 
to higher food prices and undermine EU and global food security 
(Guariso et al., 2014; Haniotis, ch. 4; and Swinnen, ch. 17).  
3. The multi-annual financial framework (MFF) 
and CAP reform 
Several authors point to the importance of the link between the MFF 
negotiations and the CAP negotiations. There are several elements. 
As Swinbank (ch. 12) explains, in 2005: “The British 
Government pressed for a new CAP reform debate, […], and in the 
European Council meeting of December 2005 secured a 
commitment for the Commission to undertake a full, wide ranging 
review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and 
of resources, including the UK rebate, to report in 2008-09.” While 
Swinbank goes on to argue that the impact of the UK government 
on the 2013 CAP decision has been very limited, it is an interesting 
hypothesis that, if it had not been for Blair and the UK government 
in 2005, there may not have been a substantial discussion and 
negotiation about a ‘CAP Reform’ as we have witnessed in 2009-13 
(although there would have been negotiations on the 2014-10 MFF). 
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The pressure to reduce CAP spending in the 2014-2020 MFF 
was reinforced by global events after 2008. The financial and 
economic crisis caused major economic and consequently 
budgetary problems for governments in all member states. It put 
pressure on budgets as tax revenues declined and demands for 
social spending (including unemployment benefits) increased 
(Haniotis, ch. 4; Swinnen et al., 2014).  
Several authors, in particular Alan Matthews in ch. 7, explain 
how the parallel negotiations of the MFF and the CAP were 
important. He identifies three linkages: 1) the need to create a 
narrative to legitimise and defend the share of the CAP budget in 
the 2014-2020 MFF (reflected in the ‘public funds for public goods‘ 
argument and coalition); 2) the compression of the time to conclude 
the CAP negotiations as the EP and the Council delayed their 
approval of their CAP mandates until the budget figures were 
decided; and 3) the inclusion of particular CAP elements by the 
European Council in the MFF (in the so-called ‘negotiation box’), 
which influenced the later CAP decision-making as EP voting on 
the MFF involved different procedures (the EP could only vote on 
the whole package without the possibility of amendments) while 
several key CAP elements were in the ‘negotiation box’ of the 
Council MFF. This particular process reduced the influence of the 
EP and enhanced the influence of the member states (through the 
European Council) on the final CAP decision.  
Matthews also argues that the second element (the shortening 
of the final negotiation phase) strengthened the hand of those 
arguing for minimal changes in the negotiations: “The insistence of 
the EP that no serious CAP negotiations should begin until the budget 
numbers are known worked to strongly favour those holding a status-quo 
oriented position on the reform proposals (for example, farm groups) while 
disadvantaging those who sought a more radical change in the orientation 
of the CAP (for example, environmental groups seeking a greater focus on 
environmental public goods).”  
A key element emphasised by several authors is that the 
months after the MFF agreement (in March 2013) were crucial in the 
CAP decision, as many of the details of the CAP, including greening 
conditions, were decided (“further watered down” as Erjavec et al. 
and Hart describe it) in these months, after the MFF was decided 
and the budget was sealed. In those months ‘public funds for public 
10  INTRODUCTION AND KEY CONCLUSIONS  
 
goods‘ was no longer as relevant for securing political support as 
the CAP budget had already been agreed. 
What is intriguing, however, from an historical perspective is 
that the timing and the approach at first sight were not so different 
from the 2003 CAP reform decision-making. Also then the EU 
budget decision preceded the CAP decision by several months.7 
Cioloş, like Fischler in 2003, established a coalition within the 
Commission that supported CAP funding if key reforms would be 
implemented. As Matthews (ch. 7) and Hart (ch. 10) explain, 
Commissioner Cioloş gained the support of the Commissioners for 
Environment and Climate Change and ultimately the College of 
Commissioners to maintain the CAP budget provided that the CAP 
would be reformed to put more emphasis on the environment and 
climate change. 
Yet the coalition between those who wanted a large CAP 
budget and those who insisted that the budget should be used in 
different ways survived during the months after the budget 
agreement in 2003 but not in 2013. Why not? Several factors seem to 
have been fundamentally different between those (months of) 
negotiations. One was the personality of the Commissioner of 
Agriculture and Rural Development and another was co-decision 
and how it changed the influence of both the EP and the Council.  
While Commissioner Fischler is widely recognised as having 
played a dominant and strategic role in the 2003 reforms, 
Commissioner Cioloş appears to have been less committed, less 
                                                        
7 The Fischler 2003 MTR (mid-term review) reforms need to be seen in 
tandem with the 2002 EU budgetary agreement. The 2003 reform 
(proposals) allowed Fischler to convince those most opposed to the CAP 
within the European Commission to agree to a much smaller budget cut 
than they had asked for. (Other Commissioners and Ministers of Finance 
targeted a 30% budget cut of the CAP.) By proposing reforms that reduced 
the negative effects of the CAP on the environment, on market distortions 
and on the WTO negotiations, and that enabled the CAP to fit within a 
concept of sustainable rural development, Fischler and his team created a 
new “legitimacy” for the CAP and a new support base which would reduce 
the ammunition of those demanding large budget cuts. In this way they 
were able to convince the Commission to table a proposal (which was later 
approved) with much more limited cuts for the next financial period (up to 
2013) than many desired (Swinnen, 2008b). 
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experienced or less politically skilled at the European level to keep 
the coalition and the reform compromise together until the end. 
Support for this conclusion also comes from Knops & Swinnen’s 
(2014) study where interviews with a series of key participants in 
the CAP negotiations pointed primarily at the crucial roles played 
by Simon Coveney, the Irish Agricultural Minister who presided 
over the negotiations during the Irish Presidency in the spring of 
2013, and by Paolo De Castro, the COMAGRI Chair, as well as some 
of the COMAGRI Rapporteurs. The more limited role played by 
Commissioner Cioloş and his cabinet is also reflected in the lack of 
association to the ‘reforms’ and his name. In the past, the 
‘MacSharry reforms‘ and the ‘Fischler reforms’ (referring both to 
Agenda 2000 and the 2003 mid-term review policy decisions) are 
generally associated with the Commissioner for Agriculture and 
Rural Development. For the 2013 reform there is no such consensus. 
In fact only one chapter in this book (Anania & Pupo D’Andrea, ch. 
2) refers consistently to ‘Cioloş’ reforms’. For most, Cioloş, who 
joined the Commission after the process had already begun, was not 
the driver of the reforms, but more a reluctant participant.  
To be fair to the Commissioner, however, one should 
emphasise that another factor was very different than in 2003: the 
changed institutional procedure. Co-decision would have reduced 
the influence of any Commissioner and given more influence to the 
EP and the Council. In these institutions, the ‘budget-for-reforms’ 
coalition was never so strong to begin with. Hence, it is an intriguing 
question whether the Fischler approach of 2003 would have been 
equally successful in the institutional environment of 2013.  
4. Does more democracy lead to a better CAP? Co-
decision and the European Parliament 
Amongst the political economy factors that shaped the 2013 CAP 
reform decision-making, the application of co-decision rules to 
agriculture certainly stands out as an important one. For the first 
time in the long-standing history of the CAP, and following the 
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European 
Parliament took full part in the decision-making of the CAP. As 
Haniotis (ch. 4) writes, “it now takes three to tango!” 
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Ex ante there were many hypotheses on how co-decision 
would influence CAP decision-making, based on theoretical 
analyses and empirical insights from other policies where co-
decision already applied. There were three key issues, all related: 
the impact on the power distribution among the European 
institutions, the impact on the ability to come to a decision (avoid 
gridlock), and the impact on the ‘reform’ of the CAP.  
Theory predicted that co-decision would imply a transfer of 
institutional powers from the European Commission to the EP and 
the member states inside the Council, but this could be mitigated by 
factors such as an unequal distribution of analytical resources 
(Crombez et al. (2012); Greer & Hind (2012)).8 Moreover, as 
mentioned above, theory and evidence from other sectors suggested 
that increased gridlock (inability to come to a political decision) 
could increase (Crombez & Hix 2014). In fact, both the likelihood 
either of gridlock or of more reform (or more status quo) crucially 
depends on the interaction of the political preferences of key 
decision-makers and the specifics of the institutional process 
(legislative rules).9 Crombez & Swinnen (2011) suggested that the 
extent to which co-decision would influence the outcome of the 2013 
CAP reform depended crucially on the structure of relative 
preferences for reform. In other words, the introduction of co-
decision could reduce the prospects for CAP reform if the EP was 
less pro-reform than the Commission or if it would influence the 
                                                        
8 Greer & Hind (2012) proposed four scenarios to describe the new inter-
institutional balance achieved with co-decision: 1) the conventional 
scenario, where the EP acquires more influence at the expense of the other 
institutions but is constrained by limited resources; 2) the Council-EP axis, 
where the Council fills the void created by the lack of EP resources; 3) the 
Commission-centric model, where the Commission manages to extend its 
influence; and finally 4) the status quo scenario, where the changes in 
decision-making rules produced stasis, a more protracted decision-making 
process that made reform more difficult by reinforcing the status quo. 
9 Crombez & Hix (2014) find empirical support that gridlock intervals are 
smaller and more legislative activity occurs under co-decision 
(consultation) when the pivotal member states and the European 
Parliament (Commission) are closer to each other. They also observe more 
activity under qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council than under 
unanimity. 
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proposals put forward by the Commission. It could also lead to 
gridlock (no policy decision) if the EP would not agree with a 
qualified majority in the Council (Crombez et al., 2012).  
Several chapters in this volume discuss the effective impact of 
the EP in detail. For example, Roederer-Rynning (ch. 13) and Knops 
& Garrone (ch. 16) analyse the EP internal dynamics; Fertő & Kovacs 
(ch. 15) and Olper & Pacca (ch. 14) analyse the importance of the 
amendments introduced by the EP in the decision-making process, 
while Knops & Swinnen (2014) discuss the overall impact of the co-
decision procedure on the CAP outcome. I refer the reader to these 
studies for details. Here I limit myself to summarise a few 
conclusions from these analyses.  
First, given the importance of the ‘political preferences’, it is 
crucial who was involved in the main debates and decisions inside 
the EP. Interestingly, the predicted impact of a broader EP interest 
in CAP issues and on the composition of COMAGRI did not emerge 
in reality. Greer & Hind (2012) suggested that co-decision could 
encourage reform by broadening the agricultural policy agenda and 
Roederer-Rynning (2003, 2010) predicted that the new rules could 
bring new people into the EP’s COMAGRI, which would affect the 
power of vested interests and could make the CAP accountable to a 
wider constituency. As Roederer-Rynning (ch. 13) explains, it was 
expected that “ideological cleavages might become more salient as 
increased EP powers in this area compelled the chamber as a whole 
and EP political groups to compete over a broad range of decisions, 
ranging from COMAGRI assignments to report allocation, through 
the institutional parameters of intra-institutional (between 
COMAGRI and other EP fora) and inter-institutional (between EP 
and other EU institutions) cooperation”.  
However, this effect seems not to have occurred in reality. 
Roederer-Rynning (ch. 13) concludes from her analysis of 
COMAGRI compositions that the COMAGRI in 2010-2014 
legislature also had close connections to the farming world: “Its 
centre of gravity lay, politically, around centre-to-right farmer-
friendly parties, and, geographically, around a group of countries 
traditionally favouring an interventionist interpretation of the 
CAP.”  
Second, regarding the nature of the EP influence, most 
authors (including those personally involved) confirm the 
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differences in preferences between the Commission and the EP. 
Appendix 1 summarises the positions of the Commission, the EP 
and the Council on specific issues (see also Fertő & Kovacs, ch. 15). 
For example, Bureau & Mahé (ch. 3) and Hart (ch. 10) argue that the 
EP (and the Council) have been a greater constraint on reforms than 
the Commission (“however prudent” the Commissioner already 
was). However, the evaluation of ‘status-quo’ versus ‘reform’ 
preferences depends strongly on the terminology used – as I already 
discussed in the first section on what ‘reform’ means. For example, 
there is a consensus (also confirmed by various authors in this book) 
that the preferences of the EP were closer to the status-quo in terms 
of environmental requirements (greening) than the Commission, 
but wanted to go further than the Commission in terms of (re-) 
introducing market regulations.  
Third, it should be emphasised that not just the EP but also 
the Council had different preferences than the Commission, and 
that on several issues the EP and the Council found common 
ground to change the Commission proposals (see the chapters by 
Bureau & Mahé, Hart, and Fertő & Kovacs, and Appendix 1)  
Fourth, Fertő & Kovacs show that the EP (often in coalition 
with the Council) had a significant influence on the final outcome. 
It played a pivotal role in the negotiations and managed to get 
almost half of its negotiating mandate into the final texts.  
Fifth, several participants in the negotiations also emphasise 
that while co-decision obviously increased the EP’s power, the 
institutional details of the new decision-making process with the 
final trilogue negotiations where no longer were all member states 
present, also significantly affected the Council’s strategy in the 
negotiations. With the Council now being ‘represented’, much of the 
member states’ lobbying occurred in a somewhat different, and 
more ‘chaotic’ way, than in the past, where member states 
themselves were part of the final decision-making. 
Sixth, co-decision did not apply equally to all issues. De 
Castro & Di Mambro (ch. 5) in particular stress the reduced 
influence of the EP on the MFF. They suggest that this may have 
been a factor in the reduction in the CAP budget, although it is 
somewhat hard to imagine how a larger CAP budget could have 
resulted. Matthews (ch. 7) explains how farm groups were 
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‘surprised and delighted’ with the original Commission proposal to 
keep the CAP budget in nominal terms.  
As explained above, there were also other effects of the MFF 
on the CAP decision through the so-called ‘negotiation box’ or 
‘MFF-related issues’. The Irish Presidency gave privileged status to 
the conclusions by the Heads of States and Governments (the 
European Council) on these issues, arguing that they were non-
negotiable. Although the EP eventually gained some concessions, 
its role as co-legislator was certainly diminished on these issues 
(Matthews, ch. 7). 
Seventh, regarding the potential for ‘gridlock’, Knops & 
Marrone (ch. 16) suggest that the most obvious answer is that, 
ultimately, “co-decision worked”; an agreement was reached and a 
new CAP entered into force. The findings of Knops & Swinnen 
(2014) also reveal a relatively high ‘mark’ given by institutional 
actors and observers of the 2013 CAP reform to describe the EP’s 
performance to come to an agreement. In the words of De Castro & 
Di Mambro (ch. 5) it is expressed as: “Done is better than perfect.”  
Finally, as discussed in Swinnen’s (ch. 17) comparison with 
the 2003 CAP reforms, a “secrecy-based type of strategy” as Fischler 
used in 2002-2003 would have been much more difficult under the 
co-decision procedures where the involvement of the EP at various 
steps made full transparency of various proposals a requirement.  
5. Eastern enlargement: Decision-making with 27 
member states10 
Eastern enlargement brought several new aspects to CAP decision-
making: it significantly increased the number of decision-makers, it 
increased the heterogeneity of Europe and its agricultural and food 
systems, it introduced a set of different policy preferences into the 
political negotiations and it changed the relative political weights of 
all member states. 
One of the obvious policy areas was the demand from the new 
member states (NMS) for a more equal distribution of direct 
payments across member states (the so-called ‘external 
convergence‘ of payments). Existing differences in direct payments 
                                                        
10 Croatia became the 28th EU member state on 1 July 2013. 
16  INTRODUCTION AND KEY CONCLUSIONS  
 
(DPs) could be partly justified by differences in incomes and 
(historical) productivity (as they had been during the accession 
negotiations) but were obviously also due to the fact that the NMS 
were not at the table when the key budgetary and DP decisions were 
made in 2002 and 2003. Clearly, now that the NMS were part of the 
EU and part of the CAP decision-making process where the future 
DPs were to be decided, the demand for external DP convergence 
was a key demand. However, an intriguing issue is how it seems to 
have played less of a role in the debates than one would have 
expected.  
There are several hypotheses to explain this (Swinnen, ch. 17). 
The first is that the old member states (OMS) realised that the 
distribution of 2003 was unfair for the NMS and indefensible, and it 
was more of an issue of “how much” than “if”. The second 
argument is that with the pressure to reduce the overall reduction 
of the DPs, several of the NMS were more focused on lobbying for 
the maintenance of the overall DP budget. Several NMS would be 
close to a new EU average under a reduced DP budget and were 
more worried that they would actually experience a reduction in 
their DPs because of the overall budget cut, rather than a gain from 
redistribution. The countries that were most disadvantaged in DPs 
were the Baltic states – and they lobbied intensely for a 
redistribution. The ultimate reallocation benefited them most.  
Another argument is that several NMS governments were 
under pressure from their farm lobbies to fight against capping. This 
applied in particular to those with a large share of (very) large 
farms, such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Hence, these 
governments spent their political capital more on lobbying for 
maintaining the amount of DPs and for avoiding capping (see e.g. 
ch. 11 by Sahrbacher et al. and Sahrbacher et al. (2014)).  
A fourth argument is that, while the NMS were receiving 
relatively lower DPs under the agricultural policy, if one compared 
the DP share to their share in gross value added (GVA) in 
agriculture, the gap had reduced significantly and the share of DPs 
in GVA for the NMS was close to that in the OMS. Moreover, NMS 
were increasingly benefiting from large EU transfers under the CAP 
Pillar II and structural and cohesion fund (SCF) support. Hence, 
from an overall budgetary support perspective, their position was 
quite different than when considering the DPs alone. Total EU 
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support under the CAP and SCF was equivalent to around 0.6% of 
GDP in the OMS, but had risen from 1.7% in 2008 to 4% in 2013 in 
the NMS (see Figure 2 in Swinnen, ch. 17). 
Hence, obviously, all these elements of the EU support were 
taken into account when discussing the political priorities, and 
when trade-offs needed to be made in the final political 
negotiations. At the end, countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Romania saw their national DP ceilings increase 
significantly, while the other NMS either had no significant change 
or a small decline (see also Anania & Pupo D’Andrea, ch. 2). 
6. Flexibility  
One of the areas where there is consensus among all authors is the 
significantly increased flexibility at the member-state level on the 
implementation of the CAP. While the 2003 Fischler reforms gave 
the EU-15 member states the possibility to decide how to implement 
the SPS (using a national or regional model, and a flat, historical or 
hybrid approach) and on some implementation issues of partially 
decoupled support, the new CAP provides an “unprecedented 
amount of national flexibility for MS” as Matthews (ch. 19) states 
it.11 More specifically, as Anania & Pupo d’Andrea explain, the 2013 
decision “allowed member states to decide which of the voluntary 
direct payments to activate, the distribution of the overall amount 
of financial resources across the different direct payments (with the 
exception of those to be devoted to the ‘green’ payment), the criteria 
to be satisfied for a farm to have access to them, important elements 
of the implementation of the ‘green’ payment, the extent and the 
modalities of the redistribution of support between the farms within 
the country (as a result of their decisions regarding ‘internal 
convergence’, ‘degressivity and capping’ and the redistributive 
payment), and the distribution between the two pillars of the overall 
financial resources allocated to the country”, which leads to 
“significantly different agricultural policies at the national level.”  
                                                        
11 In some countries the decision is shifted to the regions: in the United 
Kingdom independent decisions were taken in England, Wales, Northern 
Ireland and Scotland; similarly, in Belgium, separate decisions were taken 
by Flanders and Wallonia. 
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This ‘flexibility’ contributed to important uncertainties at the 
end of the EU-level negotiations about the actual outcome of the 
decision-making. Key issues in the flexibility were the amount of 
recoupling which will result (as a result of the provisions on 
voluntary recoupling at the MS level); how much ‘greening‘ will 
result (as a result of the provisions on environmental 
conditionalities at the MS level); and how much shifting between 
Pillar I and Pillar II would take place. Many authors point at these 
complexities, and the fact that the flexibility has major implications 
for assessing the outcome of the CAP decisions.  
Conceptually a potential benefit of flexibility is that it allows 
the implementation of general rules to be better adapted to an 
increasingly heterogeneous EU agriculture, a heterogeneity that has 
increased by Eastern enlargement (Buckwell, ch. 20). Bureau & 
Mahé (ch. 3) agree that, from a fiscal federalism perspective, this 
could (in principle) allow a better application of general principles 
to local needs and conditions. However, the disadvantage, which is 
often emphasised, is that it allows member states to make choices 
that undermine (or water down) the general principle of the 
regulations. This concern is raised on the one hand, particularly in 
relation to greening and decoupling, by those who are concerned 
about the growth of re-coupling and the minimal impact of greening 
requirements. Conversely, farmers are worried about the uneven 
playing field and that their administration may be ‘gold-plating’ the 
regulations by imposing higher standards on them than on their 
competitors. 
In general, the judgment on whether flexibility is good or bad 
seems to depend on what people think member states will do with 
it; in other words whether they trust or distrust the national 
decision-makers to choose the type of implementation that they 
prefer. A more general concern is whether increased flexibility and 
national or regional policy fragmentation may undermine the single 
market.  
In Chapter 2 Anania & Pupo d’Andrea (see their Table 4) and 
in Chapter 11 Sahrbacher et al. (ch. 11) try to make a first assessment 
of the member states’ choices on flexibility in financial allocations 
and on capping and degressivity, respectively. Both find significant 
heterogeneity in how the new CAP will be implemented in the 
member states by 2019. They conclude that some countries have 
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used the flexibility fully in order to regionalise payment levels, 
transfer funds between pillars, couple support to production, and 
impose capping, while other member states have not. 
A key question is why the decision was taken to provide so 
much flexibility in the CAP implementation. There are several 
interpretations/explanations. The first is that with significant 
diversity in the nature of the agricultural and land systems in the 
EU, which increased even further with the eastern and central 
European enlargement, there is a need for flexibility in the 
implementation of the policies. The 2014-2020 CAP addresses this 
by allowing “tailor-made alterations” to make the CAP better fit the 
characteristics of the different agricultural systems (Anania & Pupo 
d’Andrea, ch. 2; Buckwell, ch. 20). A second interpretation is that 
the increased complexity of the decision-making process, both in 
terms of the number of member states involved (27 compared to 15 
during the 2003 reform decision) and the participation of more 
institutions (in particular the EP), required these flexible elements 
to come to a political agreement (Haniotis, ch. 4).  
Both explanations need not be exclusive or conflicting. It is 
well known from the political science literature that decision-
making with more and more heterogeneous partners may lead to 
the failure of decision-makers to come to an agreement (see e.g. 
Crombez & Hix, 2014), which led Crombez et al. (2013) to suggest 
that gridlock in CAP decisions could become a real possibility in the 
new circumstances (i.e. with 27 countries and EP co-decision). 
Hence flexibility may have been a rational choice made by the 
decision-makers to reach an agreement. This conclusion is 
consistent with the findings of Olper & Pacca (ch. 14) who find that 
voting by members of the EP (MEPs) on the CAP amendments is 
more likely to be along preferences of member state than along 
party lines.  
If so, this may have important implications for future CAP 
decision-making and reforms. Flexibility may become a permanent 
part of the CAP, caused by the need to come to political decisions in 
an increasingly heterogeneous EU. However, if the complexity and 
unfamiliarity with the new decision-procedures was a key factor, 
experience with the co-decision process may reduce the need for 
flexibility in the implementation. 
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7. Agricultural and food price changes and the 
CAP 
Several chapters (including by Haniotis (ch. 4), and De Castro & Di 
Mambo (ch. 5)) emphasise the role that the food price increases 
played in the debate. It is well known in the political economy 
literature that changes in commodity prices and market revenues 
influence agricultural and food policies (Anderson et al., 2013; 
Swinnen, 1994). Such economic changes alter the political incentives 
for interest groups and for political decision-makers. More 
specifically, agricultural and food policies shift as prices move since 
the incentives to lobby governments, and the incentives for 
governments to respond, change when economic conditions 
change. In other words, when prices increase, producers turn to the 
market to increase their incomes and when prices fall, producers 
turn to governments to assist them, and vice versa for consumers. 
This has been documented in many countries and historical periods 
(e.g. Olper, 1998; Swinnen, 2009), and the recent period of price 
spikes was no exception: in many countries of the world, the food 
price changes triggered policy reactions with food exporters 
imposing export taxes or outright bans (Anderson & Martin, 2010; 
Pieters & Swinnen, 2014).  
The changes in food prices have affected various interest 
groups in the EU, including producers and consumers, and this has 
resulted in policy reactions through the political process. While 
there were significant differences between commodities (e.g. dairy 
and livestock farmers suffered from higher feed prices), average 
farm incomes in 2011-2012 were 20-30% higher compared to 2008-
2009 (Swinnen, ch. 17). Several authors argue that the food price 
changes influenced the political equilibrium on the CAP decision-
making on different aspects: the budget; the environmental 
conditions on farm support, i.e. greening, and the nature of the farm 
support, i.e. market regulation or decoupled payments. These issues 
are obviously interrelated to some extent.  
  In terms of the budget, theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence suggest that there would be a shift towards less support 
for farmers as prices for their products and their market incomes 
increase. While this is consistent with the reduction in the CAP 
budget, the reduction in the budget is relatively limited. One reason 
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for this, as already explained above, is most likely the link with the 
proposed greening reforms that still existed (albeit in a limited 
form) going into the MFF negotiations. Another reason is probably 
the fact that, while average farm incomes increased, some farm 
groups (in particular dairy and livestock farmers) suffered from the 
increase in grain and feed prices. Their incomes fell significantly 
over the 2007-2012 period. CAP support was argued to be an 
important safety net for those sectors with declining incomes.  
The impact on environmental regulations is a combination of 
several partial effects (Swinnen, ch. 17). The first effect is that as 
farmers earn more for their production with higher prices the 
impact of increased regulations on their welfare is smaller and 
therefore they may reduce their opposition to increased regulations. 
However, this partial effect is more than offset by two other effects. 
One is that with increasing prices for their products, farmers have 
more to lose from regulations that restrict their supply. This will 
induce them to oppose such regulations more strongly. The third 
effect is that the argument of environmental regulations as 
threatening food security through restrictions on the supply of 
agricultural production becomes more credible and creates a 
coalition of producers and food consumers, already hurt by high 
prices. In this way the food price increases contributed to the 
weakening of the greening requirements. 
8. A return to market interventions?  
Food price shocks also affected the debate on market regulations. 
There was significant pressure to re-introduce market regulations, 
in particular with increased price volatility. For example, COPA-
COGECA (2011), the coalition of the main EU farmers' 
organisations, argued that, despite high prices, farmers are losers 
because of volatility, high input prices and “food chain imbalances”. 
They and other interest groups asked for a return to 
interventionism, moving away from the long-term liberalisation 
strategy for the CAP – an argument that found support in the EP 
(see De Castro & Di Mambro, ch. 5). In contrast, the European 
Commission used price volatility as a motivation for the long-run 
market-oriented strategy in the CAP reform proposals, in particular 
to maintain the decoupled CAP payments as a safety net to protect 
farmers against price volatility. These different perspectives on 
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what was the best policy strategy were visible at various moments 
(e.g. during the discussions on the sugar quota and on the document 
“A Better Functioning Food Supply Chain in Europe”, regarding 
relationships between the CAP and competition policy rules – see 
Swinnen, ch. 17).  
By the end of the legislative process, the Commission 
proposals in this area had been significantly amended but 
nonetheless substantially adopted (Matthews, 2014). Anania & 
Pupo d’Andrea (ch. 4) conclude that an evaluation of the CAP from 
the perspective of a further market orientation shows mixed results: 
the elimination of the sugar and milk quota was confirmed, but on 
the other hand the liberalisation of vine planting was reversed, there 
was an increased amount of coupled support, and competition laws 
had been waived to allow some producer actions to constrain 
supply. Bureau & Mahé (ch. 3) conclude: “The Commission 
managed to resist most of the bad ideas floating around … some of 
which could have been particularly damaging, in particular 
regarding market management and price support.” Swinbank (ch. 
8) concludes: “What is perhaps more surprising – given that the 
[WTO] Doha agreement has not yet locked-in past CAP reforms -- 
is that the EU did not significantly reverse its policy decisions of the 
last decades.”  
While the WTO was not (or not often) mentioned in this 
debate, one could hypothesise that the WTO played an important 
role in the background. Alan Swinbank (ch. 8) documents that in the 
Commission’s 2010 Communication “The CAP towards 2020”, in 
the EP’s response to that document, and in the Commission’s 2011 
Impact Assessment, which accompanied the 2011 CAP proposals, 
WTO constraints and green box compatibility were raised at several 
places to motivate certain proposals (see Swinbank, ch. 8 for details).  
In summary, during the price spikes, the EU has a) mostly 
reaffirmed the engagement of the EU towards an open trade policy 
– also by underlining the harm done by the restrictive export 
policies implemented by some countries in response to price 
volatility - and b) stayed mostly on course with its reform proposals 
in specific sectors such as dairy and sugar (phasing out the quota 
regime), despite a slight change in argumentation, i.e. by also 
linking the motivation to price volatility. That said, there is a 
significant amount of recoupling allowed, which is to be 
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determined at the member-state level (member states’ choice of 
decoupling vary between 0% and 21% -- see Table 4 of Anania & 
Pupo D’Andrea). Moreover, not all sectors stayed on course to 
liberalisation. A return to regulation is obvious in the EU’s wine 
policy, where the 2008 decision to liberalise the vineyard planting 
rights system was overturned and a new set of regulations on 
planting rights introduced before the liberalisation was 
implemented (Deconinck & Swinnen, 2013; Meloni & Swinnen, 
2015).12  
9. A perfect storm in the economy but an 
imperfect storm in the politics of the CAP 
In 2000-03, institutional, economic and political factors came 
together to create a ‘perfect storm’, which resulted in the radical 
Mid-Term Review or ‘Fischler reforms’ (Swinnen, 2008). The factors 
included the institutional introduction of qualified majority voting, 
large external changes that moved policy preferences in a pro-
reform direction and a pro-reform agenda-setter, the European 
Commission (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011).13 In addition, key internal 
changes in the EU and its institutions had given the chance for 
reform a boost and the Commission itself was strongly in favour of 
significant reforms.  
The 2008-13 period was characterised by something like a 
perfect storm in international markets and the economy. From 2008 
onwards, prices of agricultural and energy commodities peaked, 
followed soon thereafter by financial and economic turmoil, which 
created major upheavals in commodity markets, government 
budgets and the world’s economies, also inside the EU. However, 
this did not translate into reinforced pressures for reforms. While 
these economic developments had a significant impact on the CAP 
debate, they did not necessarily reinforce the existing pressures; 
                                                        
12 There is a ‘return to regulation’ in terms of policy decisions, but less for 
farmers or consumers since the decision to liberalise was not yet 
implemented before the reversal of the decision was made.  
13 See Pokrivcak et al. (2006) for the conditions for a ‘pro-reform bias’ in the 
EU under qualified majority voting. 
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sometimes the opposite happened. In addition, a series of 
institutional changes politically mitigated the pressures.  
As explained earlier in this chapter, decision-makers faced 
several pressures and constraints. Those included pressure to 
reduce the budget for farm payments because of fiscal pressures and 
the need to fund other EU policies, and high agricultural prices; a 
demand from NMS (and particularly the Baltics, where payments 
were lowest) for more equal distribution of direct payments; 
pressure for a return to market intervention and regulation in 
response to increased agricultural price volatility; ‘productionist’ 
arguments not to impose (environmental) constraints on 
agricultural production with high food prices; and (future) WTO 
agreements that constrained market interventions.14 
Overall these pressures and constraints were a complex 
mixture – not unlike the situation in the early 2000s (Swinnen, 2001, 
2008b), albeit with different ingredients. However, the 2003 set of 
complex pressures turned into a significant reform path, with a clear 
strategic vision on the part of the agenda-setters of where to go, a 
well thought-out tactic of how to get there and an institutional 
process that was conducive to such outcome. This was different in 
the 2009-2013 CAP discussions. While, like in 2002-03, an attempt 
was made to create a coalition between keeping payments for 
farmers (farm organisations) in exchange for better targeting 
(economists) and more environmental benefits (ecologists), the 
attempt was not successful. While there is a reduction in real terms, 
the budget for the CAP was largely saved, but without significant 
new greening requirements. As explained above, the environmental 
requirements are generally assessed as minimal.  
There were probably several reasons for the failure: a less 
committed and less strategic Commission, the reduced influence of 
the Commission with co-decision and better preparation and 
lobbying strategies by those who opposed further reforms. The 
opposition by farm organisations received extra ammunition as 
commodity price increases gave strength to the ‘productionist’ 
argument that the food supply should not be constrained by extra 
regulations – an argument that found much support in the Council 
                                                        
14 See Josling (ch. 18) for an explanation of why the ongoing TTIP 
negotiations had little impact on the CAP.  
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and the EP’s COMAGRI and that had a decisive impact on the final 
decision. 
Regarding market regulations, the increased price volatility 
induced demands for more regulation, including the maintenance 
of supply controls in dairy and sugar. However, DG-AGRI and the 
Commission motivated their support for DPs as a safety net 
approach – an insurance against volatility, and one in line with the 
decades-long strategy towards liberalisation – consistent with the 
WTO constraints and possible future accords. Here, despite some 
re-coupling, the status quo was seen as a possible achievement by 
those favouring the CAP’s market orientation.  
Eastern enlargement enhanced the influence of the NMS and 
led to a reduction of the gap in direct payments per hectare, 
particularly in the Baltics (where DPs were the lowest). However, 
the redistribution was limited because the NMS already benefited 
strongly from various other transfers such as Pillar II payments and 
structural and cohesion funds – in particular in relation to their 
contribution to value added and GDP. 
There were some changes in other CAP elements. 
Importantly, the new CAP offers considerably more flexibility for 
member states in the implementation of several regulations, 
including that related to coupling of direct payments, greening 
conditions, the allocation of funds between Pillar I and II and in 
capping and degressivity. 
In summary, the 2013 CAP decision included a budget cut, 
some realignment of DPs from west to east, increased flexibility in 
the implementation of the policies and the allocation of funds, and 
relatively minor changes in environmental and market regulations. 
However, the overall assessment is closer to a status-quo evaluation 
than a significant reform. The different pressures and institutional 
changes had partially offset instead of reinforced each other. In 
other words, the perfect storm in international markets resulted in 
an ‘imperfect storm’ in the political economy of the CAP, and 
relatively small changes in the CAP.  
10. The next CAP reform  
Several chapters in this volume already address the next CAP 
changes. Allan Buckwell (ch. 20) argues that “it isn’t too early to 
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start thinking about the next reform”, despite the fact that the full 
implementation of the new CAP only commenced in 2015 and runs 
until the end of 2020 and new Rural Development Programmes may 
not commence until well into 2016. Also Potočnik (ch. 6), Erjavec et 
al. (ch. 9), Matthews (ch. 19) and Moehler (ch. 21) already discuss 
the next CAP reform negotiations. They mention several reasons 
why they may start earlier rather than later: a) with co-decision it 
takes a long time to prepare and negotiate; b) a genuine reform 
requires a broad, shared understanding of the purpose and 
direction of a new policy; c) implementation problems with the new 
CAP will ask for adjustments of the rules which cannot wait until 
2020; d) the new CAP does not address the challenges that the EU 
faces; and e) the mid-term review of the multiannual financial 
framework during 2016 and the mandated reviews of ecological 
focus areas, the fruit and vegetable regime and geographical 
indications will raise questions central to the CAP in the next few 
years.  
The arguments put forward by e.g. Buckwell, Erjavec, 
Moehler, Matthews and Potočnik on how the next reforms of the 
CAP should look like are similar to the ones that were voiced in the 
2009-2013 discussions. In fact, the ideas for the future CAP that they 
put forward are remarkably similar to those on the table in the past 
reform discussions. In a way one could argue that they want to start 
the next CAP reforms to address all the issues that they feel the 2013 
decision failed to address and to solve.  
From a political economy perspective, however, this of course 
raises the question why should these arguments be more influential 
in the coming years than they were in the past. It is obvious to most 
observers that climate change, sustainability, biodiversity, etc. are 
crucial issues and that the CAP has an important role to play. But 
the question is: Why would public goods like climate change, 
biodiversity and sustainability be more relevant/important in 2017 
than they were (or should have been) in 2013?  
The contributors to this volume offer some reasons why 
things may be different in the coming years. One factor is that there 
is a different Commission. Not only has Mr Cioloş been replaced by 
Mr Hogan as Agriculture and Rural Development Commissioner, 
but there is a new overall Commission charged with pursing a new 
vision. One illustration of this is that Commission President Jean-
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Claude Juncker gave a mandate to Hogan15 to simplify the CAP, 
although this is easier said than done. Moehler (ch. 21) notes that 
simplification was already the objective of Cioloş, and the CAP has 
definitely not become simpler (Haniotis, ch. 4). Matthews also 
quotes Hogan: “Simplification is anything but simple.” That said, 
Hogan has already raised the possibility of a mid-term review 
(Matthews, ch. 19), although the need for this has been rejected by 
some member states and by the farm organisations.  
Another factor may be what happens in global agricultural 
markets, an issue that is difficult to predict. Prices are much lower 
in 2015 than during the peaks in 2008 and 2010, but it is hard to 
predict where they will be in the coming years. At the broader 
international level, there are geopolitical threats in particular in 
North Africa, the Middle East and Ukraine. Also here it is unclear 
how they will evolve and what they will imply for the CAP. 
It seems important to take the political economy constraints 
seriously. One illustration of this is that those who have different 
perspectives and policy preferences from the authors listed above 
may also see the next CAP debate as an opportunity to “correct 
some imperfections”. It is quite clear from the contributions in this 
volume that while many expect a mid-term review to happen in the 
coming years, not everybody agrees what direction it should take. 
It is intriguing to see the differences in perspective by e.g. Buckwell, 
Matthews and Potočnik on the one hand – who see it as a chance to 
move forward in the “public money for public goods” perspective 
– and that of De Castro & Di Mambro (ch. 5), on the other, who 
argue that the “reform designed in 2011 and amended in 2013 needs 
further adjustments to be considered a valid attempt to meet the 
challenges posed by the changes occurring in agricultural and food 
sector at European and global level”. Their analysis suggests that 
these further adjustments would be to have more supply 
management and regulation of markets. Moehler (ch. 21) anticipates 
these different perspectives and concludes: “There is no apparent 
need for a mid-term review. Launching such review could be 
counterproductive if the movement is seized by those who push for 
a less market oriented CAP.” 
                                                        
15 European Commission (2014).  
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Moehler (ch. 21) concludes that there is no obvious need for a 
mid-term review of the 2014-2020 CAP, but the Commission has to 
submit its ideas on a post-2020 CAP when making its proposal on 
the MFF 2021-27 in 2017. He argues that “to win over public opinion 
again, further greening of the CAP will be crucial” – an argument 
that sounds very familiar.  
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2. THE 2013 REFORM OF THE 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY 
GIOVANNI ANANIA AND 
MARIA ROSARIA PUPO D’ANDREA* 
1. Introduction 
The common agricultural policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) 
has been undergoing continuous reform since the early 1980s. 
Hence, before getting into the changes which have been introduced 
in 2013, it would be useful to place the recent CAP reform in a long-
term perspective. 
After a series of sector-specific policy adjustments (including 
the introduction of production quotas for sugar and milk, voluntary 
set aside and ‘automatic stabilisers’ aimed at keeping budget 
expenditure in each sector within predetermined limits), which 
have often been decided under strong contingent budgetary 
pressure, the first structural change in the CAP occurred in 1992 
with the MacSharry reform, named after the commissioner for 
agriculture at the time. This reform, among other things, 
significantly reduced price support for meats and arable crops and 
introduced partially decoupled ‘compensatory’ payments, linking a 
significant portion of CAP support to land allocation, rather than 
production, to ‘what’, rather than to ‘how much’ a farm produced.  
The 1999 Agenda 2000 reform moved the changes introduced 
with the MacSharry reform one step ahead by further decreasing 
price support for beef and arable crops, increasing partially 
                                                        
* We wish to thank Jean-Christophe Bureau, Louis-Pascal Mahé, Alan 
Matthews and Jo Swinnen for their helpful comments on an earlier version 
of the chapter. Senior authorship is equally shared. 
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decoupled ‘compensatory’ payments, increasing milk quotas and 
reducing price support for dairy products. When the Agenda 2000 
reform was introduced, a decision was made to conduct a ‘mid-term 
review’ of its effectiveness. At the time nobody anticipated that this 
mid-term review could become the most important step ever in the 
reform process of the CAP: the June 2003 Fischler reform. The main 
element of the Fischler reform was the introduction of the Single 
Payment Scheme (SPS). In simple terms, every farm was to receive 
a yearly payment equal to the average yearly direct payments for 
arable crops and meats it had received in the 2000-02 reference 
period (plus, subsequently, those decided, but not immediately 
implemented, for milk). This ‘single payment’ was independent not 
only from ‘how much’ the farm produced, but also from ‘what’ it 
produced, so long as the land used each year to claim the single 
payment was either farmed to produce anything apart from fruit, 
vegetables and permanent crops or was left idle (subject to ‘cross-
compliance’, i.e. conditional on the farm complying with the 
minimum environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards 
mandated by a number of regulations already in force, and to 
maintaining the land in good agricultural and environmental 
condition).  
EU-15 member states were given the option, often referred to 
as ‘regionalisation’, of distributing the overall amount of support by 
paying all farmers in a given ‘region’ the same flat per hectare 
amount.1 Where the option to have the single payment based on 
farm-specific historical payments was chosen instead, the effect was 
a ‘freeze’ of the historical distribution of support at the farm level; 
where the ‘regionalisation’ option was used, a redistribution of 
support among farms in any given ‘region’ took place. The UK, 
Finland and Germany decided to progressively adopt the 
‘regionalisation’ option, while Denmark and Sweden opted for a 
hybrid system (part of the single payment was based on farm-
specific historical entitlements, part was a flat per hectare payment). 
In the 10 member states which entered the EU in 2004 the Single 
                                                        
1 It might be worth recalling that the ‘regionalisation’ option was not part of 
the proposal put forward by Commissioner Fischler (who actually opposed 
it, on the grounds that introducing both decoupling and a redistribution of 
support at once was too much of a change for farmers), but it was eventually 
included under the pressure of certain member states.  
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Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) was to be applied, with a flat per 
hectare payment to all farmers.  
Between 2003 and 2008 the Common Market Organisations 
(CMOs) for olive oil, tobacco, cotton, sugar, fruit and vegetables, 
and bananas were reformed, extending to these sectors the 
principles introduced under the 2003 Fischler reform; existing direct 
payments were ‘decoupled’ and included in the single payment.  
At this point, many thought that the CAP reform process 
would be put on hold for some time, while the Fischler reforms were 
being fully implemented (for dairy this was to occur in 2008-09) so 
as to leave enough time for them to show their effects. Yet, based on 
a number of ‘review clauses’ which were included in the final 
agreement in 2003 as well as in other subsequent reforms since then, 
in 2007 Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel launched an initiative 
to perform a CAP ‘Health Check’ (European Commission, 2007). 
The initiative led to the November 2008 decision to further reform 
the CAP; it is fair to say that the Health Check essentially completed 
the Fischler reform process by: decoupling virtually all direct 
payments still in place; progressively expanding milk quotas, with 
the aim of making them no longer binding by 2015 (and a view to 
eliminating them at that point); eliminating mandatory set aside; 
doubling the percentage of ‘modulation’, i.e. the transfer of financial 
resources from direct payments to farms to rural development 
policies; eliminating – or further limiting, depending on the 
commodity – minimum price support provided through market 
withdrawals (‘intervention’); and giving member states, once more, 
the possibility to regionalise direct payments. 
This long series of policy changes was by no means marginal, 
either in terms of the reduction in support, or in terms of the 
reduction of the distortionary effects of the CAP. By decoupling 
CAP support they induced a market reorientation of domestic 
prices and production decisions by EU farmers and, as a result, a 
marked reduction in the domestic and world market distortions 
caused by the CAP. They also helped reduce the pressure of 
agricultural production in the EU on the environment and increased 
the efficiency of farm income support, by linking it to the carrying 
out of ‘farming and land management activities’.  
Figure 2.1 shows the changes in the amount and composition 
of CAP expenditure (in nominal terms) by its main policy measures 
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between 1980 and 2014. From 1980 to 1992 CAP expenditure, which 
at the time was largely used to generate fully coupled support, 
increased rapidly; the MacSharry reform in 1992 and Agenda 2000 
in 1999 introduced, and then increased, ‘partially decoupled’ direct 
payments and severely reduced the use of policy instruments 
providing market price support; as a consequence of the reduction 
in market price support, export subsidy expenditure declined as 
well. Over the same years there was a gradual expansion of the 
financial resources devoted to rural development policies. With the 
Fischler reform most of the direct payments were replaced by 
decoupled ones; the further market reorientation of domestic prices, 
in turn, induced a further reduction in expenditure for market 
intervention policy instruments and export subsidies. The overall 
expenditure for the CAP in nominal terms increased over time, 
albeit at a declining rate (since the early 1990s it had been falling as 
a percentage of EU GNI); however, in assessing the growth of CAP 
expenditure one should not forget that, over the same period, the 
EU expanded from 10 members to 12 (1986), 15 (1995), 25 (2004), 27 
(2007) and 28 (2013). 
Figure 2.1 Evolution of CAP expenditure between 1980 and 2014 
 
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development, European 
Commission. 
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Figure 2.2 shows changes in CAP support in the almost 25 
years between 1986-88 and 2010-12 – from before the MacSharry 
reform of 1992 to before the 2013 Cioloş reform – using three 
indicators calculated annually by OECD (OECD, various years): the 
per cent Producer Support Estimate (%PSE); the per cent Consumer 
Support Estimate (%CSE); and the sum of the most production- and 
trade-distorting forms of support as a share of the PSE.2 The figure 
clearly shows the effects of the successive reforms of the CAP in the 
period considered. These resulted in a reduction of the support 
provided to farmers (from 39% of gross farm receipts to 19%),3 in a 
large reduction of the implicit taxation of consumers, as a result of 
the reorientation away from market price support policy 
instruments (for every euro EU consumers spent on food, calculated 
at farm gate prices, the implicit taxation due to agricultural policies 
dropped from 36 to 3 cents), and in a reduction of the distortionary 
effect of the CAP on production and trade, as a result of its re-
instrumentation (the share of the support linked to the most 
distortionary policy instruments declined from 96% to 32%). 
Clearly, changes in the CAP were relatively more pronounced in 
terms of the reduction of its distortionary effects and of the implicit 
taxation of consumers, than in terms of the reduction in farm 
support, although the latter was certainly significant. 
                                                        
2 The %PSE is “the annual monetary value of gross transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm 
gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture” as a share 
of gross farm receipts. The %CSE is “the annual monetary value of gross 
transfers to (from) consumers of agricultural commodities, measured at the 
farm gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture” as 
a share of consumer expenditure on agricultural commodities (at farm gate 
prices); “if negative, the CSE measures the implicit tax placed on 
consumers by agricultural price policies”. “Most production- and trade-
distorting forms of support” are given here by “support based on 
commodity output” and “payments based on input use”, as defined by the 
OECD. 
3 In more recent years this is also the result of the sharp rise in world market 
prices. 
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Figure 2.2 Evolution of EU CAP support between 1986-88 and 2010-12 
 
Source: OECD (various years). 
The reform process of the CAP, from the early 1980s up to the 
decisions taken in 2013, shows a series of consistent steps in the 
same direction: a reduction in the support provided to farmers, a 
market reorientation of agricultural prices and the significant 
reduction of the use of policy instruments diverting farm decisions 
away from market signals. In the CAP before the Cioloş reform a 
large portion of expenditure was absorbed by decoupled direct 
payments, which accounted for 70% of the budget for the CAP and 
30% of the overall budget of the EU. The payment received by each 
farm had no link either with its income or with the income of the 
farm household, i.e. had no relation with a farmer’s need for being 
supported. If the CAP was meant to be an income support policy, 
an equitable and effective policy would have made direct payments 
inversely proportional to farm (or household) income and would 
have limited them only to those in need. The direct payment a farm 
received was linked neither to the amount of public goods it 
produced nor to the cost of producing them. If the goal was to 
promote the production by farms of public goods, such as 
environmental goods or the preservation and management of 
valuable rural landscapes, then direct payments should have been 
part of a contractual commitment by the farm to deliver specific 
services, or goods, carrying public value or, less effectively, they 
should have been determined on a flat per hectare basis in exchange 
for compliance with demanding standards, applied to all farms, 
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related to sustainable resource management and the provision of 
public goods. Nor did direct payments bear any relation with the 
contribution of the farm to the socio-economic viability of the area 
it was located in, given that they were not linked, for example, to 
the amount of labour the farm employed or the quality of its 
products.4  
The truth is that the CAP prior to the 2013 Cioloş reform was 
much better than the CAP of the past, but it still distributed an 
extremely large amount of financial resources without a clear, 
coherent set of goals. At the outset and in the early stages of the 
debate on the new reform of the CAP many believed the challenge 
this time was to design a public policy for agriculture and rural 
development in the EU which effectively addressed the concerns of 
both the sector itself and the society at large (Bureau & Mahé, 2008; 
Bureau & Witzke, 2010; Cooper et al., 2009; Hofreither et al., 2009; 
Swinnen, 2009). 
The decisions made in the 2013 reform of the CAP took place 
under rules which were radically different from those of the past. 
While previous CAP reform decisions had been taken by the 
Council of Agricultural Ministers, the Lisbon Treaty5 made them 
subject to a fairly complicated co-decision process, involving both 
the Council and the European Parliament, with the Commission 
being assigned the role of producing the initial proposal and then 
acting as a facilitator for the required convergence of the other two 
institutions on a common text. While the Parliament, for the 
decisions on the CAP, now has the power to propose amendments 
to the texts being discussed, in the case of the co-decision by the 
Parliament and the European Council regarding the multiannual 
financial framework (MFF) the Parliament can only approve or 
reject the proposal as a whole, without the possibility to propose 
changes. This means that the two procedures not only involve 
different rules, but also different political processes. In the case of 
the MFF the process is simpler, the European Council is given more 
power and the negotiation on the details are kept away from the 
                                                        
4 Analyses of the CAP in place before the 2013 reform and of its past reform 
process are provided in OECD (2011) and Sorrentino et al. (2011). 
5 The Lisbon Treaty was signed in December 2007 and entered into force on 
1 December 2009, after being ratified by all member states. 
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arenas where sectorial interests are likely to be more influential (the 
preparatory work is conducted within the Council of General 
Affairs (Ministers of Foreign or European Affairs), while the final 
decision is for the European Council (heads of state or 
government)). The new co-decision rules for the CAP and those in 
place for the MFF resulted, as expected, in a crucial shaping of the 
2013 decisions on the new EU policies for agriculture and rural 
development (Matthews, 2015). As will be discussed in the next 
section, the decisions regarding the MFF included not only the 
financial allocation to the CAP for the 2014-20 period, but also many 
important elements of the policies themselves, in an attempt to keep 
some of the decisions to be made in the hands of actors less subject 
to the political pressure of the most powerful among the 
stakeholders involved.  
The decision process turned out to be quite long, longer than 
in previous reforms, from the launch by the Commission in April 
2010 of a ‘public debate’ on the new CAP, to the formal adoption by 
the Council of the four basic Regulations introducing the reformed 
CAP on 16 December 2013, following their approval by the 
European Parliament in November. 
2. The 2014-20 MFF 
After more than two years of negotiations, on 2 December 2013, the 
Council adopted the Regulation laying down the MFF,6 i.e. the 
annual ceilings for the financial resources allocated to the ‘political 
priorities’ of the European Union for the period 2014-20.  
Total financial resources allocated in the MFF for the EU-28 
equal just under €960 billion (at 2011 prices), corresponding to 1% 
of its gross national income (GNI) (Table 2.1). In real terms this 
allocation is 3.5% lower than that in the 2007-13 MFF, when the 
member states numbered 27. If the comparison between the two 
financial allocations takes into account the change in the 
composition of the EU, i.e. excludes from the allocation of the 2014-
20 MFF the sums to be spent in Croatia, then the reduction for the 
EU-27 member states is by 4.8%. This is the first time an EU financial 
framework includes less financial resources than the previous one.  
                                                        
6 Regulation 1311/2013. 
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Two headings alone, headings 1 (‘Smart and inclusive 
growth’) and 2 (‘Sustainable growth: natural resources’), absorb 
almost 86% of the financial resources in the 2014-20 MFF. Heading 
1, which includes actions to promote ‘Competitiveness for growth 
and jobs’ and ‘Economic, social and territorial cohesion’, has been 
allocated 47% of the total resources, 1% more than in the previous 
MFF; however, a significant redistribution of resources occurred 
under the heading, with those allocated to the ‘competitiveness’ 
subheading expanding by 37.3% and those allocated to ‘cohesion’ 
contracting by 8.4%.  
Heading 2 – under which, by and large, fall the financial 
resources for the CAP – sees a contraction of its share of the total 
allocation for the MFF – from 42.3% in the previous MFF to 38.9% – 
and a significant reduction of financial resources in real terms (-
11.3%). In particular, policy measures in Pillar I (‘Market related 
expenditure and direct payments’) are assigned just over €277.85 
billion, 28.9% of the entire MFF (it was 32.1% in the 2007-13 MFF), 
and those in Pillar II (‘Rural development policies’) nearly €85 
billion, 8.8% of the total (compared to 9.6% previously). With 
respect to the previous MFF, resources to finance ‘Market-related 
expenditure and direct payments’ are reduced by 12.9% in real 
terms, and those for rural development by 11.1%.1  
In order to have the full picture of the resources available for 
policies directly relevant to agriculture one should also consider the 
portion of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund2 (EGAF) to 
be spent within the sector. The EGAF is a fund outside the MFF 
providing temporary support to workers (including those in 
agriculture) who have lost their jobs as a result of ‘major changes’ in 
trade patterns, due to disruptive effects of the globalisation process 
on a specific sector in a member state. Resources allocated to the 
EGAF for the 2014-20 period equal €1.05 billion (in 2011 prices) 
(Table 2.1).  
Negotiations over the new MFF proceeded hand-in-hand 
with those over the new CAP. As already mentioned, the MFF 
included not only decisions on the amount of financial resources 
                                                        
1 Financial resources allocated to rural development policies are from 
European Parliament (2013, Table 10, p. 39). 
2 Regulation 1309/2013. 
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allocated to the CAP in the 2014-20 period, but also decisions on 
important elements of the policy itself.  
The initial Communication by the Commission on the new 
MFF (European Commission, 2011) included proposals (a) to 
maintain a two-pillar structure for the CAP, (b) to link 30% of direct 
support to farmers to environmental and climate action objectives, 
(c) to achieve a ‘fairer and more equitable’ distribution of the 
support by making direct support per hectare converge across 
member states, and (d) to limit support provided to large 
agricultural holdings by introducing ‘a cap’ (a maximum) for the 
support each farm can receive, using the ‘savings’ this would 
generate to increase the resources allocated in the same country to 
rural development policies. These are key elements for the design 
of the new CAP which clearly go well beyond those which could be 
justified by the need to decide financial allocations.  
The two parallel, and somewhat interlinked, negotiations – 
the one on the MFF and that on the CAP – were both concluded in 
2013. The agreement on the new MFF included decisions on the 
following elements of the new CAP which were not part of the June 
2013 ‘political agreement’ on the reform:  
 ‘External convergence’ of direct payments: Member states with 
average direct payments per hectare above the EU average 
will see their allocation progressively reduced in order to 
finance the increase in those member states with an average 
direct payment below 90% of the EU average; in these 
member states the difference with 90% of the EU average will 
have to be reduced in six years by one-third. In those member 
states with an average direct payment per hectare above the 
EU average, the reduction of the financial envelope will be 
proportional to the distance from the EU average. In 2020, in 
those member states where the envelope has been reduced, 
the average direct payment per hectare cannot be lower than 
the EU average, and in no member state can it be lower than 
€196/ha in nominal prices (this corresponds to about €164/ha 
in 2011 prices). 
 Degressivity and capping: The progressive reduction of large 
direct payments will be mandatory in all member states, 
while ‘capping’ remains a voluntary measure.  
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 Greening: 30% of the national envelope for direct payments is 
to be devoted to payments linked to the production of 
environmental benefits by farms. Decisions regarding the 
constraints to be satisfied in order for a farm to be entitled to 
receive the ‘green’ payment were left to be agreed in the 
negotiations on the CAP reform, leaving however the 
possibility for member states to identify agricultural practices 
to be considered equivalent to the conditions to be eligible for 
‘green’ direct payments decided at the EU level. 
 Flexibility between pillars: All member states have the 
possibility to transfer up to 15% of financial resources from 
direct payments (Pillar I) to rural development policy 
measures (Pillar II), and vice versa. Member states with an 
average direct payment per hectare below 90% of the EU 
average are allowed to transfer to direct payments an 
additional 10% of resources from their allocation in the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD). 
 Financial discipline: Existing rules were confirmed.3 In 
Bulgaria and Romania the financial discipline mechanism 
will come into play in 2016, in Croatia in 2022. 
 Rural development: The allocation of rural development funds 
among member states was decided. Sixteen countries will 
also receive ad hoc allocations for the initial three years,4 
subject to a co-financing rate of 100%; the financial resources 
involved, just over €5.5 billion in total, are from the overall 
EU allocation to rural development policies. The resulting 
allocation of rural development funds to member states is 
                                                        
3 Rules on financial discipline guarantee that the financial allocation for the 
sub-heading “Market related expenditure and direct payments” set in 
Regulation 1311/2013 is abided by. If this is not going to be the case, then 
direct payments exceeding €2,000 are reduced as needed to make the 
expenditure for the sub-heading remain within the allocation. 
4 Austria (€700 million), France (€1 billion), Ireland (€100 million), Italy 
(€1.5 billion), Luxembourg (€20 million), Malta (€32 million), Lithuania 
(€100 million), Latvia (€67 million), Estonia (€50 million), Sweden (€150 
million), Portugal (€500 million), Cyprus (€7 million), Spain (€500 million), 
Belgium (€80 million), Slovenia (€150 million) and Finland (€600 million). 
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provided in Regulation 1305/2013; however, further 
modifications, if needed, are possible. The percentages of co-
financing have also been decided.5  
 Reserve for crises in the agricultural sector: Within heading 2 of 
the MFF, a reserve was created to provide support in case of 
a crisis affecting the sector. The reserve is allocated €2.8 billion 
and resources come from a reduction of direct payments 
exceeding €2,000; if, in a specific year, the allocation is not 
used, financial resources are returned to farmers the 
following year through increased direct payments.  
Through the reallocation of funds between member states 
implied by ‘external convergence’ and the decisions taken 
regarding the allocation of rural development funds, the 2013 
reform brought a significant country redistribution of the financial 
resources for the CAP, for an unprecedented extent, mostly from 
those countries that had traditionally received a relatively larger 
share of resources for direct payments, to those which in the past 
had been relatively penalised.  
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide a comparison of the country 
distribution of the resources for direct payments and rural 
development at the end of the new programming period (when 
‘external convergence’ will be fully implemented) and that in 2013. 
The direction of the redistribution implied by the two allocations is 
quite different, with the decisions regarding the allocation of the 
resources for rural development, agreed later, providing partial 
compensation to some of the countries which suffered the largest 
cuts in their national ceilings for direct payments.6  
                                                        
5 The maximum EAFRD financing rate will be 85% in less developed 
regions, outermost regions and smaller Aegean islands; 75% in all regions 
whose GDP per capita in the 2007-13 period was less than 75% of the 
average for the EU-25 but above 75% of the average for the EU-27; 63% for 
the transition regions other than those referred to before; 53% in the other 
regions. Financing will equal 75% for operations contributing to the 
objectives of environment and climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Finally, sums transferred from Pillar I to Pillar II will be used benefitting 
from a 100% financing from the EAFRD. 
6 Funds for direct payments are more than three times those for rural 
development.  
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The reduction of total funds, in current prices, allocated to 
direct payments in 2020 (without considering the effects of national 
implementation decisions) with respect to those in 2013 equals -
6.3% (in real terms the per cent reduction is twice as large).  
However, as a result of the provisions for ‘external 
convergence’, the member states that entered the EU since 2004, 
with the exception of Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia, will all see an 
increase in their national ceilings, or a decline by a percentage 
smaller than that observed for the overall funds. Conversely, 
original allocations to national ceilings for direct payments will be 
lower by a higher percentage than that observed on average, in all 
EU-15 member states, with the exception of Spain and Portugal 
(where they will decline by -4.8% and -1.1%, respectively). Increases 
above 10% will occur in Bulgaria (+37.3%), Estonia (+67.4%), Latvia 
(+106.7%), Lithuania (+36%) and Romania (+50.5); conversely, the 
countries which will suffer the most pronounced cuts, above 15%, 
in their allocations for direct payments are Belgium (-17.8%), 
Denmark (-16.1%), Italy (-15.2%) and the Netherlands (-18.4%) 
(Table 2.2).  
If rural development funds for 2014-20 are compared with 
those in 2007-13 (Table 2.3) – again, without considering the effects 
of national implementation decisions which modify the allocation 
of financial resources between the two pillars – several of the 
countries which experienced a significant reduction in their original 
ceilings for direct payments now see an increase in their allocations. 
This is the case, for example, for Belgium (+13.2%, against a decline 
by -0.9% of the EU funds allocated, overall, to rural development 
policies), Denmark (+8.9), Italy (+16.1%), France (+30.7%, its 
national ceiling for direct payments in 2020 will be 12.7% lower than 
in 2013), Greece (+7.4%, -12.2%), Malta (+27.5%, -8.1%) and Finland 
(+10.5%, -8%). On the contrary, Bulgaria will see its funds for rural 
development decline by -11.5%, Latvia by -8.1%, and Lithuania by -
8.6%. In fact, only 7 out of 28 countries had their allocations for both 
direct payments and rural development cut by a percentage larger 
than those observed for the total EU allocations, i.e. they do not 
partially compensate the relative cut in one allocation with the 
resources they have been assigned in the other; these are Germany, 
Ireland, Cyprus, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK, while 
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Estonia, Portugal and Spain are the only countries which did better 
than average in both allocations.  
3. The new system of direct payments 
The most important changes introduced with the new CAP are 
probably those related to the new system of direct payments which 
on 1 January 2015 replaced the SPS (and the SAPS in new member 
states) introduced by the 2003 Fischler reform. 
The SPS thus gives way to a new and more complex system 
of direct payments known as the Basic Payment Scheme (BPS). The 
‘basic payment’ component of the new system is meant (at least 
implicitly) as an income support measure. With respect to the 
previous regime it is downscaled and more evenly distributed in 
terms of per hectare support, both across member states and, within 
each member state, across farms. The other components of the new 
system of direct payments are meant either to remunerate specific 
farm behaviours (such as, in the case of the ‘green’ payment, 
agricultural practices beneficial for the climate and the 
environment) or a specific status (such as being a young farmer, or 
farming in an area with natural constraints). The introduction of a 
‘green’ component in the direct payments represents the first 
explicit attempt to link part of them to the remuneration of public 
goods and services produced by the farm, a goal advocated by many 
in the debate preceding the start of the reform process. 
A stated objective of the reform has been the introduction of 
more selective forms of support, with payments better targeted and 
more equitably distributed between farms, sectors and regions. In 
this respect, in addition to ‘degressivity’ and ‘external convergence’, 
the reform introduces a more uniform distribution of the per hectare 
basic farm payments (‘internal convergence’), payments for young 
farmers, a ‘redistributive payment’ shifting support from larger 
farms to smaller ones and payments for farms located in areas with 
natural constraints.  
However, in the new system, only some of the components of 
direct payments are mandatory, while for others the decision to 
implement them is left to the individual member state. Mandatory 
components are: the basic payment, the payment for agricultural 
practices beneficial to the climate and the environment, or ‘green 
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payment’, and the payment for young farmers. Voluntary 
components are: the redistributive payment, the payment to farms 
located in areas facing natural constraints, the payments coupled to 
production and the small farms scheme. Also for the mandatory 
components of the direct payments member states have been left 
some room for manoeuvre in terms of how they are implemented 
(such as how per unit payments are calculated, or the possibility to 
use more restrictive criteria to identify the beneficiaries of the 
specific payment, as is the case for the payment for young farmers). 
Each component of the direct payments is financed with a portion 
of each country’s national ceiling for direct payments; these are set 
out in Annex II of Regulation 1307/2013. 
The ‘active farmer’  
One of the stated objectives of the reform was to remove historical 
rents, created by the progressive decoupling of CAP support, and 
to concentrate support on persons, natural or legal, for which the 
agricultural activity is not marginal (the so-called ‘active farmers’).  
The decoupling of support started with the MacSharry reform 
and was completed by the successive changes introduced in the 
CAP since then, which linked support to land ownership and to 
maintaining it in good condition by performing minimal 
agronomical practices. This meant that beneficiaries of financial 
support did not have to farm their land any more in order to receive 
it, and this was not an unintended implication of decoupling. 
However, it led to many questioning large payments made to ‘non-
farmers’ at a time when financial resources devoted to the CAP were 
being progressively reduced and farmers were dealing with 
difficult market conditions, often causing severe financial stress.  
Already at the time of the Health Check, in 2008, member 
states were given the possibility to introduce ‘objective and non-
discriminatory criteria’ to identify active farmers entitled to receive 
the direct payments. The reform introduced mandatory conditions 
in order to be able to claim direct payments, leaving the possibility 
for member states to make them more restrictive if they wished. The 
way this matter is dealt with is not by defining who is an ‘active 
farmer’, but rather by defining who is not. Considered not ‘active’ – 
and, as a result, not entitled to receive any direct payment – is the 
farmer (natural or legal person) whose farm lies in areas naturally 
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kept in a state suitable for grazing or cultivation and who does not 
carry out on those areas the minimum activity defined by the 
member state. The Cioloş reform actually goes further and defines 
a ‘black list’ of entities who cannot be considered ‘active farmers’; 
this includes those operating airports, railway services, waterworks, 
real estate services, permanent sport and recreational grounds. All 
these are non-active farmers by definition and member states may 
decide to extend this list. However, the scope of the black list is 
significantly reduced by the provision that even those included in 
this list can receive direct payments if they are able to prove that the 
annual amount of the latter is at least 5% of the annual total receipts 
they obtain from non-agricultural activities; or their agricultural 
activities are not insignificant; or their principal company objective 
consists of exercising an agricultural activity. In addition, even 
potential beneficiaries who do not qualify as ‘active farmers’ are 
nevertheless entitled to receive direct payments if these do not 
exceed €5,000 (member states are left the possibility to lower this 
threshold).  
Minimum requirements 
As hitherto, member states decide the minimum threshold for 
claiming a direct payment in terms either of its total amount in a 
given calendar year, or of the eligible area of the holding for which 
it is claimed (the financial and physical thresholds are set at €100 
and one hectare, respectively, but member states can modify these 
depending on the characteristics of their agriculture). 
The basic payment and ‘internal convergence’  
The basic payment is nothing other than a scaled down version of 
what was the single payment in the pre-2015 CAP. Member states 
using the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) are allowed to 
continue using it until the end of 2020, at the latest. 
It is important to recognise that the financial resources 
allocated in each member state to the basic payment (or to the SAPS) 
are not set in advance, but are determined as residual, after 
deducting from the national ceiling for direct payments the sums 
needed to finance the other (mandatory and voluntary) components 
of the direct payments. In fact, depending on the decisions taken at 
the member state level, the share of the national ceiling devoted to 
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the basic payment may lie, in theory, anywhere between 0% and 
slightly less than 70%.1  
With the reform, the set of the farmers entitled to receive 
direct payments has been expanded to include virtually all active 
farmers. In fact, beneficiaries of direct payments will now also 
include farms producing fruits, vegetables, ware potatoes, seed 
potatoes, ornamental plants and grapes2 (in member states where 
the SPS was in place), and farms whose agricultural land in June 
2003 was not in good agricultural condition (in member states 
where the SAPS was in place).  
‘Internal convergence’ provisions are meant to eliminate by 
2019, or reduce, differences in the per hectare basic payment (and 
this component of direct payments only3) received by farmers in 
those member states where the SPS was used. Convergence is 
pursued either with reference to the country as a whole, or with 
respect to individual regions; these had to be defined by the member 
state and did not need to coincide with existing administrative 
units. The reform did foresee three different options for ‘internal 
convergence’: 
 Full convergence in 2015: In 2015, the first year of 
implementation of the new CAP, the same value of per 
hectare basic payment (in more precise terms, ‘the same unit 
value of the payment entitlement’) was applied in the entire 
member state, or in each ‘region’ within the member state; 
 Full convergence in 2019, at the latest: In the entire member state, 
or in each ‘region’ within the member state, the same value of 
the per hectare basic payment will be applied by 2019, at the 
latest; and 
                                                        
1 Actual allocations are provided in Table 2.4, discussed in section 6. 
2 This means new payment entitlements have been allocated. Member 
states were also given the option to allocate new payment entitlements to 
farms which had received them in 2014 from the national reserve, and to 
those who had never held, owned or leased-in payment entitlements but 
were able to submit evidence that, on a certain date, they were actually 
exercising an agricultural activity (production, rearing and cultivation). 
3 However, in those countries which opted to calculate the ‘green payment’ 
on an individual farm basis as a percentage of its basic payment, ‘internal 
convergence’ will indirectly affect this payment as well. 
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 Partial convergence: Differences between the values of the per 
hectare basic payment received by farmers in the member 
state as a whole, or in each ‘region’ within the member state, 
will be reduced, but will still exist in 2019.  
Under the ‘full convergence in 2015’ option, the uniform per 
hectare value is calculated (in 2015, and in each year thereafter) by 
dividing the allocation of the national (or regional, if ‘internal 
convergence’ is implemented at the regional level) ceiling to the 
basic payment by the number of payment entitlements. In this case, 
in any given year, the per hectare value of the basic payment is the 
same in all farms within the member state, or within the ‘region’; 
however, this amount will vary from year to year as a result of 
changes in the national ceiling, including those resulting from the 
progressive implementation of ‘external convergence’, of the 
financial resources allocated to the different components of the 
direct payments, and of financial discipline provisions. 
Under the ‘full convergence in 2019, at the latest’ option, the 
uniform unit value of the basic payment will be introduced 
progressively and will be in place by 2019, at the latest. 
Finally, under the ‘partial convergence’ option, in 2019 basic 
payments will have to be such that no payment per hectare (unit 
value of payment entitlement) will be lower than 60% of the 
national, or regional, average. Under this option member states will 
use a convergence criterion analogous to the one used for the 
‘external convergence’. Payment entitlements with a pre-
convergence unit value4 lower than 90% of the national (regional) 
average would, by 2019 at the latest, be increased by at least one-
third of the difference between their pre-convergence value and 
90% of the national (regional) average in 2019. This percentage can 
be set above 90%, but it cannot exceed 100%. The increase of the 
payments per hectare below the average will be covered by the 
reduction of the value of the payments per hectare above the 
average. For the latter, the difference between their initial pre-
                                                        
4 This ‘initial’ unit value is calculated using the number of payment 
entitlements assigned to each farm in 2015 and the value of the total 
payments received in 2014 within the SPS, adjusted by the share of the 
national ceiling which will be devoted to finance the basic payments under 
the new regime.  
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convergence unit value and the national (regional) unit value to be 
reached in 2019 will be progressively reduced, in equal steps 
starting in 2015, based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria 
established by the member state. Member states may also decide 
that the unit value of a farm’s entitlements cannot be reduced by 
more than 30% with respect to their initial pre-convergence value. 
However, it could happen that these two constraints cannot be 
jointly satisfied. If satisfying the constraint of no farm receiving in 
2019 a per hectare direct payment below 60% of the national 
(regional) average would imply a reduction of those above the 
average by more than 30%, the first constraint would be the one not 
to be satisfied, i.e. farms would still exist in 2019 receiving an 
average per hectare direct payment which is less than 60% of the 
national, or regional, average. 
‘Green’ payments 
Thirty per cent of the national ceiling for direct payments is 
allocated to ‘green’ payments. The green payment takes the form of 
an annual payment per hectare, calculated by dividing the financial 
resources allocated to these payments by the number of eligible 
hectares. However, in order to limit the extent of the redistribution 
of direct payments across farms with respect to the pre-2015 
scenario, member states who opted for the ‘full convergence in 2019, 
at the latest’ or the ‘partial convergence’ option in applying ‘internal 
convergence’ were given the possibility to calculate the ‘green’ 
payment at the farm level as a percentage of the basic payment.  
Access to the ‘green’ payment is restricted to farmers entitled 
to receive the basic payment. In order to receive the green payment 
a farm must satisfy three requirements in terms of agricultural 
practices beneficial for the climate and the environment; these have 
to do with (a) crop diversification, (b) maintaining existing 
permanent grassland, and (c) devoting part of the land to so-called 
‘ecological focus areas’ (EFAs).  
The crop diversification requirement applies only to farms of 
more than 10 hectares of arable land. In its general formulation 
(exceptions exist), the condition to be satisfied is to grow at least two 
crops (if arable land does not exceed 30 hectares), or three (if arable 
land exceeds 30 hectares), with the main crop not exceeding 75% of 
arable land and the two main ones not exceeding 95%. The ratio of 
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areas covered by permanent grassland to total agricultural area 
cannot be lower by more than 5% with respect to a fixed historical 
reference ratio. Member states may decide to satisfy this constraint 
at the national (or regional) level, rather than by the individual farm. 
Finally, the constraint on the EFA aims at maintaining, and possibly 
increase, biodiversity; it applies only to farms with arable land 
exceeding 15 hectares. In this case, farmers are required to ensure 
that an area corresponding to at least 5% of the arable land of the 
holding is an EFA. The choice of what should be considered an EFA 
within a list of options has been left to member states; this list is 
provided in Article 46 of Regulation 1307/2013 and includes: land 
lying fallow, terraces, landscape features, buffer strips, agro-
forestry surfaces which received support under rural development 
policy measures, strips along forest edges, afforested areas, and 
areas with nitrogen-fixing crops.  
Land devoted to organic agriculture is by default assumed to 
fulfil the conditions to receive the ‘green’ payment. Member states 
may choose to identify agricultural practices which are considered, 
by definition, able to generate benefits for the climate and the 
environment at least equivalent to those generated by these three 
conditions. Equivalent practices are listed in Annex IX to Regulation 
1307/2013 and are given by commitments undertaken within rural 
development measures, or national, or regional, environmental 
certification schemes which go beyond relevant mandatory 
standards established by cross-compliance. To avoid a ‘double 
payment’ for the provision of the same public good, when 
equivalent practices are used to justify green payments they become 
the baseline for triggering payments under environmental measures 
in Pillar II, i.e. Pillar II payments may occur only if the farm 
generates a volume of environmental or climate benefits above this 
level. 
In assessing the efficiency and the equity of this new 
component of the direct payments as a policy tool whose aim is to 
generate benefits for the climate and the environment, it is 
important to recognise that the ‘green’ payment has no relation 
either with increased benefits generated by the farm, if any, or with 
the costs of satisfying the set requirements, if any. 
In the worst case scenario, a farm not satisfying the 
requirements for the ‘green’ payment not only will not receive any 
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but will incur an administrative penalty. This will be gradually 
implemented: no sanction will be imposed in 2015 and 2016, while 
the maximum penalty will equal 20% of the ‘green’ payment in 2017 
and 25% from 2018.5 This means that not satisfying ‘green’ payment 
requirements will imply that, in the worst case scenario, in the first 
two years of the new regime the farm will lose only the ‘green’ 
payment, while from 2017 onwards it will also suffer a reduction in 
the other direct payments. This makes the ‘green’ payment similar 
to a voluntary measure (where farms are to decide whether it is 
profitable for them to enter a programme or not) in 2015 and 2016, 
while its requirements become, de facto, mandatory from 2017. 
However, the financial sanctions in the case of non-compliance 
being relatively innocuous, it cannot be assumed that all farms will 
find it convenient to satisfy the requirements.  
Payment for young farmers 
Direct payments for young farmers are mandatory payments that 
complement the start-up aid which may be granted to young 
farmers as part of Pillar II. These payments are financed by up to 2% 
of the national ceiling for direct payments and are granted annually 
to young farmers entitled to receive the basic payment. A ‘young 
farmer’ is defined as a natural person who (a) becomes for the first 
time the head of an agricultural holding, or who has become the 
head of a holding during the five years preceding the first 
submission of an application to receive the basic payment, and (b) 
is no more than 40 years of age in the year of the submission. 
Member states may introduce additional criteria to be satisfied in 
terms of appropriate skills and/or training requirements. The 
payment is granted for a maximum period of five years (less than 
that if the farmer had become head of the holding before the 
application to receive the payment for young farmers).6 
Member states may decide to calculate the actual payment on 
an individual basis or as a set payment; it should correspond either 
                                                        
5 Article 77.6 of Regulation 1306/2013 and Articles 23-28 of Regulation 
640/2014. 
6 If this is the case the period is reduced by the number of years elapsed 
between the setting up of the holding as a head and the submission of the 
application for the specific payment. 
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to 25% of the average value of the basic payment entitlements 
owned or leased by the young farmer, or to 25% of the national 
average value of basic payment entitlements, multiplied by the 
number of entitlements the farmer has activated. However, the 
payment must be limited to a number of hectares which cannot be 
less than 25 and cannot exceed 90 and, if introduced as an annual 
lump sum payment, it cannot exceed the basic payment received by 
the farm.  
Redistributive payment 
This is a voluntary component of direct payments. It aims at 
redistributing financial support within a member state from large 
farms to smaller ones. By 1 August of every year member states may 
decide to introduce, from the following year, a redistributive 
payment to farmers entitled to receive the basic payment. Member 
states may devote to these payments up to 30% of the national 
ceiling for direct payments. Each farmer cannot receive a 
redistributive payment in excess of 65% of the national (regional) 
average direct payment per hectare in 2015, multiplied by the 
number of the farm’s entitlements, which cannot be more than 30 
hectares, or the average farm size in the member state, if this exceeds 
30 hectares. As long as these upper limits are satisfied, member 
states are free to decide the amount of the per hectare payment. If 
‘internal convergence’ for the basic payment is implemented at the 
regional level, then the amount of the redistributive payment can 
also be set at this level.  
If a member state finances redistributive payments with more 
than 5% of the national ceiling for direct payments, then it is free to 
decide not to impose a degressive reduction on direct payments 
exceeding €150,000 (see below). Both instruments aim at 
redistributing resources: in the case of degressivity/capping, from 
those farms receiving a large amount of support to rural 
development policy measures; in the case of the redistributive 
payment, from large farms to small ones.  
Payment for areas with natural constraints  
Farmers are entitled to receive this component of the direct 
payments if their holdings are, fully or partly, located in ‘areas with 
natural constraints’, as designated by the member state in 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  61 
 
accordance with its rural development rules. Direct payments to 
farms located in areas with natural constraints are a voluntary 
component of the direct payments justified by the goal of 
guaranteeing the presence of farmers and farming in these areas by 
providing support which is additional to that foreseen in rural 
development policies. This means that this component of the direct 
payments does not replace, but rather complements, the analogous 
payments disbursed in the same areas under Pillar II.  
Member states may allocate to payments to farms located in 
areas with natural constraints up to 5% of the national ceiling for 
direct payments.  
Only farmers entitled to receive the basic payment can be 
eligible for this payment. The amount of the annual payment for 
eligible hectare is calculated by dividing the portion of the national 
ceiling committed to this payment by the number of eligible 
hectares in the areas with natural constraints for which the member 
state has decided to activate the payment. Member states can 
introduce this payment in all areas with natural constraints (as 
defined for rural development policy purposes), or limit it to only a 
part, in this case based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria. 
Furthermore, member states may opt for a payment set at the 
regional level, i.e. to differentiate the per hectare payment by region, 
and to limit the payment to a maximum number of hectares per 
farm.  
Coupled support 
In specific sectors and products7 member states may decide to grant 
farmers support coupled to production. Coupled support may only 
be granted to those sectors and regions of the member state where 
specific types of farming, or specific agricultural sectors, play a 
particularly important economic, social or environmental role; it 
may only be granted to create an incentive to maintain current levels 
                                                        
7 These are all sectors and products which have been granted coupled 
support in the past: cereals, oilseeds, protein crops, grain legumes, flax, 
hemp, rice, nuts, starch potatoes, milk and milk products, seeds, sheep 
meat and goat meat, beef and veal, olive oil, silkworms, dried fodder, hops, 
sugar beets, cane and chicory, fruit and vegetables and short rotation 
coppice. 
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of production in the sectors or regions concerned. In this case, 
support may also be granted to farmers who do not have eligible 
hectares entitling them to receive the basic payment.  
The payment takes the form of an annual payment per hectare 
– or per head, in the case of livestock; because the aim is to maintain 
the level of production, i.e. the support provided should not result 
in increased production, payments are limited to a maximum 
number of hectares and heads. Member states can use up to 8% of 
the national ceiling to finance coupled support payments. This 
percentage can be raised up to 13% if during at least one year in the 
period 2010-14 the member state had allocated more than 5% of its 
national ceiling for direct payments to coupled ones. If this share 
exceeds 10%, then the member state may decide to finance coupled 
support payments by using even more than 13% of its national 
ceiling (in this case an explicit authorisation by the Commission is 
needed). The percentage of the national ceiling allocated to coupled 
payments can be increased by an additional 2% in the case of 
support provided to protein crops. 
Crop-specific payment for cotton 
Notwithstanding the extensive decoupling of support induced by 
the previous reform of the CAP, significant coupled support has 
remained in place in the cotton sector. This will continue in the 2014-
20 period as well; in four member states only (Bulgaria, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal) direct payments will include a specific payment 
per eligible hectare of cotton, subject to specific area limitations. The 
payment per hectare of eligible area will differ across the four 
countries.  
‘Degressivity’ and ‘capping’ 
In order to generate a more equitable distribution of direct 
payments, the reform introduced a mandatory reduction, by at least 
5%, of basic payments for the part exceeding €150,000. Member 
states could increase this percentage up to 100%, in this case making 
de facto the €150,000 threshold for degressivity a ‘cap’ on basic 
payments. Member states were also given the option to apply the 
reduction after deducting from the basic payment labour costs in 
the previous year, i.e. salaries to employees, but also taxes paid and 
social welfare contributions. ‘Savings’ deriving from reduced 
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payments as a result of degressivity are to be added to the resources 
available for the country within the EAFRD, and their use will not 
need co-financing by the member state.  
A member state is exempted from the obligation to apply 
degressivity if it has decided to implement the voluntary 
redistributive payments and these absorb more than 5% of its ceiling 
for direct payments. 
Cross-compliance 
All direct payments remain subject to cross-compliance 
requirements also in the reformed CAP, but their number has been 
reduced.8 As previously, cross-compliance requirements consist of 
statutory management requirements under EU law and standards 
for good agricultural and environmental land conditions defined at 
the national level. As far as statutory management requirements, 
the number of regulations and directives whose obligations must be 
fulfilled in order to have access to the full amount of direct 
payments a farm is entitled to has been reduced from 18 to 13, while 
mandatory norms in terms of good agricultural and environmental 
land conditions to be complied with have been reduced by one, 
from 8 to 7, and a few obligations modified.  
As in the pre-2015 CAP, if cross-compliance requirements are 
not fulfilled an administrative penalty is imposed. This takes the 
form of a percentage of the total amount of direct payments in the 
specific year when the requirements had not been satisfied and its 
amount depends on the severity, extent, duration and reoccurrence 
of the non-compliance. The penalty is applied only when non-
compliance is the result of an act or omission directly attributable to 
the beneficiary.  
Small farms scheme 
The small farms scheme is a simplified scheme whose aim is to 
reduce the bureaucratic burden, for both the beneficiaries and the 
public sector, when small payments are involved.  
This is a voluntary scheme for the member states; when 
implemented, participation by individual farmers is also on a 
                                                        
8 They are listed in Annex II to Regulation 1308/2013. 
64  THE 2013 REFORM OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
 
voluntary basis. Farmers willing to enter the simplified scheme will 
have to apply by a deadline set by the member state (this cannot be 
later than 15 October 2015); farmers who have not applied by the 
deadline will no longer be entitled to participate in the scheme. 
The payment disbursed within the simplified scheme replaces 
the basic payment, ‘green’ payment, payment for young farmers, 
redistributive payment, coupled support and the crop-specific 
payment for cotton, where relevant, or the payment under the 
SAPS. Farmers entering the scheme are exempted from both ‘green’ 
payment requirements and cross-compliance conditions. The 
payment for those choosing the simplified scheme can be calculated 
in different ways. It can be an annual lump sum payment set at the 
national level, or it can be farm-specific. If the payment is 
introduced as a flat sum for all farms entering the scheme, then the 
annual disbursement cannot be less than €500 and cannot exceed 
€1,250; if the payment is farm-specific the lower bound does not 
apply. 
Unless the member state decides that the payment is farm-
specific, with each farm receiving what it would receive without the 
scheme in place, the maximum share of the national ceiling for 
direct payments which a member state can allocate to the simplified 
scheme for small farms is 10%. If the flat lump payment is adopted 
and the total amount of the payments under the scheme turns out 
to exceed this upper bound, then all payments will have to be 
reduced by the same percentage, as needed.  
4. The second pillar  
Limited changes have been introduced to Pillar II of the CAP; this 
can be explained by the consideration that the approach used in the 
2007-13 programming period proved effective and that the long-
term objective of strengthening rural development to foster the 
competitiveness of agriculture and to promote the sustainable 
management of natural resources, climate action and a balanced 
territorial development of rural areas, should be confirmed. 
Nevertheless, several changes have been introduced, mostly related 
to the programming of rural development policy measures 
(Mantino, 2013). 
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Probably the main change is the integration of the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development with the funds dealing 
with cohesion policies – the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund – 
and with the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF). These 
funds now operate under a common framework – the European 
Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds.9 Rural development policies 
for 2014-20 have become part of a Common Strategic Framework 
(CSF) whose aim is to facilitate the territorial and sectorial 
coordination of all actions put in place within the framework of the 
ESI Funds by providing strategic direction to the programming 
processes at the level of member states and regions. As a result, each 
member state was required to produce a single programming 
document, the Partnership Agreement (PA), consistent with the 
strategy indicated in the CSF, in which it had to define the national 
strategy pursued, identifying common goals and rules for all funds, 
facilitating the realisation of integrated projects, i.e. projects 
financed by more than one fund. The PA replaces the two 
documents used in the 2007-13 programming period, the National 
Strategic Framework (NSF) for the Structural Funds, and the 
National Strategic Plan (NSP) for the EAFRD. Nevertheless, despite 
the redesigned common framework, rural development policies 
maintain their own ‘identity’ spelled out in Regulations 1305/2013 
and 1306/2013. The PA, having been given the role of defining a 
single national strategy across the five funds, is expected to be 
particularly useful in increasing the coherence and effectiveness in 
the use of financial resources in those countries where 
programming documents at the regional level exist. These had to be 
drawn up in coherence with the principles and strategic goals 
indicated in the national PA. While for the 2007-13 programming 
period a member state could have for the EAFRD either a single 
national programme or individual programmes for each of its 
regions, it can now have a national programme as well as the 
individual regional programmes.  
In order to contribute to the implementation of the EU 
strategy for a ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’, each of the 
ESI Funds has to contribute to the achievement of 11 common 
                                                        
9 Regulation 1303/2013. 
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thematic objectives.10 For each of them the PA of each member state 
specifies the strategy adopted and the financial resources it has been 
allocated.  
The programming of rural development policies within the 
PA had to address six ‘priorities’11 and, at a finer level, 18 ‘focus 
areas’.  
Member states have had to indicate in their PA how they 
intend to address each of the priorities and focus areas, or to provide 
a justification if they decided otherwise. With respect to the 
previous programming period member states have been given 
significantly more flexibility from the point of view of the measures 
they could use. However, they now have had to allocate at least 30% 
of their total EAFRD to a group of specific environmental 
measures.12 
                                                        
10 The 11 common objectives are: strengthening research, technological 
development and innovation; enhancing access to, and use and quality of, 
ICT; enhancing the competitiveness of SMEs, of the agricultural sector (for 
the EAFRD) and of the fishery and aquaculture sector (for the EMFF); 
supporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy in all sectors; 
promoting climate change adaptation, risk prevention and management; 
preserving and protecting the environment and promoting resource 
efficiency; promoting sustainable transport and removing bottlenecks in 
key network infrastructures; promoting sustainable and quality 
employment and supporting labour mobility; promoting social inclusion, 
combating poverty and discrimination; investing in education, training 
and vocational training for skills and lifelong learning; and enhancing 
institutional capacity of public authorities and stakeholders and efficient 
public administration.  
11 The six priorities are: fostering knowledge transfer in agriculture, 
forestry and rural areas; enhancing the competitiveness of all types of 
agriculture and enhancing farm viability; promoting food chain 
organisation and risk management in agriculture; restoring, preserving 
and enhancing ecosystems dependent on agriculture and forestry; 
promoting resource efficiency and supporting the shift toward a low-
carbon and climate-resilient economy in agriculture, food and forestry 
sectors; and promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction and economic 
development in rural areas. 
12 These are described in Articles 17, 21, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 34 of 
Regulation 1305/2013 (investments in physical assets related to climate 
and environment; investments in forest area development and 
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Another important innovation introduced with the reform 
has to do with the local development strategy adopted. The bottom-
up ‘Leader approach’ proved to be effective in promoting local 
development in rural areas and has now been extended to all funds 
and areas. The Leader approach, which is now referred to as 
Community-Led Local Development, is mandatory for the EAFRD, 
while it can be adopted on a voluntary basis for the other funds.  
One of the main innovations has to do with the governance of 
rural development policies, with the aim of strengthening their 
effectiveness as well as their efficiency. To facilitate the achievement 
of the set goals, a ‘performance review’ procedure has been 
introduced which includes a system of incentives and penalties. Six 
per cent of each of the ESI Funds13 is set aside in a performance 
reserve. Member states were required to define a framework to 
monitor their progress towards the set objectives and targets. 
Targets had to be defined on the basis of financial indicators, 
tangible output indicators and, where appropriate, result indicators; 
in the case of rural development programmes they had to be 
identified at the level of focus area. The performance reserve shall 
be allocated only to programmes and priorities which have 
achieved their targets. When this is not the case, not only will the 
member state be denied access to the performance reserve, but, in 
the case of a serious breach, the Commission may decide to suspend 
all or part of the payments for the specific priority of the 
programme.  
The reform of Pillar II of the CAP has also involved the 
introduction of new measures and the strengthening of existing 
ones. The reform moved from Pillar I to Pillar II measures to help 
risk management. In fact, Regulation 1305/2013 now includes some 
                                                        
improvement of the viability of forests; agri-environment-climate 
measures; organic farming; ‘Natura 2000’ payments; payments to areas 
facing natural or other specific constraints; and forest environmental and 
climate services and forest conservation measures). 
13 In the case of the EAFRD this does not apply to financial resources 
transferred from Pillar I as a result of the flexibility given to member states 
in the reallocation of financial resources between the two pillars (Article 
14.1 of Regulation 1307/2013) and to financial resources resulting from 
capping and modulation of direct payments (Article 11 of Regulation 
1307/2014). 
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of the measures which were included in Article 68 of Regulation 
73/2009 (such as financial contributions against insurance 
premiums to reduce economic losses caused by adverse climatic 
events, animal or plant diseases, pest infestation, or an 
environmental accident, and financial contributions to mutual 
funds intervening to support farmers under the same 
circumstances). Pillar II now also includes a new income 
stabilisation tool, in the form of a financial contribution to mutual 
funds which provide compensation to a farm when a drop in 
income occurs which exceeds 30% of its average annual income. The 
shift of some of the risk management policy instruments from Pillar 
I to Pillar II14 raises concerns from two points of view: that of the 
stretch of the focus of the policies aimed at fostering rural 
development to make them include income stabilisation measures, 
and that of the implication of this shift for the financial allocation to 
(truly) rural development policies, which, as a result, suffered a 
further reduction with respect to the already significant one 
observed for the overall budget allocated to Pillar II (-11.1% in real 
terms).  
Another innovation introduced with the reform is given by 
the European Innovation Partnership (EIP) for agricultural 
productivity and sustainability, an instrument intended to build a 
bridge between research, on the one hand, and farmers and 
advisory services, on the other, to promote and speed-up the 
process of the production, transfer and adoption of innovations. 
5. Decisions regarding other elements of the CAP 
Within Pillar I of the CAP, next to Regulation 1307/2013, which 
pertains to direct payments, stands Regulation 1308/2013, which 
concerns the Single Common Market Organisation (SCMO). This 
Regulation confirms many of the elements governing the SCMO 
before 2015 (Regulation 1234/2007) and certain decisions which 
have been taken as part of the milk and quality ‘packages’. It also 
modifies the conditions under which export subsidies can be used 
and includes new important measures aiming at modifying in 
                                                        
14 Certain sector specific risk management tools, i.e. those for the wine and 
fruit and vegetable sectors, were not moved from the Single Common 
Market Organisation. 
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favour of farmers the distribution of market power within food 
chains and at simplifying intervention, with the goal to make it a 
truly safety net policy instrument (rather than a price support 
mechanism). Regulation 1308/2013 also confirmed the end of the 
milk and sugar quota regimes on 31 March 2015 and 30 September 
2017, respectively, and the termination of the prohibition to expand 
planting of vines on 31 December 2015. 
The most important innovation intended to increase farmers’ 
market power in food chains is probably the extension of producer 
organisations (POs) and inter-branch organisations to all sectors 
(until 2015 they were foreseen in the fruit and vegetable sector only). 
Financial resources to support start-up activities of these 
organisations are provided within rural development policies. POs 
in the olive oil, arable crop and beef sectors are given the power to 
engage in collective bargaining on behalf of their members. 
Confirming a decision which had been taken as part of the 
‘milk package’, member states are given the opportunity to make 
mandatory the drawing up of written contracts for the delivery of 
raw milk by farmers to processors. POs are given the power to 
represent their members in the negotiation for the definition of the 
contracts. Waiving provisions of existing competition law, POs are 
allowed to negotiate the price of raw milk, as long as the quantity 
involved does not exceed 3.5% of EU total production and 33% of 
that of the member state. The Regulation also stipulates the 
elements that the contracts must include, such as the price to be paid 
for the delivery, the volume of raw milk which may, or must, be 
delivered, and the duration of the contract. Moreover, upon request 
of a PO, an inter-branch organisation or a group of operators, 
member states may establish, for a limited period of time, binding 
rules to limit the supply of cheeses which have been granted a 
Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) or a Protected Geographical 
Indication (PGI). This may be done for a three-year period (but this 
interval can be extended), subject to an agreement of operators 
representing at least 50% of the production of the specific PDO or 
PGI product. The agreement cannot involve the price at which the 
cheese is sold on the market. The possibility to put in place a 
concerted collective action to limit production, by relaxing the 
provisions of existing competition law (under which such practice 
would be illegal), is extended also to PDO and PGI for hams. Finally, 
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following a request by a PO (or an association of POs or an inter-
branch organisation) ‘representative’ of the production, trade or 
processing of a specific product, a member state may decide that 
certain decisions taken within that organisation, for a limited period 
of time, are also binding for operators who do not belong to that 
organisation. A PO (or an association of POs or an inter-branch 
organisation) is considered to be ‘representative’ when it accounts 
for at least 60% of the volume produced, traded or processed of the 
specific product in the case of fruit and vegetable, or for at least two-
thirds in the case of other products.  
In the wine sector the reform cancelled the prohibition on 
planting vines, a ‘transitional’ measure which had been introduced 
in 1997 and systematically extended, always on a ‘temporary’ basis, 
since then. The last extension occurred in 2008 (Regulation 
479/2008) when the decision was taken to end the prohibition after 
31 December 2015 (with the possibility to maintain the prohibition 
in the member states wishing to do so until the end of 2018 at the 
latest). The 2013 reform confirmed the removal of the prohibition to 
expand vine plantings, but, at the same time, reverted the decision 
to fully liberalise plantings. Rather it introduced a system of 
authorisations to progressively expand vine plantings between 2016 
and 2030; such authorisations will ensure that maximum a 1% 
annual increase of the area covered by vines in each member state 
may occur. This means that in the wine sector, differently from what 
happened with the milk and sugar quotas, the reform brought a 
reversal of the decision which had already been taken to remove 
supply controls and liberalise production decisions. 
Finally, Regulation 1308/2013 limits the possibility to 
subsidise exports only when serious ‘threats of market disturbance’ 
exist. Over the years the EU has been unilaterally progressively 
giving up the use export subsidies (Figure 2.1); hence, the decision 
to limit their use only under extraordinary market conditions 
should be seen as a constraint on the possibility to reverse this 
choice in the future.  
6. The national decisions on the new CAP 
Significant flexibility in the implementation of the CAP by the 
member states has existed since the 2003 Fischler reform, when they 
were given the possibility to decide how to implement the SPS 
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(using a national or regional model, and a flat, historical or hybrid 
approach), to maintain a part of the existing support in a partially 
decoupled form (this was the case for tobacco, olive oil, fruit and 
vegetables, sugar, and sheep and goat premiums) and to make use 
of the opportunities given by Article 69 of Regulation 1782/2003 – 
and, later, Article 68 of Regulation 73/2009 – to provide support to 
specific ‘types of farming’ and ‘quality production’. However, the 
extent of the decisions left to member states with the 2013 Cioloş 
reform to introduce tailor-made alterations to make the CAP better 
fit the characteristics of their agriculture, as well as to satisfy 
prevailing domestic political preferences, appear much wider. In 
fact, the reform has allowed member states to decide which of the 
voluntary direct payments to activate, the distribution of the overall 
amount of financial resources across the different direct payments 
(with the exception of those to be devoted to the ‘green’ payment), 
the criteria to be satisfied for a farm to have access to them, 
important elements of the implementation of the ‘green’ payment, 
the extent and the modalities of the redistribution of support 
between the farms within the country (as a result of their decisions 
regarding ‘internal convergence’, ‘degressivity and capping’ and 
the redistributive payment), and the distribution between the two 
pillars of the overall financial resources allocated to the country.  
Member states had to notify the Commission by 1 August 
2014 about their decisions regarding the national implementation of 
the new CAP. Table 2.4 offers a synthetic view of how in 2019 the 
new CAP will be implemented in the member states. In the United 
Kingdom and in Belgium decisions were taken at a sub-national 
level: in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, and in the 
Flanders and Wallonia, respectively. 
Flexibility between pillars 
The possibility to shift financial resources between pillars has been 
used by 16 member states.15 Five of them (Croatia, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland and Slovakia) have decided to transfer resources from Pillar 
II to Pillar I; in 2019 the amount transferred will vary between 3.8% 
                                                        
15 France, Croatia, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and the UK had already started 
transferring funds in 2014, using the possibility given by Regulation 
1310/2013. 
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(Malta) and 25%, the maximum percentage allowed (Poland). On 
the contrary, 11 member states (Belgium (in Flanders), Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Romania, and the UK (in England, Wales and 
Scotland)) will transfer resources in the opposite direction; 
resources transferred will vary from 1.3% (Czech Republic) to 15%, 
the maximum allowed (Estonia and Wales). In some of these 
countries the magnitude of the transfer changes over time; it will 
increase in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Malta and the 
Netherlands, while the opposite will occur in the Czech Republic 
and Romania (in the latter it will become zero in 2018). Tables 2.2 
and 2.3 provide information on the implications of national 
decisions, including those related to the possibility to shift resources 
between the two pillars, for the financial allocations to direct 
payments and rural development policies in each country.  
Internal convergence 
Of the 18 member states where the SAPS is not used, only six have 
implemented the basic payment at the regional level (Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Spain and the UK).16 In eight countries a 
national, or regional, flat per hectare payment will be used, in 2015 
(France (in Corsica), Germany,17 Malta and the UK (in England)), by 
2019 (Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, and the UK (in Scotland 
and Wales)), or 2020 (Sweden). Among the eight member states 
which decided for a flat rate payment, Austria, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Germany, at different points in time, will 
be using a single rate over the entire country. The other three 
countries opted for a flat payment at the regional level. The 10 
member states that currently apply the SAPS will continue to do so 
until 2020;18 under the SAPS the same per hectare payment is used 
                                                        
16 In Belgium both Flanders and Wallonia opted for the single region 
(national) model. In England, three of the four countries (England, Wales 
and Scotland) opted for the regional model. 
17 Germany opted for the regional model and a flat per hectare payment 
already in 2015. However, by 2019 it will have a single flat per hectare 
payment in place for the whole country.  
18 They are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 
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in the entire country. Finally, of the 12 member states which opted 
for a partial convergence of the per hectare payment, eight 
(Belgium, Croatia, France (except in Corsica), Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) have decided for the reduction in the 
above average per unit value of a farm’s entitlements, as a result of 
‘internal convergence’, not to exceed 30% (European Commission, 
2015). 
Share of national ceilings for direct payments allocated to the basic 
payment, or to the SAPS 
Member state decisions regarding the three voluntary direct 
payments (payments to farms located in areas facing natural 
constraints, coupled payments, and the redistributive payment) 
show very different patterns. No country has chosen to implement 
all three voluntary payments, or not to implement any. The share of 
the national ceiling for direct payments allocated to the ‘basic 
payment’ or to the SAPS (including the small farms scheme, if 
implemented) derives from the decisions taken by each member 
state regarding the voluntary payments to implement and the 
amount of financial resources it allocated to them as well as to the 
mandatory payment for young farmers. At least in theory, it may 
assume any value strictly smaller than 70%, given that 30% of the 
ceiling must be allocated to ‘green’ payments and the financial 
allocation for the mandatory payments to young farmers must be 
greater than zero, with no minimum having been set. In fact, 
decisions by member states generated a wide spectrum of shares of 
financial resources being allocated to the ‘basic payment’ and to the 
SAPS.  
Seven member states allocated at least 65% of their ceiling 
for direct payments to the ‘basic payment’ or to the SAPS (Austria, 
Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the 
UK19). In Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands ‘basic 
payments’ will absorb a share of the ceiling very close to 68%, as 
they all decided not to introduce the payment for farms located in 
areas facing natural constraints and the redistributive payment, and 
used less than 1% of the ceiling for coupled payments.20 Twelve 
                                                        
19 In the UK as a whole this percentage is 67% (Commission, 2015). 
20 The same is true for England, Northern Ireland and Wales in the UK. 
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member states ended up devoting to the ‘basic payment’, or to the 
SAPS, a percentage between 50% and 65% of their ceiling (Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden), six between 50% 
and 40% (Belgium (42%, resulting from 57% in the Flanders and 30% 
in Wallonia), Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Poland and Portugal) and 
three less than 40% (France, Lithuania and Malta). In Malta only 
13% of the national ceiling will be used for the ‘basic payments’, as 
a result of the choice to devote 57% of the ceiling to finance coupled 
support payments and 1% to payments to young farmers. It has 
been estimated that 55% of the overall EU-28 financial resources for 
direct payments will be used for the basic payment and the SAPS 
(European Commission, 2015). 
Coupled support 
The possibility to maintain part of the support coupled, and its 
magnitude, has been one of the most controversial issues in the 
negotiations. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom were strongly against it, while countries which had been 
using coupled payments more extensively took the opposite view. 
Coupled support payments turned out, by and large, to be the most 
popular voluntary component of direct payments; they have been 
implemented by all member states but Germany. In five member 
states (Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands) 
coupled payments will absorb a share of the national ceiling for 
direct payments which remains below 3%, while, at the opposite 
end, in four countries (Belgium (Wallonia), Finland, Malta and 
Portugal) it will exceed 15%.  
Payments for areas with natural constraints 
If coupled support has turned out to be a popular voluntary 
measure, only Denmark decided to activate the payment for farms 
in areas with natural constraints, and allocated to it less than 1% of 
its overall ceiling (the maximum allowed was 5%).  
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Redistributive payment 
The redistributive payment has been introduced in eight member 
states21 (Belgium (Wallonia), Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania), with a financial allocation which 
varies between 5% (Romania) and 20% (Wallonia and France22).  
Degressivity and capping 
Only two of the member states which introduced the redistributive 
payment will also have degressivity (Bulgaria and Poland), 
although they could have chosen otherwise, while Belgium (both 
Flanders and Wallonia), Croatia, France, Germany, Lithuania and 
Romania used the opportunity not to apply it. Fifteen out of the 22 
member states where degressivity will be implemented23 decided to 
apply the minimum possible percentage cut and to impose no cap, 
i.e. they will only apply a 5% cut on basic payments exceeding 
€150,000, while the others opted for higher percentage cuts. Nine 
countries decided to put a cap on direct payments. Finally, nine 
member states will apply degressivity to basic payments after 
having deducted salaries (not surprisingly, five of them are among 
those which opted to apply the minimum possible degressivity cut). 
The European Commission estimated that in the 2015-19 period 
degressivity and capping will result in a mere €112 million being 
transferred yearly from direct payments to rural development 
policies (European Commission, 2015), less than 0.3% of the 
financial resources allocated to direct payments in the 28 member 
states. 
Small farms scheme 
Finally, 15 member states decided to implement the small farms 
scheme, and only two (Latvia and Portugal) opted for a flat payment 
equal for all farms entering the scheme. 
                                                        
21 The decision to activate this payment can be modified every year. 
22 In France the allocation will progressively increase from 5% in 2015 to 
20% in 2018. 
23 These are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK (England). 
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Ranking national decisions based on their relative degree of 
‘conservativism’  
The information provided in Table 2.4 suggests a possible ranking 
of member states with respect to their revealed preferences in terms 
of the degree of ‘conservatism’ for their agriculture and rural 
development policies emerging from their use of the given room for 
manoeuvre.24 Two groups of EU-15 countries can be identified at 
the opposite ends of the hypothetical spectrum. Those relatively 
more inclined to introduce changes, although limited, in their 
agricultural policies, i.e. relatively ‘less conservative’, appear to be 
Germany, the Netherlands and, in the UK, England and Wales; in 
fact, they decided for a flat, national or regional, basic payment in 
2019 at the latest, to strengthen rural development policies by 
transferring financial resources from Pillar I to Pillar II and not to 
support their farms with payments coupled to production (in the 
Netherlands coupled payments involve a mere 0.5% of the national 
ceiling for direct payments).  
At the other extreme, one can identify a group of member states 
which used the flexibilities associated with the decisions to be taken 
at the national level to change the CAP (as implemented at home) 
as little as possible, i.e. the relatively ‘most conservative’ ones; this 
group includes Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, which opted not 
to implement a flat basic payment (at neither the national nor the 
regional level), not to transfer resources from one pillar to the other, 
to allocate more than 10% of their national ceiling for direct 
payments to coupled support, and not to implement the remaining 
two voluntary components of direct payments, by doing so further 
limiting the redistributive effects of the reform for their farmers. 
Between these two extreme groups one can possibly identify two 
intermediate ones, countries which are relatively ‘moderately 
conservative’ and ‘conservative’ with respect to their agricultural 
policies.  
                                                        
24 In classifying the countries based on their preference for relatively more 
or less policy conservation we considered only national decisions 
regarding the implementation of the reform; the results obtained seem to 
largely confirm negotiation stances, but in few cases a somehow different 
behaviour emerges once the reform has been decided. 
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The first group may include Austria, Finland, France, Greece, 
Sweden, and, in the UK, Northern Ireland and Scotland; within the 
second group one could place the Flanders and Wallonia, and 
Ireland.  
A wide variability emerges also in the implementation 
decisions of EU-13 member states. For example, three of the 
countries which will continue using the SAPS (Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia) will transfer a significant amount of funds (between 
15% and 25%) from Pillar II to Pillar I, but Estonia decided to 
transfer 15% of its funds in the opposite direction, from Pillar I to 
Pillar II. If Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania 
decided to implement, in addition to coupled support payments, 
the redistributive one, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia opted to introduce only the 
latter. Nine of the EU-13 decided to introduce the small farms 
scheme, but Cyprus, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia 
decided not to do so. 
Our conclusion is that, compared with previous ones, the 2013 
Cioloş reform yielded significantly different agricultural policies at 
the national level. Choosing partial or full convergence, at regional 
or national level, the decision to implement, or not to do so, the 
redistributive payment, the use of degressivity or capping of the 
basic payment, and the extent of coupled support payments make 
what in principle is still a common policy across the whole EU 
generate very different distributions of support within each 
member state. Many of the innovations contained in the reform 
which have been indicated as the most important ones have been 
introduced in the CAP as voluntary measures; some countries 
decided to use the new opportunities, while others have simply 
ignored them.  
7. Conclusions 
Compared with previous reforms of the CAP, the Cioloş reform is 
more difficult to assess. The difficulty arises from the many changes 
it involves, which, we believe, may be given evaluation marks 
signalling positive and negative judgments.  
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What is new in the reformed CAP?  
As discussed in the previous section, one of the most important 
innovations in the new CAP is the unprecedented degree of 
flexibility regarding a large number of voluntary measures and 
implementation decisions left to member states. Although this 
flexibility has had to be exerted within a given set of constraints, it 
was wide enough to yield quite different national realisations of the 
CAP, making one wonder how ‘common’ the policies for 
agriculture and rural development implemented in the 28 
individual member states are. The 2013 reform was the first one to 
bring a significant redistribution of support between member states 
(through the combined effect of the ‘external convergence’ of direct 
payments and the changes in the distribution of national allocations 
for rural development policies), and between farms within a 
member state (through the extension of direct payments to virtually 
all farms, ‘internal convergence’, ‘capping’, ‘degressivity’, the 
redistributive payment and the payment to young farmers). The 
redistribution benefitted member states and farmers who had 
enjoyed relatively less support from the CAP in the past, at the 
expense of those who did better previously.  
A positive innovation is the small farms scheme, a voluntary 
measure which was adopted by 15 member states, which 
significantly simplifies CAP support to small farms, with evident 
benefits for the beneficiaries as well as in terms of the administrative 
burden for the public sector.  
Another positive element of the reformed CAP is the 
significantly increased amount of resources devoted to research and 
development activities. 
The ‘green’ payment has been claimed to constitute a 
significant innovation, a step forward linking farm support to the 
production of public goods. We share the opinion of those who 
believe that the conditions to be satisfied in order to have access to 
this component of the direct payments are for most farms not very 
demanding and, as a result, it will generate marginal environmental 
benefits overall (Bureau & Mahé, 2015: chapter 3, this volume; 
Erjavec et al., 2015: chapter 9, this volume); Hart, 2015: chapter 10, 
this volume; Matthews, 2013; Potočnik, 2015: chapter 6, this 
volume). If this is the case, it has not introduced any significant 
change in the CAP, as it is, de facto, no different from the basic 
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payment. The two together will reproduce, on a somehow 
downsized scale, the single payment of the pre-2015 CAP, i.e. an 
income support measure with no linkage with the need of a farm to 
receive financial support, to the amount of socially valuable goods 
it produces, or with the additional costs it has to bear in order to 
generate a set volume of public goods. In terms of the implications 
of the reformed CAP for the environment, relevant provisions to be 
considered are also the relaxation of some of the cross-compliance 
requirements and, on the other hand, the constraint imposed on 
rural development programmes to assign a sizeable amount of 
resources to environment- and climate-related measures. 
As with previous reforms, the new CAP has been allocated a 
significantly reduced, in real terms, amount of financial resources, 
although these remain conspicuous.  
Is the new CAP more targeted?  
In the eight countries where it has been implemented, the 
redistributive payment will bring a significant redistribution of 
support in favour of small farms. The direct payment for young 
farmers, a mandatory measure which, however, can involve only a 
relatively small portion of financial resources, also introduces a new 
element in Pillar I which goes in the direction of better targeting 
direct support. Coupled payments provide targeted support in 
specific sectors and areas. On the contrary, the voluntary payment 
to farms located in areas facing natural constraints has been a flop; 
it was introduced by Denmark only and was allocated less than 1% 
of the country’s ceiling for direct payments. The decision to restrict 
the set of the beneficiaries of direct payments to ‘active farmers’ only 
will also be likely to have no tangible results. That said, the net effect 
of these measures is a new CAP more targeted than in the past 
towards young farmers and smaller farms.  
Is the new CAP less market distorting? 
The score card of the reform from the point of view of bringing a 
further market reorientation of the CAP shows mixed results. On 
the one hand, the elimination of sugar and milk quotas was 
confirmed; on the other, the decision to liberalise vine planting was 
reverted by limiting new plantings, an increased amount of 
financial resources will be used for coupled support (Bureau & 
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Mahé, 2015: chapter 3, this volume) and existing competition law 
waived to allow concerted actions to restrict supply by producers of 
PDO and PGI cheeses and hams. The reform has also brought new 
measures specifically meant to help farms face increased market 
competition: new risk management support measures; modified 
and significantly scaled up actions to promote the effective 
production, dissemination and adoption of innovations in 
agriculture; and the extension of POs from fruit and vegetable to all 
sectors. 
Is the new CAP more equitable?  
‘External’ and ‘internal convergence’ will significantly reduce 
differences in EU per hectare direct payments to farmers. However, 
a more uniform distribution of support does not automatically 
translate into a more equitable one. Equity can only be assessed with 
respect to a criterion, a principle to be pursued. If direct payments 
are assumed to support farmers as such – irrespective of their 
incomes, of the public goods they produce, of the contribution they 
make to the viability of their local area – then more uniform per 
hectare direct payments are probably more equitable. Also the 
redistribution of support from larger to smaller farms as a result of 
the redistributive payment, and the effects of capping and 
degressivity do not necessarily mean a more equitable distribution 
of support. If we assume smaller farms generate smaller incomes 
(and we decide to ignore household income generated by non-farm 
activities), providing more support to smaller farms improves the 
equity of direct payments as an income support measure.  
It should be clear by now why an overall assessment of the 
reformed CAP remains difficult. The Cioloş reform brought positive 
innovations in the CAP as well as innovations which have brought 
the robust, consistent path outlined by the previous reforms since 
1992 to a grinding halt. Those who hoped for a significant step 
forward along the same path, with the reform identifying a clear set 
of consistent strategic goals pursued by the CAP, a more targeted 
distribution of support and a significant portion of the financial 
resources devoted to increasing the market competitiveness of 
farms and promoting the production of public goods, probably have 
good reasons for being disappointed. Those who hoped the 
financial resources allocated to EU policies for agriculture and rural 
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development would not be severely cut (as feared at the beginning 
of the decision process), and for the reformed CAP to bring as few 
changes as possible, are probably quite satisfied by the final result.  
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3. WAS THE CAP REFORM 
A SUCCESS?*  
JEAN-CHRISTOPHE BUREAU 
AND LOUIS-PASCAL MAHÉ 
1. Introduction 
The 2013 CAP reform has been a long process involving many more 
actors, the European Parliament in particular, than in the previous 
reform undertakings. The early stages of the journey envisaged 
rather bold changes in response to the well identified failures of the 
CAP as pointed out by many stakeholders, analysts and think tanks. 
The distribution of direct payments and the impact of agriculture 
on the environment were prominent issues. This chapter takes stock 
of the actual outcome of the political process after the Council and 
the Parliament amended the Commission proposals in which 
ambitions for change had already been curtailed by the influence of 
farmer organisations and national administrations. 
Did the long process behind the new CAP reform deliver 
changes as expected and desired by the general public? To conclude 
whether this reform has been a success or a failure, one would like 
to ponder the final decisions in regards to a clear set of objectives or 
at least to an agreed vision for the future of European agriculture. 
However, no such thing can be found. Indeed, due to the lack of a 
consensus on what should be the objectives of the CAP, the Lisbon 
Treaty mostly did a cut and paste of the 1957 objectives of the Rome 
Treaty, even though many Council decisions and exposé des motifs in 
                                                        
* This chapter benefitted from precise comments from Allan Buckwell, Alan 
Swinbank, Alan Matthews, Jo Swinnen and Cathie Laroche-Dupraz. 
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the Commission’s regulations had shown how outdated these 
objectives had become.1  
We try to use as a benchmark for gauging success the distance 
between the June 2013 decisions and the new CAP objectives 
introduced by successive summits into the European Union official 
literature, particularly concerning the environment and the efficient 
use of public expenditures. We also use as a yardstick the guidelines 
of a needed reform identified by economists and prominent think 
tanks to evaluate to what extent adopted measures are indeed 
solutions to the remaining CAP problems. 
In this chapter we argue that the adopted regulations 
materialised only a fraction of the initial hopes for making the CAP 
more in line with the challenges of the 21st century. By and large the 
new payment has kept the deficiencies of the single payment. 
However, in spite of the many limitations of the new regulations 
and the loopholes introduced by the amendments of both the 
Council and the Parliament, some of the provisions can nevertheless 
be seen as positive. The wide latitude left to member states in the 
application of the reform suggests that they will now largely drive 
its impact. Whether this will be a positive outcome is still unclear: 
the national adaptations of the common legislation reveal great 
heterogeneity across Europe in ways of addressing some of the 
historical failures of the CAP, in particular its inability to promote 
public goods and deliver value for money. 
After a brief history of events, we focus on the new 
architecture of the direct payments, which exhibits more continuity 
than changes in spite of a renewed vocabulary and an attractive list 
of intentions. The effectiveness of the greening of the CAP is 
covered in section 4. Rural development, which was not the main 
subject of contentious debates, is briefly covered in section 5. 
Adjustments brought into market policies, safety nets, risk 
                                                        
1 This is particularly the case of the repeatedly stated objectives on 
environmental quality and rural development; see the conclusions of the 
2001 Göteborg European Council as an illustration. To be precise, note that 
the Lisbon Treaty does not fully replicate the wording of the 1957 Treaty 
since Article 44 was removed after a ruling of the European Court of Justice 
in 1994, stating that Community preference was not a principle of 
Community law (Greece v. Council, Case C-353/92); and Article 44 of the 
1957 Treaty was repealed by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. 
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management devices and measures to induce a better balance of 
market power in the food chain are dealt with in section 6. Section 7 
comes back to the issue of direct payments and rural public goods 
in a supranational context such as the CAP. It discusses the right 
sharing of powers and financing rules according to the spatial scope 
of the public goods at stake. Section 8 summarises our main 
conclusions. 
2. After the ‘Health Check’: A promising start 
When discussions on the future common agricultural policy (CAP) 
began, soon after the ‘Health Check’, many expected a major CAP 
reform in 2013. The previous multiannual financial framework 
(MFF) in 2005 had been the result of tense bargaining on agriculture 
and structural funds as well as on rebates. This outcome was then 
seen as buying time for the CAP, but surely, 2013 was the ideal time 
for a major reform. The CAP had been singled out as an obsolete 
policy, as its large budget was deemed to reinforce the past rather 
than to build Europe’s future (Sapir, 2003). The legitimacy of the 
massive amount of direct payments granted to farmers as 
compensation for the dated price cuts of the 1990s and early 2000s 
was fading. The EU had engaged in the ‘Europe 2020 strategy‘, a 
broad scheme for growth requiring a new design for EU policies. 
After 2008, the financial crisis was viewed as an additional reason 
to trim down and refocus CAP expenditures. 
Between 2007 and 2010, a vibrant debate on the future of the 
CAP took place across many segments of civil society.2 A 
considerable number of opinion papers, proposals and programmes 
showed that European society took agriculture and rural 
development seriously. Most of the main farmer organisations and 
several member states had a conservative vision. Basically, they 
                                                        
2 The formal online consultation organised by Commissioner Cioloş 
between April and June 2010 was itself deceptive, as submissions reflected 
identical ‘cut and paste’ versions of farmers unions’ prose coexisting with 
romantic suggestions for a policy to be friendlier to the environment and 
to animal welfare. However, a much deeper debate took place, fuelled by 
numerous contributions from member states, farm’ organisations, think 
tanks, environmental groups, academics, consumers and a heterogeneous 
set of organisations, from the UK Eurosceptics to the Church of Sweden. 
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defended the existing CAP, and in particular, its budget, along with 
a ‘simplification’ of the regulations which in mundane terms were 
hidden demands for less environmental constraints. By contrast, 
most of the other stakeholders highlighted the flaws of the current 
CAP, namely the inefficiency in transferring wealth, environmental 
damages, and the lack of ethical justification to Pillar I payments.3 
That budgets devoted to traditional CAP payments should be 
reduced and emphasis placed on research and public goods 
delivery was a view shared by many think tanks, academics and 
green groups. Expectations for a major reform were fairly high for a 
while. 
The surge in food prices in 2008 changed the image of 
agriculture. It was suddenly presented by agrarian circles as a 
strategic industry in times when food and energy could become 
scarce. Political forces with a more conservative agenda built on this 
fear to advocate maintaining the agricultural budget. Then, farm’ 
organisations put to good use the sudden drop in farm income in 
2009, confirming that one should “never miss the opportunity of a 
good crisis”. Top administrators in charge of agriculture in member 
states benefiting the most from the CAP budget increasingly came 
into play. Their prevailing view was that most EU farms, and even 
the most efficient ones, still needed the direct support in place to 
avoid a gloomy fate. A wide support for keeping a large budget for 
agriculture emerged in the inner circles of European and most 
national administrations. This support was clearly not unanimous, 
but the member states most opposed to it were much less vociferous 
than usual during the key phases of the negotiation process. The 
energetic demand from the new member states, academic circles 
included, for an alignment of hectare payments rates across old and 
new member states contributed to securing a large agricultural 
budget.  
                                                        
3 A survey of the different positions and proposals at the time can be found 
in a report commissioned to a large group of European academics, 
coordinated by Bureau & Witzke (2010). Section 2 of this report reveals a 
wide spectrum of ‘visions’ for future EU agriculture, but also large areas of 
convergence between academics, think tanks, environmental and socially 
concerned organisations as well as some member states. 
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Downgrading expectations 
Since the early 1990s, the Commission has traditionally appeared as 
the driver of reforms for the common interest, while, within the 
Council, the positions of member states on the CAP often followed 
some national interest, such as maximising net budgetary returns. 
In 1992 and 2003, commissioners deftly managed to design a true 
reform and worked with supporting member states to have some or 
most of it passed through the Council. This time, things were 
different due to the new institutional framework. Even before the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission had to 
develop its proposals while keeping in mind the possible veto of the 
Parliament. Hence, the proposals had to be more ‘co-constructed’ 
with the European Parliament’s Committee for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (COMAGRI). Further complications came up as 
budget and agricultural negotiations were intimately linked, given 
the weight of the CAP in the whole budget. There was no clear 
vision shared by member states regarding the sort of agriculture 
they wanted in the longer term on which the Commission could 
build.4 The Commission found inspiration in the Europe 2020 
strategy, to define some general principles, i.e. the CAP should be 
contributing to a more competitive and balanced food chain, 
including through promoting innovation, taking the diversity of EU 
farming systems into account to a greater degree, and addressing 
environmental degradation.  
The Commission was aware of the increasing necessity to 
respond to new challenges for the farm sector, particularly 
regarding the environment, efficient use of public funds, and 
international competition. The Commission nevertheless relied on 
studies that justified the vision that any significant departure from 
the current system of direct payments would result in a large 
number of farms going bankrupt. The Commission proposals, 
drafted in October 2010 and November 2011, reflected both 
prudence and movement. They implied a cleaning and grooming of 
the past while preserving existing expenditures, using efficiency, 
                                                        
4 The lack of shared objectives for the future reform was apparent in the 
2008 debates on the future orientation of EU agriculture under the French 
presidency. It failed to meet a consensus on an innocuous declaration, 
eventually published as a conclusion of the presidency (not the Council). 
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competitiveness and sustainability as arguments to do so.5 In spite 
of some innovative content, the contemplated reform could be seen 
as a set of adaptations of the previous system rather than an in-
depth reorientation of the CAP. 
The global architecture of the reform proposed by the 
Commission was largely maintained throughout the negotiation 
process between the Parliament and the Council, even though in the 
last stage the political role of the Commission within the new 
institutional framework proved to dwindle. Both Council and 
Parliament amendments changed many important details that 
reduced the environmental ambitions of the proposals, thus 
acceding to demands from European farmers. Indeed, COMAGRI 
was shown to be largely under the influence of farm interests, 
perhaps because it attracts members with close connections to 
farming, and because CAP technicalities put off other MEPs.6 
Debates within the Parliament were dominated by MEPs taking 
stances in favour of the farm sector, basically arguing for the status 
quo and for the upgrading of payment rates per hectare in the new 
member states. The joint decisions of the Parliament and the Council 
first settled the farm budget and then the detailed regulations in 
June 2013.7  
Much needed reforms 
During the debates over the reform, the dominant impression was 
the convergence of a large group of stakeholders (called the 
‘reformers’ here) on important issues, and their real contribution to 
pave the way for designing a desirable reform. They included some 
member states, academics, think tanks and environmental 
                                                        
5 The Commission did envisage the bolder ‘option 3’ for the reform in its 
Communication to the Council and the Parliament but this scenario 
received little support (European Commission, 2010b). Many saw this 
option as not seriously defended by the Commission, but rather as a way 
to bracket their actual proposal by two radical scenarios. 
6 An illuminating historical account of the roles and influences of each of 
the three European institutions (Commission, Parliament & Council) in the 
process leading to final decisions is given by Knops & Swinnen (2015). 
7 Official Journal of 20 December 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/ 
cap-post-2013/legislation/index_en.htm. 
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organisations. A typical illustration of the proposals that were put 
forward remains the excellent analysis conducted by the Dutch 
Social and Economic Council (SER, 2008). These stakeholders 
proposed to reduce the single payment and to refocus budgets on 
the delivery of green and ‘blue’, i.e. water, services as well as on 
research and innovation. This mirrored many of the ideas put 
forward by think tanks (Bureau & Mahé, 2008; LUPG, 2009; Cooper, 
Hart & Baldock, 2010); academics, e.g. Anania et al., 2008; Bureau & 
Witzke, 2010. The proposals tabled by some member states, e.g. The 
Netherlands, the UK, also shared many of these recommendations. 
On some particular aspects, reformist farmers’ and other 
organisations (such as the UK Country Land and Business 
Association and, to some extent, the European Landowners 
Organisation) also shared views such as the need to protect 
renewable resources such as soil, water and biodiversity. On other 
issues, major divergences appeared among the reformers, in 
particular regarding the role of government intervention and the 
need to support and stabilise markets and transfer income to 
farmers.  
A point of convergence for the reformers was the diagnosis of 
the flaws of the current CAP. They considered that the considerable 
amounts of direct payments currently in place lacked justification, 
being proportional to eligible land area and mostly the 
‘grandchildren’ of the ‘compensatory payments’ for price cuts that 
took place in 1993, 1999 and later; that they tended to increase 
‘natural’ income disparities across member states and across 
individual farmers; that the bulk of payments was provided to 
beneficiaries who were, on average, wealthier than the taxpayer 
bearing their cost; that a significant share of these transfers were 
prone to leakages and benefited unintended recipients due to pass-
through to primary factors (land and farm equity owners, in 
particular8); that they made more costly the entry of newcomers and 
                                                        
8 This process has now been going on for a long time and the additional 
contributions of aids to explain land prices is hard to detect statistically and 
depends on lease regulations. Other sources of farming profitability are key 
factors of land prices. As regards farm equity, its additional value due to 
subsidies is hidden in the grey clouds of farm capital evaluation that an 
incoming farmer has to pay – officially or not – to the retiree when he takes 
over a farm.  
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hence countervailed the young farmer subsidy programmes; that 
these payments led risk-averse farmers to specialise more, 
favouring simpler rotations and monoculture, with adverse 
environmental effects; that the whole payment scheme was no 
longer in accordance with some urgent problems such as the 
dramatic erosion of biodiversity in agricultural areas, water 
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, etc.; and that cross-
compliance, supposedly linking good farm practices to payment 
eligibility, had not been enforced by member states but was still 
invoked in spite of a missing relation between payment rates and 
compliance costs.9 
Another point of convergence was that the reform was a 
unique opportunity to redirect public expenditure towards the 
recommendations of economic analysis. This included granting 
incentives to positive externalities and public goods, sheltering the 
long-term fate of natural resources from market short-sightedness, 
and providing economic conditions for growth and innovation, in 
particular through infrastructure, information, research and 
development. As a whole, the reformers adopted the ‘public money 
for public goods’ stance. In the inner circles of the CAP decision 
system, however, the concept of ‘public goods’ tended to be 
interpreted in a broader sense than what economic theory refers to 
(see the “Summary of the Institutional Positions in the CAP 
Negotiations” in the tables in the Appendix). 
3. Direct payments 
Embedding entitlements into the CAP 
Direct payments have long become the major budgetary item in the 
CAP. The pressure to maintain a high level of expenditures arose 
from farm’ organisations. They have never been fond of the 
conditions and the programming imposed in order to receive 
Pillar II payments, and cherish entitlements and payments ‘rights’, 
a designation which was most unfortunate for a down payment that 
                                                        
9 ECA (2011) supplies anecdotes of the unsuppressed vagaries of the Single 
Payment System. Although the arguments essentially refer to European 
law and have little economic content, the report obviates a faulty system of 
tradable entitlements.  
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was supposed to offset a once and for all support price cut. The 
pressure also arose from member states anxious to maintain net 
budgetary returns. MEPs followed suit. Such pressure has been 
surprisingly successful: while the Commission seemed open to 
significant budget reallocations, the Pillar I budget remained 
practically untouched, neutering any major reform along the ‘public 
money for public goods’ line.  
The choice of the Commission itself was to stick to the concept 
of entitlements to direct payments instead of embarking on the 
contractual approach. It was also to dodge planning a gradual 
reduction of the Pillar I payments, which have barely any 
connection with public goods and are still a tool for income support. 
A reason why the Commission fell short of planning the phasing 
out of the single payments, but maintained a significant flat ‘basic’ 
payment, is that farm incomes depend greatly on direct payments. 
Static simulations using the Farm Accountancy Data Network and 
more sophisticated studies such as “Scenar 2020” (Nowicki et al., 
2010) were used to back the idea that any sharp decrease in the 
direct payment budget would result in a large number of farms 
going bankrupt. This outcome was foreseen not only in member 
states where farm structures are lagging, but also in the ones where 
farms are highly modernised but also heavily indebted, such as 
Denmark and the Netherlands. The Commission’s impact 
assessment stressed this point and warned against the risk of 
“unbalanced territorial development”, should direct payments be 
reduced. Whether this assessment reflects economic reality is 
debatable. Clearly, direct payments account for a major share of net 
farm incomes. In the livestock sector and in several countries, these 
payments account for a large part of apparent added value, and an 
even larger part of net income (Matthews, 2014). However, farms 
depending most on direct payments, e.g. the extensive livestock 
sector, would easily qualify for forms of support other than basic 
payments, such as Pillar II measures more targeted towards public 
goods. Provided that the valuation of such environmental and 
territorial services by society is high enough to justify payments 
suitable to make a living, marginal areas can avoid further loss of 
farm population. In large arable crop farms, many international 
examples show that a gradual adjustment to a well-planned and 
announced reform involves large cost reductions, in particular 
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through the cost of primary factors (New Zealand and Canadian 
agriculture have successfully phased out large subsidies).  
The fact that large farms, otherwise technically efficient, 
seemed to be on the brink of failure without the Single Payment 
Scheme (SPS) is about much more than the widely perceived 
distribution issue; it is also a problem of resource allocation and 
inefficiency of the agricultural system as a whole. It is a vexing 
paradox that the CAP payments have generated a modernised and 
capitalised farm sub-sector, assisted under the argument of 
improving competitiveness, which at first glance would be unable 
to thrive without huge amounts of public funds. Such farms should 
be viable after dynamic adjustments are allowed to occur. Policy-
makers should be more aware of the long-term implications of 
buying time and short-term peace from the lobbies through 
granting rents that capitalise on farm equity and become ‘drawing 
rights’ on the EU budget, becoming so entrenched that they 
undermine much needed reforms.  
A better architecture for Pillar I, but weakened by loopholes  
The Commission proposal for a new architecture of direct payments 
survived the negotiation process with the Council and the 
Parliament. The multiple layer payments may appear in line with 
similar proposals from some think tanks (for examples, see SER, 
2008; Bureau & Mahé, 2008). However, a number of key 
characteristics of think tank proposals were dropped along the way. 
So were the ideas of gradually phasing out the basic payment; of 
making payments contractual and not transferable; and of attaching 
a new set of green payments to designated public goods rather than 
submitting current payments to extra cross-compliance. In the end, 
the cost-effectiveness of the payments to deliver public goods has 
been curtailed, at least in comparison with a more focused scheme.10 
                                                        
10 To illustrate the point, taking a crop farm of 100 ha with a gross margin 
of €400/ha and assuming the worst case of 5% EFA condition requiring to 
set aside arable land, focused ‘green’ payments would cost €2,000 while 
30% of the entitlements to direct payments (assume €25,000) amount to 
€7,500. On these aspects, see the analyses of Mahé (2012), Matthews 
(2013b), and Hart (2015) in chapter 10 of this volume.  
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The link between payments and the opportunity cost of effective 
upgraded practices was abandoned.  
The misuse of public funds was exacerbated by relaxing the 
requirements for counterparts for the green payments. 
Furthermore, in widespread situations where the conditions for 
green payments require no or minimal adjustment of practices and 
land use, the cost of compliance will be null or nearly so and the 
green payments clearly a windfall gain – in which case 
‘greenwashing’ is an appropriate qualification. It is a paradox that 
Article 28 of the Direct Payment Regulation requires that, in the 
context of transmission of entitlements, any windfall gain due to an 
increase of the value of entitlements “is to revert to the national 
reserve” and that the pervasive likelihood of windfall gain due to 
‘green’ payments is overlooked.  
One conspicuous diversion of the previous SPS, pointed out 
by the European Court of Auditors, was the de facto admitted 
eligibility of non-farm entities. The new regulations call for efforts 
to narrow down the ‘active farmer’ condition for receiving 
payments. Designated non-farm activities such as recreational 
activities are now explicitly excluded. No payment should be given 
to areas “naturally kept apt to grazing or cultivation” (Art. 9, R1307) 
even though the exclusion criteria as written in the delegated acts 
seem rather lax.11 Eventually, the primary objective of the ‘active 
farmer’ provision is to allow exclusion of the most publicised 
leakages, e.g. payments to airports and golf courses. In spite of 
potential loopholes that make12 this objective conditional on the 
national implementation of the measure, the active farmer 
argument is perhaps a double-edged sword, since it enshrines the 
notion that only farmers should be paid for the delivery of 
environmental services on agricultural land, while the debate on 
this issue deserves to be open since the economic and legal bases for 
                                                        
11 Exclusion from payments would result if more than 50% of the declared 
area is natural. It will be tempting to adjust the claims so that the threshold 
is not passed.  
12 These exclusions can be easily nullified due to an explicit exception when 
direct payments are at least 5% of the non-agricultural receipts, which is 
not a dire demand (see item 2(a) of Art. 9 R1307). Again, member states’ 
adaptation of the regulation will prove determinant. 
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this privileged right granted to farmers are questionable. This 
measure, with its weakness and judicial complexity, is the result of 
the choice to stick to cross-compliance and entitlements instead of 
deploying contractual payments focused on services in which 
compensation and cost of services could be made more equal. Were 
green payments adjusted to the costs suffered by economic agents, 
this issue and many other perverse effects of direct payments would 
vanish. 
Overall, the new architecture of direct payments states 
legitimate objectives but the maintained status of ‘entitlement cum 
cross-compliance’ suffers from three weaknesses: 1) it is far from a 
targeted measure either on environmental services or on any other 
public good; 2) it does not respond to the major criticism that, in 
many member states, those who benefit more from these transfers 
are often wealthier than the average taxpayer who funds them; and 
3) tradability of entitlements and rent capitalisation feeds the 
political demand for perpetuation of the basic payments.  
Capping, redistribution and convergence 
The capping of payments initially proposed by the Commission was 
modest, but that which results from the regulation’s final adoption 
will, in practice, be almost completely ineffective, particularly for 
the largest beneficiaries in member states choosing the 5% reduction 
of the basic payments. The topping up of payment ceilings by the 
outlays of hired labour costs for the larger farm units, already in the 
proposals, is a strange way to foster employment in rural areas, as 
was argued for. The wage rate being overwhelmingly set by the 
national labour market, this allowance is a biased transfer in favour 
of capital and land rather than labour, contrary to what is alleged. It 
had been suggested that such an exception for capping would be 
restricted to farm cooperatives or similar arrangements where farm 
income is shared by workers, but high stakes for the few large 
beneficiaries and national biases have managed to influence the 
decision process. The first evaluation by the Commission of the 
product of the reduction of payments mechanism for the period 
2015-19 is €558 million or €110 million per year, which translates 
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into only 0.2% of the Pillar I budget.13 It appears that the impact of 
capping and degressivity is unlikely to match the redistribution that 
took place under the former modulation schemes. 
However, the possibility left to member states to implement 
redistributive payments, i.e. to provide higher per hectare payments 
for the first hectares (up to 65% of the average payments on the first 
30 ha or the average farm size) can have significant distributional 
consequences. Eight member states took this option and 
accordingly most of them chose not to apply the reduction 
mechanism. This means, as for capping, that the largest beneficiaries 
will not be particularly penalised. In the case of France, the main 
promoter of this provision, this measure is such that the degree of 
progressivity of CAP payments involves redistributions going 
much further than the previous ones. While this measure has a 
compelling social legitimacy, it raises the question of its longer-term 
impact on maintaining small structures in place. The smaller size of 
EU farms is a significant explanation of the limited competitiveness 
of the EU beef and sheep production compared to third-country 
producers. This privileged treatment of smaller farmers would be 
even more justifiable if the top-ups were conditioned on verifiable 
upgraded practices regarding the environment or on territorial 
objectives, i.e. on joint public goods provision. 
Convergence of payment rates was widely accepted in the 
name of equity. However, convergence of the level of payment per 
hectare hardly makes the overall distribution of payments more 
equal due to the farm size effect. The redistributive payments have 
the merit of alleviating the inequality bias built into the system, 
since basic payments are proportional to area and entail small 
compliance costs. One more feature of uncapped payments has been 
overlooked. Being unlimited, the payments boost the net income of 
farmers whose acreage is large and hence saving propensity high 
enough to buy additional land or to invest in even larger farms, 
either in EU-15 or in new member states, or in both, or in residential 
                                                        
13 Nine member states have declared their intention to cap basic payments 
at maximum amounts ranging from €150,000 to €600,000. Ten member 
states opted for applying only the minimum reduction of 5% on amounts 
of basic payments above €150,000. Eight member states plan on subtracting 
the salaries actually paid by farmers from the payments before applying 
the reduction of payments’ mechanism (European Commission, 2014). 
100  WAS THE CAP REFORM A SUCCESS? 
 
properties. Moreover, owners of largest farms benefiting primarily 
from CAP payments reach higher tranches of income tax rates, 
which make the use of marginal purchased inputs cheaper than 
their marginal products, a mechanism which further exacerbates 
intensification. 
The compulsory shift towards a more uniform payment per 
hectare can be seen as progress, in the sense that such payments 
should be less directed towards the most productive areas than the 
historical entitlements based on compensations for old price cuts. 
However, the rationale for a uniform payment rate is weak, since a 
single rate per hectare it is a poor indicator that this payment is ‘fair’, 
especially when the public goods supplied and their production 
costs are heterogeneous. As simulations for the Parliament had 
pointed out, the impact of such a shift in terms of global inequality 
(as measured by Gini coefficients) is limited, unless this 
redistribution is conditioned on a capping of payments per capita 
(Bureau & Witzke, 2010). In addition, the compulsory shift to a 
uniform rate per hectare is hardly a revolution: member states 
already had the possibility to get away from the historical 
individual references under the previous Regulation 2009/73, and 
many of them had done so. The innovation is that this shift to a per 
hectare basic payment symbolically closes a period where direct 
payments had the legitimacy of the ‘compensatory payments’. 
Whether this lifts a major psychological obstacle to designing a 
genuinely new CAP in the future remains to be seen. 
While the flexibility left to the member states keen to make 
different choices between pursuing social objectives and boosting 
production capacity has proved useful to avoiding endless 
negotiations, the embodiment of a permanent entitlement to the 
basic payment per hectare remains at the core of the economic and 
political problems of the CAP and precludes the emergence of a 
policy based on public sector economics. A crucial clause remains 
missing in EU texts, which is that no individual should receive EU 
payments above what can be considered the minimum wage in 
his/her country, unless these payments are laden with obligations 
to deliver public goods or services and require specific costs. This 
issue was not even discussed, even though Farm Accountancy Data 
Network figures show that the average transfer to a farmer reaches 
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a very high level in some member states.14 Ten member states (often 
with a high proportion of large farms) are not going to apply a real 
capping but will use the flat 5% reduction of basic payments instead, 
even though they are now assured to keep the proceeds in the 
country. As most member states using redistributive payments did 
not go as far as also applying the payment reduction mechanism, 
the general picture is of the reluctance to implement an effective 
capping of support. This fact reveals that ‘national preferences’ for 
(non-) redistribution of support, or national politics rather, are a key 
explanation for why capping was so hard and contentious to phase 
in. It also suggests that diverging national interests15 and the 
heterogeneous proportions of large farms across member states 
were not enough to explain the aborted attempts to cap large 
payments in 1993. 
Full harmonisation of the per hectare payments throughout 
the EU is clearly not achieved, but this criterion made little sense if 
strictly enforced: the per hectare payment is not a particularly 
legitimate indicator; and homogenisation of a per hectare payment 
does not ensure that equity is achieved when structures, economic 
and regulatory conditions differ. Were the convergence conducted 
more swiftly than GNP/capita, further rents would be generated in 
new member states, making later reforms more painful and primary 
factor market adjustments toward efficiency slower. Demands for 
more convergence from new member states were often a 
smokescreen for plain bargaining on a larger share of the EU 
budget. On this issue the Commission proposal was reasonable and 
the reform probably went as far as it was politically possible.  
Payments to young farmers and for natural constraints, 
simplification 
The new CAP gives member states latitude for subsidies to young 
farmers entering the profession (programmes already existed at the 
member state level as well as under rural development funding). 
However, the mere fact that such policies are seen as necessary to 
                                                        
14 According to these data, the average farmer in Luxembourg receives 
€63,000 from the taxpayer, see Matthews (2014). 
15 In the initial attempts to reduce the largest payments by a levy, the 
proceeds were not to be kept by member states.  
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make it possible for newcomers to enter the sector illustrates the 
barriers caused by the pass-through of payments to asset and equity 
prices.16 From that point of view, the young farmer payment can be 
seen as a patch to alleviate a problem created by the CAP in the first 
place. As it is neither targeted to identified public goods nor 
restricted to designated areas stricken by rural decay or dereliction, 
and granted in areas where farming has too many candidates, it thus 
inflates the various hidden payments to retiring farmers or fuels the 
bidding up of land prices.  
The reform makes it possible for member states to provide 
larger amounts of aid to farmers in areas with natural constraints 
(ANC). The experience with past programmes of Pillar II suggests 
that they address some important objectives and do so at a limited 
cost. The Commission also successfully introduced a definition of 
these areas based on agronomic and biophysical characteristics, 
rather than the former (absurd) definition which led some very 
fertile land to be classified as less-favoured. This voluntary measure 
did not succeed since only one country decided to use it. Applying 
a flatter rate to direct payments, which favours less privileged areas, 
and the simultaneous availability of measures with similar 
purposes in Pillar II, without merging the two schemes, may be the 
explanation. 
One drawback of extended targeting of Pillar I payments is 
that the new measures contribute to the blurring of the distinction 
between Pillar I and Pillar II and the coordination of different 
measures having the same objectives.17 This hardly contributes to 
making the CAP simpler. The regime for small farmers makes good 
sense and even more so for the new possibility of replacing annual 
calculation of payments by a lump-sum annual amount.18 This 
                                                        
16 The capitalisation of payments into land prices is a controversial issue 
that needs to be explored further. Swinnen et al. (2013) noticed that the 
capitalisation mechanism is observed in many empirical studies but with 
variable intensity. It should be stressed that extensive capitalisation does 
not mean that direct payments are the essential explanatory factor of land 
prices.  
17 It is also the case for the young farmer payment that supplements Pillar 
II programmes and also for green payments. 
18A similar possibility exists for the young farmer payments. 
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clause was introduced by the Commission proposals and the 
regulation extends this possibility to the young farmer payment. But 
the concept could have been carried further, by offering a once and 
for all payment to small farmers (particularly older ones) so as to 
facilitate farm restructuring, another idea floated by economists 
advocating the bond scheme (e.g. Swinbank & Tangermann, 2004).  
Recoupling  
Another concern with the reform is the degree of recoupling of 
direct payments. While coupled payments amounted to 7% of the 
total Pillar I direct payments in 2013, i.e. €2.85 billion, the new 
regulation allows coupled support to reach 13% of the national 
ceiling, plus potentially 2% for those member states that support 
protein seeds, i.e. up to €6.3 billion in 2019, and potentially more 
with authorisation under Article 53.3 of Regulation 1307/2013. 
However, not all member states opted for voluntary coupled 
support at the maximum level. According to member state 
notifications to the Commission in 2014, the budget devoted to 
voluntary coupled support should reach 10% of the Pillar I 
payments envelope.19 This is a significant increase compared to the 
situation before the reform.  
The possibility of recoupling also goes beyond what was 
previously possible at least in terms of product coverage. This can 
be seen in some limited cases as a shift back to distorting forms of 
support in order to boost lack of competitiveness and in others as a 
manner to maintain products and techniques with associated 
positive externalities. Given the poor record of past ambitious 
schemes of coupled payments, the extension of coupling to protein 
crops, an option that seems to be chosen by 10 member states, is 
hardly convincing.20 However, there are genuine cases of joint 
                                                        
19 Source: i.e. €4.1 billion in 2019, based on ceilings provided in Annex II of 
Regulation 1307/2013 and the member states notification in European 
Commission (2015). 
20 Current enthusiasm for supporting proteins ignores that payments for 
oilseeds and protein seeds were implemented in the 1980s. They rapidly 
became the largest expenditure in the EU budget, without ensuring that a 
competitive sector would emerge, and with a limited impact on the self-
sufficiency of proteins at the time. When the measure is used to foster 
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public goods that are only delivered together with production. 
Article 68 of the previous regulation already provided some 
flexibility to member states in this area, which was used, for 
example, to support extensive livestock production. On this issue, 
the outcome of the reform is less satisfactory than the initial 
proposals by the Commission, which were more restrictive in terms 
of production systems eligible for support, but the flexibility left to 
member states makes it consistent with the need to foster joint 
externalities in a particular region. 
The notifications of member states bring some light on the 
motivations behind the high rate of adoption of this voluntary 
measure. The main beneficiaries are beef (42%), milk (20%), sheep 
and goats (12%) and protein crops (10%). Although the linkages 
with territorial and environmental objectives are not explicit at this 
stage, the presumption is that the component of ’jointness’ with 
rural public goods is present in the motivations of member states, at 
least for livestock. Less convincing is the choice to maintain coupled 
support for beet crops (4%) by 10 member states which include a 
rare combination of Mediterranean and Nordic countries trying to 
escape comparative (dis)advantage. The cost-benefit ratio of these 
measures needs to be verified through a procedure of evaluation 
such as the one in the rural development programmes and the 
lessons of past experiences should be fully drawn.  
Overall, to summarise, the reform is clearly disappointing as 
far as direct payments are concerned, although the reshaping of the 
direct payments architecture clearly stresses long-run motivations 
to reach more defensible policy objectives and by doing so could 
pave the way for a more targeted, pro-public goods system in the 
future. In the absence of a commitment to review the regulation 
before 2020, the 2013 reform clearly missed a major opportunity to 
address fundamental problems of the CAP such as the leakages of 
payments, indirect incentives to intensification and specialisation, 
or the lack of rationale for granting such a high level of payments to 
a single individual. 
To place the multiple weaknesses of the new payment system 
that we pointed out in a long-run perspective, it is worth stressing 
                                                        
production of lucerne and alfalfa, it may nevertheless provide 
environmental benefits.  
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that our critical comments essentially originate in the dual nature of 
the bulk of the new hectare payments, i.e. the combination of the 
basic and the green components in a single rather than two separate 
instruments. For the most part our critiques relate to the first 
component, and only to the green payment as long as in the majority 
cases it is a top-up without further compliance cost. As a so-called 
‘income support scheme’, the basic payment suffers from the same 
perverse effects as the previous single payment: leakages, rent-
creating and rent-seeking, regressive distribution, inequity of 
heterogeneity of payment rates per hectare, inequity of income 
distribution due to farm size concentration, unintended 
beneficiaries, etc. Hence the measures introduced in the reform to 
mitigate the perverse effects: convergence of rates within and 
between member states, capping receipts per farm, redistributive 
payments, etc. Because the green component is attached and often 
proportional to the basic payment, it suffers from similar 
deficiencies and perverse effects.  
The two major defects of the new green payment is that it is 
based neither on the value of ecological services expected from 
eligibility conditions nor on the cost of providing these services. If 
these costs are at most equal to the value of the public goods under 
scrutiny, public support is justified. But if payment is close to the 
cost incurred – and accordingly provides earning opportunities to 
farm labour – the dire questions of capping, degressivity, 
convergence, unintended beneficiaries, proportionality to acreage, 
etc., would no longer be relevant since windfall gains would be 
insignificant. Moreover, green payments could vary across Europe 
according to the nature value of the areas and to the local cost of 
procurement.  
Of course, available information on rural public goods value 
is still inadequate, but information on costs is easier to uncover and 
although the task is immense, the new system does not include any 
progress in that direction. It mainly gives an official status to the 
principle of relating direct payments to environmental and 
territorial public goods in the rural space of Europe, but only in a 
broad sense without approaching equalisation of payments, values 
and costs. There is a long way to go, both from a political and 
economic point of view, before such sound economic foundations 
are established in the CAP principles in the same way as, for 
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example, the ‘polluter pays’ principle was established in European 
environmental policy.21 
4. Greening ‘à la carte’ 
The so-called ‘green’ payment is sometimes presented by the 
Commission as the first compulsory payment that compels member 
states to act in favour of the environment, and is therefore 
considered an important step. While this cannot be ignored, the 
conditions under which this was achieved suggest that the CAP is 
still far away from the public goods orientation.  
The Commission proposal was moderately ambitious as 
regards the greening of payments, but the first draft, which 
designed the ecological focus areas (EFAs), was a breakthrough in 
terms of the much needed protection of biodiversity (see Bureau, 
2013; Kleijn, 2014). COMAGRI played a significant role in relaxing 
the green payment conditionality, but many of the amendments that 
de facto removed any teeth from the green payment conditions (at 
least in member states willing to do so) came from the Council 
(Hart, 2015: chapter 10, this volume). Eventually, the greening 
conditions on Pillar I payments were watered down either by the 
Parliament, e.g. relaxing penalties for compliances, or by the 
Council, e.g. weakening requirements for EFAs and conditions for 
permanent grassland, and in many cases by both, e.g. expanding 
                                                        
21 Defining such optimal green payments would need further rules 
regarding how the roles and financing burdens are shared between the EU 
and of national governments according to the scope of public goods 
(section 6). If green and basic payments were separated as suggested above, 
the cost incurred and income foregone for green payment eligibility would 
be made heavier due to both the persistence and the size of the basic 
payment itself. As the latter would provide a reward for doing nothing for 
the environment, the green incentive would be more costly as second-best 
theory shows. In situations where the services are due to the efforts of past 
generations and cost nothing to the current one, the choice between setting 
legal obligations to maintain the flow of services without reward and 
granting aids for not degrading existing services is, as in the case of 
pollution, a political decision regarding property rights or a trade-off 
between implementation costs of different schemes addressing the same 
purpose. 
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land eligibility as an EFA, adding to exemptions from requirements, 
granting the ‘green by definition’ status, etc.22 
In the aftermath of the reform, any member state unwilling to 
‘green’ its direct payments has many possible options. It can reduce 
dramatically the Pillar II budget, including measures devoted to 
public goods (five member states have chosen to transfer funds from 
Pillar II to Pillar I against 10 the other way around). It can also 
implement a basic payment subject to fewer statutory management 
requirements than the former single payment. A member state can 
also use a number of options to minimise the constraints on the 
green payment (Hart & Menadue, 2013). We can quote the national 
certifications of equivalence, options to define EFAs, exemptions for 
large categories of farmers, ways of counting the different crops and 
defining ‘diversification’, bundling of the permanent pasture 
constraint at a regional level, etc. Eventually, a member state can 
manage to have almost any of its farmers eligible for the green 
                                                        
22 An example is the proposal to extend the initial list of conditions for a 
hectare to be eligible to counting as EFA. The idea was first to include land 
covering fodder such as lucerne or alfalfa in addition to fallow, terraces, 
traditional orchards, etc., which were listed as eligible for EFA status in the 
Commission proposal. Lucerne was rapidly expanded to ‘nitrogen fixing 
plants’ subject to a ‘no fertilizer and no pesticide condition’. However, the 
latter condition was softened as a ‘no fertilizer or no pesticide condition’, 
before being dropped altogether. At the end, intensive soybean production 
with glyphosate could potentially be counted as EFA if a member state 
were willing to do so. That 27 member states included nitrogen fixing crops 
in their EFAs is not reassuring, although the most popular crop species 
notified by member states seem to be rather extensive ones. Similar 
examples could be found with the crop rotation constraint (winter wheat 
and soft wheat can be considered as two different crops; temporary crops 
between two successive harvests of corn can be considered as 
diversification, etc.); with equivalent practices, and with the possibility of 
counting short rotation coppice, possibly grown out of the farm perimeter 
as EFAs. Another illustrating case is the options chosen in France for the 
ratio of permanent pastures: no sensitive pastures were defined outside of 
those under the environmental regulations (habitats...) and, when arable 
land is converted into pasture, it is granted permanent pasture status as 
soon as the first year, thus creating a discrepancy between actual and legal 
permanent pastures. 
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payments without changing any of its environmentally unfriendly 
practices.  
By contrast, those member states willing to be serious with 
greening now have greater flexibility to do so. Signs of a serious 
reorientation of Pillar I payments towards environmental services 
are apparent in the local implementation of the regulation proposed 
in the UK, for example, with an increased transfer rate of 15% from 
Pillar I to Pillar II, i.e. higher than the previous modulation scheme, 
to fund the New Environmental Land Management Scheme, more 
ambitious than the previous Environmental Stewardship Scheme. 
The fact that 20 member states did not opt for equivalence schemes 
suggests that only a minority will use all options to relax 
environment cross-compliance requirements on Pillar I payments, 
even if a majority chose rather extensive definitions for land uses 
eligible for EFAs and lax interpretations of the crop rotation 
obligation. 
The EFA may be enforced for half of the required 5% rate at a 
wider spatial grid than the farm to pursue the protection of 
corridors of biodiversity. This pooling of commitments might be 
used by farmers to focus the EFAs on less productive areas. This 
way to minimise the economic cost of the requirement may 
nevertheless lead to positive effects on biodiversity, as envisaged by 
analysts of the reform proposals23 who advocated for such 
flexibility. The reference grid has to make sense regarding natural 
conditions and the regulation (delegated acts) requires clear rules to 
be established for participating farmers, including financial 
compensation between those who set aside more land than average 
and those who do less. The Commission also deserves credit for 
                                                        
23 In order to promote connectivity of EFAs, Matthews (2012: 44) proposed 
topping up payments of Pillar II for farmers who deliberately associated 
their EFAs with landscape scale plans. Mahé (2012: 13) proposed defining 
the EFAs on a spatial grid or network and organising an exchange of 
obligations between farmers, so as to combine individual obligations and 
ecological corridors. The Committee of the Regions, in its Opinion on the 
Commission’s CAP proposals (OJEU 27 7 2012, item 26), also explicitly 
called for “conferring on local and regional authorities the power to initiate 
and manage targeted environmental measures and allowing them to 
introduce territorial contracts which are signed jointly with farmers or their 
representatives.” 
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displaying firm resistance to repeated demands from the farmer 
organisations to have the EFAs applied at regional level without any 
individual responsibility, which would have led to condoning all 
individual practices contrary to greening. 
The eligibility conditions for green payments in the initial 
Commission proposals were seen to be already satisfied in most 
farming areas (in France, for example, see CGDD, 2012). The 
extension and relaxation of eligibility conditions in the final acts 
strongly suggest that most farms in the EU will receive the 30% 
greening premium with barely any cost. Another windfall gain is 
then inserted into the CAP. The essential contribution of the reform 
boils down to granting an official status to environmental objectives 
of the CAP, providing room for manoeuvre to member states where 
green preferences are better conveyed by policy-makers, and 
possibly facilitating a next step when evidence becomes strong 
enough to make compulsory the currently voluntary best options 
adopted by early bird member states.  
5. Rural development 
The reform has changed the rural development programme in the 
area of strategic programming, in the content of the measures 
eligible for funding, and in linking the programme to broader 
‘strategic’ EU policies, in particular regarding innovation.  
The better integration of the rural development fund with 
other common funds, through the Common Strategic Framework, 
should ensure more consistency and a faster implementation of the 
measures after the 2013 CAP reform. It is nevertheless too early to 
assess whether this will be successful in practice. The reform created 
changes that have so far required adjustments and generated delays 
as well as under-approval.  
The change from three axes to six priorities is hardly a recipe 
for efficiency. These priorities are so general and ambitious that one 
wonders how a reduced Pillar II budget could seriously make a 
difference in areas such as climate change, innovation, job creation 
and competitiveness. The European Innovation Partnership is 
presented by the Commission as a way to foster innovation while 
bridging the gap between researchers and users. Transferring 
public money away from farm payments to research and innovation 
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has long been a recommendation by think tanks. However, sceptics 
argue that the record of the EU research programme is questionable 
in terms of bureaucratic administration. The compulsory 
involvement of the private sector in these ‘partnerships’ is no 
guarantee of efficiency compared to the funding of more 
fundamental and potentially cumulative research.  
The new objectives introduced in the rural development 
policy are certainly respectable. However, funding a risk 
management toolkit, subsidising low carbon agriculture or 
devoting money to a low ‘European Innovation Partnership’, while 
Pillar II experienced greater budget cuts than did Pillar I, is likely to 
result in much less resources for agri-environmental schemes. 
Countries reluctant to act in favour of the environment could 
considerably limit their commitments to agri-environmental 
payments, especially given that the attempts of some MEPs to 
impose a minimum threshold were rejected. 
Overall, the changes brought about by the CAP reform 
regarding the issues of rural development are limited. The reform 
has maintained the two-pillar structure but the two now tend to 
overlap; the programming of the national plans should, on paper, 
be more consistent and efficient, but it is unclear whether this will 
materialise. The multiplication of ambitious objectives under the 
small and decreasing funding of Pillar II is likely to result in budget 
dilution.  
6. Price policy, risk management and market 
organisation  
In the impact assessment documents, the Commission rightly 
pointed to the necessity to improve the functioning of agricultural 
markets in a context of a CAP devoted to increased market 
orientation. Prices being the results of market forces which are 
prone to failures regarding risk coverage and fair competition, three 
main challenges are to be addressed: combining old and new 
instruments to face exceptional market situations, facilitating the 
mitigation of the adverse effects of price volatility on farm returns, 
and restoring a better balance of market power along the food chain. 
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Market policy scaled down to a safety net to face crises 
Several aspects of the 2013 package show a continuation of the CAP 
reforms since 1992. Typically, the end of supply control in the sugar 
sector and the limitations to the intervention purchases in most crop 
sectors continue a historical trend. Most of the credit for the 
progress in consistency of the EU policy must be attributed to the 
Commission. In sectors where the Council and the Parliament have 
reversed some of the Commission proposals the reform 
achievements are less compelling. The wine example is an 
illustration of the tedious but largely unsuccessful attempts by the 
EU institutions to move toward a modern market policy focused on 
identified market failures and to be less captive to the farmer 
organisations.  
Some achievements are worth pointing out. While farm 
pressure groups argued for going back to guaranteed prices and 
public purchases, they have been resisted. The Commission also 
resisted demands for making direct payments ‘countercyclical’. The 
latter proposal made some apparent sense (direct payments to 
cereal growers were provided even in periods of high prices when 
this industry was already very profitable). However, 
countercyclical payments would have entailed undesirable 
consequences: they may have required going back to commodity-
specific support, against the historical evolution of the CAP; they 
would have led to replacing the savings of fixed payments so as to 
smooth incomes across years, which farmers do naturally by some 
bureaucratic procedures; they might have resulted in very large 
budgetary outlays in particular years, hardly compatible with the 
fixed annual budget framework.  
Pressures for more public market management came from the 
large price variations over the period. The attempts of some farm’ 
organisations to reinstall floor prices and market support did not 
succeed. Rather, the Commission introduced a crisis management 
system, which built on the combination of instruments developed 
to cope with the 2009 dairy crisis. 
Most of the price policy instruments of the traditional CAP 
are still there but have been put on the back burner. The changes in 
the wording of the Market Organisation Regulation reveal a new 
approach: market instruments are still in place but intended to 
address specific circumstances and problems. Intervention and aid 
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for storage are kept alive for many products and can be triggered by 
the Commission after consultation with the Committee for the 
Common Market Organisations (Art. 229) which decides according 
to qualified majority (save for beef and veal). The Commission may 
also adopt delegated acts with the same procedure and take 
exceptional measures for addressing or preventing market 
disturbances or resolving specific problems (Art. 219). The more 
intrusive market management for fruit and vegetable is maintained, 
with strong powers to producer organisations, such as resorting to 
market withdrawals through operational funds, which can be 
subsidised by up to 4.7% of production value in cases of crisis 
management. Given the particularly high price volatility in this 
sector, good economic arguments justify stronger instruments than 
in sectors where storage is feasible and natural fluctuations of 
output less dramatic.  
Such an argument cannot apply to the wine sector, where the 
continuation (and even worsening) of a form of supply control 
through a license system and continued distillation are hardly 
defensible. Wine is typically a good that does not meet the criteria 
for which public intervention is needed (it is not subject to extreme 
yield fluctuations, it can be stored, there is a growing demand 
worldwide). The ‘reform’ in this sector is clearly a step back. The 
new supply control system ends up introducing major rigidity and 
bureaucracy compared to the former system of (then tradable) 
planting rights (Deconinck & Swinnen, 2014). It is likely that the 
new arrangements will delay further the necessary adjustments at 
times when new competitors increase their world market shares.  
Border measures are still in place, under the obvious 
constraints of the World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. 
Additional import duties can be implemented by the Commission 
in the context of safeguard clauses, but cannot be imposed “where 
imports are unlikely to disturb the Union market” (Art. 182). Export 
subsidies are still potentially active, naturally within the WTO 
limits, but important changes were made to the policy of using 
export subsidies. They are triggered only when the conditions on 
the internal market are seen as requiring exceptional measures (Art. 
219). For example, Article 196 of Regulation 1308/2013 states, 
“[W]ithout prejudice to the application of exceptional measures, the 
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refund available should be zero”. This change can have far-reaching 
economic consequences, as pointed by Matthews (2013a).  
Another tool is introduced according to the Commission 
proposals: the reserve for crises.24 This reserve fund is “intended to 
provide additional support in case of major crises”. The wording of 
Articles 25 and 26 is, however, worrying as regards the possibility 
to implement an effective siphoning of the basic payments into a 
significant reserve to cope with crises. If the funds levied in a year 
are not used before October 16, they must be reimbursed. Hence the 
reserve cannot really build up to the €2.8 billion ceiling as 
announced, and the war chest available any year amounts to a 
modest €400 million, which is insufficient in case of major crises. 
Moreover, the Commission’s lack of independence from political 
pressures in the management of crises makes the prospect for a self-
financed fund from direct payments unlikely, as the saga of 
addressing the Russian embargo has shown.25 
These developments illustrate the weaknesses of the current 
institutional framework regarding market crisis management. Such 
weaknesses were pointed out by think tanks in the preparatory 
stages of the 2013 reform, which led to the proposal that crises be 
                                                        
24 Articles 226 of Regulation 1308/2013 and 25 and 26 of Regulation 
1306/2013. The total amount is €2.8 billion for the period 2014-20, with 
equal instalments of €400 million, established by applying at the beginning 
of each year a reduction of direct payments. In the Horizontal Regulation 
preamble of the Commission proposals, the possibility to use resources 
from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund was explicit. The use of 
the limited resources (€150 million per year) of this fund (R1309/2013) is 
targeted towards workers and self-employed and small and medium-sized 
enterprises but rather restrictive. 
25 Farmer organisations, the Agriculture Council and COMAGRI opposed 
the Commission’s will to use the reserve and resisted the allocation of 
unused agricultural funds to other needs. One argument was that the 
origin of the crisis was political. The ECOFIN Council confirmed that the 
reserve should be used for “crisis affecting agricultural production or 
distribution”. Eventually, the reserve for 2014 will be reimbursed and the 
levies for 2015 untouched. For an instructive record of the events, see 
Matthews (2015). 
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managed by an independent agency with a written mandate.26 A 
basic element of such a mandate would be an objective definition of 
‘exceptional market disturbances’, which would dictate the use of 
the reserve in a predictable manner in order that agents in the food 
chain can make informed decisions and that mutual funds for 
income stabilisation could integrate the safety net management into 
their schemes. It was pointed out that if the decision to act on 
markets is sensitive to political pressures from the farm lobbies and 
their stakeholders, these pressures will always push in the same 
direction: against price falls and in favour of hikes. The procedure, 
as described in Article 229 where Committees (and farm lobbies 
indirectly) intervene, is vulnerable to political failure, all the more 
so since the origin of the reserve funds is a levy from the direct 
payments – incidentally, 100%-financed by the common EU budget. 
There is no doubt this will be resisted by member state delegates, 
and in dire market circumstances funds will be brought from 
outside the agricultural budget.  
Overall, the changes in the use of price and market 
instruments are appropriate to providing a safety net for facing dire 
circumstances in spite of remaining structural weaknesses which 
will prevent the efficient use of European fiscal resources. In many 
cases the Commission has made progress, but it has stopped 
halfway short of the desired goals, and the two other institutions 
have even undermined the reform stance. 
Support to risk management schemes 
The issues regarding risk management are clearly more akin to 
market policies than to rural development. Still, instruments eligible 
for support are defined mainly in the Rural Development 
Regulation 1305/2013: 1) insurance covering losses due to climatic, 
disease-related or environmental incidents; 2) mutual funds 
                                                        
26 Bureau & Mahé (2008) advocated a mandate along the principles of the 
European Central Bank. Some would argue that this may also in itself be a 
problem, but the principle is that such a mandate ought to be decided and 
revised with large majorities of citizens and countries to ensure virtuous 
rules to prevail instead of the outcome of lobbies’ interference in daily 
monitoring processes.  
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covering similar incidents; and 3) income stabilisation tools.27 The 
general rate of subsidisation is 65%. However, rules for the fruit and 
vegetable sector are exposed in the Single Common Market 
Organisation (Single CMO) Regulation, which states that harvest 
insurance can be part of operational programmes (up to one-third 
of the programme expenditure) and that producer organisations can 
manage mutual funds.28 In the Single CMO Regulation the wine 
sector can benefit from support for setting up costs of mutual funds 
and from up to 80% of subsidies of the harvest insurance premiums 
in case of natural disasters. 
The support for regulation of risk management tools raises a 
number of issues related to market and government failures. Strictly 
private schemes seem unlikely to emerge at a satisfactory level of 
risk coverage for agricultural products (there seems to be a ‘missing 
market’ problem). Still, is the generous taxpayer contribution to 
insurance and mutual funds as envisaged in the schemes easy to 
justify? How will market instruments and risk management 
mitigate adverse effects of natural and economic shocks? Would an 
overly zealous collective risk management system not face moral 
hazard by inducing farmers to adopt risky strategies such as 
extreme specialisation? 
Government intervention in risk mitigation systems for 
agriculture is extensive in many countries. For a private insurance 
market to emerge individual risks should be independent and 
unlikely to reach the catastrophic levels that can lead to the failure 
of insurance companies.29 Some agricultural natural risks can be 
independent, such as moderate irregularities of weather or local 
pest damages. Insurance companies can provide such coverage and 
at a cost decreasing with participation. But voluntary subscriptions 
might first attract farmers with higher risks and jeopardise the 
viability of insurance providers, leading to under-procurement of 
insurance by the private sector. Because of these two failures, 
                                                        
27 Except for the latter, the instruments were already defined in similar 
terms in the Single CMO Regulation 73/ 2009. 
28 Regarding fruits and vegetables the two risk management tools were in 
R1182/ 2007 but not in R2200/96.  
29 See e.g. Henriet & Rochet (1991); Cafiero et al. (2005); Bureau & Thoyer 
(2014), p. 54. 
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government subsidises premiums or makes subscription 
mandatory, or both. Climatic shocks to agriculture can also reach 
catastrophic levels, thus requiring the state to be an actor of last 
resort. Other risks affect all or many individuals at the same time 
(systemic), such as epizootic, natural or economic shocks that affect 
prices. The law of large numbers theorem does not then apply to 
these risks and the definition of an insurance premium is unfeasible. 
Mitigation of such risks can rely on reserve funds sourced by 
member contributions and public support. 
The US experience in subsidising farm insurance is a long one 
and has been often criticised for revealing itself ex post to be a costly 
and regressive way to transfer income from the taxpayer to farmers. 
In his review of research evidence Wright (2014) points out that US 
farmers received a ‘profitable’ return on their premiums ($1.90 
compensation for every $1 in premium, on average) and that the 
cost to taxpayers was ‘high’ ($1.10 for every $0.90 in compensation). 
He also points out that insurance companies have benefited a lot 
from the system and strengthened the farm lobby. Babcock (2012) 
estimates that between 2001 and 2011, the US crop insurance 
programme cost taxpayers about $50 billion, but only half – $25 
billion – found its way into farmers’ pockets, while the other half 
was spent to cover management costs and commissions paid to 
insurance agents and companies, so that eventually the programme 
cost $2 to deliver $1 of benefits. One may wonder whether the 
seemingly generous rate of subsidy in the EU schemes (65% of 
premiums for insurance and 65% of compensation and set-up costs 
for mutual funds) is likely to add a source of inefficient expenditure 
into the CAP. A very rough calculation30 suggests that the transfer 
efficiency in the EU programme may not be so bad in comparison 
                                                        
30 A very tentative use of the 65% subsidy rate to the schemes (assuming 
that on average premium + subsidy = compensation + administration costs 
net of financial returns, and that the latter is about 20% of compensation, a 
rough estimate derived from data on general insurance provided in 
Henriet & Rochet (1991)) leads to orders of magnitude for apparently high 
expected compensation/premium ratios: expected compensation of €1.40 
for €1 premium, for insurance, and €1.80 for €1 of contribution in the case 
of mutual funds. The ratio of taxpayer costs to expected compensation is 
0.47 for insurance and 0.65 + instalment subsidy for mutual funds, ignoring 
possible leakages such as those mentioned in the US experience. 
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to other farm programmes. In the case of rural development plans, 
the administration and transaction costs are in the range of 20% to 
50% of the transfer, and sometimes more. Hence €1 of benefit costs 
the taxpayer between €1.20 and €1.50.  
In the case of risk management, compensation occurs only in 
the case of losses whose disruptive consequences lead to lower 
welfare. Mutual funds should be attractive with the subsidy rate of 
65% of the compensation and instalment costs since the expected 
return to €1 of contribution could be around €1.80. In the case of the 
US programme, many analysts claim that the very large degree of 
its subsidisation makes insurance very attractive to farmers, while a 
large share of the money is wasted in the process. It is not written in 
advance that such a course of events will occur in Europe since the 
magnitude of natural risks is smaller and the proposed Income 
Stabilisation Tool is a mutual fund limited by its own resources. 
Experience will show whether implementation aggravates the 
public burden of the schemes, but at this stage the odds do not seem 
poor, as long as the new schemes do not resort to new financial 
resources instead of Pillar I basic payments.  
Two weaknesses of the schemes are worth mentioning. The 
first weakness is in the need for further clarification of the rationale 
for setting public support rates. The current flat rate and the level of 
support do not seem to be in proportion to the expected welfare 
gains to society from a more efficient farm sector resulting from less 
volatile farm returns. Cordier (2015) has estimated the value at risk 
(threshold of low returns with a 5% probability) for selected farm 
orientations and found that it differs considerably across farming 
sectors, e.g. €14,000 in fruit and vegetable crops and €16,900 in main 
crops. Whereas risk exposure and the availability of private 
strategies (futures markets, storage and diversification) vary a lot 
across sub-sectors, incentives to participate in coverage systems 
should be stronger and, hence, support rates higher for sectors with 
greater risks. Instead of the flat rate of 65%, a modulation of subsidy 
rates across sectors could improve the system of risk coverage.31 
An issue related to moral hazard is the impact of a generous 
system of insurance on individual behaviour regarding risk 
                                                        
31 Operational funds for the fruit and vegetable sector do provide stronger 
tools to cope with volatile prices. 
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exposures. A very protective ex-post system will trigger strategies of 
risk exposure such as higher specialisation to increase expected 
returns. As price guarantees have demonstrated in the past, quasi-
monoculture has developed with adverse consequences on both 
demand for further protection and on the environment. Experience 
is necessary to design and regulate an efficient system that would 
not ride astray, as the US evidence suggests it to be likely. 
The second weakness is related to the consistency of market 
instruments with one of the decentralised risk management 
instruments: the Income Stabilisation Tool. The design of mutual 
funds for income stabilisation is contingent on the expectations that 
fund managers will be able to have for the Commission response to 
unusual market disturbances, regarding prices and the use of the 
reserve for crises and possibly other funds out of the MFF. As 
already pointed out, the various committees involved being under 
political influence, their behaviour is unpredictable. The Income 
Stabilisation Tool (IST) is based on mutual funds and therefore can 
only dispatch ex-post the funds in reserve. The IST is supposed to 
cope with income drops. In doing so its margin of action will 
depend greatly on what is being done by the Commission’s use of 
market tools and the reserve for crises. Hence tensions are bound to 
develop between decentralised tools and central decisions made by 
the Commission under the pressures of market-exceptional 
disturbances and special interest representations. 
As a whole, the risk management system launched by the 
reform appears to be promising regarding the coverage of natural 
hazards. The system should better take into account the differences 
in risk exposures and private coverage possibilities among farm 
sub-sectors. As regards price and income stabilisation the use of 
market instruments will depend on the ability to reallocate financial 
means from Pillar I to the reserve for crises and on the wisdom of 
the decision process (Commission and ad hoc committees) when 
crises occur, which is hard to predict. Mutual funds as income 
stabilisation tools should be developing as the incentive to 
contribute is rather strong, but the technical development of such 
tools based on observable and objective data is only beginning. 
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The balance of market power in the food chain 
The CAP has a long history of conflicting with competition policy. 
Exemptions from Article 101 of the Treaty are possible under some 
conditions, one being the satisfaction of (all) the CAP objectives of 
Article 39, but this condition is hardly feasible in practice since 
“increasing individual [farm] earnings” and reasonable consumer 
prices cannot easily be made compatible. The atomistic structure of 
the farm sector makes it prone to being crushed by the pressure of 
upstream and downstream oligopolies and forces it to absorb most 
of the price adjustments. This resulted in measures intended to 
strengthen the bargaining power of producers through legal 
protection and support for producer organisations. The 2009 dairy 
crisis and the phasing out of the quotas led to clauses in the 
regulation which would allow farmers to organise and negotiate 
with collectors contracts whereby written conditions include prices.  
The Commission proposals let the member states decide 
whether contracts would in general be required, but the article 
regarding dairy was more demanding.32 In the final decisions, the 
mandatory recognition proposals are upheld for dairy and fruit and 
vegetables. The farmers’ possibility to regroup to negotiate 
contracts also extends to many other sectors. Recognition of 
producer organisations and inter-branch organisations, however, is 
not mandatory for sectors other than milk, olives, olive oil and fruit 
and vegetables, silk and hops. When recognised, such producer 
organisations may negotiate contracts (live beef and most arable 
crops). Recognised producer and inter-branch organisations are 
also declared compatible with competition rules, provided that no 
obligation exists to charge a single price and that competition is not 
excluded. The Commission may require renegotiation if 
                                                        
32 In the dairy sector, contracts, if decided by member states, were supposed 
to include conditions defined at EU level (Art. 104, proposals). Moreover, 
it foresaw that in the dairy sector POs “may negotiate” such contracts on 
behalf of members, as long as their market share is under a threshold (33% 
of national production). It required recognition by member states of POs 
and inter-branch organisations to be compulsory in general, but nothing 
was defined regarding contractual relations for sectors other than milk. 
This would have left to the initiative of member states to extend or not to 
other sectors the ability for POs to negotiate contracts on behalf of their 
members. 
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competition is curtailed. The Commission rightly resisted the 
requests from some farmer organisations to grant inter-branch 
organisations powers to establish a sort of reference price. Such a 
possibility would have ruined the role of prices as a means to 
channel upstream the differences in collectors’ efficiency to 
transform and market the raw material. The possibility for inter-
branch organisations to act as mediators is worth mentioning as it 
might help improve the situation of smaller organisations or 
individuals, but the powers of inter-branch organisations to 
monitor and dissuade unfair commercial practices regarding large 
retail companies or collectors remain quite elusive. The thresholds 
of market share for producer organisations to negotiate without 
coming under fire from competition authorities are set in fixed 
numbers, which are different across sectors. They may be plausible 
and easy to monitor, but their logic is still obscure and a better 
alternative could be to refer to absence of dominant position in the 
relevant market, with the caveat that competition authorities badly 
need to upgrade their effectiveness in monitoring such situations 
and unfair practices as well. 
The rhetoric on the virtues of contracts to strengthen on their 
own the bargaining power of an individual farmer was only wishful 
thinking, since the ability of the farmer acting alone to sue the 
dominant purchaser is void given the dissuasive cost-benefit ratio 
of any legal action and the threat of retaliation. On the other hand, 
when farmers associate just to negotiate prices with little or no 
contribution to food chain efficiency, as appears to be the case for 
milk deliveries to a private collector, the line between a cartel and 
sales grouping can be slim. The power granted by the new 
regulation to producer organisations to negotiate delivery contracts, 
including on pricing rules, without falling under the scrutiny of 
competition national and European authorities, changes the odds. 
This should have positive consequences for agricultural producers 
in some sectors, particularly where collectors hold a large share in 
the relevant market.  
The powers given to producer organisations in most farm 
products have raised concerns that abuse of dominant position by 
the farmer side could also occur. Besides the clauses targeting 
products under geographical indication, the Commission has issued 
guidelines for implementation making explicit that dominant 
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position, price fixing, and entry deterrence shall be avoided and that 
producer organisations providing services for efficiency gains in the 
food chain are less likely to conflict with competition rules.33  
However, the significant strengthening of the farm sector’s 
bargaining powers can hardly replace the much needed 
effectiveness of competition policy in the food chain and in 
particular in the retail sector, which has become increasingly 
concentrated over time. With the current focus on making the farm 
sector stronger, the risk of double marginalisation with the ensuing 
costs for consumers should not be dismissed. The competition 
authorities may show some efficiency in using legal arguments to 
break cartels and limit mergers, but they do not carry a lot of clout 
to prove and discipline abuse of dominant position and excessive 
market power by the concentrated retail sector. And this is in sharp 
contrast with the numerous anecdotes of small suppliers forced to 
accept dire conditions under threat of being banned from further 
purchases. Another neglected area needing scrutiny is the 
concentrated farm input industry where the suspicion of 
unbalanced market power is clear. The Commission and the 
competition authorities need to improve their toolbox to prove 
excess profit margins and dominant position with a more solid legal 
basis and to be more cautious in letting mergers happen both in the 
farm input industries and the retail sectors. Moreover, 
preoccupation with consumers should not lead competition 
authorities to neglect scrutiny of buyer group practices which are 
frequent in the retail sector (Carstensen, 2010).  
Overall, in the area of market management, the reform has not 
fundamentally changed the CAP. This in itself is a considerable 
success given the risk of developing costly and rent-generating 
policies, as was done at the same time on the other side of the 
Atlantic. The efficiency of the new crisis management instruments 
remains to be tested, but as regards market management, the reform 
is by no means a failure. 
                                                        
33 The Commission has launched a consultation on these matters and issued 
guidelines to implement Articles 169, 170, 171 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_cmo_regulation/ 
index_en.html). 
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7. Flexibility, subsidiarity, pillars and lessons 
from fiscal federalism  
In the process of addressing flaws in the CAP, the three core 
institutions of the trilogue have proved both opportunistic and 
creative, with some merits, but at the cost of losing coherence and 
facing likely deviations from policy purposes at the member state 
level. Furthermore, the consistency between co-financing rules, 
degrees of subsidiarity and territorial scope of the public goods has 
become confusing. Supranational governance has drifted further 
away from even the most broadly defined fiscal federalism 
principles. 
The position of the Parliament to not enter into negotiations 
over amendments before the budget had been settled and the 
accession of the other two EU bodies to this demand were first a 
clever trick to avoid polluting negotiations with national interests, 
familiar vetoes and marathon debates. This outcome made it 
possible to avoid opening the Pandora’s Box of a discussion on the 
net budgetary returns, with domino effects on other components of 
the EU budget, which could have triggered a major institutional 
crisis. However, this tactical move clearly reflects a built-in 
weakness of governance at this stage of the EU construction. When 
EU policies generate private rents but draw on common pool EU 
public funds, a degree of government failure is undermining the 
system. Most direct payments of the CAP are illustrative examples.  
A large amount of flexibility has been conceded to member 
states in the implementation of the measures in the new CAP 
regulations, including the possibility to move large sections of the 
budget into or out of Pillar II. This flexibility is the deepening of a 
trend introduced in the 2003 reform and in the Health Check 
regarding the end of historical entitlements (regionalisation) and 
maintaining member states’ latitude in recoupling, modulation and 
rural development measures stricto sensu.  
An optimistic view is that flexibility is a relevant approach to 
ensure that better information and local initiatives respond to the 
wide heterogeneity of agricultural challenges across Europe 
regarding structures and environmental impacts. Flexibility can 
also be viewed as a learning process for the member states in which 
governments are excessively influenced by lobbies and defend 
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status quo interests, and which gradually come to accept a policy 
change after experimentation in other countries. Regionalisation 
and convergence of payment rates per hectare within member states 
are cases in point.  
The main concern is the record of national and local 
governments in implementing the CAP, on two grounds in 
particular: lack of parsimony in public spending and failed 
enforcement of environmental conditions. When the money from 
the EU budget is deemed appropriated, national governments have 
shown a tendency to be lax in eligibility conditions and complacent 
in imposing penalties or suing unintended beneficiaries and, worse, 
corrupt users of public money (see, e.g. ECA, 2011; anecdotes of 
fines imposed on member states for misspending CAP funds are 
rife). On the environment front, the sweetening of conditions for 
green payments eligibility, the removal from the Commission 
proposals of the Water Framework Directive from cross-compliance 
and its banishment to a vague declaration in an annex do not bode 
well for the expectation that member states will be firm when 
proposing measures ensuring a reversal of environmental 
damage.34 As has happened in the context of pollution, a race to the 
bottom, or at least downwards, is to be feared.35 Flexibility granted 
to member states to design detailed practices and equivalence rules 
under the supervision of the Commission could make sense if the 
Commission were in a position to keep firm on the principles. But 
this would no doubt be at the cost of more ‘Brussels bashing’ from 
lobbies and Eurosceptics. 
                                                        
34 In the Commission proposals Article 93 of the Horizontal Regulation, 
Directive 2000/60 (water), was supposed to be integrated into the list of 
GAEC conditions Annex II. In Regulation 1306 it is only mentioned as a 
topic for advisory agencies and as a declaration of intention postponed at 
the end. 
35 An example of such national decisions is illustrated by the option in 
France, first, not to declare any sensitive permanent pastures outside of 
Natura 2000 zones while the possibility exists and, second, to allow a 
compensation between surfaces of converted old permanent pastures by 
newly created ones which will be defined as permanent, subito sancto, one 
may say, as soon as the first year, thus inducing a decrease of genuine 
permanent pastures, but giving an illusion that the total of ‘labelled’ ones 
is kept constant.  
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Co-financing of Pillar I measures by national fiscal resources 
did not receive any support in spite of the quest for a new legitimacy 
for the direct payments. Still, new measures were to be financed and 
hence allocated to the two pillars of the EU budget. The end result 
is that some Pillar II issues, traditionally devoted to rural 
development and environmental protection, are also covered by 
Pillar I. Member states can also move funds from Pillar I to Pillar II. 
With the greening of Pillar I, measures for the environment, for 
areas with natural constraints and for young farmers are now in 
both pillars: the reform blurs even further the line between rural 
development and income support. Support to producer 
organisations and to risk management schemes are now in Pillar II 
but funds for market support in case of emergency are in Pillar I, the 
traditional toolbox for price policy. Also in Pillar I is the new reserve 
fund for crises.36 In practice, what characterises a rural development 
programme tends to be limited to co-financing,37 and to the specific 
management procedures. Overlapping also introduces possible 
inconsistencies between pillars. The economic logic of the 
distinction between the two pillars should be addressed properly by 
a full reorganisation of pillars at the next reform opportunity, since 
their initial distinction has drifted away from their initial economic 
and political rationales (Mahé, 2012; Dupraz et al., 2014). 
It comes as an apparent paradox that the pervasive reference 
to public goods provision as justification for CAP expenditures did 
not transpose into a political debate on the correct level of 
government to organise and finance this procurement.38 The 
supranational institutions of the EU did not want to open up this 
issue yet, but some day they will have to face it. The classical views 
of Musgrave on fiscal federalism are still widely considered, 
whereby the distribution and stability functions of government are 
best carried at the central level while, regarding the design and 
fund-sourcing of allocation policies, governance level and scope of 
public goods should match. Pure public goods for which exclusion 
is impossible and rivalry absent are to be provided for and funded 
                                                        
36 Articles 25 and 26 of Regulation 1306/3013 – ‘Horizontal’. 
37 With the exception of those shifted from Pillar I to Pillar II. 
38 The Commission document “The added value of the EU budget” is, 
however, a starting point (EC, 2011). 
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by the central government and, therefore, as regards agriculture and 
the CAP, by the EU institutions and budget, because they are mostly 
transboundary in nature.  
Agriculture is able to provide a number of environmental 
services, most of which are public goods. Cooper et al. (2010) have 
proposed a relevant list of these services, which includes: 
agricultural landscapes, farmland biodiversity, water quality, water 
availability, soil functionality, climate stability, air quality and 
resilience to flooding and to fire. They also include other public 
goods labelled ‘social’ such as food security, safety and rural 
vitality, which could rather be labelled ‘statehood’ public goods, or 
considered political goals to keep the public good concept narrow 
enough to be operational.  
Climate stabilisation (carbon storage and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions) and, to a large extent, general 
biodiversity whose non-use value is recognised, are typical pure 
public goods and their scope is global. Hence there is a strong 
argument to have the relevant policies designed and financed at the 
supranational level and totally financed by the EU budget, as is the 
case with Pillar I.39 Most of the other environmental services 
regarding water, soil and air, save for cases where transboundary 
effects occur, are more local in use and some degree of exclusion is 
possible at least through the travel cost of access. Hence local 
governments should be better equipped in information to tailor 
their supply and more parsimonious in local taxes to finance them 
at the appropriate level than EU institutions would be. This is the 
expected virtue of subsidiarity, where the financial responsibility of 
local institutions is expected to respond to both social demand for 
local public goods and taxpayers’ desire that the financial burden 
be just enough for efficient procurement. Several agri-
environmental measures of Pillar II, where co-decision and co-
                                                        
39 In Article 59 of Regulation 1305/2013 (Rural Development) the issue 
raised here is implicitly recognised by applying different rates of EU co-
financing which reflect assumptions on the different scopes of the public 
goods targeted. Climate mitigation and adaptation actions can benefit from 
up to 100% EU financing, which amounts to moving these measures to 
Pillar I, except for granted flexibility in local management. This approach 
is an alternative to pillar reshuffling. But it does not solve the odd treatment 
of the basic payments inherited from the past.  
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financing of rural development programmes prevail, fit well in the 
fiscal federalism framework.  
On the other hand, flexibility with EU full coverage of 
expenses such as direct payments of Pillar I tends to fuel 
opportunism and insatiable drawing on common pool tax 
resources, as amply shown by member states’ attitudes regarding 
the basic payments of Pillar I.40 Moreover, while a doctrinal view of 
federalism would prescribe that only local government should be in 
charge of local public goods, a more pragmatic conception (e.g. 
Begg, 2009) takes into account possible cases where paucity of 
political resources and weak legal institutions at the local level lead 
to government failures, or even to corruption. The EU construction 
does reveal such concerns, as it requires member states to abide by 
democratic principles and to ensure that the rule of law prevails, 
thus reflecting values embodied in the Treaty. The EU interference 
in setting management rules and targets for environmental quality 
indicators, such as water quality and availability, which are mostly 
local by nature, reflects a concern for avoiding local government 
failures. Except in Eurosceptic circles this is widely accepted, hence 
joint competence and co-financing for agri-environmental measures 
of Pillar II would appear as an appropriate framework if 
administrative and transaction costs were trimmed off. 
Beside environmental public goods, the CAP tries to target 
‘statehood public goods’ provided by agriculture. Cohesion goals 
regarding rural regions under stress is part of the distributive 
function of government and is best conducted by the central level of 
government, i.e. the EU. The special support for portions of the 
territories under stress can benefit from the EU budget either fully, 
such as the ANC payments which belong to the first pillar, or 
partially, such as the Pillar II programmes for areas with natural 
handicap. However, the coexistence of two schemes with the same 
purpose is likely to entail excessive administration costs. As regards 
the basic payments of Pillar I, they cannot be justified by social 
cohesion or distributive arguments because they are regressive, in 
spite of the small levy on the largest beneficiaries. They are a poor 
                                                        
40 A similar risk exists with the 100% EU-financed but locally managed 
Pillar II measures for climate change mitigation, unless they are properly 
monitored by the Commission. 
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tool for financing the delivery of environmental protection through 
cross-compliance. The argument for their belonging to Pillar I is 
elusive and they should be phased out for the most part in order to 
build up resources better targeted to crisis management. 
Market stability and risk mitigation are social goals addressed 
by several tools scattered in Pillar I and II. Market and price policy 
tools are still in Pillar I. The reserve for crises is also established in 
Pillar I from temporary levies on the basic payments. But Article 26 
of Regulation 1306 lays down restrictions on the process. In Pillar II, 
member states are encouraged to help create and subsidise risk 
management funds. This combination of tools raises three 
problems. The annual periodicity of the reserve for crises makes its 
management by the Commission particularly irksome, as crises are 
not easy to forecast almost a year in advance. The obligation to 
reimburse the unused levies from the basic payment is odd and 
reflects political concession rather economic logic. Why not build a 
reserve for the whole duration of the MFF and delay the allocation 
of the unused funds to the end of period? The second issue is the 
coordination of the tools of two pillars managed by two-stage 
governments, national and EU. The third is the likely heterogeneity 
of the national systems of risk management, which may contradict 
market unity. As market crises encompass all Europe there is a case 
for collecting all the tools of stabilisation and risk management in a 
third pillar which could resort to pluriannual funds, as is the case 
for the (small) European Globalisation Adjustment Fund.41 
The CAP reform has missed an opportunity to condition EU 
policies to a real European added value. This may prove fatal in the 
long term, with the development of Eurosceptic forces, and the 
increasing reluctance of pooling budget resources without clear 
justification. In the long run, a CAP more focused on the supply of 
truly European public goods would have paved a safer way to 
preserving what the EU agricultural policy has in common. One 
                                                        
41 Arguments from some Commission administrators that the annual 
nature of the budget precludes the building of a pluri-annual fund seem 
contradicted by the regulation laying down the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund. Item (3) of R1309/2013 reads, “Given its purpose, which 
is to provide support in situations of urgency and unexpected 
circumstances, the EGF [European Globalization Fund] should remain 
outside the Multiannual Financial Framework”. 
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should not forget that co-financing responds to a very crucial need: 
making member states as well as local authorities responsible for 
good management of the EU’s money, rather than simply giving 
them the rights to draw from a common pool budget to maximise 
their net returns with questionable and poorly managed initiatives. 
By granting so much flexibility to member states with so little 
national co-financing, the CAP remains, to paraphrase Bastiat’s 
definition of the state, the great fiction where everyone tries to live 
at the expense of the other.  
8. Conclusion: The 2013 CAP reform, bloom and 
gloom 
At an early stage of the reform process a real change in direct 
payments was expected. Reformist organisations felt short-changed 
by the 2010 and 2011 Commission proposals, and even more by the 
final regulation published in December 2013. They could find little 
of the work they had done to make reform proposals implementable 
in the Commission’s texts. One reason, according to former 
Commissioner Cioloş, was the impossibility to sell a reform moving 
away from income support and towards rewarding the delivery of 
public goods to the European Parliament. The demand by the latter 
to have the budget decided before entering negotiations did not 
bode well for an ambitious reform. At this stage, the 2013 reform 
leaned toward limited adjustments of the existing policy, denting a 
few major flaws of the CAP only at the margin. 
Overall, the 2013 reform has been a lost opportunity for 
making the CAP more targeted on public goods procurement, more 
equitable, and less permissive to excessive rents inducing leakages, 
capital deepening and addiction to subsidies. Targeting and 
greening did not really come through. In 2015 on average across the 
28 member states, 55% of the direct payments are basic payments, 
i.e. ‘income’ or ‘production capacity’ support. The green payments 
were supposed to require additional efforts to protect resources and 
put an end to biodiversity losses and the Commission had tabled 
interesting proposals, in particular regarding EFAs, pastures and 
diversification. But the provisions were largely watered down by 
both the Council and the Parliament. Eventually, few farms will 
have to make costly changes to their practices to be eligible for the 
green payments; and only farms in the areas most specialised in 
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monoculture will have to implement some conservation measures, 
a limited change for which the reform can be credited.  
No progress toward equity was made and capping the largest 
payments did not happen, in spite of the possibility for member 
states to keep the proceeds of reductions in their own national 
basket. As many as 21 member states apply only a flat 5% reduction 
of payments above €15,000, or none at all. Payments reductions will 
account for less than 0.2% of the Pillar I envelope. An extensive 
exercise in transparency regarding the eventual destination of 
subsidies of the large beneficiaries in relation with their own wealth 
is necessary if EU institutions are seriously concerned about the 
existing margin for adjustment, reform and efficient use of common 
funds.  
Only a new set of contractual, targeted, cost-based and 
pluriannual but non-transferable payments would have helped 
solve the problem of capitalisation of support and its leakage to 
unintended beneficiaries. In reality, it did not happen.  
However, viewing the 2013 reform as a straight failure 
ignores several important achievements of the negotiation. First, the 
Commission managed to resist most of the ‘bad ideas’ floated 
around, not the least by MEPs or member states. Some of them 
could have been particularly damaging, in particular regarding 
market management and price support. This accomplishment 
should not be underestimated. From this point of view, the 
composition of the new European Parliament suggests that a future 
‘reform’ could drive the CAP back to old policy instruments. 
Second, the reform leaves a considerable degree of latitude to 
member states, a device to instil needed changes as a sort of 
experimentation. Member states truly willing to implement a 
genuine reform have the possibility to do so, including the use of 
significant latitude to adapt the green payment conditions if other 
measures provide similar results. This flexibility may be viewed as 
a learning process whereby some member states take the lead as 
early adopters of voluntary measures and are followed by others at 
the next wave of reform.  
Overall, the reform has struck a decent balance between 
market signals and the possibility to support products with some 
public good aspects. Market policy tools are still in place and could 
be triggered in case of major crises and the principles that they 
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would serve only as safety nets and not be diverted into misuse of 
taxpayer money are officially recognised. Measures to launch risk 
management schemes in member states are a good starter, needing 
calibration, tuning and experimentation. The reserve for crises is a 
welcome initial step but its use should be better protected from 
special interest interference and be redesigned to build a respectable 
amount of funds to face dire circumstances. The recommendation 
to convey the management of this reserve to an independent agency 
with clear but adjustable behavioural rules should be considered 
again.  
The new architecture for Pillar I also sends the message to all 
member states that direct payments should be justified by 
environmentally friendly management practices. Even though at 
this point it is more subject to rather lax constraints, this puts a final 
point to the idea that these payments were ‘compensatory’, and 
therefore a right for farmers. The pervasive use of the word 
‘entitlement’ and the lack of recognition of windfall gains is, 
however, regrettable, as it blurs the message to the farming 
community. A major characteristic of the reform is the flexibility left 
for national adaptation. Member states that are truly willing to 
implement a genuine reform have the possibility to do so. Overall, 
more than €6 billion were transferred from Pillar I to Pillar II and 
only €3.4 billion in the reverse direction over the whole financial 
period. A net transfer to rural development programmes of €3 
billion is not much in relative terms, but it is progress. 
On the Commission’s agenda in the next few years should be 
reflecting on the pillar structures, the rules of co-financing, and the 
power-sharing between the EU institutions and national 
governments. Lessons from fiscal federalism should be taken on 
board at some stage. In particular, the scope of public goods, be they 
local, global or mixed, and the level of government and financing, 
should coincide better. Together with the rigid annual constraint for 
selected expenditures which are random by nature, such as the 
safety net, these reasons motivate a reshuffling where one pillar 
would address global public goods with EU tools and pooled 
money, another one such as Pillar II would address more local 
public goods, and a third one, outside the MFF and funded by the 
basic payments, would be available for stabilisation and risk 
management. 
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The respective roles of the three institutions in the trilogue 
reveal that the Commission, however prudent, has generally been 
more pro-reform than its counterparts. This was to be expected from 
the Council, as the historical experience of price-setting in the old 
CAP clearly shows. But the main contribution of the Parliament as 
a force blocking change and arguing for blanket irrigation of the 
farm sector with EU funds, came as a disappointment. The 
organisation of the EU Parliament committees raises a serious 
question regarding their ability to reflect a true concern for the 
public good. Committees should be organised around wider issues 
than they are currently, to address social trade-offs and avoid 
delaying coordination to plenary sessions where in-depth 
examination of alternatives is not possible. It is a paradox that on 
several levels, NGOs have expressed and channelled social and 
public concerns that the democratic process proved unable to 
address, because institutions are not robust enough to rent-seeking 
and lobbying influences.  
Finally, a striking paradox appears between the scopes of the 
last two major reforms. The 2003 reform was supposed to be limited 
and did not mobilise significant and long consultations and expert 
work, yet it has proved to be a major reform. The 2013 CAP reform, 
in contrast, although long, well-prepared and based on an enlarged 
consultation thanks to the Commission, did not change much 
regarding the rules of distribution of taxpayer money. The process 
produced a reform of intentions rather than a reform of actions. Let 
us hope that the legal literature in the new regulations, which is rich 
in well-thought-out and new directions, will one day be followed 
by acts and facts. 
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4. ACHIEVEMENTS AND 
CONSTRAINTS OF THE 2013 CAP 
REFORM 
TASSOS HANIOTIS 
1. Introduction 
The political economy underlying the reform of any public policy 
involves a rather delicate balance between institutional realities and 
declared policy objectives. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
is not exempt from this reality. If anything, this balance seems to be 
even more complex in the CAP and its reforms. Member states’ 
interests often diverge, reflecting different political priorities 
stemming from the very diverse structures of their primary sector, 
thus adding an additional layer of interplay between actors to the 
habitual one of farmers versus taxpayers or consumers. 
Often, different theoretical approaches are applied to analyse 
how this balance evolves over time by assessing the interaction of 
opposing interests, and the impact this has on arriving at, or in 
upsetting, this balance among institutional actors. In my 
intervention here, however, I do not intend to apply any analytical 
framework to assess whether the 2013 CAP reform confirms either 
approach. Rather, my starting point is different. 
My focus is on how three different parameters – the 
economics, the politics and the policies of the recent CAP reform – 
influenced the final outcome of a reform that, for the first time in the 
50-year history of the CAP, took place with the European 
Parliament acting as co-legislator. It is my hope that this different 
angle could provide some useful input that would allow testing 
various analytical hypotheses on the political economy of the recent 
CAP reform. 
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2. The economics of CAP reform 
The first aspect that influenced the debate on the 2013 CAP reform 
was the significant change in the economics that characterised 
agricultural markets. The debate over agricultural policy reform, 
both globally but also especially in the EU, habitually had as its 
starting point the need to bridge the price gap between the EU and 
world markets of agricultural commodities with the long-term 
downward trend of agricultural prices as the underlying 
assumption. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, serious 
doubts were raised on the validity of this assumption, which 
significantly changed in the public policy debate, and market 
developments altered significantly the manner by which the various 
policy actors positioned themselves towards the reform. 
Enter the ‘price’ story, i.e. the significant increase in price 
volatility in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the co-movement of 
commodity prices, and the significant increase in the level of 
agricultural prices. The literature on the characteristics of this 
period of excessive price volatility in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis is both extensive and inconclusive, but in the policy debate the 
impact was immediate. 
Those focusing on the negative impacts of excessive price 
volatility put the blame on previous reforms of the CAP that 
allegedly lowered the safety net (implying in general the decrease 
of intervention prices and omitting the significant income support 
layer from decoupled payments). Those focusing on commodity 
price co-movement identified speculation as the culprit, demanding 
that public intervention addresses (in unidentified ways) this 
problem. Finally, those stressing the fact that agricultural prices 
almost doubled in real terms within the span of less than a decade 
considered this to be the proof for which they had searched for quite 
some time – no need for income support when market returns, i.e. 
market receipts, are that high. 
The policy dilemma at the early stages of the CAP reform 
debate was therefore linked to the prospects of prices remaining 
volatile and/or high, as these prospects were expected to be driven 
both by a demand pull and by supply constraints. 
After a significant period of market turbulence, price 
volatility and price co-movement seem to have settled to levels that 
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market fundamentals can explain. The major change, however, 
concerns the price level at which agricultural prices seemed to have 
settled after this turmoil. Even after the summer of 2014, when 
record harvests characterised the cereal market, the level at which 
wheat and maize prices reached their post-harvest bottom exceeds 
what was considered a price ceiling less than a decade ago. 
The reasons for this are linked to the second market 
development that affected the CAP reform debate, the ‘cost’ story of 
agriculture, and more specifically its energy link. That direct and 
indirect links of agricultural markets with the energy markets exist 
was not new. Such links were well established in the literature, but 
what was now new was the significant breakdown of traditional 
price relationships in the energy markets, which has affected the 
competitiveness of agriculture around the world. And although the 
effect of crude oil prices, direct or indirect, on cereals through the 
biofuel market subsided recently as the growth of biofuels faltered, 
significant changes in the natural gas markets have implications in 
the fertiliser market. For the EU especially, and its reliance on 
nitrogen-based fertilisers, this development is of major importance 
for the long term.  
The above brought to the forefront the third major economic 
development that influenced the CAP reform, the debate on ‘food 
security‘. Seen as a problem for net importers and an opportunity 
for net exporters, with proposed solutions covering a wide 
spectrum of issues from research and innovation to food waste, 
nutrition and health, the food security debate has assumed different 
dimensions and been seen from different angles depending on the 
position and interest of the various actors. But in the CAP reform 
debate, it has assumed a distinctively European dimension, both in 
terms of a newly reinforced background concern that could justify 
the continuation of public support of EU agriculture, including with 
respect to the identification of the need to search for policy measures 
aimed at ‘greening’ the CAP in order to jointly deliver private and 
public goods. 
3. The politics of CAP reform 
Within the context of the above three economic challenges, CAP 
reform actors, both institutional and, more broadly, stakeholders, 
had to adjust to the real novelty of this reform, the introduction of 
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co-decision following the Lisbon Treaty. Co-decision brought a 
major change in the manner by which CAP reforms are decided, 
affecting the balance of power between all three institutions 
involved. 
The Commission kept its naturally strong position stemming 
from its right to initiate reform proposals; in fact, the rules on public 
consultation and impact assessments made these proposals more 
transparent and evidence-based than ever before. Given that the 
other two decision-making institutions, the Council and European 
Parliament, lack the resources that are necessary to support with 
evidence their positions, the Commission continues to have the 
natural advantage of capturing the mainstream of public thinking. 
However, as the process of negotiations proceeds, the role of 
the Commission becomes weaker. The real dilemma facing the 
Commission is whether to defend its proposal in a pretty strict way, 
forcing a potential conflict with the Council and Parliament and 
leading negotiations to the second reading of its proposal, or to seek 
a necessary compromise for a synthesis during the first reading. The 
first option strengthens the public image of the Commission but 
weakens its prospects for success. The second option encourages a 
more pragmatic solution but at the risk of it being too remote from 
the initial proposal. 
The role of the new player, the European Parliament, in this 
new process initially made the prospects of a compromise appear 
very remote, as over 8,000 amendments were tabled. In the end, the 
Parliament managed to group together the various and varying 
positions of its members and to arrive at amendments that in most 
cases were not that far away from the logic of the reform. However, 
the real complicating factor has been the fact that the Parliament 
feels quite uneasy about allowing the inevitable details of the reform 
process to be clarified in implementing acts. Its role in this process 
is weak, as it lacks the necessary technical services that would 
monitor developments. It developed therefore the tendency to add 
too many details to the basic act, or to the delegated acts, where its 
role is stronger. This has been the unintended contribution of the 
Parliament to the complexity of the final reform decision. 
The arrival of a newcomer in the process led the traditional 
player, the Council, to implement a major change in its negotiating 
practices. When in the past the Council had to negotiate only with 
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the Commission, it was natural that, as the final stages of 
negotiations advanced, member states narrowed down their 
desired changes in the proposal to their real ‘red lines’. With co-
decision the major change is introduced by the fact that member 
states have to negotiate their positions via the member state holding 
the presidency. It is the presidency that will negotiate with the 
Commission and the European Parliament, and the member states 
feel uncomfortable with this fact. 
As a result, instead of narrowing down and limiting their 
proposals for compromise, they showed a tendency to complicate 
the process by adding too many details in their negotiating 
desiderata. With 28 member states in the process, the natural result 
is a synthesis of conflicting interests that can only become an 
acceptable compromise if a significant layer of complexity is added 
(often under the pretext of subsidiarity). 
4. The policies of CAP reform 
The three words that exemplified the targets of this particular CAP 
reform were ‘fairer’, ‘simpler’ and ‘greener’. The outcome of the 
reform can be summarised as: fairer, yes; simpler, definitely not; 
greener, still unclear. 
The CAP is clearly fairer after its recent reform. Maybe this is 
not to the extent some would have desired, including the 
Commission, if one compares the initial proposal to the outcome, 
but the distribution of support will have an impact. The allocation 
among member states will redistribute support from those with a 
higher level of support to those coming from a very low base. 
Within member states, their regionalisation choices could also limit 
extreme cases of uneven distribution as payments are gradually 
harmonised. Putting these together will imply that compared to its 
previous state, the new CAP will be fairer with respect to the 
declared objective of the reform to improve the distributional 
impact of direct payments. 
When it comes to the objective of making it simpler, the new 
CAP has definitively fallen short. The outcome of a new and also 
more democratic process of decision-making, this result will 
necessitate that all three institutions learn the necessary lessons 
from this first-ever experience to avoid the same mistakes in the 
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future. From their starting point proposals have to be simpler, 
compromise proposals narrower in focus and limited to the 
essential interest of member states and the balance between the 
various layers of legislation (basic act, delegated act, implementing 
act) should more accurately reflect the degree of detail that is 
essential at each legislative layer. 
Finally, on greening, which will be the real test of the success 
of this reform, the jury is still out. The CAP reform introduced a 
major shift in policy paradigm. Land became the reference for 
support (as all direct payments are redistributed based on 
recipients’ area, and not on past subsidies), land use became the 
condition for support (with the 30% green payment expanding the 
role of good cross-compliance) and land use change became the 
long-term objective of the policy, with an attempt to use the virtuous 
cycle of research, innovation and farm advice to bridge the gap 
between what is requested by farmers and how this can be achieved. 
How member states will implement in practice what in theory 
seemed desirable will be the big test of this reform. But the result 
would have to be assessed globally, taking also into account the 
interaction between direct payments and agri-environmental 
measures.  
5. Some conclusions 
Among the various aspects that are relevant in assessing the 
political economy of the recent CAP reform, three, in my view, merit 
greater focus if the outcome of future reforms were to be improved 
– timing, analysis and communication. 
Under normal conditions, the time gap between the proposal 
of a reform and its agreement among all three institutions is roughly 
three years. In the turbulent world of agriculture, this implies that 
an initial proposal could be made in an environment of, say, high 
prices, and a decision could be taken during a period when prices 
are pretty low. In theory, an evidence-based proposal should be able 
to resist short-term pressures, especially when the impact 
assessment process is supposed to test exactly the coherence of the 
policy proposal and its ability to anticipate future challenges. But 
the gap between theory and practice in the political world is very 
often revealed by decisions that undermine initial intentions. 
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This gap is clearly demonstrated in the continuous debate 
over what some perceive as the need to increase intervention prices 
to address market price volatility (the inspiration often being US 
‘countercyclical’ polices). Significant structural differences between 
US and EU farm policies (EU policies cover a much broader 
spectrum of products than US policies, and focus more on 
enhancing value added along the food chain than supporting bulk 
commodities) should explain why such comparisons are irrelevant. 
In addition, while countercyclical measures in the overall 
macroeconomy reflect the need to target some basic economic 
variables (the inflation rate, the unemployment rate, or a 
relationship between both) in a situation where both supply and 
demand are continuous, the fundamental difference of the 
agricultural sector is the discontinuity in the supply side. Although 
the failure to address this market reality lies behind the long history 
of policy failures of countercyclical measures in agriculture, this 
policy failure is often ignored in the final stages of negotiations, 
because it is often the price level of the moment rather than price 
prospects in the long run that influences the debate.  
This shows once more the neglected role that analysis plays 
in policy decision-making. In essence, political choices are choices 
among policy options. The more solidly based on evidence these 
options are, the more coherent political decisions are going to be. 
The debate of regionalisation, or rather the absence of a real debate 
on regionalisation, demonstrates this point strongly. In theory, but 
also in the design of the policy concept of this reform, 
regionalisation is a common underlying feature of direct payments, 
cross-compliance, and agri-environmental measures, which could 
be driven in a rational way by defining common agronomic and 
economic conditions. That the political choice made by member 
states left this policy option aside in their final decisions explains to 
a large extent several inconsistences that are evident in the final 
compromise. 
Although the above are prerequisites for success, 
communication is the means by which policy coherence is 
maintained. However, in the actual process of negotiations, 
communication can be the first victim, and very often the link 
between a certain proposal and the reasons for which it was 
developed disappears. The EU’s ecological focus area (EFA) 
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measure is a perfect example of what happens in the absence of 
communication during a negotiation process. The EFA reflects a 
marginal land conservation measure, as the real additional impact 
does not exceed 1-2% of total arable land area. Yet judging by 
reactions to the reform, one would tend to believe that this marginal 
element of the policy would to a large extent determine the 
judgment of its success or failure; and all that in the absence of any 
reference relating to the main objective of this measure – protection 
of biodiversity. 
Yet the above observations, significant as they may be in 
explaining limitations of the 2013 CAP reform, remain marginal 
with respect to its most important element and identifying 
characteristic: it is the first such reform to bring to the forefront all 
facets of co-decision. This is what the EU’s democratic process was 
meant to be, after all – a synthesis of the contributions of all three 
institutions, with its advantages, its challenges and its 
contradictions. Thus the underlying lesson to be learned on how to 
make the CAP reform process more efficient in the future is: it now 
takes three to tango! 
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5. PERSPECTIVE FROM THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
PAOLO DE CASTRO  
AND ANGELO DI MAMBRO 
1. The context 
Four main factors should be kept in mind in order to understand 
the circumstances in which the latest CAP reform process was 
finalised. Three of these factors are endogenous, i.e. attributable to 
the internal dynamics of the EU policy- and decision-making 
process. The fourth factor is exogenous, i.e. related to changes in 
global food supply over the last 10 to 15 years, which became more 
severe beginning in 2007-08 and beg crucial questions regarding the 
design of agricultural policies all over the world.  
The first endogenous factor is the role of the European 
Parliament. The 2013 CAP reform is the first overhaul of EU 
agricultural policy approved with the full participation of the 
European Parliament in all stages of the decision-making process. 
This feature marked the reform process since the beginning. The fact 
that the 2010 ‘kick off’ of the debate on the reform was delivered 
through an online public consultation is an acknowledgment of the 
need for wider participation and a ‘new start’ after years during 
which the legitimacy of CAP expenditure had been widely 
questioned. 
The political message of such an initiative was that the new 
CAP had to be meaningful for both EU agriculture and society, 
representing a new alliance between farmers and citizens of the 
Union. The public debate focused firstly on the contribution of 
European agriculture to the management of environmental 
resources, and secondly on the competitiveness of farms. The 
emphasis on environmental public goods delivery, in fact, followed 
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the insight of the previous major reform of the CAP, delivered in 
2000-03. 
The second endogenous factor is that the 2014-20 CAP reform 
is the first one to target 28 member states. Thus there were great 
expectations about the CAP’s ability to fully embrace specificities of 
an enlarged Europe, in which the differences in socio-economic 
conditions and in the characteristics of agricultural sectors and rural 
areas are more marked.  
The third endogenous factor relates to financial constraints. 
The whole debate was conditioned by the negotiations over the 
2014-20 EU multiannual financial framework (MFF). Unlike the first 
element above, this is not an absolute novelty in CAP reform 
history. This time, however, the mediation on the MFF proved to be 
remarkably difficult and prolonged because of the impact of the 
global economic crisis on the EU. Due to this circumstance, 
European heads of state reached a final political agreement on the 
MFF only in February 2013. The outcome was a reduced overall 
budget compared with the preceding one (2007-13), despite the 
additional tasks requested of the EU in a phase of intense economic 
crisis. Specifically, the total amount of appropriations is €34 billion 
less, i.e. about -3.5% for both commitment and payment 
appropriations. This is the first time in the EU’s history that such a 
decrease has occurred.1 Keep in mind that the Lisbon Treaty gives 
the Parliament powers in the negotiations over the annual budget, 
but the procedure is not the same for the MFF: the Parliament can 
adopt or reject the whole package, with no possibility of 
amendments. 
Besides these endogenous factors, new elements emerged in 
the global food supply and demand scenario while the CAP reform 
process developed. In 2009, for instance, the EU milk crisis already 
highlighted the impact on EU agriculture of phenomena such as the 
extreme volatility of prices at global level. The ‘rollercoaster’ of 
prices concerns both the main agricultural commodities and the raw 
materials, which are essential to the production of inputs such as 
animal feed or fertilisers. 
                                                        
1 European Parliament (2013), Directorate General for Internal Policies, 
Policy Department B, European Council Conclusions on the Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2014-2020 and the CAP. 
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The endogenous factors affected the reform process both in 
terms of legislative procedure and policy. Unfortunately, the 
exogenous factor – changes in global food supply and demand 
dynamics – influenced the debate on the policy only marginally, or 
at least not as much as it should have done. Maybe this is natural, 
but in the whole debate the ‘internal’ issues, namely the impact of 
the reform on farm competitiveness and the impact of the ‘green 
measures’ on farms, were the attracting poles of the discussion. 
What was happening outside the EU seemed to be irrelevant. Since 
European agriculture is no longer protected from global markets 
and the consequences of extreme price volatility, the debate should 
have instead focused more on the new scenario and the reform 
proposal itself should have provided more targeted tools to cope 
with the new situation. 
Given these circumstances, did the final result of the reform 
process match the expectations of farmers and citizens? And how 
does the new CAP respond to the challenges of the new situation?  
2. The legislative proposals 
After the 2010 public consultation, at the end of the same year, the 
Commission published the Communication “The CAP towards 
2020”. In 2011, the Commission tabled four legislative proposals 
respectively on direct payments, rural development, the Single 
Common Market Organisation (so-called ‘Single CMO’) and 
‘horizontal aspects’ of the CAP.  
From the very first it appeared clear that, in structural terms, 
the proposed reform was in substantial continuity with the 
revisions of the past. Notably, there were adjustments in the rural 
development pillar and the unification of the CAP Common Market 
Organisations into a single one. On the latter the draft regulation 
did not contain significant changes in terms of policy. 
The reinforcement of the support of risk management tools in 
the rural development pillar (introduced with the ‘Health Check’ of 
2008) appeared relevant but lacked ambition. The more remarkable 
idea in the same draft regulation was the launch of the European 
Innovation Partnership (EIP) on “Agricultural Productivity and 
Sustainability”, to be developed as local clusters of innovation 
targeting farmers’ needs. 
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The main and most controversial changes occurred in the 
direct payment pillar. Among the proposed modifications, the 
legislative draft contained mechanisms for a fairer distribution of 
CAP financial resources among member states (so-called ‘external 
convergence’) and among farmers (‘internal convergence’). These 
adjustments aimed to ensure a more equitable share of EU funds, 
with a definitive dismantling of the regime based on historical 
reference and transition to a minimum national average direct 
payment per hectare for the distribution of aid to farmers. 
Regarding external convergence, negotiations among member 
states in the Council led to a compromise at the heads of states and 
governments level between the EU-12 and the EU-15, i.e. ‘new’ and 
‘old’ member states, which ‘softened’ the convergence but ensured 
the triggering of the process that shall be completed after 2020. The 
same happened with the internal convergence process, which will 
be slower and less traumatic for farms. The Parliament played a 
greater role in achieving this result. 
The main novelty proposed in the structure of the new CAP, 
however, was the introduction in the first pillar of three ‘greening’ 
agricultural practices, accounting for the 30% of the national 
envelope for direct payments. Broadly, ‘greening’ refers to CAP 
efforts to promote environmental sustainability and combat climate 
change. The first pillar’s three practices – crop diversification, 
maintaining permanent grassland and establishing on every farm 
ecological focus areas (EFAs) – are still part of the final agreement. 
They are mandatory for farmers and compliance with greening 
requirements is a pre-condition to gaining access to CAP support. 
The greening is part of a ‘multilayer’ direct payment scheme, which 
aims to increase the modularity and adaptability of the regime vis-
à-vis national and territorial needs. 
Looking at the long cycle of CAP reforms that began in 1992, 
the first pillar’s greening practices can be viewed as a reinforcement 
of environmental cross-compliance, already introduced in the 
former overhaul of agricultural policy in 2000-03. In the 2013 
reform, this move is considered to be necessary to strengthen the 
contribution of the sector to the correct management of 
environmental resources at EU level. The legislator is thus 
demanding that the agricultural sector enhance its environmental 
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performance beyond the good will initiatives of states, regions and 
farmers in the context of rural development plans.  
Greening is a decisive element for comprehending the 2013 
reform from a genuinely political perspective. It should seal the 
‘new deal’ between EU farmers and citizens on European 
agricultural policy. In the pristine mind of the legislator, greening 
was the commitment that could provide CAP expenditure with 
renewed legitimacy in the eyes of taxpayers. In more practical 
terms, greening represents the trade-off between the intensification 
of farmers’ commitments in the delivery of environmental public 
goods on the one hand, and the strong public backing of taxpayers 
on the other. 
In this regard, a first shortcoming of the reform is that the 
level of public support for the CAP has actually decreased. 
Comparing the final year expenditure of the last two MFFs (thus 
2013 and 2020 respectively) using constant 2011 prices, the CAP 
budget is down 13% for direct payments and market measures and 
18% for rural development.2 The completion of the phase-in by new 
member states in the CAP financial and legal framework increased 
the number of beneficiaries of CAP support. Thus it appears clear 
that the increase in the number of European farmers supported by 
CAP measures has not been matched by an expansion in the 
available budget. 
In addition to this, from the side of farmers and national 
public administrations the greening proved very difficult to 
implement. In particular, the dispositions on EFAs are burdensome 
to control. In this perspective, greening could become a major 
source of payment errors. At least this is the fear of many national 
authorities.  
Given that since 2010 the debate between EU institutions, 
farmer organisations and civil society focused mainly on the 
contribution of European agriculture to the management of 
environmental resources, it is worth discussing the potential and 
real benefits for the environment of greening agricultural practices. 
The problem is that CAP greening assumes the features of new 
obligations for farmers, but says nothing about measurability and 
verifiability of the effects of the new rules on the environment. In 
                                                        
2 Ibid. 
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doing so, the reform exposes itself to the widespread criticism of 
imposing additional constraints and costs on farmers without 
producing major environmental gains. 
But even if MEPs or member states had wanted to amend the 
Commission proposal and add this kind of change to the reform, it 
would have not been possible. The lack of benchmarks, indicators 
and shared parameters at farm level to measure the real benefits of 
agro-environmental practices means the debate about sustainability 
in European agriculture cannot be resolved at present. How can 
farmers be efficient land managers if they cannot rely on shared 
indicators on soil and water quality, resource efficiency and 
biodiversity levels to effectively manage the environment? 
In addition to the reform elements that seemed ill-designed 
from the beginning, others indicated a lack of global vision in setting 
the Commission proposal’s priorities. In the four years between 
2007 and 2012 agricultural global markets were in turmoil. The price 
of raw materials, including agricultural ones, experienced 
unexpected short-term rises and falls that exacerbated the normal 
levels of volatility of agricultural markets. The extreme volatility in 
the short term went along with a trend of increasing prices in the 
medium term (2001-12).3 The issue of food security was so urgent 
that it topped the agenda of the 2011 G20 Summit.  
The turmoil seems to have passed, but most of the drivers that 
triggered the food price spikes of 2008, 2010 and 2012 are still at 
work. Demographic trends at global level, with wider prosperity 
and consequent change in food consumption patterns in emerging 
economies, are expanding the demand for food, fibre and fuels from 
agriculture, intensifying pressure on environmental systems. 
Further, this is happening in a multipolar world,4 i.e. in a system of 
international and trade relations that are much more complicated 
than in the past. In this context, global markets give unprecedented 
opportunities for the growth of the European farm and food 
industry, but they also leave farmers more exposed than in the past 
                                                        
3 P. De Castro et al. (2012), The Politics of Land and Food Scarcity, Alingdon: 
Earthscan. 
4 C.A. Kupchan (2012), No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the 
Coming Global Turn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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to the market risk that can come from trade tensions, food-borne 
outbreaks or extreme climate phenomena on a global scale. 
All these factors increase the uncertainty and pose 
unavoidable questions regarding modern agricultural policies, 
which nowadays have to shift their focus from market regulation to 
risk management tools.  
All this appears to be overlooked in the CAP reform. Some 
say the CAP’s best risk management tool is the income support of 
the first pillar, claiming it is a source of stable revenue for the 
farmers. This appears to be a false argument, since income support 
is a feature of normality that is overwhelmed by extraordinary 
events, which we define as ‘crisis’: an event that breaks the norms, 
i.e. something unexpected, unpredictable, sudden and harsh in its 
impact on economic activities. Moreover, to consider income 
support a risk management tool does not make sense in the long 
run, given the declining trend of public funds supporting 
agriculture. As already stated, the budget of the first pillar is 
shrinking and the number of farmers has increased. Also, from the 
perspective of structural consolidation, in which the number of 
farms will decrease in new member states, as has already happened 
in the old ones, income support is already irrelevant to many 
farmers for coping with price crises and risks related to markets and 
climate conditions and that are much greater than in the past.  
While the CAP reform gives new legal powers to the 
Commission to react in the event of a sudden crisis, the draft 
regulations do not give priority to the challenge of setting up 
effective permanent risk management tools.  
The symbol of this failure is the ‘crisis reserve’. The first drafts 
of the regulations on the MFF and the CAP provided a ‘crisis 
reserve’ for farmers, to be activated in case of sudden market 
disruptions and placed outside the EU budget, so that it could have 
been used as an extraordinary source of financing and could 
cumulate year after year. The 2013 agreement of the heads of state 
and governments on the MFF instead moved it into Heading 2, i.e. 
into the CAP budget. Following this decision, the crisis reserve must 
be financed every year with a linear cut of roughly 1.3% of all direct 
payments above  2,000. If the reserve is not used the money is 
refunded the following year with no possibility of cumulation. 
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This decision is a call for greater public spending discipline, 
but it leaves narrow margins for the EU to cope with the unexpected 
and creates a strange situation in which there is a crisis reserve but 
it is almost impossible to use it. All the stakeholders and the EU 
institutions, in fact, tend to be exceptionally prudent when it comes 
to deciding whether to use the reserve, adding an element of 
incertitude for the farms experiencing the crisis. 
Moreover, this decision does not take into account the very 
nature of the modern market crisis, which can be heavily influenced 
by geopolitical factors. The farming sector is not always directly 
responsible for the crisis. This was the case of the embargo of EU 
agricultural and food products by Russia in August 2014 in 
retaliation for EU sanctions on Russia for its actions in Ukraine. It 
took a long time and exhausting negotiations to secure the crisis 
reserve and to find alternative funds to finance the extraordinary 
measures required by the situation. 
The main lesson of the 2008-12 crises is that the focus on the 
CAP as an economic and environmental policy no longer fits the 
global scenario. This does not mean that the nexus between 
agriculture and the environment should be ruled out, rather much 
to the contrary: it is not enough. Not only should agricultural policies 
have a more intense connection with environmental ones but also 
with other policies, such as: trade, research, energy and climate 
action policy, food and health and even social policies. This is not to 
mention development policies, which have an already established 
linkage with agriculture, even though the CAP policy-makers 
started to consider this element only recently. 
All the efforts in the CAP reforms from the 1990s to 2008 
aimed for the emancipation of EU agricultural policy from the 
isolation in which it developed, as a ‘sector’ policy. These overhauls 
strived to affirm the full acknowledgment that in developed 
countries ‘agriculture and food’ are no longer exclusively a matter 
of agricultural production and involve many other aspects. One of 
these is environmental public goods delivery. The 2008-12 crisis 
reinforced this awareness that there are many other aspects to be 
considered ‘out there’, above all trade, and that we should broaden 
the network of policies dealing with agriculture and food. 
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3. The role of the Parliament: “Done is better than 
perfect” 
The February 2013 MFF agreement enabled EU ministers of 
agriculture and the Parliament to accelerate the CAP reform. In fact, 
the MFF 2014-20 adoption had been a huge procedural obstacle to 
the finalisation of a compromise on the legal texts of the reform 
proposed by the Commission almost one and half years earlier. The 
timetable to have the reform definitively approved in time for 
implementation in member states at the beginning of 2014, 
however, proved to be tight. It was already made clear, for instance, 
that the entry into force of the regulation on direct payments, which 
required the most intense effort of adaptation by national public 
administrations, had to be postponed an entire year to January 2015. 
In March 2014, the Parliament, the Council and the Commission had 
reached their own positions on the reform, but a big question mark 
concerned whether they were able to find a compromise on 
thousands of pages of legal texts by June 2014, i.e. in just four 
months.  
At the time, Agriculture Committee MEPs had to make the 
most important decision in the entire legislature. There were many 
obstacles on the path to finalising agreement on the reform. As 
clarified in the preceding paragraph, the distance from the 
Commission view on some crucial issues was significant and many 
doubts concerning core elements of the legislative proposal had 
already emerged. Given the complexity of the legal texts, the delay 
in the adoption of the MFF and the consequent tight timetable made 
a first reading agreement difficult to reach.  
Despite all these concerns and the option of rejecting the 
Commission proposal, the Parliament decided to accept the 
challenge to finalise the reform. Why? Because sometimes “[d]one 
is better than perfect”.5 This was the case of the previous CAP 
reform process, which in the 2003 so-called ‘mid-term review’ 
provided changes much more radical than those of 1999-2000. 
The Parliament decided to assume its responsibility and seize 
the opportunity to adapt the CAP to the new times, striving to 
                                                        
5 This widespread motto is generally attributed to S. Sanders (2013), Lean 
In: Women, Work and the Will to Lead, New York, NY: Knopf. 
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improve the reform in the direction of farm competitiveness and 
risk management, while maintaining the principles of the 
Commission proposal on enhancing environmental sustainability. 
Thus the MEPs focused on two aspects: policy modularity and 
increasing support for the organisational features of farming. 
Policy modularity referred to the ability of CAP to fit different 
agricultural contexts. The Parliament backed the proposal to give 
more flexibility to member states when they decide on the share of 
funds to transfer between pillars and on coupled support. 
Regarding the ‘multilayer’ direct payments scheme, the MEPs 
worked for the introduction of a ‘redistributive payment’ for the 
first hectares, to provide more targeted support for small and 
medium-sized farms. This scheme is voluntary for member states. 
In contrast with the Council position, the MEPs battled to 
maintain compulsory support for young farmers in the first pillar 
and to rule out ‘double funding’ on green direct payment. The 
greening element, however, was amended to be more suitable to 
different kinds of agriculture, thanks to the introduction of practices 
equivalent to the three envisaged by the Commission proposal. 
Despite the Parliament commitment on progressive ‘capping’, i.e. 
the reduction of payments beyond a certain threshold, this was 
approved as voluntary for the states. 
As for strengthening support for the organisational features 
of farming, the MEPs saw in the Single CMO Regulation the 
potential to bridge the gap left by the Commission’s proposal on the 
competitiveness of farms and their ability to manage risk. After a 
challenging internal debate, the Agriculture Committee chose to 
focus on two distinct elements: incentivising bottom-up 
organisation of agri-food chain actors, and improving the ‘safety 
net’ in terms of extraordinary market measures in order to cope with 
possible imbalances in the transmission of price changes at different 
stages of the food chain. The two elements are inseparable, i.e. the 
management of measures that can go beyond the normal EU 
competition rules is attributed exclusively to producer groups and 
inter-branch (inter-professional) organisations. This has to be 
intended as an incentive for actors across the agri-food chains to 
organise themselves from the bottom-up, taking responsibility and 
triggering forms of agri-food chain ‘self-management’. 
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The low level of organisation is still one of the main obstacles 
to the farm sector obtaining adequate remuneration from the 
market. This is why it is of major relevance to incentivise 
aggregation in the supply stage of the agri-food chain. The rationale 
for this approach can also be viewed as the strengthening of the role 
of producers in light of the positive experience built with the fruit 
and vegetable sector legislation. The revised Single CMO allows for 
the recognition of producers’ organisations, associations and inter-
branch organisations not just in the fruit and vegetable sector, but 
for all agricultural sectors, except for milk and sugar, on which 
specific sectorial rules apply. 
More significant, producer groups and inter-branch 
organisations can be exempted – through an implementing act by 
the Commission – from EU competition rules in case of crisis or 
‘temporary market disruptions’, directly managing measures that 
previously were an exclusive prerogative of national and EU public 
authorities. These measures concern the market withdrawal or free 
distribution of products, private storage, joint purchasing of inputs 
necessary to combat the spread of pests and diseases or to address 
the effects of natural disasters, and financing communication 
programmes to restore consumer confidence after food-borne 
outbreaks. As regards to geographical indication on products, the 
Parliament obtained the possibility for consortia to carry out 
strategies for the management of supply. 
This is a relevant shift in comparison with the past. In the 
former legal framework, only the Commission and member states 
could finance the withdrawal of surpluses during a period of 
market disruption. The CAP reform transfers, under determined 
conditions, this power to producer groups and inter-branch 
organisations. 
This set of amendments should be seen as a clear attempt to 
overcome the limited financial resources in the market crisis 
reserve. The new prerogatives of the organisations pose a major 
challenge for the agricultural sector as well. Nobody can say 
whether these provisions will work, but the MEPs preferred to aim 
for a more active role for farmers in the agri-food chain and 
adjusting other elements of the reform in the coming years. 
The CAP reform undergoing a mid-term review in 2017, as 
foreseen in the ‘whereas’ part of the new regulations, cannot be 
158  PERSPECTIVE FROM THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
 
taken for granted. However, it appears clear that the reform 
designed in 2011 and amended in 2013 needs further adjustments to 
be considered a valid attempt to meet the challenges posed by 
changes in the agricultural and food sector at European and global 
level. 
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6. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE 
(FORMER) EUROPEAN 
COMMISSIONER FOR 
ENVIRONMENT 
JANEZ POTOČNIK* 
1. The facts 
The basic facts with which common agricultural policy grapples are 
more or less known but worth repeating, as they have been 
considered in recent years in attempts to make the CAP greener, and 
they will have to be considered even more in the future.  
The first fact: agriculture, along with forestry, is hugely 
important for the environment. The reason for this is quite simple: 
combined, farmers and foresters in Europe manage 75% of our land 
use. 
Second, agriculture and the environment are heavily 
interdependent. First of all, agriculture needs the environment: 
farmers depend on good environmental conditions, fertile soil, the 
availability of unpolluted water, pollination and other aspects of 
biodiversity such as the natural predators of crop pests. Many 
farmers also depend on keeping climate change under control so as 
to avoid large-scale desertification, floods or other extreme weather 
events. And beyond the direct impact of the environment on 
agriculture, farmers in many regions can benefit from an 
environmentally healthy and beautiful landscape by diversifying 
their activities to include tourism on the farm.  
                                                        
* I would like to thank also my former member of the cabinet Vesna Valant 
for her valuable contribution. 
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Third, the environment also needs agriculture. This need is 
particularly clear in situations where traditional farming systems 
have evolved along with wildlife species, high nature value farming 
being one such example. If these farming systems are abandoned or 
production methods are intensified in certain ways, then the 
precious biodiversity is lost. 
And fourth, globally, and in many regions including Europe, 
food production is exceeding environmental limits or is close to 
doing so. Agriculture, including fisheries, is the single largest driver 
of biodiversity loss. In Europe, agriculture is the predominant land 
use in about half of its area, and the intensification of farming since 
the mid-20th century has led to a number of serious environmental 
problems such as water pollution, loss of biodiversity, soil erosion 
and loss of soil organic matter, air pollution from ammonia, and loss 
of valuable cultural landscapes. It is also estimated that 50% of all 
species in Europe depend on agricultural habitats, which are much 
less healthy than other habitats. 
2. Where to begin? With what we already have: 
the CAP 
It is not that we have to start from the scratch. For more than 20 
years, the CAP has increasingly incorporated environmental 
considerations, and a series of CAP reforms has moved in the right 
direction for the environment, first by decoupling CAP payments 
from production, i.e. reducing the incentive to intensify production, 
then by developing policy on, and gradually increasing funding for 
environmental measures under, rural development programmes. In 
2003, rules on cross-compliance were introduced as a condition for 
farmers to receive first-pillar payments, which helped to underpin 
effective implementation of relevant environmental legislation on 
farms.  
The Commission’s 2011 CAP reform proposals went one step 
further, attaching specific greening requirements to farmers’ direct 
payments. The underpinning principle was ‘public money for 
public goods‘, with agriculture having an important role in 
producing public goods, many of which are highly valued by 
society but not rewarded by the market. The most significant of 
these public goods are environmental. At the same time, through 
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the CAP, farmers are directly supported by the EU budget, thus by 
European taxpayers. As a condition of this support, and for the CAP 
to gain credibility in the eyes of stakeholders other than farmers, the 
link between direct payments and respecting environmental 
legislation and environmental practice was introduced. The three 
greening elements put forward in the Commission’s proposal were 
crop diversification, the protection of permanent grassland, and the 
requirement for farms to designate 7% of their arable land as an 
unfarmed ecological focus area (EFA). They were proportionate in 
terms of the burden imposed, and were supported by the impact 
assessment. 
These proposals were greatly watered down by the Council 
and Parliament, excluding many farmers from the scope of rules on 
crop diversification and permanent grassland, reducing the EFA to 
5% and in general introducing a very large degree of flexibility for 
member states. This makes it difficult to predict the actual benefits 
for the environment.  
Nonetheless, when deciding how to implement the latest 
CAP reform, member states would do well to bear in mind the 
reality of the simple equation that the more they do through 
implementation of EU environmental regulation, the less they have 
to pay with public money; and that if they fail to make the right 
choices in terms of regulating environmentally damaging practices, 
there will be a high budgetary price to pay, as the only alternative 
will be to pay farmers to remedy the damage already done.  
At a time of economic hardship and related budgetary 
constraints, it would be odd for an administration not to look very 
closely at where to draw the line between mandatory requirements 
and incentive payments. Many member states, if they examine this 
question with an open mind, will ask themselves how long they can 
afford to go on paying for things which are essentially no more than 
good practice in terms of land management.  
3. The big picture 
When looking at the future challenges one should not 
underestimate the influence of major global developments, firstly 
those that began at the United Nations Conference for Sustainable 
Development (UNCSD) in 2012 in Rio de Janeiro. Many, including 
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myself, were not happy with the outcome or its level of ambition, 
but the commitment to develop so-called sustainable development 
goals proved to be greater than expected. The ‘post-2015 process‘ of 
intergovernmental negotiations that is currently taking place in 
New York under the leadership of the United Nations is indeed very 
promising. The essence of this process is seeking agreement on a 
global commitment to a transformative agenda for sustainable 
development. This agenda does not target only developing nations, 
as does the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but all nations 
around the globe. In a way, it is even more challenging for the 
developed world, which is very much addicted to unsustainable 
ways of production and consumption. The European Union is, of 
course, an important part of that process and our leadership role 
needs to be maintained. We should be careful that we do not shy 
away from being the driver and instead become a follower.  
For the transformative agenda to be efficient some conditions 
need to be met. Transformation requires changing the development 
and growth model. This means that we have to fully engage in the 
private sector and existing business investment capacity, including 
that of the financial sector. Domestic policies need to fit the purpose 
and domestic public financial resources should be channelled into 
building transformational capacity and transformation itself. We 
also have to use all the potential of international cooperation, from 
trade to science and research cooperation and from technology 
transfer to capacity building. The direct help provided through 
public financing in the form of Official Development Aid (ODA) 
should continue.  
The ‘post-2015 process’ of intergovernmental negotiations 
should be concluded by autumn 2015. The UNCSD-mandated Open 
Working Group Proposal for Sustainable Goals, based on 
substantive contributions of all the countries and stakeholders, 
included 17 goals and for each goal a number of targets and 
indicators. The most important goals for the future of agriculture 
are: end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and 
promote sustainable agriculture; ensure availability and sustainable 
management of water and sanitation for all; protect, restore and 
promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably 
manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land 
degradation and halt biodiversity loss.  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  163 
 
Another major global development is connected to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). After 
the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP), 
the international community actively engaged and prepared for the 
summit next year in Paris. Signs in the international community are 
encouraging: one can clearly identify not only higher levels of 
awareness of the importance of addressing climate change more 
seriously, but also a readiness to actually do something about it.  
Encouraging messages also emerged from the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which reached some 
landmark decisions in 2010 in Nagoya. They included the “Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity”, the “Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-
2020” and the “Aichi Biodiversity Targets” and the “Strategy for 
resource mobilization in support of the achievement of the 
Convention’s three objectives”. Means of implementation were 
further detailed in the 2012 Hyderabad and 2014 Pyeongchang COP 
meetings.  
Despite the many past agreements and commitments that 
were not met in practice, it is of vital importance to understand that 
there is no real alternative to a sustainable future, that there are 
signs that the world is ready to more seriously engage in this 
process and that each one of us will have to play his part. Changes 
in existing agricultural practice will play a crucial role in this global 
transformation process.  
4. Europe’s economic hardship and what it means 
for the CAP 
Another factor that will greatly influence future developments in 
agricultural policy is the economic reality in the European Union, 
now and in the future. In recent years we have concentrated our 
attention on addressing the financial and economic crises and on 
solving the high level of indebtedness of some of our economies. But 
mere sound macroeconomic policy is not enough to improve 
European competitiveness vis-à-vis new and emerging global 
players. There are clear signs that this task is still ahead of us and 
one can realistically expect that the future economic situation in 
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Europe will remain challenging. This will likely limit to an even 
greater degree public financing possibilities, and the reasons for 
eligibility will have to be really convincing. Using public money for 
delivering public goods is a strong argument, and it will have to be 
exploited more assiduously in the context of future common 
agriculture policy. Preventing disease or pollution is much better 
than curing an illness or cleaning polluted land or water. The reason 
is obvious – prevention is much cheaper than the cure.  
The latest CAP reform came into effect on 1 January 2015. It is 
early to say what its impact on the environment will be, although it 
may well fall short of expectations. Unless member states opt for an 
ambitious implementation, we may well be faced with the 
conclusion that CAP reform has not delivered much improvement 
for the environment.  
What should be done in future very much depends on 
deliverables of the reform. There may be positive elements on which 
it will be possible to build; if not, the policy approach will have to 
be reconsidered. Further reflection could take place on using more 
results-based environmental payments, instead of the current, 
rather prescriptive approach. There could be questioning of the 
current – and more and more difficult to justify – balance between 
the first and second pillars (and the actual concept of pillars itself), 
and there may be future consideration of alternative ways to 
support environmental objectives on farms and in forestry areas 
(including the option of having a separate environmental fund). 
Another consideration could also be whether a prescriptive 
approach with very detailed requirements and many derogations 
and exemptions on implementation of greening measures is viable, 
and, in the context of new legislative rules for the CAP (ordinary 
legislative procedure with much more involvement of the European 
Parliament), whether such an approach still fits the purpose. A more 
outcome-oriented policy based on defining principles and priorities 
for the environment in the CAP while leaving detailed 
implementation to national and regional authorities could be an 
alternative to the current complex set of rules. 
5. No way around it: We’re in this together 
It may be early for such speculation, but one thing is sure: the 
problems related to the major impact of agriculture on the 
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environment will remain – globally, in Europe, and on every single 
farm. The issue of how to reach a step-by-step reduction in the 
negative environmental impact of agriculture and how to make the 
agriculture truly sustainable in all respects (economic, social and 
environmental) will not disappear from global or EU agendas. We 
of course need a viable and vibrant farming sector in Europe – but 
it is also crucial that we find a way to do it while avoiding further 
pollution and damage to the environment and human health.  
The transformation of our societies, of the way we produce 
and consume, the way we live, is inevitable. Laws of physics are also 
valid in our economies. For the first time, we humans are, with our 
activity, seriously affecting the balance of our planet, and our 
responsibility, individual and collective, for our common future is 
incomparable to the responsibility of those sharing the very same 
planet a couple of generations ago.  
It bears repeating: our countryside, 75% of our land in 
Europe, is managed by farmers and foresters. While they may own 
their land, how they treat it affects the rest of us. In that sense, they 
are guardians of our environment. No one can play that role in place 
of them, but neither can they do it alone. They need help and can 
continue to get it via future – but properly reformed – common 
agricultural policy.  
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7. THE MULTI-ANNUAL 
FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK AND 
THE 2013 CAP REFORM 
ALAN MATTHEWS* 
1. Introduction 
The 2013 reform of the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP), the 
first under the ordinary legislative procedure, took place at the same 
time as the negotiations on the EU’s multiannual financial 
framework (MFF) for the period 2014-20. This coincidence in timing 
had important implications for the outcome of the 2013 CAP reform, 
which are explored in this chapter.  
Three linkages are highlighted in the discussion. First, the 
direction taken by the 2013 CAP reform was shaped, in part, by the 
need to create a narrative to legitimise and defend the share of the 
CAP budget in the 2014-20 MFF. Of course, the environment for EU 
farming had also changed markedly since the completion of the 
Health Check reform in 2008. Addressing the fallout from the global 
food price spike and increased price volatility, the growing 
attention to environmental and climate change challenges, and the 
need to maintain territorial balance in rural areas, particularly in the 
new member states, would have been sufficient to motivate a 
further reform of the CAP. However, there was an urgency to adapt 
the CAP to take these changes into account given the fact that the 
                                                        
* This chapter is based on a working paper prepared as part of the European 
Parliament project “The First CAP Reform under the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure: A Political Economy Perspective” led by Louise Knops and 
Johann Swinnen of the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. I am 
grateful to the editors and to Alan Swinbank for helpful comments on 
earlier versions. 
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CAP budget was also up for discussion in the context of the MFF 
negotiations.  
The fact that the CAP budget share could not be taken for 
granted had been underlined by a leaked draft of an earlier 
Commission response to the budget review mandated as part of the 
2007-13 MFF, which suggested, “[Future reform of the CAP] must 
stimulate a further significant reduction in the overall share of the 
EU budget devoted to agriculture, freeing up spending for new EU 
priorities” (CEC, 2009: 17).1 Given the dominant role of the CAP 
budget in overall EU spending, it has always been a factor in MFF 
negotiations. What made the 2014-20 MFF negotiations different 
was the clear articulation of an alternative set of spending priorities 
(the Europe 2020 strategy) combined with wide-ranging fiscal 
austerity in Europe, which strengthened the resolve of the net 
contributor countries to limit the increase in EU budget ceilings and 
even to obtain a reduction relative to the 2007-13 period. Thus the 
option in previous MFFs to increase spending in other areas while 
also allowing an increase in CAP spending by raising the overall 
MFF ceiling was not an option on this occasion.  
In seeking to defend the share of CAP spending in the next 
MFF, Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development 
Dacian Cioloş needed allies around the Commission table. He 
gained the support of the environment and climate change 
commissioners and, ultimately, the College of Commissioners, to 
maintain the CAP budget provided that the reformed CAP placed 
greater emphasis on delivering results for the environment and 
climate change. Arguably, the CAP proposals would have moved 
in this direction in any case given that there was some support for 
focusing CAP expenditure more on public goods in the public 
consultation held to gather ideas for the CAP reform (CEC, 2010), 
but the need to win support around the Commission cabinet table 
confirmed this momentum.2 The result was that the Commission 
                                                        
1 The draft can be downloaded from the website of Le Groupe PAC 2013, 
www.pouruneautrepac.eu/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/draft-
document-reforming-the-budget-oct-2009.pdf-0. 
2 Euractiv (2011) proposed a further explanation for the Commission’s 
decision to leave support for farmers largely unchanged. It points to a 
Franco-German understanding whereby Germany agreed to keep the 
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MFF proposal, when it appeared, contained a ceiling for CAP 
expenditure which surprised and delighted farm groups. At this 
stage, the linkage with the MFF played an important agenda-setting 
role for the CAP reform proposals. 
A second linkage was created in the negotiation phase of the 
CAP reform. In principle, once the CAP reform proposals had been 
published by the Commission in October 2011, the CAP 
negotiations could have continued independently of the MFF 
negotiations. The agricultural negotiators could have discussed the 
structure and design of direct payments, market management 
mechanisms, rural development programmes and horizontal 
management and financing issues in isolation from the budget talks. 
One could envisage the Agriculture Council3 and Parliament 
approving the CAP regulations even in advance of the conclusion 
of the MFF negotiations.4  
Politically and practically, however, this was never likely to 
be the case. Already in October 2011, the Parliament secretariat had 
noted that the general adoption of the CAP legislative proposals by 
the co-decision procedure would probably not be possible before 
the inter-institutional agreement (IIA) on the financial perspectives 
2014-20 (Adinolfi et al., 2011). In its formal response to the 
Commission’s proposed MFF in June 2012, the Parliament made 
clear that it would adhere to the principle that ‘nothing is agreed 
                                                        
current CAP budget unchanged in exchange for the introduction of 
‘transition regions’ in the bloc’s cohesion policy. See 
www.euractiv.com/specialreport-budget/cap-budget-news-506285. 
3 Formally, it is the Agriculture and Fisheries Council, but this shortened 
form is used throughout this chapter. 
4 The MFF sets the ceilings for expenditure on Heading 2 “sustainable 
growth and natural resources” and the sub-heading for “market-related 
expenditure and direct payments”. Direct payment ceilings are set in the 
CAP regulation on direct payments. While the practice is to adapt the direct 
payment ceilings to the budgetary resources available in the regulation, 
this does not have to be the case. The financial discipline mechanism exists 
to ensure that, in any budget year, the appropriations for direct payments 
do not exceed the financial resources available. If the CAP negotiators 
overestimated the allocation to the CAP when the MFF was eventually 
agreed, this mechanism could be used to ensure CAP expenditure stayed 
under the MFF ceiling. 
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until everything is agreed’ as an appropriate working method 
(European Parliament, 2012a).5 A number of stakeholder 
groups/member states/MEPs argued that their agreement on the 
scope of the greening measures in Pillar I was dependent on the 
scale of the ‘compensation’ available from the Pillar I budget.6 The 
fact that both the Council and Parliament deferred their approval of 
their respective mandates on the CAP reform dossier until March 
2013, when the budget figures for the CAP were known, delayed the 
start of the informal trilogues on CAP reform. Thus a consequence 
of this scheduling linkage was to compress the time available to 
conclude the CAP negotiations given the preference by all sides that 
an agreement had to be reached before the end of the Irish 
presidency in June 2013. I argue that it also strengthened the hand 
of those arguing for minimal changes in the CAP regulations in the 
negotiations. 
Third, the MFF and CAP negotiations were not only linked by 
the volume of resources to be made available for agricultural policy 
in the period 2014-20. On this occasion, the General Affairs Council 
presidency in its initial draft of the ‘negotiating box’7 (which 
eventually evolved into the European Council’s conclusions on the 
                                                        
5 The Council may have adopted a somewhat different working method. In 
deciding how to advance the MFF dossier in July 2012 following the Danish 
presidency’s first presentation of the negotiating box, the Cyprus 
presidency proposed that “a strict demarcation will be kept between the 
financial and non-financial issues. Detailed examination of the 
Commission’s sectoral legislative proposals will continue actively in the 
relevant working parties, leaving aside the financial and horizontal 
aspects” (Council of the European Union, 2012a). 
6 For example, COMAGRI in its opinion on the MFF adopted on 18 
September 2012 stressed “that the transition to a regional model and to 
further greening of the CAP in the next multiannual period will have a 
severe impact on farmers, and that extra cuts in the overall CAP budget 
would consequently put even more pressure on the position of individual 
farmers”. 
7 The ‘negotiating box’ is a document prepared by the Council presidency 
and discussed in the General Affairs Council, setting out the allocations, 
methodological provisions and options on all MFF elements. The 
document evolves over time as the negotiations progress and the views of 
member states are taken into account, and provides the basis for the 
eventual agreement at the European Council.  
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MFF in February 2013) explicitly introduced a number of elements 
that the Parliament held should be decided under the ordinary 
legislative procedure (Council of the European Union, 2012b). This 
inclusion of particular CAP elements in the MFF agreement created 
a specific dynamic around the inter-institutional negotiations on 
these issues. For example, when a political agreement between the 
institutions was reached in June 2013 under the Irish presidency, 
these MFF-related issues were left to be negotiated later, in 
September 2013, under the Lithuanian presidency. Although the 
Parliament eventually gained some small concessions in the final 
settlement, its role as co-legislator on these issues was certainly 
diminished by virtue of their inclusion in the European Council 
MFF conclusions. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
outcome of the MFF negotiations for the size of the CAP budget. 
Section 3 assesses how the sequencing of the MFF and CAP 
negotiations affected the outcome of the latter. Section 4 discusses 
the controversy around the CAP legislative issues included in the 
MFF dossier and how these were resolved. Section 5 presents the 
conclusions.  
2. The size of the CAP budget 
The Commission published its proposal for the new MFF regulation 
for the period 2014-20 in June 2011 (CEC, 2011a). It proposed a 
financial framework with 1.05% of gross national income in 
commitments, translating into 1% in payments from the EU budget. 
A further 0.02% in potential expenditure outside the MFF and 0.04% 
in expenditure outside the budget would bring the total figure to 
1.11%.8  
In absolute terms, the Commission proposed an MFF 
expenditure ceiling of €1,025 billion for the 2014-20 period 
compared to €994 billion in the 2007-13 period (all in constant 2011 
prices). This represented a modest 3% increase in real terms over the 
seven years. However, if expenditure outside the MFF and outside 
                                                        
8 MFF commitments represent a ceiling for the annual budget headings and 
actual commitment appropriations are often lower, except for cohesion 
spending where the MFF ceilings are carried over automatically into the 
annual budgets. 
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the budget is included, the 2014-20 total amounted to €1,083 billion, 
which is a 9% increase on the previous period (Little et al., 2013).  
The initial Commission proposal for agriculture in the MFF 
surprised many because it maintained the level of CAP spending in 
nominal terms. Indeed, Commissioner Cioloş even claimed that 
agriculture spending had been maintained in real terms once 
elements related to agriculture but not included in the CAP budget 
were taken into account, using the data in Table 7.1. The 
Commission proposal for the CAP was based on freezing the MFF 
2014-20 ceilings at the level of the 2013 ceilings in nominal terms. 
No allowance was made for expenditure on public intervention or 
other crisis expenditure in this MFF total, but a crisis reserve 
allocation was placed outside the formal MFF as an additional item. 
Table 7.1 The Commission’s proposed budget for agriculture in the 
2014-20 MFF (constant 2011 prices) 
Total proposed budget 2014-20 €386.9 bn 
 Of which:  
Pillar I – direct payments and market expenditure €281.8 bn 
Pillar II – rural development €89.9 bn 
Food safety €2.2 bn 
Most deprived persons €2.5 bn 
Reserve for crisis in the agricultural sector €3.5 bn 
European Globalisation Fund Up to €2.5 bn 
Research and innovation on food security, the bio-
economy and sustainable agriculture (in the common 
strategic framework for research and innovation) 
€4.5 bn 
Source: CEC (2011c). 
The Parliament set down an early marker on the size of the 
CAP budget it wanted to see in the coming MFF period. In adopting 
its resolution in May 2011 responding to the Commission’s 
Communication on the CAP towards 2020 (rapporteur A. Dess), it 
called for the EU agricultural budget in the next financing period 
“to be maintained at least at the same level as the 2013 agricultural 
budget.” The following month, in adopting its resolution on the 
report of its special committee on the policy challenges and 
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budgetary resources for a sustainable European Union after 2013 
(the SURE committee), the Parliament reaffirmed that “the amounts 
allocated to the CAP in the budget year 2013 should be at least 
maintained during the next financial programming period”.  
An ambiguity remained, however, in that the Parliament’s 
resolutions did not specify whether the CAP budget should be held 
constant at the 2013 level in real or nominal terms. In responding to 
the Commission’s formal legislative proposal on the MFF published 
in June 2011, Parliament’s Agriculture and Rural Development 
Committee (COMAGRI) in its opinion on the Budgets Committee 
resolution (rapporteur P. De Castro) adopted a hard line. 
COMAGRI called for the cuts proposed by the Commission to be 
rejected and for Parliament to call for an amount corresponding to 
the ceilings for the current programming period. Specifically, 
COMAGRI interpreted “the maintenance of CAP spending at least 
at the same level” as referring to expenditure in real terms. It 
wanted the Council to increase Heading 2 of the MFF dealing with 
sustainable growth and natural resources and the sub-heading for 
CAP direct payments and market-related expenditure to €420.7 
billion and €336.7 billion respectively, corresponding to a freeze in 
real terms.  
It took the European Council four attempts based on 
proposals from the Council President Herman Van Rompuy (two 
leading up and during its November 2012 meeting, and two leading 
up to and during its February 2013 meeting) to finally agree on MFF 
conclusions. Van Rompuy’s first proposal would have seen 
significant reductions in both Pillar I and Pillar II allocations 
compared to the Commission’s proposal, but the Pillar I reductions 
were partly reinstated in his second proposal.9 By the end of the 
February 2013 European Council meeting, an additional amount 
had also been added to the CAP Pillar II allocation (Table 7.2).  
 
                                                        
9 For details, see http://capreform.eu/no-decision-on-mff-budget-at-first-
attempt/. 
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Table 7.2 CAP allocations in the 2014-10 MFF, € billion (2011 prices) 
 MFF  
2007-
13 
Commission 
July 2012 
proposal 
European 
Council 
President’s 
first 
proposal 
13 Nov 
2012 
European 
Council 
President’s 
second 
proposal 
22 Nov 
2012 
European 
Council 
final MFF 
conclusions 
8 Feb 2013 
MFF total 
commitment 
appropriations 
993.6 1,033.2 973.2 972 960 
Heading 2 420.7 386.5 364.5 372.2 373.2 
Of which:      
CAP Pillar I 336.7* 283.1 269.9 277.9 277.9 
CAP Pillar II 95.5 89.9 83.7 83.7 84.9 
Note: *Before modulation and other direct transfers to rural development. 
Sources: Little et al. (2013); European Council Draft Conclusions SN37/12 dated 
13 November and 22 November 2012, respectively.  
In its response to the European Council conclusions, the 
Parliament decided not to challenge the overall level and 
distribution by heading of the proposed MFF, accepting the 
particularly difficult economic and financial context at the time of 
this decision. Instead, it focused on improving the implementation 
of the MFF by introducing greater flexibility to allow the ceilings to 
be used to the fullest possible extent, new arrangements relating to 
the MFF revision and the unity and transparency of the budget, as 
well as a further engagement in reforming the financing of the EU 
budget. However, the Parliament has insisted that this should not 
be perceived as a precedent and it has reiterated its position that the 
MFF figures, and every other part of the European Council’s 
relevant political agreement, are subject to negotiations with the 
Parliament (European Parliament, 2014). Thus the European 
Council MFF conclusions on the size of the CAP budget provided 
the backdrop against which the negotiations on the new CAP 
regulations took place. 
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3. Sequencing of the budget and CAP 
negotiations 
From the outset, the COMAGRI negotiators adopted the position 
that Parliament would only adopt its final position on CAP reform 
once the MFF ceilings had been decided.10 There is a view that this 
linkage between the MFF and CAP negotiations delayed the start of 
negotiations on the CAP and, given the general acceptance of the 
need to conclude negotiations by the end of the Irish presidency’s 
term if the new reforms were to enter into force on time in 2014, this 
may have compressed the time available for CAP negotiations, 
possibly weakening the Parliament’s position in the co-decision 
process. 
Indeed, the linkage with the MFF negotiations probably did 
shorten the time for the negotiations on the CAP regulations. If the 
European Council had agreed on their MFF conclusions in 
November 2012 as was the original intention, it is likely that the 
Council’s general position could have been agreed before March 
2013. Whether the Parliament’s negotiators would have been ready 
to start informal trilogues before March 2013 is less clear. The 
COMAGRI rapporteurs pressed ahead and prepared their draft 
opinions by May 2012, which were then open for amendment that 
summer. Given the volume of amendments to the rapporteurs’ draft 
opinions and the need to consolidate these amendments and then to 
vote on them, it is possible that this process could not have 
proceeded more rapidly than it did. On balance, however, it seems 
probable that the CAP trilogues could have begun a little earlier if 
the MFF negotiations were not taking place in parallel.  
However, even if the informal trilogues had started earlier in 
2013, it is not clear whether that would have altered the balance of 
concessions in the final outcome. Interviewees asked about the 
impact of the compressed time for negotiations on the outcome gave 
mixed responses (Knops & Swinnen, 2014). Some felt that the very 
intense negotiating period between April and September 2013 
helped to concentrate minds on reaching an agreement, while others 
noted that it also rushed the drafting phases and could have put 
                                                        
10 COMAGRI meeting on 20 March 2012 with the Parliament’s Budget 
Committee rapporteurs on the MFF regulations. 
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either player in a ‘take it or leave it’ position. However, there is no 
clear evidence that a longer negotiating period would have changed 
the outcome or led to a different agreement, with either the Council 
or the Parliament succeeding in achieving more of their original 
goals. 
What is clearer is that the insistence of the Parliament that no 
serious CAP negotiations should begin until the budget numbers 
were known worked to strongly favour those holding to a status 
quo position on the reform proposals (for example, farm groups) 
while disadvantaging those who sought a more radical change in 
the orientation of the CAP (for example, environmental groups 
seeking a greater focus on environmental public goods). In the 
agenda-setting phase of CAP reform (which took place largely 
between Commissioners) the size of the budget proposed for the 
CAP in the MFF could be made contingent on the scale of the 
reorientation of the CAP promised by the agriculture commissioner.  
But once the MFF was adopted by the European Council and 
its overall size and ceilings accepted by the Parliament in early 2013, 
the threat of a budget cut no longer played a role in determining the 
outcome. Farm groups and status quo-minded member states and 
MEPs could work to weaken the ambition of the greening proposals 
without having to worry that this could lead to a further reduction 
in the CAP budget (Matthews, 2013). Environmental groups and 
reform-minded member states and MEPs, on the other hand, had to 
argue their position without being able to wield the threat that the 
budget could be reduced if their proposals were not accepted. In 
fact, status quo-minded actors attempted to turn the argument 
around to suggest that the scale of the greening required justified an 
even larger CAP budget. This contrasts with the argument within 
the Commission in the agenda-setting phase that the CAP budget 
would only be maintained provided an ambitious greening strategy 
was pursued.  
4. CAP-related issues in the MFF 
A contentious issue in this CAP reform process was the inclusion in 
the MFF negotiating box (under the responsibility of the General 
Affairs Council) of issues which would ultimately be incorporated 
into the new CAP regulations (to be decided by co-decision between 
the Parliament and the Council in its formation as the Agriculture 
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Council). The MFF Regulation is adopted by the General Affairs 
Council by unanimity after having obtained the consent of the 
Parliament (the Parliament may approve or reject the Council’s 
position but not adopt amendments). The sector-specific legal acts 
are subject to the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision), 
which means that the Council and the Parliament decide together 
and that the Council decides by qualified majority.  
The point is not that the various CAP-related issues included 
in the MFF negotiating box risked being decided using the MFF 
decision rules (which would have severely limited the potential 
input and involvement of the Parliament). The role of the MFF 
Regulation is solely to establish the ceilings for the main categories 
of expenditure (known as ‘headings’) for the annual EU budgets as 
a whole and for the main ‘sub-headings’.11 All other CAP-related 
issues were ultimately included as provisions in the revised CAP 
regulations that were subjected to the co-decision process. 
However, the issues on which the European Council had 
pronounced in its MFF conclusions were given a privileged status 
by the Agriculture Council negotiators in the trilogue discussions. 
Initially, the Council’s position seems to have been that the 
European Council’s MFF conclusions on CAP issues were non-
negotiable. The Council moved very slightly from this position in 
the last days of the Irish presidency, but when a political agreement 
was reached on the revised CAP regulations on 26 June 2013, all of 
the issues included in the MFF conclusions were in square brackets 
and there was agreement that these would be addressed later. By 
late August 2013 the Parliament’s CAP regulation rapporteurs had 
identified their priorities among the outstanding issues 
(distinguishing between those issues on which they wanted to insist 
on changes in the Agriculture Council’s position, and those issues 
on which they were prepared to accept the Council’s position 
provided concessions were made on their priority areas). On this 
basis, a political agreement including the MFF-related CAP issues 
was finally reached between the institutional negotiators at the 
informal trilogue meeting on 24 September 2013.  
                                                        
11 Article 312(3) of TFEU: “The financial framework shall determine the 
amounts of the annual ceilings on commitment appropriations by category 
of expenditure and of the annual ceiling on payment appropriations.”  
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Some historical perspective is gained by looking at how CAP 
issues were addressed in the 2007-13 European Council MFF 
conclusions when the consent procedure was still in place. These 
conclusions set out the ceilings for commitment appropriations for 
Heading 2 “preservation and management of natural resources”, 
the sub-heading for market-related expenditure and direct 
payments, and the Rural Development Regulation. They also 
addressed the issue of voluntary modulation of funds from Pillar I 
to Pillar II and specified that modulated funds would not be subject 
to national co-financing and minimum spending per axis rules set 
out in the Rural Development Regulation. While the Commission 
was invited to allocate rural development expenditure between the 
member states (in the case of the EU-15, subject to a key to be agreed 
by the Council), the European Council set down some markers in 
terms of minimum allocations and also allocated specific amounts 
to individual member states on rather unclear criteria. The 
individual member state allocations were not formally announced 
until the Commission approved in September 2006 a decision fixing 
the total rural development budget for the period 2007-13 (which 
also took into account the accession of Bulgaria and Romania as well 
as cotton and tobacco transfers) and including a subdivision in 
budget allocations by year and by member state (CEC, 2006).  
It seems, however, that individual member states had a good 
idea following the European Council meeting of their individual 
rural development allocations even if these were not finally 
confirmed until the Commission’s decision the following 
September.12 These CAP issues in the European Council’s MFF 
conclusions were in nature broadly financial but did not otherwise 
touch on the content of the CAP policy. 
In the preparations for the 2014-20 MFF, there was a more 
extensive discussion of CAP-related issues in the MFF dossier. 
These began at an early stage. The progress report of the Polish 
presidency in December 2011 mentions that a number of CAP issues 
were being discussed in the General Affairs Council’s MFF working 
                                                        
12 For example, Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern was able to report the 
Irish rural development allocation in a newspaper article the day after the 
European Council meeting concluded. See “Totting up the many benefits 
for Ireland and EU of new budget deal”, Irish Times, 19 December 2005.  
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group (Council of the European Union, 2011). They included the 
overall volume of resources for the CAP budget, the pace and 
ambition of internal and external convergence, whether to pursue 
greening in Pillar I or Pillar II, the size of any potential green 
payment in Pillar I, the role of the crisis reserve and the rural 
development allocations by member state. Thus, from an early 
stage, the Council’s MFF working group was discussing both the 
MFF ceilings as well as the future shape of the CAP. 
The General Affairs Council had its first opportunity to 
debate the ceiling for Heading 2 in the MFF at its April 2012 
meeting. The Danish presidency circulated a draft text for that 
section of the MFF negotiating box, which covered the following 
issues (Council of the European Union, 2012c): 
 the overall level of commitment appropriations for Heading 
2, as well as the ceiling for the sub-heading for market-related 
expenditure and direct payments (no figures were included 
at this stage); 
 level and model for redistribution of direct support – details 
of the possible convergence model across member states; 
 capping of support for large farms; 
 the method for financial discipline; 
 other elements relating to Pillar I (an apparent reference to 
possible linear reductions in direct payments); 
 greening (of direct payments); 
 flexibility between pillars; 
 principles for distribution of rural development support; 
 co-financing rates for rural development support. 
In addition, under common provisions relevant for all of the 
structural funds, including the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development, it was proposed to bring them together under 
a common strategic framework to maximise their effectiveness. 
Further, it was proposed that all the structural funds would be 
subject to macroeconomic conditionality. The Commission would 
be empowered to request a member state to amend its partnership 
contract and the relevant programmes to support the 
implementation of Council recommendations under the EU’s 
economic governance arrangements. Where a member state failed 
to comply with the request, the Commission would be empowered 
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to suspend some or all of the payments to the programme 
concerned. 
At the end of the Danish presidency’s term in June 2012, the 
presidency presented for the first time a draft version of the full MFF 
negotiating box, including text on Heading 2 (Council of the 
European Union, 2012b). The CAP-related issues just enumerated 
remained part of the text in this and successive drafts of the 
negotiating box up to and including the European Council 
conclusions on the MFF in February 2013. The positions of the 
Council and the Parliament on these issues are reviewed in detail in 
Matthews (2014).  
The inclusion in the Council’s MFF negotiating box and 
ultimately in the European Council’s MFF conclusions of issues 
covered by the legislative proposals on the CAP was clearly a 
problematic element in concluding the 2013 CAP reform. In its 
comprehensive resolution of 23 October 2012 outlining its views on 
the MFF, the Parliament noted (European Parliament, 2012b): 
78. …that any political agreement reached at European 
Council level constitutes no more than a negotiating 
mandate for the Council; insists that after the European 
Council has reached a political agreement, fully-fledged 
negotiations between Parliament and the Council need to 
take place before the Council formally submits for 
Parliament’s consent its proposals on the MFF regulation;  
79. Reiterates that, according to the TFEU, Parliament and 
the Council are the legislative bodies and the European 
Council does not have the role of legislator; stresses that 
the negotiations on the legislative proposals relating to the 
multiannual programmes will be pursued under the 
ordinary legislative procedure.  
Three questions can be framed to better understand this 
problem. First, what is the distinction between the budgetary and 
the legislative aspects of the MFF agreement? Second, should the 
European Council (and the General Affairs Council in its 
preparation of draft MFF conclusions in the negotiating box) be 
discouraged from pronouncing on legislative issues in their MFF 
deliberations? Third, if the European Council does address 
legislative issues in its MFF conclusions, what is the status of these 
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conclusions on legislative aspects when the relevant Council 
formation and Parliament negotiate on the final legislation? 
At a formal level, the distinction between MFF budgetary and 
legislative aspects is clear. Article 312 TFEU provides that the 
Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, 
shall adopt a regulation laying down the MFF. The purpose of the 
MFF is to ensure that Union expenditure develops in an orderly 
manner and within the limits of its own resources. Specifically, the 
MFF determines the amounts of the annual ceilings on commitment 
appropriations by category of expenditure and of the annual ceiling 
on payment appropriations. Thus the budgetary aspects of the MFF 
are very limited, confined to setting annual ceilings at the EU level 
for the MFF as a whole and for its major headings. The MFF 
regulation must be adopted unanimously by the Council after 
obtaining the consent of the Parliament. All other matters belong 
formally to legislation adopted under the ordinary legislative 
procedure where the Parliament has equal status as co-legislator 
with the Council. 
The European Council has the responsibility to provide the 
Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall 
define the general political directions and priorities thereof. 
However, it cannot exercise legislative functions (Article 15, TEU); 
legislative and budgetary functions are exercised by the Council 
jointly with the Parliament (Article 16, TEU). In practice, it has 
become the norm that the actual decision on the MFF ceilings is 
taken by the European Council and later confirmed by the General 
Affairs Council. In negotiating the 2014-20 MFF, the MFF 
negotiating box was developed by successive Council presidencies 
but the final agreement was reached at the European Council on the 
basis of successive drafts prepared under the responsibility of the 
European Council President Van Rompuy, who assumed control of 
the process in October 2012 (Kölling & Serrano Leal, 2014).  
It seems appropriate that the MFF negotiations should also 
focus on legislative matters given that the MFF is intended to reflect 
the political priorities of the Union. It is neither possible nor sensible 
to restrict or prevent the Council nor the European Council from 
drawing conclusions on legislative issues when discussing the MFF 
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regulation.13 Instead, it seems more useful to focus on the third 
question: the status of these conclusions in the subsequent 
negotiations between Council and Parliament. 
The Parliament addressed this question in its resolution on 
the lessons to be learned from the 2014-20 MFF negotiations and the 
way forward (European Parliament, 2014). The resolution stated 
that Parliament: 
[d]eplores the fact that, despite Parliament’s strong 
objections, all successive ‘negotiating boxes’ presented by 
different Council presidencies and, ultimately, the 
European Council MFF agreement of 8 February 2013 
contained a significant number of legislative elements that 
should have been decided under the ordinary legislative 
procedure; stresses that the legally required unanimity in 
the Council on the MFF Regulation could only be achieved 
by pre-empting certain major policy changes in EU 
sectoral policies, thereby hindering, in clear contradiction 
with the Treaties, Parliament’s prerogatives under co-
decision, and in particular its right to amend on an equal 
footing with the Council… 
                                                        
13 Nonetheless, the Parliament wants to be fully involved in these 
discussions and felt that its views were not heard in the current round. 
Expressing its dissatisfaction in its resolution of 3 July 2013 on the MFF 
(European Parliament, 2013), the Parliament stated that it: “[15.] [v]iews as 
deeply regrettable the procedure that led to this agreement on the MFF 
2014-2020, which in reality has had the effect of depriving Parliament of its 
true budgetary powers as provided for in the TFEU; considers that the 
numerous meetings held over the past few years between its delegation 
and the successive Council presidencies on the margins of the relevant 
General Affairs Council meetings, as well as its participation in informal 
Council meetings dealing with the MFF, served no clear purpose, as they 
had no impact on the spirit, calendar or content of the negotiations or on 
the Council’s position, including the need to distinguish the legislative 
from the budgetary aspects of the MFF agreement; [16.] [c]alls, therefore, 
on its Committee on Budgets, in cooperation with its Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs, to draw the necessary conclusions and to come 
forward with new proposals on the modalities of such negotiations, in 
order to ensure the democratic and transparent nature of the whole 
budgetary procedure.” 
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In response, it called for a standard formula recalling the 
provisions of Article 15(1) TFEU to be included in the conclusions 
of the European Council.  
In assessing the Parliament’s ability to fully exercise its role as 
co-legislator, a distinction might be drawn between legislative 
measures that directly influence the net payment position of each 
member to the overall budget and other legislative measures. The 
budgetary aspect of the MFF relates to the setting of overall ceilings 
for Union expenditure in total and on individual MFF headings. 
However, in reaching unanimous agreement in the European 
Council on these figures, individual member states’ negotiating 
positions are very influenced by the impact of these figures on their 
net payment position. Politically, in the absence of a transparent 
mechanism to achieve an agreed redistributive outcome, it is hardly 
conceivable that member states will agree to the overall ceilings 
without knowing the specific allocations they will receive under 
directly allocated programmes (cohesion and CAP Pillar I and Pillar 
II spending).  
The Parliament has on many occasions deplored this juste 
retour approach to the MFF negotiations.14 It has based much of its 
justification for the reform of the EU’s own resources regime on the 
                                                        
14 In its resolution drawing lessons from the experience of the 2014-20 MFF 
negotiations, the Parliament noted its deep concern over “…the fact that 
budgetary debates in the Council have been for many years poisoned by 
the logic of ‘fair returns’ instead of being driven by the logic of the 
European added-value…”, and stated its belief “that this logic also 
prevailed in the way the MFF agreement was struck by the European 
Council on 8 February 2013; considers it regrettable that this was reflected 
in the fact that the national allocations, especially from the two biggest 
areas of expenditure in the EU budget, agriculture and cohesion policy, 
were determined at that moment; criticises, in particular, the increased 
number of special allocations and ‘gifts’ granted in the course of 
negotiations between Heads of State and Government, which are not based 
on objective and verifiable criteria, but rather reflect the bargaining power 
of Member States, trying to secure their national interests and maximise 
their net returns; denounces the lack of transparency in striking this 
agreement and the reluctance of the Council and the Commission to 
provide Parliament with all relevant documents; highlights that the 
European added value should prevail over national interests” (European 
Parliament, 2014). 
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argument that it will reduce the influence of this way of thinking on 
the final MFF outcome. But even under a reformed EU own 
resources system member states will still remain focused on their 
expected gross receipts from EU spending programmes. The ability 
to adjust these gross receipts is an important instrument in the 
hands of the European Council presidency in seeking unanimous 
agreement on the MFF ceilings (in the case of the CAP, both 
allocations under Pillar I and Pillar II are involved). Until the 
European Union moves towards an explicit recognition of the EU 
budget’s redistributive role, the Parliament will find it very difficult 
to secure a change in these allocations in the trilogue process, given 
the balancing role that these financial allocations play in securing 
this unanimous agreement. This is confirmed by the recent 
experience where the European Council’s conclusions on the 
allocation of Pillar I and Pillar II were confirmed in the final 
agreement. Thus, while formally part of the co-decision process, it 
is hard to see how the Parliament will get to exercise its role as co-
legislator on these issues until a financial mechanism to achieve 
acceptable net positions is introduced to explicitly acknowledge the 
redistributive role of the EU budget. 
As regards the remaining legislative issues that might be 
discussed in the Council’s MFF negotiating box and the European 
Council’s MFF conclusions, where the Council and Parliament hold 
different views, there is no reason why the Parliament’s role as co-
legislator should not be fully respected. In practice, on this occasion, 
the Irish presidency was more reluctant to move away from its 
mandate on these issues than on other issues. It was only in the 
closing stages of the informal trilogues that it made an offer to 
accept a minimum level of mandatory degressivity on large 
payments, in return for the Parliament’s agreement to take all other 
MFF issues off the table. In the event, the MFF issues were shelved 
until finally concluded under the Lithuanian presidency after the 
Council adopted a new mandate with concessions to the 
Parliament’s position on the issues of degressivity of large 
payments, the legislative treatment of the rural development 
allocations by member state and co-financing rates for less 
developed regions, outermost regions and smaller Aegean islands 
(Matthews, 2014). As the COMAGRI press release welcoming the 
agreement noted: “For Parliament, the key issue in this final 
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negotiating phase was to ensure that policy content which should 
be legislated under co-decision is not determined solely by heads of 
state” (COMAGRI, 2013).  
 This is obviously an important marker for future 
negotiations. The presidency logic may be that, because the MFF 
conclusions are adopted by unanimity by the European Council, 
they deserve to be ‘privileged’ in trilogue discussions. If this were 
the case, there would be an incentive for those member states that 
fear they may be outvoted on an issue in the regular Council to raise 
the issue at the level of the European Council where adoption by 
unanimity could help to strengthen their negotiating position on 
that issue. Arguably, this might explain the inclusion of some very 
specific directions on CAP issues in the February 2013 European 
Council conclusions.  
5. Conclusions 
The 2013 CAP reform was not only the first to be concluded under 
the co-decision procedure between the Council and the Parliament, 
but it was also complicated by the parallel negotiations on the MFF 
for the period 2014-20. In this chapter, I argue that there were three 
elements that linked the MFF negotiations to the CAP negotiations 
and influenced the overall outcome of the latter. 
The first linkage was in the agenda-setting phase of the CAP 
reform. Given the economic and fiscal situation in the EU after the 
2008 crisis, there was a very limited prospect of increased resources 
for the EU budget while the Europe 2020 agenda had prioritised 
spending on growth priorities such as innovation, the digital 
economy, employment, youth, industrial policy, poverty, and 
resource efficiency. It thus seemed eminently likely that the CAP 
budget would need to be cut significantly to free up resources for 
new spending priorities. In the event, there was no dramatic cut to 
CAP spending; the long-term steady decline in the share of the CAP 
in the total EU budget continues, but this is largely due to the impact 
of inflation rather than to any significant discretionary reductions in 
CAP expenditure. While this CAP reform might have moved in the 
direction of greater targeting on environmental public goods in any 
event, the emphasis put on greening the CAP seems to have been 
part of a Commission agreement to protect the CAP budget 
provided that a significant share was redirected to supporting 
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measures favourable to the environment and climate action. The 
2013 CAP reform might have been a ‘green’ reform anyway, but the 
timing of the MFF negotiations accelerated the move in that 
direction. 
The second linkage arose as a result of the particular 
scheduling of the MFF and CAP negotiations. From an early stage, 
the Parliament made it clear that it was not prepared to negotiate on 
the proposed new CAP regulations until the budget allocations for 
the CAP were known. This meant that the CAP trilogues could not 
begin until after the MFF headline numbers had been agreed. Given 
the complexity of the CAP reform dossier, it is a moot point whether 
either the Council or the Parliament would have been in a position 
to start the CAP trilogues earlier if, say, the European Council had 
agreed on its MFF conclusions at its November 2012 meeting as had 
been originally planned, rather than at its February 2013 meeting as 
turned out to be the case. There is also no evidence to suggest that a 
longer period of negotiation would have led to a different outcome, 
or to a better outcome. However, what is clear is that the insistence 
of the Parliament that no serious CAP negotiations should begin 
until the budget numbers were known worked to strongly favour 
those holding to a status quo position on the reform proposals (for 
example, farm groups) while disadvantaging those who sought a 
more radical change in the orientation of the CAP (for example, 
environmental groups seeking a greater focus on environmental 
public goods). Farm groups and status quo-minded member states 
and MEPs could work to weaken the ambition of the greening 
proposals without having to worry that this could lead to a further 
reduction in the CAP budget. Environmental groups and reform-
minded member states and MEPS, on the other hand, had to argue 
their position without being able to wield the threat that the budget 
could be reduced if their proposals were not accepted. 
The third linkage was the inclusion of a number of CAP-
related issues in the European Council’s MFF conclusions, which 
were later given a privileged position by the Council presidency in 
the trilogue negotiations with the Parliament. The Council 
presidency was unwilling to show any flexibility in its negotiations 
on these issues until the last minute, and it was only some months 
after a political agreement had been reached on the CAP reform that 
agreement was reached also on these MFF-related CAP issues. One 
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might speculate that the outcome of the negotiations on these issues 
would have been different if the Council presidency had viewed 
them as subject to the usual co-decision bargaining. The MFF-
related issues include CAP legislative decisions that directly affect 
the net flows from the EU budget to member states (e.g. the external 
convergence formula, the distribution of Pillar II funds) and all 
other legislative issues that might be addressed in the European 
Council conclusions. On practical and political grounds, this 
chapter argues that the Parliament will always find it virtually 
impossible to change the unanimous agreement of heads of state 
and government on the direct allocation of resources unless and 
until a financial mechanism to achieve acceptable net positions is 
introduced to explicitly acknowledge the redistributive role of the 
EU budget. If the Parliament is to have influence on these issues, 
then it must exercise that influence prior to the European Council 
conclusions being reached. On the other hand, all other issues 
should be fully open in the trilogue negotiations between the two 
institutions.  
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8. THE WTO: NO LONGER 
RELEVANT FOR CAP REFORM? 
ALAN SWINBANK* 
his chapter explores the role the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) played or, rather, did not play in the 2013 
‘recalibration’ of the CAP. In their detailed study of the 
European Parliament and the role of co-decision in determining the 
post-2013 CAP, Knops & Swinnen (2014: 20) mention the WTO only 
once. In a footnote they comment: “We draw the reader’s attention 
here to the absence of the WTO in the list of external actors, as 
international trade negotiations played a marginal role in the 2013 
CAP reform, compared to previous reform rounds where WTO 
agreements could be seen as the main driver of reform.”  
Many analysts have indeed argued that international trade 
negotiations and WTO rules have been an important determinant of 
changes to the CAP (see, for example, my own work in Daugbjerg 
& Swinbank, 2009, 2011). So why this apparent difference between 
the series of CAP reforms from 1992 to 2008, and that experienced 
in 2013? In an attempt to address this overarching question this 
chapter is organised as follows: first, a brief review of policy 
changes from 1992 to 2008 and their (apparent) conformability with 
evolving WTO rules; second, a re-examination of the relevance of 
the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in the mid-2010s; and, third, a 
short account of how WTO constraints were addressed by the 
European Commission and the European Parliament in the 2013 
CAP reform debate. 
                                                        
* I am grateful to Rolf Moehler and Tim Josling for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft, but retain full responsibility for the contents of the present 
text. 
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1. Past CAP reforms and the WTO 
Two decades on, the MacSharry reform of 1992 are still viewed as a 
watershed in the evolution of the CAP. Prior to 1992 the main 
mechanism for farm income support was a managed – highly priced 
– market, involving restrictive import barriers, intervention buying, 
and export subsidies, which led to considerable distortions in world 
trade. The reform began a process of decoupling support: in 
particular the support prices for cereals and beef were reduced and, 
to compensate for the implied revenue loss, farmers became entitled 
to area payments on cereals grown, and headage payments on 
particular categories of beef animals kept. There were other 
pressures, most notably the cost to the EU’s budget (Moehler, 2008: 
77), but many analysts have concluded that pressure from the EU’s 
trading partners in pushing for a conclusion to the Uruguay Round 
of trade negotiations that had begun in 1986, was a decisive factor 
in delivering the reform package in May 1992. Kenyon & Lee (2006: 
267), for example, claim that the “turning point in the [trade] 
negotiations came when…the EC signalled its readiness to reform 
the CAP”, and that “the dynamics of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, especially the determination of the Cairns Group and 
the United States to insist on agriculture reforms, were…important 
drivers behind the 1992 CAP reforms”. 
Significantly, the CAP reform negotiations and those with the 
US negotiators over the status of decoupled payments in the 
evolving AoA proceeded in parallel (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011: 83-
5). Thus the MacSharry reform switched some support from the so-
called ‘amber box’ of trade-distorting support to the ‘blue box’ of 
partially decoupled payments, and enabled the EU to sign up to the 
Uruguay Round agreements in Marrakesh in 1994, including the 
AoA. Although some saw this as a cynical exercise in box shifting, 
the EU’s periodic notifications to the WTO of its domestic support 
never led to a dispute in the WTO or to serious challenge in much 
of the academic literature.1 The 1992 reform predated the 
implementation of the AoA, thus in Figure 8.1 – showing the EU’s 
periodic notifications of amber, blue and green box support – 
                                                        
1 Jacques Berthelot of Solidarité has been a persistent critic: 
http://solidarite.asso.fr/-Jacques-Berthelot-Publications-. 
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expenditure on the blue-boxed area and headage payments already 
appears in the first data set for 1995-96.  
Figure 8.1 EU’s notifications of domestic farm support, € million 
 
Notes: The amber box – not terminology found in the AoA – measures the value 
of trade-distorting support “in favour of agricultural producers”, which was 
capped and then subject to a 20% reduction. In this chapter, amber box and 
aggregate measurement of support (AMS) – a term which is found in the AoA 
– are used interchangeably. The blue box, uncapped, refers to expenditure on 
“direct payments under production-limiting programmes” (Article 5(a) of the 
AoA), whilst the green box is expenditure that has “no, or at most minimal, 
trade-distorting effects or effects on production” and meets a set of “policy-
specific criteria and conditions” set out in Annex 2 to the agreement. For a 
definitive treatment, see Brink (2011). 
Source: EU submissions to the WTO in the G/AG/N/EEC/ (later 
G/AG/N/EU/) document series. 
In the Marrakesh settlement the EU-15 committed itself to a 
20% reduction in the maximum amount of trade-distorting support 
– its bound total aggregate measurement of support (AMS) – that it 
could grant to its farm sector, from just under €79 billion in the first 
year of the agreement, down to just over €67 billion in 2000-01 and 
thereafter (see line labelled “AMS Binding” in Figure 8.1).2 As can 
                                                        
2 The AMS binding was later increased to accommodate the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements of the EU (Josling & Swinbank, 2011: 79). Inflation has taken 
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be seen in Figure 8.1, had expenditure on area and headage 
payments been declared as amber rather than blue box support, the 
EU would have been very close to its AMS binding in 2000-01.  
The Agenda 2000 CAP reform in 1999 was in part driven by 
the need to prepare for the accession of several new states from 
Central and Eastern Europe, but external pressure was also 
important. In particular, concerns were being expressed about EU 
cereal production that threatened to generate surpluses larger than 
the volume of subsidised exports permitted under the AoA; and the 
EU believed it would have to make further cuts to farm support in 
the new trade round (provisionally referred to as the Millennium 
Round) that the Seattle WTO Ministerial was expected to inaugurate 
later that year (Schwaag Serger, 2001: 32-3). In Agenda 2000 there 
was a further cut in support prices for cereals and beef, partially 
compensated by an increase in the area and headage payments first 
introduced in the MacSharry reform. Over a number of years these 
changes switched more amber box support to the blue box, as can 
be seen in Figure 8.1. 
At the time, and through the opening phases of the Doha 
Round launched in 2001, the EU was keen to defend its European 
Model of Agriculture – involving the multifunctionality of 
European farming – whilst reluctant to commit to more than token 
reductions in the three elements of support enunciated in the AoA: 
market access, domestic support, and export competition.3 But 
Franz Fischler, the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development, already had plans for a mid-term review of his 
Agenda 2000 reform.  
What became known as the Fischler reform of 2003 resulted 
in a further decoupling of support. The area and headage payments 
introduced in the 1992 and 1999 reforms (and the compensation for 
                                                        
its toll. Between January 1995 and June 2014 the European Central Bank’s 
index of consumer prices for the euro area had risen by 45%, before 
flattening off, implying that the EU’s AMS binding had decreased by about 
30% in real terms compared to when initially set 
(http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=122.ICP.M.U2.N
.000000.4.INX).  
3 See, for example, its Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal of December 
2000 (WTO, 2000a; Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2009: 160-1). 
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milk producers that had been agreed in 1999) were bundled into the 
Single Payment Scheme (SPS). Fischler’s preferred format was that 
an individual farm’s area and headage payments would simply be 
replaced by the SPS, but without any requirement to grow crops or 
keep animals.4 The payment was, however, linked to land at the 
farm’s disposal, which had to be kept up to the standards of ‘good 
agricultural and environmental conditions‘ (GAEC), and cross-
compliance meant that a series of environmental and animal welfare 
conditions had to be met. Although some doubts have been 
expressed (see, for example, Swinbank & Tranter, 2005), the EU 
declared the SPS to be a decoupled payment in conformity with 
Annex 2 of the AoA: in Figure 8.1, this switched blue box 
expenditure to the green box. Fischler’s Mediterranean package of 
2004 turned a series of amber box supports into green box 
payments, as did the sugar and other reforms undertaken by his 
successor, Mariann Fischer Boel, including the Health Check of 2008 
(Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2011). Thus by 2012 the bulk of support for 
EU farmers took the form of green box payments, and amber box 
support was substantially below the EU’s AMS binding. 
There is, however, a slight discontinuity in the data series that 
cannot readily be reconciled with substantive changes in EU farm 
policy. The larger part of the EU’s AMS has always been a desk-top 
calculation of market price support: “the gap between a fixed 
external reference price and the applied administered price 
multiplied by the quantity of production eligible to receive the 
applied administered price” (AoA, paragraph 8, Annex 3). The 
‘fixed external reference price’, based on the years 1986 to 1988, is 
itself rather an anomaly – it can result in a sizeable AMS even when 
current world market prices are above the ‘applied administered 
price’, for example – but it is fixed, whereas the other two elements 
of the calculation vary according to circumstances. WTO members 
have shown some ingenuity in calculating their AMSs. 
                                                        
4 But there were two significant variants to this. First, member states could 
apply the scheme on a regionalised basis, pooling the SPS allocation for a 
region and paying a flat rate per hectare. Second, member states could opt 
to link part of the payment to farming activities: 25% of the arable payment 
could remain linked to growing the crop, for example (known as ‘partial 
decoupling’) (Swinbank & Daugbjerg, 2006). In most of the new member 
states a rather different form of area payment applied. 
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In its 1988 submission, for example, Japan eliminated its AMS 
for rice, sharply reducing its overall amber box declaration. Godo & 
Takahashi (2011: 176-7) report that various policy changes, 
including a new policy guideline in 1988, had weakened the concept 
of an applied administrative price, but that “the overwhelming 
majority of Japanese agricultural policy researchers are sceptical of 
whether [Japan’s] new rice policy guideline of 1988 had any 
practical meaning…[A]bandoning the administered price did not 
reduce economic protection for rice”. 
For 2007-08, figures for which were reported in January 2011, 
the EU managed to more than halve its AMS from the year before. 
A large part of this reduction stemmed from the virtual elimination 
of the declared level of amber box support for fresh fruit and 
vegetables. Whilst it is not easy to see why the EU had declared such 
a high level of amber box support for fruit and vegetables prior to 
2007-08, it was equally difficult to discern what policy change 
justified the revised practice (Swinbank, 2011). In response to 
questions in the Committee on Agriculture, the EU explained that 
its “price gap calculation resulted from the existence of an, albeit 
rudimentary, price support instrument in which the entry prices 
[applicable to imports] only served as a proxy for the applied 
administered price…This price support instrument was abandoned 
in the 2007 reform” (WTO, 2012a: 20). The response to a follow-up 
question from Australia elicited no further information (WTO, 
2012b: 40), although the EU did agree to undertake bilateral 
discussions with Australia and respond more fully at a later date (p. 
42). 
As a result of the various CAP reforms undertaken in the 
2000s, including its rather contentious ‘reform’ of the fruit and 
vegetables regime, the EU’s ability to sign up to a Doha agreement 
involving sharp reductions in trade-distorting support had been 
radically enhanced. Basically agreed back in 20085 was a proposal 
to reduce its AMS binding by 70% (to €21.7 billion for EU-27), 
together with an 80% reduction in a wider measure of overall trade 
distorting support (OTDS). Josling & Swinbank’s (2011: 90) 
                                                        
5 WTO members had come close to a Doha agreement in 2008. The 
December text of the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture (WTO, 2008) is 
still the blueprint for any future agreement. 
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calculation was that the EU’s OTDS binding would be €23.8 billion. 
In November-December 2012, during the CAP reform debate, the 
level of support the EU declared for 2009-10 – before the decoupling 
effects of the 2008 Health Check had fed through, as can be seen from 
subsequent notifications reported in Figure 8.1 – was a current AMS 
of €8.8 billion (which would have been €10.2 billion had the de 
minimis allowance been set at zero), and blue box expenditure of 
€5.3 billion, less than 2% of the overall level of the value of 
production (WTO, 2012c). Assuming the EU’s green box payments 
had been correctly declared – or, if not, that they went unchallenged 
– then not only did the domestic support commitments of the 
existing AoA pose no problems for the EU, but a Doha agreement 
as foreshadowed in 2008 would not do so either. What a Doha 
agreement would do is lock in past reforms. 
Although legislation pertaining to export refunds (aka 
subsidies) still remains on the statute books, with the current CAP 
and world market prices export subsidies are largely unused, and it 
is not difficult to believe that the EU would agree to remove this 
example of agricultural exceptionalism from the WTO in the context 
of a Doha agreement, aligning agriculture with all other economic 
sectors with a prohibition on the use of export subsidies. In the 
Committee on Agriculture, however, Australia and others continue 
to query the EU over its sugar exports – more on this anon. 
On the third pillar of the AoA, market access, the EU farm 
lobby has probably been more concerned in the recent past about 
the opening of the EU market through a rash of regional trade 
agreements, agreed or in negotiation: tariff rate quotas (TRQs), on 
beef and cheese, for example, in the EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) (Agra Facts, No. 55-14, 23 
July 2014); or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) agreement with the US, discussed by Josling (2015: chapter 
18, this volume). Buoyant world market prices, and a succession of 
CAP reforms unmatched by tariff reductions, have left scope for 
sizeable cuts in a number of the EU’s most-favoured nation (MFN) 
tariffs. The MFN tariff on white sugar, for example, is still at its post-
Marrakesh level of €419 per tonne, with the continuing possibility 
to invoke the AoA’s Special Safeguard Provisions, whilst the 2006 
reforms have reduced the support price from €631.9 to €404.4 per 
tonne (Noble, 2012: 12-3). 
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In January 2009 DG Agriculture’s then Director-General Jean-
Luc Demarty (2009: 17, 14) told the Oxford Farming Conference that 
“the Doha Round remains a top priority for the EU”. But he had 
earlier pointed out:  
Our major contribution is and remains our 2003 CAP 
reform. It has been and it remains in our interest to make 
the best use of this negotiating capital: thanks to our past 
reforms, and as part of an overall package deal, we can 
accept a steep reduction in the ceiling on our trade-
distorting subsidies, the elimination of our export 
subsidies and a significant reduction of our border 
protection. 
There was now no need for further CAP reform, even had a 
successful conclusion to the Doha Round been achieved, and in any 
event there seemed to be little prospect of a Doha settlement. 
2. The Agreement on Agriculture: Still relevant in 
the mid-2010s? 
WTO commitments are monitored in its committees (for example, 
its Committee on Agriculture), and can be challenged through its 
dispute settlement process. Consequently, farm policies can come 
under pressure, leading to reform, both as a result of trade 
negotiations (leading to tighter constraints on support) or through 
litigation. WTO members contest their interpretations of WTO 
agreements before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and, as is the 
case in most judicial systems, there seems to have been an evolution 
of the rules (see, for example, Goldstein & Steinberg, 2008). Two 
such cases, relevant to the present discussion, concern the EU’s past 
use of export subsidies on sugar, and US support for upland cotton, 
both of which we comment upon in a more general appraisal of the 
relevance of the AoA in the mid-2010s. 
According to the WTO Secretariat, by December 2014 some 
488 disputes had been recorded.6 Of these, 77 cases had cited 
infringements of the AoA (see Figure 8.2), compared to 105 citing 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, for 
example, and 42 citing the Agreement on the Application of 
                                                        
6 www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm. 
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Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. It should be noted that these 
numbers have limited meaning: any particular case might cite more 
than one WTO agreement; two or more cases might address 
essentially the same complaint brought by two or more WTO 
members; and a case is registered following a request for 
consultations, not all of which will lead to the establishment of a 
panel or a ruling of the DSB. Moreover, their economic, political and 
legal significance is ignored. A hotly contested case can be litigated 
through several stages: panel, Appellate Body, and arbitration on 
the remedies to be applied. 
Figure 8.2 Timing of the 77 AoA cases (to December 2014) 
 
Source: derived from 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm. 
In the early years of the WTO there was a flurry of cases citing 
the AoA, some (such as beef hormones and bananas) unresolved 
leftovers from pre-1995, but by the late-2000s and early 2010s, apart 
from an upsurge in 2009, the pressure of AoA cases seemed to be 
abating. More recently, WTO members have been making renewed 
use of the AoA in their requests for consultations, but five of the 
latest nine cases are focussed on Indonesia’s import arrangements 
for agricultural products. 
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Table 8.1 Disputes citing the Agreement on Agriculture against the EU 
Case 
number 
Name Year 
DS26 & 
DS48 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) (Complainants: United States, 
Canada) 
1996 
DS27 Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas (Complainants: Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, United States) 
1996 
DS69 Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry 
Products (Complainant: Brazil) 
1997 
DS104 Measures Affecting the Exportation of Processed 
Cheese (Complainant: United States) 
1997 
DS134 Restrictions on Certain Import Duties on Rice 
(Complainant: India) 
1998 
DS210 Belgium — Administration of Measures 
Establishing Customs Duties for Rice 
(Complainant: United States) 
2000 
DS265, 
DS266 & 
DS283 
Export Subsidies on Sugar (Complainants: 
Australia, Brazil, Thailand) 
2002/3 
DS291, 
DS292 & 
DS293 
Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products (Complainants: United States, 
Canada, Argentina) 
2003 
DS389 Certain Measures Affecting Poultry Meat and 
Poultry Meat Products from the United States 
(Complainant: United States) 
2009 
DS400 & 
DS401 
Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing 
of Seal Products (Complainants: Canada, 
Norway) 
2009 
Source: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm. 
Of the 77 AoA cases, 16 involved complaints against the EU 
(or a member state),7 although as collated in Table 8.1 below they 
could be said to involve only 10 substantive cases. The list includes 
important instances where WTO law, and EU practice, were 
                                                        
7 In addition several involved European states that later became members 
of the EU. 
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stringently tested, but several big cases – beef hormones, the 
approval and marketing of biotech products, and seal products – do 
not touch upon the CAP as understood in this chapter. Bananas was 
a complex case. Although it involved EU support for its own banana 
producers, the thrust of the case was much more to do with the EU’s 
relationship with its preferential suppliers in the ACP (African, 
Caribbean and Pacific states). The really important CAP case in 
Table 8.1 is export subsidies on sugar. 
Once the legal battles had been fought and lost, it is Poletti & 
De Bièvre’s (2014: 1191) view that “compliance was forthcoming 
surprisingly quickly”. Indeed, they continue, “the EU adopted an 
extensive reform of its sugar regime, substantially complying with 
the far-reaching requirements of the WTO ruling”. Ackrill & Kay 
(2011: 86) reach a more nuanced conclusion: they write that their 
analysis had shown that while the WTO ruling “was not sufficient, 
by itself, to explain fully the reform implemented”, it was “a key 
factor” that, with the opening up of the European market through 
the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative, “and sugar’s 
exceptionalism, led finally to reform of the last major unreformed 
sector under the CAP”. Whilst it is difficult to describe the 2006 
sugar reform as a success (Noble, 2012: 14-5), and WTO members 
continue to question whether the EU’s sugar exports infringe its 
WTO obligations,8 it remains my view that it was the EU’s 
commitment to the WTO system as a “single undertaking” (‘nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed’) that strengthened the 
reformists’ hand in procuring the EU sugar reform (Swinbank, 2009: 
618). But whilst the quota system endures, which the 2013 
recalibration of the CAP extended to 2017 despite the European 
Commission’s attempt to end quotas in 2015, suspicions will persist 
that out-of-quota sugar exported to world markets is, in effect, 
subsidised. 
Of the 77 cases citing the AoA, 57 referred to the articles on 
market access, 15 to export competition, and only 5 to the disciplines 
on domestic support. The five were: 
                                                        
8   For example, both Australia and Brazil queried the EU on whether it had 
“exceeded its WTO commitment levels for sugar exports with export 
subsidies in the 2011/2012 marketing year” at the Committee on 
Agriculture in November 2012 (WTO, 2013: 7). 
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 DS161 & DS169, Republic of Korea – Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef – complainants the 
United States and Australia; 
 DS267, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton – 
complainant Brazil; 
 DS357, United States – Subsidies and other Domestic Support for 
Corn and Other Agricultural Products – complainant Canada; 
and 
 DS365, United States – Domestic Support and Export Credit 
Guarantees for Agricultural Products – complainant Brazil. 
The two Korean Beef cases were dealt with jointly, and led to a 
lengthy review of the AoA’s domestic support provisions, but a 
somewhat inconclusive outcome. The Appellate Body upheld the 
conclusion of the WTO panel established to rule on the case that 
South Korea had incorrectly calculated its domestic support for beef 
for 1997 and 1998, but rejected the panel’s own calculation “as the 
Panel used, for these recalculations, a methodology inconsistent 
with…the Agreement on Agriculture”. Lacking the relevant 
information, the Appellate Body was then unable “to complete the 
legal analysis of: (i) whether Korea’s domestic support for beef 
exceeds the de minimis level contrary to Article 6 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture; (ii) whether the failure to include Current AMS for beef 
in Korea’s Current Total AMS was contrary to Article 7.2(a) of that 
Agreement; and (iii) whether Korea’s total domestic support for 
1997 and 1998 exceeded Korea’s commitment levels contrary to 
Article 3.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture” (WTO, 2000b: 57; see also 
Brink, 2011: 37). 
Upland Cotton was a long drawn-out and complex case that 
began with a request for consultations from Brazil in September 
2002, and has, perhaps, been resolved with the passage of the 2014 
Farm Bill (Schnepf, 2014). It was not just the AoA’s domestic 
support provisions that were at stake: the export subsidy 
commitments of the AoA, and the provisions of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures were also cited, and proved 
to be more serious breaches of US obligations. Inter alia, marketing 
(so-called ‘Step 2 payments’) made to domestic users of US grown 
cotton were found to be prohibited subsidies contingent on the use 
of domestic over imported goods, whilst Step 2 payments paid on 
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exported cotton were found to be export subsidies within the 
meaning of the AoA, and inconsistent with US export subsidy 
commitments (as were the export credit guarantee programmes). 
Various payment schemes were deemed to be actionable subsidies 
within the meaning of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures that led to significant price suppression 
on world markets. The US was told to eliminate its prohibited 
subsidies, and take steps to remove the adverse effects of actionable 
subsidies by 2005. 
As Schnepf (2014: 5) wryly notes: “Because the price and 
income support programs contained in omnibus farm bills could 
only be modified or removed by an act of Congress – and such 
changes generally only occur within the context of a new farm bill – 
the Administration had been limited in its ability to respond to the 
WTO panel recommendations.” However, the Step 2 programme 
was eliminated in 2006, and the export credit guarantee 
programmes either modified or eliminated. The 2008 Farm Bill, 
nonetheless, failed to satisfy Brazil’s remaining grievances; the 
dispute went back to the WTO, and Brazil was granted authority to 
take retaliatory action. But then, to avoid retaliation, in 2010 the two 
parties agreed to continue negotiations pending adoption of the 
2014 Farm Bill, whilst meanwhile the US would pay Brazil $12.275 
million a month, for “technical assistance and capacity-building for 
Brazil’s cotton sector” (Schnepf, 2014: 3). The US stopped these 
compensation payments in October 2013, with the dispute 
unresolved. The 2014 Farm Bill, however, “resulted in cotton being 
singled out and treated differently from all other U.S. program 
crops. U.S. cotton no longer has access to the price and income 
support programs offered for other program crops, but instead will 
rely on a within-year, market-based insurance guarantee as its 
primary support measure” (Schnepf, 2014: 7). As noted earlier, 
however, whether this will finally bring the dispute to a close 
remains to be seen. WTO pressures do seem to have influenced, 
eventually, US cotton policy, but not the support programmes for 
other crops. As de Gorter & Kropp (2014) note: “While the cotton 
policy reforms may help to resolve the U.S-Brazil cotton case, in an 
ironic twist, Congress has put in place subsidy programs for other 
crops that invite more trade disputes.” Indeed, Smith (2014: 1) has 
expressed the view that “all of the major new subsidy programs are 
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unambiguously amber box programs…While these new programs 
are unlikely to cause problems for the US in meeting its current 
WTO Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) commitments, they 
may make it more difficult for the US to agree to future reductions 
in allowable caps on AMS expenditures and related de minimis AMS 
exclusion provisions in a new WTO agreement.” 
An important step in the legal process that led to the DSB’s 
ruling was that “two challenged measures (production flexibility 
contract and direct payments) are related to the type of production 
undertaken after the base period and thus are not green box 
measures conforming fully to paragraph 6(b) of Annex 2 to the 
Agreement on Agriculture”.9 This realisation, that it might not be 
easy to satisfy the requirements of the green box, led Swinbank & 
Tranter (2005: 57) to suggest that the EU’s newly enacted SPS might 
not qualify for the green box either. If not green, the US’s disputed 
subsidies should presumably have been allocated to the amber, or 
possibly the blue box. But in Upland Cotton Brazil had not alleged 
the US had breached its amber box ceiling – although Sumner (2005: 
1) suggests it probably had – and so the issue was not arbitrated. In 
DS357, however, in January 2007, Canada claimed that “through the 
improper exclusion of domestic support, the United States provides 
support in favour of domestic producers in excess of [its] 
commitment levels”; and in DS365 in July 2007, in a follow-up to 
Upland Cotton, Brazil expressed similar concerns. Neither of these 
cases has progressed.10 
So the record to date is mixed. The US amended its cotton 
policy a decade after the Upland Cotton case was initiated, but it 
appears to have been unperturbed by WTO constraints on domestic 
support in elaborating other commodity programmes in the 2014 
Farm Bill. No dispute has shown WTO members to be in breach of 
their amber box AMS bindings. And although the Appellate Body 
in March 2005 issued clear guidelines on how the policy specific 
criteria for green box payments should be read, no dispute has 
revisited the topic. In the 2000s EU policy-makers might 
legitimately have worried about how the CAP’s domestic support 
                                                        
9 www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm. 
10 www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds357_e.htm and 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds365_e.htm. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  207 
 
measures might be interpreted if its policy was challenged, but by 
the 2010s – particularly with no Doha outcome in sight – this earlier 
concern had less validity. Why worry about something that might 
happen in the distant future, following a Doha outcome, 
particularly when the US had demonstrated that a major power can 
put off abiding by a DSB ruling for a decade or so? 
3. The post-2013 CAP and the WTO 
Although neither the desultory progress of the Doha Round, nor the 
constraints of existing WTO agreements as developed by the 
dispute settlement process, posed any immediate threat to the CAP 
in 2013, WTO concerns were not entirely forgotten – mainly with 
respect to the domestic support commitments of the AoA.  
The European Commission’s November 2010 
Communication, “The CAP towards 2020”, made only passing 
reference to the WTO: it referred to the need to respect “EU 
commitments in international trade”, and claimed that its proposal 
for an income stabilisation tool would be “WTO green box 
compatible” (European Commission, 2010: 4, 11). The European 
Parliament’s response to this missive paid rather more heed to the 
WTO (European Parliament, 2011). It too stressed the need for risk 
management tools to be WTO-compatible (paras 56 and 57). It 
considered that decoupling had “essentially proved its worth, 
allowing greater autonomy in decision-making on the part of 
farmers, ensuring that farmers respond to market signals and 
placing the vast bulk of the CAP in the WTO green box”; but went 
on to suggest that member states should “have the option of 
allowing part of the direct payments to remain wholly or partially 
coupled within WTO limits” (a measure later referred to as 
‘voluntary coupled support’) (para 23 and 24). Finally, it drew 
attention to the “commitment given by the WTO members during 
the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference to achieving the 
elimination of all forms of export subsidies in full parallelism with 
the imposition of discipline on all export measures…” (para. 64). 
The European Commission’s impact assessment, 
accompanying its formal proposals of October 2011, acknowledged 
WTO constraints in a number of places. It claimed: 
[T]he positive EU trade performance in the last decade 
took place while respecting the WTO disciplines 
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introduced by the Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture in 
terms of domestic support, export subsidies and market 
access. The EU often went further with its reduction 
commitments as a result of CAP reforms and trade policy 
changes: 
– Domestic support: past CAP reforms have moved 
support away from price support towards decoupled 
income support. Today more than 90% of direct payments 
are decoupled and qualify for WTO green box (with no or 
limited trade distorting effects).  
– Export refunds: as a result of domestic reform 
towards more market orientation the use of export refunds 
has been strongly declining… 
– Market access: the EU has been pursuing 
increased market access especially for least developing 
countries, and thanks to the Everything But Arms and 
European Partnership Agreements the EU is by far the 
largest importer of agricultural products from developing 
countries… (European Commission, 2011: 32-3). 
It dismissed linking intervention prices “to the development 
of production costs in Europe”, or the “introduction of a 
countercyclical payment that would link direct support back to 
agricultural prices”, in part because “direct payments linked to 
price developments could not be classified in the ‘green box’ of the 
WTO, thus undermining the EU’s trade negotiating position at the 
WTO” (p. 39). Moreover, the definition of an ‘active farmer’ – one 
deemed eligible for income support – “would need to respect WTO 
green box criteria (in particular they cannot imply an obligation to 
produce)”. Furthermore, “[t]o retain the WTO green box nature of 
Pillar I payments, the ‘greening’ component will need to be a 
decoupled, fixed payment applying to all farmers in a specific area 
(Member State or region); in this respect, care should be exercised 
in rewarding specific types of production e.g. through a grassland 
premium, and certainly not production per se” (p. 72). 
How much recoupling has taken place as a result of the 
provisions on voluntary coupled support will only become fully 
apparent once the member states have introduced their national 
schemes. Whether the EU has successfully ensured that its ‘active 
farmer’ measures, and its greening provisions, do not infringe the 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  209 
 
green box criteria will continue to be debated in the literature, and 
may one day be tested in a dispute settlement case. It remains my 
view that the greening provisions are neither decoupled income 
support under paragraph 6 of Annex 2 (for example, they appear to 
infringe the provision: “The amount of such payments in any given 
year shall not be related to, or based on, the type or volume of 
production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer 
in any year after the base period”), nor valid payments under 
environmental programmes as defined by paragraph 12 (Swinbank, 
2012: 52). The latter for example specifies: “The amount of payment 
shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in 
complying with the government programme” – and yet the 
payment is quite arbitrarily set at 30% of the direct payments budget 
available in any particular member state. But does it matter? 
In the post-2013 CAP, the annual budgetary provision for 
direct payments is just under €42 billion (National Ceilings, Annex 
II of Regulation (EU) No 1307/20130). If by some chance it was 
suddenly decided that all of these were not green box payments 
after all and should be declared in the amber box, then on the basis 
of the EU’s amber and blue box notifications of €6.9 billion and €3 
billion, respectively, in 2011-12 (see Figure 8.1), the maximum likely 
amber box notification would seem to be of the order of €52 billion, 
well below the EU’s current AMS binding of €72 billion. Other WTO 
members might question the green box status of the EU’s greening 
payments, particularly in the Committee on Agriculture, but 
without a Doha settlement there would be little point in escalating 
their concerns into a dispute settlement case. 
In Oxford in 2009 Jean-Luc Demarty (2009: 14) had claimed 
that the EU’s trade partners recognised the EU negotiated in ‘good 
faith’. We do not yet know how the EU intends to declare its 
greening payments to the WTO, although the expectation is that 
they will be declared as green box support. But if the EU insists that 
they are green box payments, whilst the international perception 
grows that they are not, the EU’s position as a leading proponent of 
a rules-based system of international trade could be seriously 
eroded, together with the authority of the WTO itself. 
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4. Concluding comments 
In Swinnen’s (2008) graphic metaphor, leading up to 2003 there had 
been a perfect storm of circumstances that led to a radical outcome. 
By contrast, a decade later, the CAP was becalmed. The need to 
agree a new multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2014-20, 
and the largely forgotten agreement of the European Council of 
December 2005 to “undertake a full, wide-ranging review covering 
all aspects of EU spending, including the Common Agricultural 
Policy, and of resources, including the United Kingdom rebate”, 
meant that a recalibration of the CAP had to be undertaken. But new 
Commissioner Dacian Cioloş and the European Parliament’s newly 
empowered Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development 
(COMAGRI), following ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, strongly 
favoured the status quo. The United Kingdom’s coalition 
government had so marginalised itself in EU affairs that it was no 
longer capable of taking a leadership role (Swinbank, 2015: chapter 
12, this volume). Despite the rhetoric of ‘greening’ – to make the 
CAP more environmentally aware and face the challenges of climate 
change – as Hart (2015: chapter 10, this volume) demonstrates the 
outcome was profoundly disappointing when measured against 
environmental NGOs’ aspirations. Moreover, with the Doha Round 
stalled, and much of the heat taken out of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement process, there was no pressing need to make further 
changes to the CAP for the foreseeable future. What is perhaps more 
surprising – given that a Doha agreement has not yet locked in past 
CAP reforms – is that the EU did not significantly reverse its policy 
decisions of the last two decades (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, in 
preparation). In this author’s opinion, the WTO had been a major, if 
not the major, driver of CAP reform from 1992 to 2008. In 2013 that 
force for change was muted. What circumstances will prevail for the 
2020 CAP ‘reform’ remains to be seen! 
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9. FROM ‘GREENING’ TO 
‘GREENWASH’: DRIVERS AND 
DISCOURSES OF THE CAP 2020 
‘REFORM’ 
EMIL ERJAVEC, MARKO LOVEC 
AND KARMEN ERJAVEC 
1. Introduction: Watered-down reform 
This chapter argues that the changes in institutional frameworks act 
as drivers of the reform of European Union (EU) common 
agricultural policy (CAP) towards 2020 in terms of bringing the 
central supports mechanism closer to the environmental objectives 
by making it conditional on new environmental actions. The idea 
became known as the ‘greening of CAP’ (Hart et al., 2011; Matthews, 
2012), after the European Commission (2010) used ‘greening’ in its 
proposal of new CAP legislation as a shift in paradigm and an 
introduction of other important changes in both CAP objectives and 
instruments. The essence of the new definition of CAP was to find a 
new justification for and mechanisms of agricultural policy.  
During the negotiation process, the reform faced 
unfavourable circumstances that resulted in a watering down of the 
environmental components. Firstly, the reform was considered 
parallel to negotiations on the EU multiannual financial framework 
(MFF). Since a decision on the latter required a unanimous vote, the 
status quo bias of the procedure was strong, allowing member states 
whose preferences were closer to the status quo to use legislative 
powers to influence CAP reform, as it was part of the package. 
Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) enabled the European 
Parliament to (equally to Council) amend CAP reform legislation 
and to veto budget agreement (Crombez et al., 2012). Since 
216  THE WTO: NO LONGER RELEVANT FOR CAP REFORM? 
 
Parliament’s preferences were close to the status quo, it was able to 
hinder the reform by threatening to block it. 
The CAP is not only about institutional change but also about 
sets of ideas, known as discourses, which are used to make certain 
policy choices more acceptable. Three discourses emerged during 
the reforms: ‘productivist’ discourse, arguing that the EU should 
protect domestic production; ‘neoliberal’ discourse, arguing that the 
state should refrain from interfering with markets; and 
‘multifunctional’ discourse, arguing that various functions 
performed by agriculture should be supported by state (Potter & 
Tilzey, 2005; Erjavec & Erjavec, 2009). Even though the three 
discourses are competing, they are also incorporating each other’s 
elements (Erjavec & Erjavec 2015).  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the conceptual 
context of the new CAP and the decision-making process behind it 
from the political perspectives. The articulation and incidence of the 
recognised and potential new CAP drivers and discourses are 
elaborated through the emphasis on paradigmatic changes. The key 
focus of analysis is on ‘greening’ as the key term of this policy 
reform. The main thesis is that the dominant role of productivist 
political setting and discourse was to turn greening into a 
‘greenwash’ strategy. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, in section 2, drivers 
and discourses of the CAP reform are elaborated. Methods 
employed (overview of outcomes of the reform process; critical 
discourse analysis of the key documents that played a central role 
in the process) are presented in section 3, followed by the research 
results in section 4. In the last section the role of research outcomes 
in explaining and understanding CAP reforms is discussed. 
2. Framework for the analysis 
2.1 Changes in institutional frameworks 
CAP reforms since the 1980s were influenced by changes in several 
institutional frameworks and settings that, although interrelated, 
played independent roles in the reforms (Moyer & Josling, 2002; 
Garzon, 2006; Swinnen, 2008). The literature identifies three main 
institutional frameworks that influence the CAP: multilateral trade 
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negotiations (Coleman & Tangermann, 1999; Daugbjerg & 
Swinbank, 2007; 2008); budget negotiations; changes in the policy 
paradigm (Garzon, 2006). In addition, there are four particular 
institutions of representation and decision-making that influence 
the reform: change in policy network (Daugbjerg, 1999); path 
dependency; change in decision-making procedures; change in 
agency quality (Pokrivcak & Swinnen, 2004; Pokrivcak et al., 2006). 
In a hypothetical-deductive manner, this section explains how 
greening corresponded to the developments in the above-
mentioned institutional settings. 
Multilateral trade, long-term budget and paradigm change 
The role of multilateral trade negotiations, which were considered 
to be the most important driver of CAP reform, has weakened (see 
Swinbank, 2015: chapter 8, this volume). There are several reasons 
why that happened: most of the trade distorting price and 
production supports has been phased out during the past reforms; 
the WTO Doha Round of multilateral negotiations stalled; some of 
the EU’s main trade partners reintroduced income supports 
(Bureau, 2012). 
The second main driver of CAP reform is the scope and 
distribution of the budget related to agricultural policy instruments 
and negotiated as part of the MFF. Fiscal pressures faced by member 
states due to the eurozone crisis strengthened demands to curb the 
CAP budget. Simultaneously, since direct payments to farmers in 
new member states (NMS) were only being phased in, the CAP 
budget towards 2020 had to be increased in order for the already 
established rights to be implemented. 
The important factor about negotiations on the MFF is that 
agreement requires a unanimous vote, which puts member states 
whose preferences are closer to the status quo into a strong 
negotiating position (because if no agreement is reached, the 
preceding MFF applies). Furthermore, since MFF negotiations took 
place parallel to negotiations on CAP reform, member states with 
more status quo-oriented preferences regarding budget procedure 
were able to use their legislative powers to influence CAP reforms 
in the MFF package. Net contributors to the budget are typically in 
favour of curbing it, such as the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. 
Some of them, known as CAP ‘reformists’, favour phasing out 
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traditional supports such as price and production supports and 
historical direct supports (Pillar I), and reorienting the CAP towards 
environmental supports and rural development programmes (Pillar 
II).  
Major net recipients of the CAP budget such as France, Italy, 
Ireland and Spain are known as ‘conservatives’ for being in favour 
of traditional types of supports (Lovec & Erjavec, 2013).1 Since in the 
MFF negotiations the interests of CAP conservatives were closer to 
the status quo, they were able to influence CAP reform by only 
agreeing to a small reduction in the CAP budget in return for a more 
conservative reform. Those who were in the weakest negotiating 
position were NMS, which due to the phasing in of direct payments 
and the lower production intensity and level of usable resources, 
had significantly lower past allocations to hold on to compared with 
the other member states. 
The third main driver of the reform is the change in policy 
objectives, principles and mechanisms, known collectively as 
paradigm change. According to Garzon (2006:62-3), the objectives 
of the early CAP were modernisation of agriculture, fair incomes for 
farmers, price stability and availability of food at affordable prices; 
its principles were a preference for domestic production, a common 
market and financial solidarity; and it employed price and 
production supports. Since the early CAP was based on protecting 
domestic producers from world market pressures, it corresponded 
to a ‘productivist paradigm’. Objectives of the reformed CAP 
between 1992 and 2008 were competitiveness, multifunctional and 
sustainable agriculture, realising a European model of agriculture 
and rural development; its principles were gradual openness to 
global markets and sustainable development; and its mechanisms 
were changes in direct supports and rural development 
programmes. This new CAP, which was more based on market 
forces and some new policy challenges, corresponded to a ‘liberal-
multifunctional paradigm’. 
Before the CAP 2020 negotiation process, there were already 
pressures to continue to reform CAP down the line of paradigm 
                                                        
1 The differentiation of reformists and conservatives is not so 
straightforward. See for example Lovec & Erjavec (2013) for typology of 
member state preferences during the 2008 “Health Check” reform. 
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change (Declaration by Agricultural Economists, 2010). A majority 
of the supports consisted of direct payments, which were still 
mostly allocated on a historical basis (in terms of compensation for 
reduction of price supports during past reforms for specific, more 
protected production activities). This created unequal conditions 
generally for the farmers and regions (mainly NMS, but also 
Portugal and some other regions in the EU-15), with fewer historical 
payment rights as well for young farmers trying to enter the 
business (which gave rise to political pressures from the NMS). 
Furthermore, direct supports were concentrated: as much as 80% of 
direct payments went to 20% of beneficiaries.2 One of the central 
ideas before the reform process began was to abolish or replace 
historical payments with per area supports conditional upon new 
environmental actions (public goods arguments), thus making CAP 
‘greener’. 
The co-decision procedure 
CAP reforms were facilitated by changes in particular institutions 
of representation and decision-making, which worked in 
combination with changes in the above-mentioned institutional 
frameworks. Firstly, diversity of interest groups involved in the 
process increased. New actors included small farmer organisations, 
environmental NGOs and development NGOs (Daugbjerg, 1999; 
Garzon, 2006: 90, 96). Secondly, there was institutional pressure to 
continue on the established path of the reforms regardless of the 
further contextual change. Thirdly, after the unanimity rule in 
decision-making on the CAP was replaced with qualified majority 
vote (QMV), the possibility of reform increased. Changes in 
Commission nomination procedure strengthened the opportunity 
for a nomination of more pro-reform-oriented commissioners 
(Pokrivcak & Swinnen, 2004; Pokrivcak et al., 2006; Swinnen, 2008). 
                                                        
2 During past reforms these problems were partly addressed through the 
introduction of the mechanism of cross-compliance, which made direct 
supports conditional on certain production standards, the ability of 
member states to allocate direct supports on a regional basis, the 
mechanism of modulation, which transferred 10% of the direct payments 
over €5,000 to Pillar II, and the mechanism of degressive capping, which 
transferred an additional 4% of individual payments over €300,000 to Pillar 
II. 
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The Lisbon Treaty (2009) introduced two important changes 
that could reduce the possibility of reform. Firstly, the co-decision 
procedure, renamed ‘ordinary legislation procedure‘, was applied 
to the CAP, meaning that the European Parliament became co-
legislator at the Council’s side. With this the Parliament is able to 
block and amend the CAP reform legislation. If its preferences were 
more status quo-oriented than those of the qualified majority in the 
Council – meaning that it preferred no reform over proposed reform 
– it could use its legislative powers to influence the outcome of the 
policy process (Crombez et al., 2012). Secondly, the Parliament 
would be able to veto the MFF agreement. Since the number of veto 
players involved in budget negotiations already consisted of all the 
member states, this novelty was important only if its preferences 
were closer to the status quo than those of the other decision-makers 
holding veto rights (Lovec & Erjavec, 2015: 52-3). 
2.2 Changes in dominant discourses and CAP 
reforms 
Discourse – “language use seen as a type of social practice” 
(Fairclough, 1989: 26) – does not simply reflect reality but contains 
ideas that, within certain social and political contexts, legitimise 
policy. These ideas are created by certain political actors who try to 
pursue their particular interests by disguising them as general 
interests (Fairclough, 2003). 
Three dominant discourses influenced CAP reform. In other 
words, by describing three sets of central ideas (also 
paradigms/concepts) of the CAP, three different ‘languages’ have 
been used. First, ‘productivist’ (also ‘protectionist’ or ‘mercantilist’) 
discourse is characterised by the central idea that domestic 
producers and production are endangered by world markets, which 
is why the state should intervene to support them. Keywords 
typical of productivist discourse are food (in)security, sufficient 
supply, price fluctuations, stable prices, need for fair and 
comparable income, market pressures, weak role in supply chain 
and market concentration. The productivist discourse was 
dominant during the early CAP.  
Second, ‘neoliberal’ discourse is characterised by the central 
idea that markets provide for optimal allocation of resources and 
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maximise overall welfare, which is why the state should refrain 
from interfering with markets. Keywords typically used within this 
discourse are trade distortions, welfare losses, fiscal burden, 
competitiveness, simplification, efficiency and effectiveness. This 
discourse emerged in the 1980s, especially in the context of world 
trade pressures, and has grown stronger since then.  
Third, ‘multifunctional’ discourse is characterised by the 
central idea that agriculture performs certain quality-intensive 
functions that should be supported by the state. Keywords typical 
of this discourse include sustainable management of the 
environment, biodiversity, food quality, supply of local and 
traditional foods, animal welfare, development of rural areas, 
landscape conservation, etc. Multifunctional discourse emerged 
during the reform process (Potter & Tilzey, 2005; Erjavec & Erjavec, 
2009: 220-4) (see Table 9.1). 
Even though the three discourses can be considered rival, 
they tend to transgress each other’s boundaries and to incorporate 
each other’s elements (Erjavec & Erjavec, 2015). For example, 
productivist discourse incorporated elements of the multifunctional 
discourse such as environmental concerns by arguing that 
continuous support for production in the EU is needed because of 
threats to supply due to climate change and soil degradation around 
the world. 
2.3 Empirical research  
Existing research has demonstrated that CAP reforms are highly 
complex and that their outcomes are not completely predictable 
(Moyer & Josling, 2002; Garzon, 2006; Swinnen, 2008). The first line 
of research aims at establishing drivers and outcomes of the CAP 
2020 reform. It is divided into four stages. At each of the stages main 
issues, the role of procedures and outcomes for individual actors 
such as EU institutions, member states and interest groups are 
identified based on analysis of the primary documents and reports. 
These four stages are defined as follows: 
i. Spring 2010 – June 2011: Setting of the new policy agenda with 
publication of the report on the public debate that was 
launched by the European Commission in spring 2010 
(European Commission, 2010a) and with the publication of 
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the Commission strategy paper on the CAP towards 2020 in 
November 2010 (European Commission, 2010b); 
ii. June – October 2011: Publication of a proposal for the 2014-20 
MFF by the European Commission in June 2011 (2011e) and 
of the new CAP regulations on market measures, direct 
supports, rural development and horizontal issues in October 
2011 (European Commission, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d); 
iii. End of 2011 – March 2013: Negotiations between member 
states within the European Council and the Council of 
Agricultural Ministers, which entered the final stage in the 
second half of the 2012 and were concluded with the February 
2013 European Council agreement and March 2013 
Agriculture Council agreement on common positions on the 
MFF and CAP reform (European Council, 2013; Council of the 
EU, 2013); and negotiations within the European Parliament, 
which were concluded with the adoption of a joint position 
amending the Commission’s proposal by the Committee on 
Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) in early 
2013, which was then modified by the plenary in March 2013 
(European Parliament, 2013); 
iv. May – September 2013: Negotiations between the European 
Commission, Council of the EU and European Parliament, 
also known as ‘trilogues’, which were launched in May 2013 
and ended with June agreement on non-financial issues 
(European Commission, 2013a) and September agreement on 
financial provisions (European Commission, 2013b).  
The second line of research engages in critical discourse 
analysis, which is a more in-depth and interpretative approach 
compared to mere content analysis (Fairclough, 2002). The 
fundamental feature of discursive analysis is a systematic 
description of sets of ideas that – in their particular political and 
social contexts – serve particular interests. On a macro-textual level, 
we analysed the main meanings of the key text of the 2014-20 CAP 
reform and identified the discourses. On a micro-textual level, we 
also analysed the choice of keywords, since analyses of keywords 
are typically used to identify discourses (Fairclough, 2003). The 
European Commission’s Communication “The CAP towards 2020” 
(European Commission, 2010b) serves as basic document defining 
the conceptual framework of the whole reform, as the goals set in 
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this document have not been subject to change in the subsequent 
reform stages. The document is based on the outcome of the public 
debate (European Commission, 2010a) and opened the Council and 
European Parliament negotiation process on the CAP reform. We 
also applied critical discursive analysis to the Commission proposal 
for four basic regulations of the CAP, which describe the CAP 
mechanisms, with detailed explanations of measures (European 
Commission, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d) and final political 
agreement on the reform reached on the 26 June 2013 (European 
Commission, 2013). This document details the agreed upon 
modifications to individual politically controversial elements of the 
CAP reform according to its individual measures. 
3. Results of the research 
3.1 Analysis of the process of the 2020 CAP reform 
First stage: Pre-negotiation settings  
In spring 2010, a public debate on the future of the CAP was 
launched by the European Commission. In accordance with the 
summary report, three groups of issues emerged: growing demand 
for food and volatility of prices; environmental concerns such as loss 
of biodiversity, soil degradation and climate change; and various 
distributional concerns (European Commission, 2010a). Most of the 
participants in the debate were professionally engaged in 
agriculture and demonstrated specific knowledge of the CAP. 
In November, the European Commission published a 15-page 
strategic document titled “The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the 
food, natural resources and territorial challenges of the future” 
(European Commission, 2010b). The Commission’s vision of the 
reform was based on the introduction of per area payments that 
would be conditional on a set of “new, simple, generalized, non-
contractual environmental actions”. The vision of the Commission 
was named ‘greening of the CAP’.  
In general, member states supported the approach. However, 
in a 2010 joint paper Germany and France argued that the reform 
should bring “no disadvantages to member states or farmers” and, 
more explicitly, that “full convergence of payments was not an 
option”. They specifically pointed out the importance of the 
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agreement on the new MFF. Farmer organisations argued against 
the reduction of CAP funds and for CAP having ‘stronger teeth’. 
Environmental organisations were satisfied with the ‘green’ rhetoric 
but were careful due to lack of detail (Euractiv, 2010). In mid-2011 
the European Parliament passed a resolution on the future of CAP, 
calling for “sufficient resources in order to be able to meet the new 
challenges”. 
Second stage: A concrete proposal  
In June 2011, the European Commission (2011e) published the 2014-
20 MFF proposal. In real terms, the funds available for agriculture 
corresponded to existing obligations. Additional funds were set 
outside the budget for mechanisms such as crisis mechanism and 
accommodation to future trade agreements. 
In October 2011, the European Commission published a 
proposal reforming the main CAP regulations. The key elements of 
the Commission proposal are presented in Table 9.1. 
In distributional terms the Commission’s proposal was 
relatively conservative. Introduction of single per area payments 
was expected to redistribute some of the supports from more 
intensive to more extensive production systems; actual income 
effects depended on several factors such as average size of the 
holdings, land ownership, production structure, intensity, etc. 
(European Commission, 2011d). The external convergence formula 
did not bring much more than an increase of payments in the Baltic 
States. The total financial effect of the capping (after total labour 
costs were deducted) was limited. Nevertheless, in countries such 
as the United Kingdom, Germany, Slovakia, Czech Republic and 
Hungary where the number of big beneficiaries was substantial, the 
effect was still notable (for detailed analysis see Sahrbacher et al., 
2015: ch. 11, this volume).  
The overall distributional effects of the proposal were smaller 
than those produced by modulation of direct payments to Pillar II 
during the previous reforms. Following the Commission proposal, 
modulation was no longer obligatory. 
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Table 9.1 Commission proposal of regulations reforming CAP 
Group of 
measures 
Type of proposed changes 
Market 
measures 
- Further limitations and simplification of 
intervention measures 
- Sugar quotas and vine planting ban expire in 2015 
- Strengthening of the producer organisations, 
support for private intervention 
- Crisis mechanism for the case of major market 
disturbances 
Direct 
payments 
- ‘Regionalisation’: introduction of basic per area 
regional payment (min 60% of direct support) 
- ‘External convergence’: in member states with 
payments currently below 90% of the EU average, 
30% of this gap to be closed 
- Progressive capping minus total labour costs 
- 5% (10%)* of direct payments could remain 
coupled with production 
- ‘Greening’: preservation of permanent grasslands, 
crop diversification and introduction of ecological 
focus areas (EFAs) on at least 7% of the area (30% 
of direct support). Obligatory, except for farms <3 
ha and organic farms. 
- Rest of the funds used to top up payments for 
young farmers, for those farming in areas facing 
natural constraints and for small farmers 
(simplified scheme) 
- New cross compliance requirements (water 
framework directive, etc.) 
Rural 
development 
- Member states allowed switching 10% of Pillar I 
to Pillar II; member states where direct payments 
were below 90% of the EU average allowed to 
switch 5% of Pillar II to Pillar I 
* Higher percentage of payments allowed to be coupled applied to countries 
where this share was currently higher. 
Source: European Commission, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c. 
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The biggest innovation in the Commission proposal was the 
greening element. In accordance with official estimates, costs 
incurred due to new requirements accounted for approximately 
one-third of the green payment. Ecological focus areas (EFAs), 
which were considered to be the most important measure, were 
already in place on around 3% of the farm areas (European 
Commission, 2011d; Bureau, 2012: 318, 320; Matthews, 2012: 327-
328). 
Third stage: position of member states and European Parliament  
One of the initial focuses of the negotiations was on the CAP 
budget.3 Net contributors such as Germany and the UK wanted to 
see the CAP budget significantly curbed. Germany and the UK also 
opposed capping. Conservative member states such as France, Italy 
and Spain were strongly against any reduction in the CAP budget. 
Member states that traditionally received larger amounts of rural 
development supports, such as Austria, were worried that Pillar II 
would be sacrificed during the negotiations. NMS were worried 
that their payment levels would be further reduced (Euractiv, 2012). 
By the end of 2012 the decision on the CAP budget took its 
final shape. The proposed budget was decreased by approximately 
10% in real terms, with a greater reduction of Pillar II. A nominal 
minimal floor for direct payments was set at €196 (75% of the 
average payment in per area terms). There was to be no obligatory 
capping. Flexibility to switch funds between Pillars 1 and 2 was 
increased to 15% and now applied in both directions. NMS were 
granted additional flexibility of 10%. Member states traditionally 
receiving large amounts of rural development supports were 
granted discrete allocations of these funds. Furthermore, the 
framework agreement included reference to CAP reform issues, 
namely the ‘regionalisation’ (introduction of per area supports) and 
‘greening’ (new obligatory environmental actions). In order to make 
financial agreement acceptable, conservative member states 
demanded the Commission relax its position on these two issues 
and become more realistic (Council of the EU, 2012; Agra Focus, 
                                                        
3 The main issues of the budgetary negotiations were the overall level of 
EU budget, cohesion and CAP funding as well as the UK rebate.  
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December 2012: 7-10).4 Commenting on the EFAs, even German 
Agriculture Minister Ilse Aigner said that “in times of increasing 
global demand for food, it would be absurd to leave 7% of land 
fallow” (Euractiv, 2013a). After some minor corrections were made, 
an agreement was found in the European Council on 8 February 
2013. Based on the estimation, member states losing the least 
(compared with existing allocations, direct payments being fully 
phased-in) were France, Italy and Spain, and those losing the most 
were NMS (with the exception of the Baltic States) (Agra Focus, 
March 2013: 9, 17). 
The agricultural ministers addressed most of the remaining 
national concerns at the March 2013 Council. Due to pressures from 
conservative member states regionalisation of payments was 
substantially relaxed due to the mechanism of ‘internal 
convergence’ proposed by the Irish delegation in the Council (which 
also held the presidency). Firstly, the internal convergence target 
was set at 60% (minimum level of average regional payment given 
to the individual beneficiary), and secondly, member states were 
allowed to top up supports on first hectares (so-called ‘inversed 
degressivity’, proposed by France). The argument of conservatives 
for these changes to the Commission proposal was that “if 
production was to be maintained, supports should not be 
redistributed from more towards less productive farmers”.  
The second ‘victim’ of the compromise agreement was 
greening: a number of farmers, such as smaller farmers, were 
exempted from the requirements, environmental requirements 
were relaxed (EFAs were now required on 5% of the area) and 
‘equivalent measures’ defined by member states were allowed. 
Other changes to the Commission’s proposal included delayed 
phasing-out of supply controls in the sugar sector, reintroduction of 
supply controls in the wine sector,5 allowing a higher share of 
                                                        
4 The framework agreement was based on the proposal by European 
Council President Herman Van Rompuy. 
5 The Council’s position reintroduced planting rights in the wine sector. 
Furthermore, these could no longer be traded but were under full authority 
of national governments. Thus, liberalisation of the wine sector agreed in 
2007 was effectively reversed (Deconinck & Swinnen, 2013; Meloni & 
Swinnen, 2014). 
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payments to be coupled with production and extending the Simple 
Area Payment Scheme to be applied by a majority of NMS (Euractiv, 
2013a; Agra Focus, April 2013: 2-3; Hart & Menadue, 2013). 
The European Parliament decided to reject the budget 
position of member states since it involved too many provisions 
referring to CAP reform (European Parliament, 2013). Apart from 
that the COMAGRI drafted the position of the Parliament on CAP 
reform in March 2013. In most matters the position was close to the 
Council final agreement, which was also defended by conservative 
member states. In comparison to the compromise position of the 
Council, extension of supply controls was greater, share of 
payments coupled with production was larger, and external 
convergence was slightly weaker. However, there were also some 
progressive elements in the position of the Parliament: support for 
obligatory capping, higher co-financing rates for Pillar II 
programmes and rejection of ‘double funding’ resulting from 
financing ‘equivalent greening measures’ from Pillar II. This last 
issue was added by the plenary, after the COMAGRI failed to avoid 
the plenary vote (Euractiv, 2013b; Agra Focus, January 2013: 13-5). 
Fourth and final stage 
In May 2013, the trilogues between the Parliament, Council and 
Commission were launched in order for the legislative process to be 
concluded as a first reading agreement. Due to the delays in the 
process, the implementation of a CAP reform was already 
postponed for a year (Agra Focus, April 2013: 9, 11-2; May 2013: 5). 
By June, they were able to settle the non-financial issues. The 
agreement on these issues was close to the Council’s position with 
the exception of supply controls and minimum internal 
convergence rate, where it was somewhere between the positions of 
the Council and the Parliament, and double funding, where the 
position of the Parliament and the Commission was followed (Agra 
Focus, July 2013; see Fertő & Kovacs, 2015: chapter 15, this volume). 
During the summer, an agreement on financial issues was reached. 
Germany finally agreed on capping 5% of payments over €150,000 
(in case no equivalent redistributive payment was applied). 
Furthermore, there was no longer any requirement for the co-
financing of voluntary modulated funds and the co-financing rates 
for rural development were increased (European Commission, 
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2013b; Agra Focus, September 2013: 2). In spite of these corrections 
in favour of Pillar II programmes, their reduction was still expected 
to be substantial. 
COPA-COGECA, which was strongly against regionalisation 
and greening, was satisfied with the outcome. But environmental 
NGOs such as BirdLife International, which considered that 
greening had been weakened and rural development programmes 
better targeted towards new objectives sacrificed, argued that the 
reform was actually a step back and that such ‘greening’ was in fact 
‘greenwash’ (Agra Focus, March 2013: 15). According to IEEP (2013): 
“The reform has done little to stop questions about the rationale for 
providing large scale support for agriculture in Europe.” The most 
dissatisfied with the reform process were the NGOs concerned with 
development, such as Oxfam, which thought that the interests of 
developing countries were being ignored throughout the process. 
3.2 Analysis of the discourses 
We will now apply the discourse analysis as explained in section 2.2 
to the CAP strategic aims summarised in Table 9.2 and the measures 
summarised in Table 9.3. 
Strategic aims of the CAP 
The discourses analysis of the conceptual framework of CAP 
reform, which may be interpreted as a justification of the policy, has 
shown that the first strategic aim of the CAP defined by the 
Commission is to preserve the food production potential in order to 
“guarantee long-term food security” for European citizens and “to 
contribute to growing world food demand” in the light of market 
instabilities often attributed to climate change (European 
Commission, 2010b). It is a productivist discourse, evident by its 
emphasis on ‘food production’ to ‘guarantee food security’. The first 
aim therefore considers the contribution to growing world food 
demand due to the increase in the global population (European 
Commission, 2010b). The European Commission implicitly gives 
the European Union responsibility for meeting rising global food 
demand. The central aim related to guaranteeing food security is 
justified by market instabilities caused by climate change while 
other factors influencing fluctuations in price and production are 
not examined. The European Commission also tried to justify the 
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CAP with the environmental element, which is as a key demand of 
environmental NGOs but also popular with the broader public 
(European Commission, 2010a; Bureau, 2011).  
The second strategic aim emphasises the CAP as supporting 
farming communities that provide European citizens with quality, 
value and diversity of food produced sustainably (European 
Commission, 2010b). This aim is formulated within a traditional 
multifunctional discourse, evident in its advocacy of support for 
farming communities, environmental concerns and maintaining the 
rural landscape, and by the use of keywords such as ‘sustainability’, 
‘quality, value and diversity of food’, preserving ‘biodiversity’ and 
the ‘rural landscape’. Also in this aim, the European Commission 
has made extensive use of the term ‘adaptation to climate change’, 
indicating the importance of this popular environmental element in 
justifying the CAP. The preservation of ‘public goods’, considering 
the demands by CAP critics that it be made a key aim of the CAP 
(Declaration of Agricultural Economists, 2010; Hart et al., 2011), is 
not mentioned in this second aim but is instead listed among the 
objectives of the CAP. This could be interpreted as the European 
Commission not having wanted to disturb the balance between the 
three discourses by incorporating the concept of the preservation of 
public goods called for by important CAP critics, mainly scholars 
and environmental NGOs (Declaration of Agricultural Economists, 
2010; Hart et al., 2011).  
Central to the third strategic aim is that the CAP should 
promote employment in rural communities from which several 
economic, social and environmental benefits derive (European 
Commission, 2010b). This could also be viewed as an example of the 
hybrid discourse: while stressing the importance of agriculture and 
the preservation of local production, typical of the productivist 
discourse, the emphasis on ‘multiple benefits’ is more characteristic 
of the multifunctional discourse, one of its keywords. An 
environmental element is also evident, i.e. the reduction of 
greenhouse gases, further emphasising the important role of the 
CAP in the mitigation of climate change as a justification for its 
raison d’être.  
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Table 9.2 Discourses of three strategic aims of the 2014-20 reform 
(European Commission, 2010b) 
Discourse Strategic aims Keywords 
Productivist  To guarantee food 
security and contribute 
to meeting growing 
world food demand in 
the light of market 
instabilities caused by 
climate change. 
To maintain local 
production  
Guarantee food security, 
growing world food 
demand, 
climate change, local 
employment 
Multifunctional To support farming 
communities that 
provide European 
citizens with quality, 
value and diversity of 
food produced 
sustainably 
Sustainability, quality, 
value and diversity of 
food, preserving 
biodiversity and the 
rural landscape, 
adaptation to climate 
change, multiple 
economic, social, 
environmental and 
territorial benefits, 
reduction of greenhouse 
gases 
Neoliberal To promote greater 
competitiveness, 
efficient use of taxpayer 
resources and effective 
public policy  
Competitiveness, 
efficient use, effective 
policy 
 
 
To summarise, the document intimidates in the sense of 
telling stakeholders that if they fail to introduce the presented 
productivist CAP reform, the consequences would be tragic: “The 
significant cut back in European farming activities would in turn 
generate important economic, environmental social consequences” 
(European Commission, 2010b). After having presented the drastic 
consequences of not adopting CAP reform, a demand for such 
reform is only natural: “The reform of the CAP must continue to 
promote greater competitiveness, efficient use of taxpayer resources 
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and effective public policy returns European citizens expect, with 
regard to food security, the environment, climate change and social 
and territorial balance” (European Commission, 2010b). This is an 
illustration of the document’s subscription to the neoliberal 
discourse (‘competitiveness’, ‘efficient use’ and ‘effective policy’), 
reinforced by productivist (‘food security’) and multifunctional 
(‘environment’, ‘climate change’ and ‘social and territorial balance’) 
elements. The neoliberal discourse does not begin until the second 
part of the document, which could be interpreted as an attempt to 
somewhat conceal its use. This makes sense insofar as the neoliberal 
discourse, with its advocacy for ceasing all public transfers into 
agriculture, may be considered the antithesis of the multifunctional 
and productivist discourses since both call for a strong state 
presence and market regulation. The neoliberal discourse was 
incorporated into the justification of the strategic aims since it 
encompasses part of the measures, especially those concerning 
market management mechanisms, e.g. abolition of the production 
quota system. Thus adaptation to climate change was incorporated 
into all three strategic aims by the European Commission. Climate 
change has thus become a key element for preserving the CAP. This 
‘greening’ element may be seen as a kind of meta-element of all the 
discourses employed in the actual CAP reform.  
Measures of the 2014-20 reform 
Further, the discourse analysis of documents detailing and 
regulating CAP measures (European Commission, 2011a; 2011b; 
2011c; 2011d) has shown that the productivist discourse 
predominates in direct payments (accompanied by the 
multifunctional discourse in the green payments measure), the 
neoliberal (supplemented with productivist) discourse 
predominates in the market management mechanisms, and the 
multifunctional (with elements of productivist) discourse 
predominates in the rural development regulations.  
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Table 9.3 Discourses of the measures of the 2014-20 reform (European 
Commission, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d) 
Measures Discourse Keywords 
1. Direct payments   
Basic Payment 
Scheme 
Productivist  Contribute to food security 
and farm income, internal 
and external convergence, 
redistributive payment 
Coupled payment  Productivist To address the reform 
impacts on specific sectors  
Young farmers  Productivist Additional payment for 
young farmers 
Small farmers Hybrid: 
productivist and 
multi-functional 
Vital food production, 
maintain social balance in 
rural areas 
Areas with natural 
constraints 
Multifunctional  Natural constraints, rural 
development 
Greening direct 
payments 
Multifunctional Greening, organic, crop 
diversification, ecological 
area 
Active farmers Productivist Favouring active farmers 
2. Market measures   
Sugar quota 
abolition 
Neoliberal Improved competitiveness 
on market  
Wine planting rights 
system  
Productivist Reinstate wine planting 
rights  
Market interventions Hybrid: 
neoliberal and 
productivist 
Increased competition on 
market, provide safety net 
for farmers  
School Fruit and 
Milk Schemes 
Productivist Increased budget for Fruit 
and Milk Schemes 
Rules for producer 
organisations 
Productivist Better organisation of 
farmers, regulation 
3. Rural development 
policy 
  
Fostering knowledge 
transfer and 
innovation  
Hybrid: 
productivist and 
multifunctional 
Transfer knowledge and 
innovation, ensure 
sustainable development  
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Enhancing 
competitiveness of 
agriculture and farm 
viability 
Hybrid: 
productivist and 
neoliberal 
Farm viability, 
competitiveness 
Promoting food 
chain and risk 
management in 
agriculture 
Hybrid: 
productivist and 
multifunctional 
Food chain organisation, 
risk management  
Restoring, 
preserving and 
enhancing 
ecosystems 
Multifunctional Restoring, preserving and 
enhancing ecosystems 
Promoting resource 
efficiency, low 
carbon, climate 
resilient economy  
Multifunctional Low carbon and climate 
resilient economy 
Social inclusion, 
poverty reduction, 
economic 
development in rural 
areas 
Multifunctional Social inclusion, poverty 
reduction and economic 
development in rural areas 
 
As the productivist discourse was most widely employed, the 
CAP’s redistributive role was strongly emphasised, an observation 
corroborated by the CAP budget distribution (Erjavec & Erjavec, 
2015). Comparing the individual discourses by budget share, it 
could be very roughly estimated that the prevalent two discourses, 
i.e. productivist (with more than 60% from total funds for the CAP) 
and multifunctional (more than 30%), have a budget ratio of 2:1, 
while the neoliberal discourse’s share is almost insignificant. 
‘Greening’, the foundation of multifunctional discourse, seems to 
have an especially large share if compared to the previous budget 
distributions.  
However, this finding should be discussed in a broader 
context. Considering the amount of financial means designated for 
direct payments, the last CAP reform (dated 2002) with the 
introduction of the cross-compliance rules for direct payments 
already started some environmental connotation of the policy. The 
last CAP reform has made the ‘greening’ element arbitrary by 
assigning it more than 30% of the total direct payment budget, equal 
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to slightly less than 25% of the total CAP budget. The European 
Commission had thus designated certain measures of the last CAP 
reform as ‘greening’ and granted them almost a quarter of the total 
CAP budget, but the question remains whether these measures are 
multifunctional, as they were presented in the discourses.  
Namely, in the process of adopting CAP reform and defining 
measures more explicitly, the multifunctional discourse, with its 
strong greening element that was prevalent in the CAP reform aims 
and objectives, has been weakened through the reform negotiation 
process. The rules for EFAs were significantly watered down in the 
last stage of political negotiations in the Council and later agreed 
with the European Parliament. Several exemptions, such as for 
small farms, forest and permanent grassland regions, protein plants 
on the list of eligible areas, were introduced (Agra Focus, 2013a; 
2013b). In addition, the ‘greening’ crop diversity requirement will 
only affect a very small share of the farm land according to the 
Commission’s own published impact assessment. Many different 
actors argue that the environmental elements were restricted in the 
new measures (IEEP, 2013). Thus the ‘greening’ element that was 
used primarily only for justification of a specific policy was not 
proportionately integrated into measures and the budget 
distribution, i.e. ‘greening’ was in fact ‘green light’ or even a 
‘greenwash’ strategy.  
4. Discussion and conclusion: Is CAP moving 
backwards? 
4.1 Change in drivers implies new drivers for change 
External trade was not an important driver of the most recent 
reform, in contrast to some of the previous reforms. The share of 
supports that were allowed to be coupled with production 
remained high, and since green payment exceeds official estimates 
of costs, it cannot be categorised as an environmental payment 
(‘green box’ subcategory by WTO typology). Furthermore, greening 
elements imply certain production activities on the eligible land 
(Daugbjerg, 2014). On the other hand, the reformed CAP stays in the 
framework of multilateral trade negotiations, which is 
demonstrated by phasing out some of the remaining market 
measures. 
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In the absence of external pressures, negotiations on the MFF 
(see A. Matthews, 2015: chapter 7, this volume) and paradigm 
change were the most important drivers of the recent reform. The 
fact that the Commission’s proposal for CAP reform was 
conservative in distributional terms and even allowed for switching 
of part of the funds from Pillar II to Pillar I, which was against the 
trend of the past reforms, demonstrated that the Commission was 
well aware of the limitations of the possible budget agreement 
imposed by the unanimity rule. Thus the Commission tried to hide 
the expected reduction of Pillar II programmes behind the flexibility 
mechanism and to focus attention of the reform on the greening of 
the Pillar I. The point it was trying to make was made explicitly by 
Matthews (2012: 327-8), who argued that compared with the pre-
reform CAP, when only a third of rural development supports were 
spent on environmental measures, 30% of direct payments was now 
allocated for environmental actions. However, conservatives, 
whose budget preferences were closer to the status quo, were able 
to take advantage of their legislative powers to negotiate a modest 
reduction in the budget for substantial relaxation of regionalisation 
and greening in a package deal.6 The legislative powers of the 
conservatives were demonstrated by estimates of the financial 
effects of the budget agreement, showing that they lost the least 
(Agra Focus, March 2013: 9, 17). 
According to former Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development Dacian Cioloş, the reform “more than anything noted 
the paradigmatic change of CAP” (Agra Focus, July 2013). However, 
after regionalisation and greening were reduced (target and 
requirements were relaxed, a substantial number of farmers was 
exempted, equivalent measures were allowed, see IEEP, 2013), 
paradigm change was no more than an (half) empty shell. It could 
be said that the main hidden aim of the latest CAP policy changes 
for the conservative block was to extend the re-distributional logic 
of the CAP within a still comprehensive budget while implementing 
as few paradigmatic changes as possible. 
                                                        
6 Since direct payments are nominal, they will not be affected by reduction 
of CAP budget in real terms. 
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4.2 Institutional changes hindered policy change 
There was strong path dependency in the reform process 
demonstrated by several facts. The CAP structure of two pillars 
remained, and direct aid took on some new connotation but are still 
the key CAP mechanism and distributional tool. On the other side, 
the Commission tried, with the environmental paradigm, to 
improve public acceptance of the still expensive CAP and further 
liberalise the market mechanism to be accommodated with the new 
global trade drivers (no longer in the frame of WTO trade 
negotiations, but more in the growing bilateral trade agreement 
pressures). In this way the proposed reform brings the CAP closer 
to the new liberal-multifunctional paradigm, in spite of the lack of 
direct external pressure.  
The ‘co-decision procedure’ introduced by the Lisbon Treaty 
hindered policy change. Since the preferences of the European 
Parliament on CAP reform were more status quo-oriented than 
those of the qualified majority in the Council (demonstrated by their 
respective positions on the new budget and CAP reform, see 
Euractiv, 2013b; 2013c), the Parliament was able to use its legislative 
powers to relax regionalisation and greening as the key 
characteristics of the reform. Furthermore, the Agriculture 
Committee’s conservative position might have influenced the 
position of the Council in the first place since it strengthened the 
conservative voices in the Council (Lovec & Erjavec, 2015). 
Additional factors influencing the Council’s position were that the 
final agreements were made during the Irish presidency, which 
supported the conservative vision of the CAP, and that Germany 
was defending a relatively conservative position.  
The COMAGRI, which played an important role in drafting 
the Parliament’s position, tried to avoid a plenary vote and to 
directly enter the trilogue since this would enable it to present the 
result of the trilogue negotiations to the plenary as a fait accompli. 
However, it failed to do so and the plenary rejected double funding, 
which turned out to be one of the progressive elements defended by 
the Parliament. Two other progressive elements were capping and 
higher co-financing rates. In order to introduce these elements, the 
Parliament threatened to veto the MFF. 
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The result of the CAP policy change process is a political 
compromise, in which the agricultural ministers in the Council have 
managed to keep reform at a bare minimum. The Parliament, which 
contributed to a small extent to the substance of the final policy 
change, was mainly busy playing its new role of co-legislator in the 
field of agricultural policy and drawing attention to itself. Anyone 
who has closely monitored the process cannot escape the 
impression that by the end of the negotiations the Commission was 
prepared to accept any kind of reform. The co-decision procedure, 
as well as the loss of real power due to the economic crisis in the 
larger member states, has weakened the Commission position 
substantially in the CAP reform process. 
Greening controversy 
In order to retain a ‘strong’ CAP and the current distribution of 
financial resources, the Commission, Parliament and Council used 
greening to justify it and productivist discourse as a major 
component for determining CAP measures. Decision-makers in the 
Council and Parliament have put forward a modernised 
productivist discourse, which has increased its foothold in the latest 
reform compared to previous reform efforts, all in a conscious effort 
to preserve the CAP as an important public policy and to maintain 
its budget distribution scheme. The popular environmental element 
was included in all discourses, but it was not proportionately 
integrated into measures and the budget distribution. By 
predominately using the productivist discourse and only 
apparently using ‘greening’ strategy, the key EU decision-makers 
turned ‘greening’ into ‘greenwash’. 
The fact that the greening element was weakened acted 
against the communication strategy of the Commission, since 
environmental NGOs were increasingly pointing out that the CAP 
was in fact being greenwashed. Thus, by the time reform process 
was over, key actors themselves stopped using the term ‘greening’ 
as a reference for the CAP 2020 reform.  
Most important, the latest ‘greening’ policy changes have 
been a failure. The use of exceptions, especially those that allow 
conventional farming of protein-rich crops in ecologically sensitive 
areas, deals quite a blow to the Commission’s initial logic. It could 
be argued that the original concept was poorly planned and quite 
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unrealistically developed. The environmental paradigmatic twist 
has thus definitely failed, especially seeing how the reform is now 
being implemented in member states. Evidently, in most member 
states agriculture and agricultural policy are still too immature for 
such a redirection. 
The discussion about the future CAP is already open 
At this very moment, before the most recent reform has even begun 
to exert an effect, the CAP is already in need of new reform. A brief 
review of the key actors’ opinions shows that nobody is satisfied 
with this new CAP – neither the farmers, nor the policy-makers, nor 
the administrators, environmental organisations nor academia. We 
are still faced with a morass of decisions, regulations and varying 
financial means, with no exact concept of how to sculpt it into a 
coherent whole. This policy framework, which may indeed be 
successful in persuading the naïve of its makers’ good intentions, 
has brought about neither more environmental benefit nor 
development, elements of which European agriculture is in dire 
need.  
One could argue the EU needs a new, lucid consideration of 
what it wants its CAP to achieve. Given the current constellation of 
political power and interests, this consideration seems unlikely; it is 
not unreasonable to be sceptical about any possibility of change 
after 2020. The only certainty is another round of prolonged, 
strenuous negotiations, of which the fundamental question will be: 
Why do we have the CAP anyway?  
The main requirement would be to introduce the strict logic 
of the policy cycle, which is to have policy address real questions 
and challenge. In addition, member states face very different 
problems, generally unconnected to the distribution of Pillar I 
funds. The two-pillar CAP logic should be abolished and an 
integrated concept established, perhaps even towards 
renationalisation in a form of more targeted policy – at least for the 
wealthier member states. For most member states, agro-food 
development is the main challenge in need of considerably more 
attention.  
Finally, modern agricultural politics must distance itself from 
the particularity of interest politics and assume the responsibility of 
creating a better, more efficient policy, and not only the setting of 
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high-flying goals. All this sounds very utopian and naïve, of course, 
yet the level of absurdity that the CAP has reached today calls for 
impossible demands and the opening of a new discussion regarding 
the new CAP reform. 
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10. THE FATE OF GREEN DIRECT 
PAYMENTS IN THE CAP REFORM 
NEGOTIATIONS 
KALEY HART 
1. Introduction and context 
A key issue for the CAP reform process in 2010 was to strengthen 
significantly its capability for the delivery of environmental public 
goods to address the environmental challenges facing the EU. This 
was considered vital to legitimise the CAP (Hart et al., 2011; 
Matthews, 2012). The Commission’s proposed means to achieve this 
was to change the architecture of Pillar I direct payments, by 
introducing three compulsory ‘greening’ measures for farmers to 
which member states would allocate 30% of their direct payments 
budget (approximately €12 billion/year). On the face of it, this 
proposal represented an opportunity to provide a basic level of 
environmental management across all farms receiving CAP support 
in Europe. It had the potential to mark a turning point for the CAP 
and set a trajectory for future reforms. 
However, the proposal to green Pillar I proved to be highly 
contentious. Fiercely debated, even before the detailed proposals 
were announced, greening direct payments soon became a symbol 
of Agriculture Commissioner Dacian Cioloş’ reform and a major 
political battleground. Indeed, the battles have continued beyond 
the formal CAP agreement, into the discussions on the content of 
the delegated acts, into implementation and subsequently into the 
new commissioner’s brief to investigate simplification.  
The greening proposals were criticised by the majority of 
actors from the outset. Environmentalists were sceptical that the 
mechanisms of greening Pillar I could satisfactorily reward 
environmental public goods provision. Others saw them as 
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undermining Europe’s ability to contribute to ensuring food 
security, for example, by requiring land to be taken out of 
production (ecological focus areas – EFAs), threatening farming 
income and thereby livelihoods, as well as increasing the 
complexity of the CAP (Hart & Baldock, 2011; Matthews, 2012). For 
most environmental organisations, the proposal to green Pillar I 
was already a second-best option. They would have preferred to see 
a continued shift of funding towards rural development policy, 
following the trajectories of previous reforms (see, for example, 
BirdLife International, 2008). However, given the economic climate, 
it was considered unlikely that there would be appetite for 
increasing the rural development budget to fund an increase in 
environmental activity, rather that this part of the CAP budget 
would be at risk of cuts (Allen & Hart, 2013; BirdLife International 
& European Landowners’ Organization, 2010).  
As the first CAP reform subject to co-decision between the 
Agriculture Council and the European Parliament, this chapter 
considers the interplay between both institution and their respective 
roles in watering down proposals for a meaningful greening of the 
CAP. It examines how calls for increased national flexibility, both 
by those who wanted to strengthen the ability of greening measures 
to achieve environmental benefits and by those who saw it as a way 
of minimising their impact, led to the content of the measures being 
successively diluted and a long list of exemptions introduced. By 
the end of the formal negotiation process some even suggested that 
this reform process had been a step backwards for the integration of 
environmental concerns into the CAP (Brunner, 2013; Bureau, 
2013a; IEEP, 2013).  
The influence brought to bear by the Parliament and the 
Agriculture Council has to be set within the context of the overall 
dynamics and politics of the reform debate as it developed over 
time. A chronological perspective is taken. The reform orientation 
and scene setting started in 2010, with the publication of an own 
initiative report by MEP George Lyon of the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and orientation debates within the 
Agriculture Council. This was followed by the Commission’s 
Communication in November 2010, for which the Parliament’s 
response was a report by MEP Albert Dess of the European People’s 
Party (EPP). From the Council, Presidency Conclusions (rather than 
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Council Conclusions) emerged in June 2011, under the Hungarian 
presidency,1 in which moderate support was expressed for the 
concept of greening the CAP, if not the structure for doing so. The 
Commission’s legislative proposals were published in late 2011. The 
following 18 months, to May 2013, were occupied by the 
development of negotiating mandates by the Parliament and 
Council. The final phase of trilogues and political agreement took 
another nine months, with formal agreement in December 2013. 
The debate and subsequent changes to the proposals centred 
on five key areas:  
 the content and architecture of the measures themselves; 
 the definition of who might already be deemed to be 
compliant with the measures and therefore exempt from their 
requirements, i.e. ‘green by definition’; 
 acceptable alternative ways of meeting the requirements, i.e. 
‘equivalence’; 
 whether the greening measures should provide a baseline for 
Pillar II agri-environment-climate payments; and 
 whether the penalties for non-compliance with the greening 
measures should extend beyond 30% through reductions in 
basic payments. 
These issues appear as recurring themes through the 
chronological sections and are brought together at the end.  
2. Setting the scene  
By the time of the publication of the Commission’s Communication 
in late 2010, the debate on the objectives, architecture and budget of 
a future CAP had been active already for many months. Providing 
support for securing environmental outcomes via a future CAP – 
‘public goods for public money’ – increasingly was seen as a means 
of legitimising CAP expenditure. However, there were divergent 
opinions over the most appropriate system of payments to secure 
these goods and services – should there be a gradual shift from 
                                                        
1 Seven member states did not sign up to the document, largely due to 
continued disagreements on the distribution of direct payments to EU 
farmers in the post-2013 period. 
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income support payments to more targeted payments for 
environmental goods and services, or should income support 
payments be maintained, and if so, should these target all eligible 
farmers, those who are economically marginal, or those who are 
providing the greatest additional benefits to society and who would 
be the winners and losers of such changes? 
Initial thinking from the Parliament was contained within 
George Lyon’s report, adopted by the Parliament plenary on 8 July 
2010 (European Parliament, 2010a). This suggested that a future 
CAP should ensure sustainable production, environmental 
protection and a fair income for farmers. It proposed contractual 
top-ups to the single payment to provide member states with the 
flexibility to make greening payments focused on climate change, 
measures to improve production efficiency and grassland 
payments. However, the process of adopting the report exposed 
divisions over the extent to which the environment should feature 
as a focus for the future CAP. Views on which public goods the CAP 
should support proved particularly sensitive. An amendment, 
tabled by the EPP between the Committee on Agriculture and Rural 
Development (COMAGRI) and plenary votes, which was 
subsequently agreed,2 set the tone for later negotiations. This 
defined food security and food safety as ‘first generation’ public 
goods that should provide a core rationale for the CAP, alongside 
the environment (defined as ‘second generation’) (European 
Parliament, 2010b). This provided an early signal that the 
Parliament would resist any CAP restructuring it considered to 
reduce support for farming activity.  
In the Agriculture Council, a number of orientation debates 
took place, under the French presidency in the second half of 2009 
and under the Spanish presidency in the first half of 2010. In 
December 2009, the Paris Declaration was signed by 22 member 
states3 which argued against a major overhaul of the policy, 
outlining the importance of the CAP in supporting the European 
                                                        
2 The motion for this amendment passed through the Parliament with a 
vote of 356 for, 219 against and 18 abstentions, with the majority of 
opposition coming from the S&D and Greens/EFA parties. 
3 With the exception of the UK, Denmark, Malta, the Netherlands and 
Sweden. 
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food model and calling for a budget commensurate to the scale of 
ambition. This was followed in February 2010 by the Warsaw 
Declaration on the future of the CAP beyond 2013, which was 
signed by nine new member states and called for a departure from 
the current funding allocation criteria, greater equity in payment 
levels and a respect for the principle of financial solidarity. 
Environmental priorities did not feature in either of these 
statements, rather the focus remained predominantly on issues 
surrounding the potential redistribution of direct payment 
envelopes between member states. 
The Commission’s Communication on the future CAP 
appeared in November 2010 and included the proposal to introduce 
a series of three simple green measures in Pillar I, which farmers 
would be required to implement in return for 30% of their direct 
payments (see De Castro & Di Mambro, 2015: ch. 6, this volume). 
The Parliament’s response was drafted by MEP Albert Dess (EPP). 
Controversially, his report rejected the proposal to have ‘greening 
measures’ under Pillar I, suggesting instead that direct payments 
should be conditional upon farmers undertaking a number of 
simple environmental measures that go beyond cross-compliance 
requirements situated as agreements in Pillar II. This plan was 
presented as intending to encourage member states to build on 
existing agri-environment schemes and to avoid the introduction of 
“new, bureaucratic environmental conditions into the first Pillar” 
(European Parliament, 2011).  
The Dess report was not well received within COMAGRI or 
by other stakeholders, even those who might have preferred a Pillar 
II approach for greening. His ideas had not been developed in a 
collaborative manner, involving other political groups and 
stakeholders, which led to his report not being well presented or 
understood. Some felt his greening proposals were overcomplicated 
and would not lead to environmental additionality and others 
mistrusted his motives, thinking that this was simply a way of, at 
best, rewarding the status quo and, at worst, removing or 
significantly reducing any additional environmental requirements 
on farmers, given that the Pillar II budget was likely to come under 
significant pressure during discussions on the multiannual financial 
framework (MFF). In part his report sought to demonstrate that the 
Parliament was an equal partner in the reform process by proposing 
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a radical departure from the Commission’s proposals on greening. 
If the Parliament had supported the Dess greening proposals, it 
would have signalled a clear divide between itself and the 
Commission on an issue that was becoming increasingly symbolic 
of the reform. Given that the timing of his report coincided with the 
more general positioning of the Parliament on both the CAP and the 
MFF, in the event, the EP did not take this risk. The greening part of 
the Dess report was amended significantly4 and the agreed final text 
was sufficiently ambiguous that it could be interpreted as both 
supporting the essence of the Commission’s proposals for greening 
Pillar I and leaving open the door for an alternative Pillar II 
approach.  
This ambiguity thus allowed the impression that Lyon, Dess 
and the Commission were broadly heading in a similar direction. In 
hindsight, the Dess report represents perhaps a missed opportunity 
to steer and shape the Commission’s legislative proposals and 
cement the Parliament’s position on the back of the earlier Lyon 
report. Rather than providing a major contribution into the debate, 
and a strong position on greening around which the Parliament 
could orient itself, it instead served to expose political differences, 
widen the fault lines between political parties, and allowed 
Commissioner Cioloş to feel that he had the endorsement he needed 
to proceed with his legislative proposals.5  
3. Publication of the Commission’s proposals and 
the development of negotiating mandates 
The Commission’s legislative proposals for the 2014-20 CAP were 
launched on 12 October 2011, and were presented as providing “a 
new partnership between Europe and its farmers in order to meet 
the challenges of food security, sustainable use of natural resources 
and growth”. Although the greening proposals signalled a 
                                                        
4 Through 61 compromise amendments, whittled down from the 1,200 
amendments proposed (Anon, 2011a; European Parliament Committee on 
Agriculture and Rural Development, 2011). 
5 Commissioner Dacian Cioloş, comments following the EP plenary 
adoption of the Dess report on the CAP after 2013 
(http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/ciolos/headlines/ 
speeches/2011/06/20110624b_en.htm). 
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significant change to the structure of Pillar I, it should be 
remembered that these were part of a much broader restructuring 
of Pillar I direct support to farmers. The redistribution and targeting 
of support both between and within member states were also 
extremely politically contentious.  
The greening proposals involved the requirement of all 
member states to allocate 30% of their direct payments envelope to 
three agricultural practices beneficial to the climate and the 
environment (greening practices) that were to be compulsory for all 
farms. Organic farms were considered ‘green by definition’ and 
therefore would automatically receive the ‘green’ payment, and 
farmers within Natura 2000 areas – a network of nature protection 
areas in the EU territory – would have to comply with the greening 
measures unless they were incompatible with the practices required 
on the particular site.  
The three measures proposed are set out in Box 10.1. 
Box 10.1 The proposed agricultural practices beneficial to climate and the 
environment 
• Crop diversification: three different crops to be grown on arable 
land over three hectares, with none of the three covering less than 
5% of the arable land and the main one not exceeding 70%. 
• Permanent grassland: maintenance of 95% of the area of 
permanent grassland on the holding as declared in 2014. 
• Ecological focus areas (EFAs): 7% of the holding (excluding 
permanent grassland) to be managed as EFAs, with an EFA to 
comprise one or more of the following elements: land left fallow; 
terraces; landscape features, e.g. hedges; ponds; ditches; trees in a 
line, in a group or isolated; field margins; buffer strips – with no 
production on them; areas afforested with funding from the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). 
The proposals provided no detail on how these measures 
might work in practice and the impact assessment that accompanied 
the proposals (European Commission, 2011b) also contained scant 
information on their likely environmental impacts. In terms of the 
content of the measures, the Commission retained the power to 
define the detail through delegated acts, which raised many 
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questions about precisely what would be required under the 
greening measures and how they would operate.  
Reactions to the greening proposals were almost universally 
negative (Anon, 2011b). Farmer organisations criticised the 
obligation to ‘set aside’ 7% of arable land for ecological purposes, 
arguing that it would imperil food security, require farmers to find 
ways of increasing production on remaining land and damage the 
ability of farmers to respond to market signals (COPA-COGECA, 
2011). On the other hand, environmental organisations expressed 
disappointment with the proposals, questioning whether the 
‘green’ element of the direct payment would deliver any more than 
was already delivered through cross compliance. A BirdLife press 
release stated: “[I]f the CAP of the future was to be the one proposed 
by the Commission…people might be excused for wondering 
whether the product is worth the price tag” (BirdLife International, 
2011). Some economists also criticised the proposals as being an 
inefficient means of providing environmental public goods (see, for 
example, Koester, 2011).  
Criticisms in the Agriculture Council suggested the proposals 
would not only lead to more red tape and bureaucracy for farmers 
and administrators but were insufficient to meet the future 
challenges facing Europe and the agricultural sector, in particular 
food security and climate change. The proposal to retain 7% of 
cropped land as an ecological focus area was considered ‘unwise’ at 
a time when demand for food was increasing. In addition, there was 
criticism that the measures were too rigid, with calls for greater 
flexibility to allow them to be tailored to local conditions and the 
proportion of the Pillar I envelope to be allocated to these green 
payments was considered by some to be too high (Anon, 2011c; 
Antoine, 2011). 
The Parliament’s reactions were broadly similar. At a public 
debate in November 2011, a common concern voiced among MEPs 
was the lack of simplification in the proposed regulations and the 
suggested conflict of the EFA measure with food security objectives. 
The implied simplistic, production-focused view of European food 
security was never really challenged, and environmental 
counterarguments were voiced but failed to gain much purchase. 
As the discussions progressed, the divide widened between 
those seeking to improve the environmental benefits that could be 
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achieved through the measures and a larger group who wanted to 
maintain the status quo and minimise the degree to which the 
measures impinged on productive farm activities. Both sides sought 
to propose changes to the Commission’s proposals. There was a 
fundamental difference between supporters of ‘greening’ who saw 
it as an opportunity to deliver genuine environmental improvement 
and those who saw it as a means of rewarding different farm types 
on the basis of their perceived environmental worth, e.g. permanent 
crops, or making minor adjustments to the allocation of funding 
within a largely unchanged CAP. Both sides of the argument, 
however, suffered from a lack of evidence on potential impacts of 
the greening proposals.6 The Parliament commissioned two pieces 
of work to inform the development of their negotiating position 
(Hart et al., 2011; Matthews, 2012). However, alternatives for 
delivering environmental public goods that were in keeping with 
the ethos of the Commission’s proposals to green Pillar I were few 
and far between (Hart & Little, 2012), so the Commission ploughed 
on with their evidence-free proposals! 
Within the Parliament and the Agriculture Council, three key 
concerns on greening measures came to the forefront:  
 member states wanted more flexibility to tailor measures to 
their own situations;  
 greening measure should not impinge upon production; and  
 it was vital to minimise any increase in bureaucracy and 
administrative requirements.  
Improving the environmental outcomes for the measures was 
only a concern amongst a minority of MEPs and member states. 
Another important element in the discussion in both the 
Council and the Parliament was uncertainty over the total budget 
for the CAP. Willingness to accept genuine greening measures was, 
for many, conditional on avoiding a sharp reduction in the level of 
the budget. Defending a reduction in funding and a new 
requirement on farmers would have been difficult for many political 
                                                        
6 The legislative proposals differed from those in the 2010 Communication 
on which the original impact assessment had been undertaken, but despite 
updated analysis being carried out, this was never put into the public 
domain. 
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parties across the EU. In those member states particularly affected 
by redistribution of direct payments, this problem was exacerbated. 
Indeed, it has been argued that “by proposing greening as a way of 
legitimising the existing flow of untargeted Pillar I payments to 
farmers, the Commission framed the issue in a way that it was 
bound to lose” because the way in which the proposals were drafted 
provided no means of reducing the direct payments budget if less 
ambitious greening measures were adopted. Therefore, there was 
no incentive on the Council or the Parliament to maintain the 
environmental ambition of the green measures (Matthews, 2013a). 
The Commission defended their proposals by explaining that 
they were simple and applied to all farmers. They also pointed out 
that on average farmers already had about 3.5% of land that would 
count towards the EFA target (European Commission, 2011b; 
Forstner et al., 2012). Increasingly, the Commission’s line was 
backed by environmental NGOs that feared the unrelenting 
criticisms risked a significant weakening of the greening proposals. 
The importance of the greening measures and the belief that they 
should be mandatory for all beneficiaries of direct payments in 
order to “have a wide application across the EU territory” was 
reaffirmed in a letter co-signed by the Commissioners for 
Agriculture, the Environment, and Climate Action in March 2012. 
The Parliament’s rapporteur on direct payments, and thus the 
greening proposals, was MEP Luis Miguel Capoulas Santos of the 
Socialists & Democrats (S&D). His challenge was to navigate the 
different views within his own party and between political parties 
and among stakeholders to develop the Parliament’s position on the 
Commission’s proposals. Three ideas emerged during this process. 
First, the idea of a menu approach to greening measures gained 
traction. This extended the list of greening options, allowing 
member states or farmers to choose which to apply. Second were 
calls for a much wider group of farmers to be considered as ‘green 
by definition’ and therefore automatically eligible to receive the 
green payment. Third, it was suggested that penalties for non-
compliance with greening should not impinge on the basic 
payment, thereby reducing the incentive to comply.  
Capoulas Santos found that there were quite different views 
within his own party on the menu idea. The S&D group included 
an informal sub-coalition of reform-minded MEPs, which became 
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known as the ‘Viking Group’, who were keen not to see the 
environmental aspirations of greening disappear. They rejected the 
menu idea as a weakening of the greening concept and feared it 
would risk killing off the greening proposals altogether.  
In contrast, the menu approach was strongly favoured by the 
Council. A series of alternative proposals for greening the CAP were 
set out in a discussion document in April 2012, which became 
known as the Luxembourg paper (Council of the European Union, 
2012). This paper had originated as a more ambitious paper by the 
Stockholm group of member states that had sought to increase the 
environmental additionality of the proposals. However, the 
document that was eventually published7 proposed a series of three 
very different options (from moving the measures to cross-
compliance to permitting a proportion of Pillar I payments to fund 
agri-environment type activities). The middle option was an 
embellished version of the Commission’s proposals and advocated 
an extended list of options for greening, as well as increasing the 
types of farms that would be ‘green by definition’. Indeed, the 
degree of flexibility proposed would have allowed member states 
to implement greening in a way that simply maintained the status 
quo. This was heavily criticised by environmental NGOs.  
The Commission’s response to these calls for greater 
flexibility was a ‘concept paper’8 published in May 2012. This 
introduced the concept of ‘equivalence’. This meant that 
beneficiaries of agri-environment-climate measures and 
participants in environmental certification schemes could be 
considered as fulfilling one (or several) of the greening measures 
provided the coverage of the farm by these measures was the same 
as the greening measures and the environmental ambition of the 
actions was greater than the ambition of the greening measures. 
Other ideas in the concept paper included changes to the definition 
of permanent grassland and a suggested increase in the threshold 
                                                        
7 Council of the European Union (2012), “Greening Instruments – menu for 
Member States within the EU framework”, Working Paper 9283/12, 26 
April. 
8 European Commission (2012), “Greening – Concept paper”, May 
(http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/legal-proposals/ 
concept-paper-on-greening_en.pdf). 
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for crop diversification from 3 to 10 hectares. Initially this paper 
caused confusion. Its status was unclear, although it quickly became 
viewed as a quasi-official paper. But it was completely unclear how 
these revised proposals would work in practice, leading to 
considerable uncertainty, including within the Commission 
services. The confusion provided space for the Parliament and 
Council to elaborate their own interpretations of what was 
intended. In particular, by conceding exemptions and increasing the 
thresholds for crop diversification, the Commission had signalled 
that these were areas where additional flexibility could be found, 
and it encouraged hopes that similar options might be possible for 
the EFA measure.  
The development of the Parliament’s final negotiating 
position for the CAP was a long, drawn out process. The 
amendments proposed by Capoulas Santos involved a considerable 
weakening of the Commission’s proposals in the name of 
simplification and reducing bureaucracy. In keeping with the 
concept paper, they broadened the categories of farmers deemed to 
be ‘green by definition’ to include farms which were 
‘environmentally certified’ or those which were in agri-
environment schemes. A new measure for permanent crops was 
proposed, and the threshold that should apply to the EFA measure 
was proposed to increase to 20 hectares. The thresholds for crop 
diversification for three crops was to be raised to 20 hectares; farms 
between 5 and 20 hectares were only required to have two crops. 
Furthermore, farms with more than 80% of the holding under 
permanent grassland or permanent crops and an arable area under 
50 hectares should be exempt from the measure altogether.  
Capoulas Santos supported an idea put forward by the 
Netherlands and Denmark that EFAs could be implemented 
regionally, suggesting that farms working together to create 
‘continuous, adjacent EFAs’ need only allocate 5% of their cropped 
area as an EFA. He proposed breaking the link between compliance 
with the green direct payments and receipt of the basic payment, 
essentially making greening voluntary. Any resulting unspent 
funds transferred to the agri-environment-climate measure under 
Pillar II. More positively, he was clear that double funding should 
not be permitted and that Pillar II environment payments should 
clearly be additional to those received for Pillar I greening.  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  257 
 
There followed a period of intense activity within the 
Parliament, with political parties tabling thousands of amendments 
and compromise amendments developed to put to the debate and 
vote within COMAGRI in January 2013.  
In this vote, a further weakening of the greening measures 
took place as the following amendments were approved: 
 The breaking of the link between the greening payment and 
the basic payment.  
 For farmers considered to be ‘green by definition’, the entirety 
of the holding would be exempt from the greening 
requirements, not just the area under an agri-environment 
agreement, farmed organically or designated as Natura 2000.  
 Double funding would be permitted, i.e. payments for the 
same activities could be received under Pillar I and Pillar II.  
 Farmers on holdings where more than 75% of their land is 
permanent grassland and the remaining land does not exceed 
50 hectares would be exempt from the crop diversification 
and EFA measures. 
 Farmers with holdings certified under national or regional 
environmental certification schemes that have “at least an 
equivalent impact as the relevant practices [as greening]” 
would be deemed to be compliant with the greening 
measures. The measures considered to be equivalent would 
include on-farm plans for nutrient management, energy 
efficiency, biodiversity action, water management plan; soil 
cover measures; and integrated pest management.9  
 EFAs would only be required on arable areas over 10 
hectares10 and not on land with permanent crops.  
 New elements would count towards EFA, included nitrogen 
fixing crops. Production would be allowed on EFAs, e.g. on 
buffer strips, provided no fertilisers or pesticides are used.  
                                                        
9 The equivalence between these measures and the Commission’s greening 
measures was not at all clear. 
10 This was more demanding than the 20 hectares originally proposed by 
Capoulas Santos but weaker than the Commission’s proposal which had 
no threshold. 
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 The EFA percent required would be reduced to 3% for the first 
year, and 5% thereafter.  
 The required EFA percentage could be reduced by 3% if 
implemented at the regional level to achieve ‘adjacent 
ecological areas’. 
 Crop diversification would not apply to arable land under 10 
hectares, and only two crops would be required between 10 
and 30 hectares with the main crop not covering more than 
80%.  
 For permanent grassland member states would be given 
flexibility to apply the requirement at the national, regional or 
sub regional level. 
 One environmentally positive proposal (tabled by the Greens) 
would introduce a ban on the ploughing of carbon-rich soils, 
wetlands and semi-natural grassland and pastures. 
This COMAGRI vote, particularly the proposal to permit 
double funding, caused uproar amongst environmental 
stakeholders. It led to a concerted campaign to highlight not just the 
inefficiency of the proposal but that it would contravene a 
fundamental principle underpinning rules for public expenditure in 
the EU, namely that no costs for the same activity be funded twice 
from the EU budget.11 Negative press coverage, particularly in the 
UK, ensued and a letter-writing campaign to MEPs was mobilised 
to try and ensure that this amendment was overturned in plenary.  
The plenary vote to authorise the Parliament negotiating 
mandate took place in March 2013. This focused primarily on the 
two contentious issues of double funding and the extent of the of 
the ‘green by definition’ exemption. A roll call vote was held on both 
issues. The amendment to prevent double funding12 was approved 
by a significant majority (379 in favour, 285 against and 7 
                                                        
11 See Article 111 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 of 25 
June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of 
the European Communities (OJ L 248, 16.9.2002). 
12 The rule was set within rural development regulation and the 
amendment stated very clearly that payments for actions funded under the 
agri-environment-climate measure must go beyond those under both 
cross-compliance and the green direct payment. 
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abstentions). On the ‘green by definition’ issue a large number of 
amendments were tabled, but the intensely political nature of the 
debate led to political parties voting against one another with the 
result that none of the amendments were passed. As a result the 
Parliament’s position relating to all elements of the article in 
question (Article 29) reverted to the original Commission proposal. 
This meant that proposals to exempt certain types of farms from 
greening, e.g. those that were predominantly grassland, were 
rejected. However, in a rather peculiar procedural mix-up, in the 
voting on the recitals referring to the same issue, the original 
amendment proposed by Capoulas Santos was approved,13 which 
caused confusion over the Parliament’s final negotiating position on 
this particular issue. The COMAGRI amendments to the greening 
measures remained unchanged, as did the separation of the penalty 
for non-compliance with the greening requirements from the basic 
payment. As a result the final negotiating mandate agreed by the 
Parliament was closer to the Commission’s proposals than had been 
intended, but the content of the three greening measures was 
considerably weakened. 
A week after the Parliament plenary vote, agriculture 
ministers agreed their negotiating mandate, known as the ‘General 
Approach’. In most cases the amendments proposed served to 
dilute the Commission’s proposal further than those tabled by the 
Parliament so as to reduce even further their potential 
environmental impact, but in a few notable cases the Council 
proposed a stronger line (see below). Alongside the three greening 
measures, which were substantially altered in content, the Council 
also proposed that member states, as an alternative to or in 
conjunction with the greening measures, could identify and use 
‘equivalent’ measures carried out under agri-environment 
agreements or in compliance with national or regional 
environmental certification schemes, building on the Commission’s 
concept paper. The possibility of developing a standalone 
certification scheme at the national or regional level that would 
operate instead of the greening measures was also put forward.  
                                                        
13 This stated that only land actually covered by an agri-environment 
agreement, registered as organic or designated as Natura 2000, should be 
considered ‘green by definition’. 
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It should be noted that a month earlier, as part of the MFF 
negotiations, heads of state had controversially intervened in the 
details of the CAP. Originally, Germany, heavily pressured by the 
farm lobby, had proposed that the MFF agreement should stipulate 
a lower proportion of land to be managed as an EFA. This was not 
agreed but the following text was: “[T]he requirement to have an 
ecological focus area on each agricultural holding will be 
implemented in ways that do not require the land in question to be 
taken out of production…” This was to have serious ramifications 
for the eventual content of the EFA measure. It was frequently used 
as an argument for reducing yet further the environmental 
conditions (and eventually the weightings) placed on practices 
making up the EFA; a notable example was the argument that 
pesticides and fertilisers should be permitted on EFAs.  
The Agriculture Council’s negotiating position on the 
standard greening measures varied in strength compared to the 
Parliament’s negotiating mandate.14 As the Parliament’s position 
had defaulted to the Commission proposals on the general 
requirements for greening, most of the Council’s amendments on 
greening were weaker environmentally, particularly by extending 
the list of types of farms exempt from greening. The Council also 
proposed that the greening measures should not form the baseline 
for payments under Pillar II, leaving the door open for double 
funding. The content of the EFA measure was weakened, as the 
threshold for the application of EFA was raised to 15 hectares,15 the 
list of elements for EFA was lengthened, and the list of exemptions 
from the measure was extended considerably. The last was also true 
for crop diversification. In addition, the Council suggested that 
weighting factors should be applied to different elements of the EFA 
to reflect their environmental benefit. This idea had its origins in the 
French weighting system applied to standards of ‘good agricultural 
and environmental condition’ (GAEC) under cross compliance. The 
idea was that the weighting factors would be taken into account 
                                                        
14 A full tabulation of the agreed mandates of the Parliament and Council 
compared to the Commission proposals is contained in Annex III of Knops 
& Swinnen (2014).  
15 Although the eligible area was arable and permanent crops as per the 
Commission’s proposal, whereas the Parliament had removed permanent 
crops from the measure. 
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when calculating the total area required to reach the EFA 
commitment. It was proposed that these should be set out as an 
annex to the legislative text. The lack of details on what these 
weighting factors should be left their potential environmental 
impact uncertain and were widely considered to be a tactic to 
introduce yet another means of further watering down the EFA 
measure.  
On the positive side, the Council proposed that the penalty 
for non-compliance with greening measures could reach 125% of 
the greening payment, giving farmers a much stronger impetus to 
comply. Whilst member states also proposed that the EFA 
percentage should be reduced, this was only to 5%, rather than the 
3% for the first year as proposed by the Parliament.  
In short, prior to the trilogue, the Council’s position was 
rather weaker environmentally than that of the Parliament, 
certainly in terms of the content of the standard greening measures 
and in its position on permitting double funding. The two areas 
where the Parliament was weaker were in seeking to remove 
permanent crops from the EFA requirement and breaking the link 
between compliance and receipt of the basic payment, essentially 
making the greening requirements essentially voluntary.  
4. The trilogues and political agreement – balance 
of influence between the Parliament and the 
Council in the final outcome 
The trilogue discussions between the Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission started very quickly once negotiating mandates 
had been agreed. As anticipated, the greening articles proved 
particularly contentious, especially given how much weaker both 
Parliament and Council positions were compared with the 
Commission’s original texts.  
There was, arguably, a structural bias in the trilogue 
negotiations towards a further weakening of the proposals (see Box 
10.2). The lack of belief (compounded by the absence of evidence) 
among environmental stakeholders and those member states or 
MEPs with a commitment to a ‘greener’ CAP that the Commission’s 
original proposals would deliver genuine and significant 
environmental benefits meant there were few passionate defenders 
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of the original draft. In contrast, there were many who were 
concerned about the cost implications for farms (especially for the 
crop diversification three-crop rule) or administrations; and who 
were therefore more than willing to accede to amendments that 
reduced these costs, without attracting political ‘blame’.  
Perhaps more significantly, the very presence of the greening 
proposals had already succeeded in helping protect the CAP budget 
from more serious cuts than had been feared in the MFF 
negotiations. In this view, once the CAP budget had been settled, 
the content of greening was far less important politically. 
 
Box 10.2 Structural bias in the trilogue negotiations towards further 
weakening of the greening proposals 
The trilogue negotiations can be conceptualised by considering the 
level of overlap in Council and Parliament positions in terms of 
their ambition or political direction, and the text. 
Where there is a clear distinction between political direction 
there is likely to be a clear political debate, with (ideally) 
predictability on whether there is a likely landing zone, with the 
Commission well-placed to steer discussion in that direction. Where 
there is relatively similar political direction and not much distinction 
between texts, the trilogue process is likely to be even more 
straightforward. But where – as in the case of greening – the level of 
political ambition is not dissimilar (with both Council and 
Parliament having a wide spread of levels of ambition) and there is 
a significant divergence in text, the discussion is likely to be 
confused, with a lack of clarity on tactics on both sides. This allows 
opportunistic participants to agree to text in the opposing 
institution’s position, which helps their objectives without saddling 
them with any political downsides.  
Arguably, the lack of a clear description from the Commission 
early in the process of the environmental benefits to be delivered by 
greening made it difficult for the Commission and others to clarify 
the extent to which successive dilutions of the text mattered for the 
delivery of outcomes. There were few participants – other than the 
Commission – that were genuinely convinced by the value of the 
original proposals.  
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Therefore, there was little incentive to defend the proposal, 
particularly given that it was difficult to point to specific damage 
particular changes to the text might have in relation to the scale of 
environmental ambition. Conversely, a number of participants had 
either strong political pressures (farming stakeholder concerns) or 
funding pressures (an interest in reducing complexity, or reducing 
the number of farms covered by greening in order to reduce 
administrative costs), which meant they were biased towards 
accepting amendments in the other institution’s position that helped 
them in this regard. 
Source: Personal communication, UK negotiator. 
 
The scale of weakening of the greening measures is associated 
mainly with the outcomes in five key areas (see also Bureau, 2013a; 
Matthews, 2013b):  
i) the exemptions which reduce the number of farms and area 
of land that must adhere to the greening measures;  
ii) the content of the measures, particularly for EFA and the 
weighting factors;  
iii) the nature of the equivalent practices;  
iv) the extent to which the greening measures provide a baseline 
for area-based payments (such as agri-environment-climate 
payments) under Pillar II; and  
v) the link between penalties for non-compliance and receipt of 
the basic payment. 
Each of these is examined to determine the extent to which 
the Parliament’s negotiating mandate, marginally stronger from an 
environmental perspective, was reflected in the final agreement. 
Exemptions and ‘green by definition’: Both the Parliament 
and the Council were responsible for the introduction of major 
exemptions to the greening measures, reducing significantly the 
proportion of farms and land required to adhere to the greening 
requirements.  
There were minor differences over the size thresholds for 
farms, below which the crop diversification and EFA measures 
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would not apply;16 and the change in the requirement to maintain 
permanent grassland from farm to national/regional level. In areas 
of greater differences, both institutions won significant changes, 
which weakened yet further the original proposals. The Parliament 
advocated the removal of permanent crops from the EFA 
requirement, concerned that this would lead to the grubbing up of 
olives and other orchards in the Mediterranean region to avoid 
being caught by the new rules. This position would leave the 
permanent crop sector without any obligations to carry out 
greening measures in Pillar I but, in the absence of evidence on the 
scale of the impact and given the strong pressure from the 
Parliament, it was agreed. The Council argued for significant 
exemptions to the crop diversification and EFA measures for certain 
types of farms.17 Most of these were approved, although not for 
participants in agri-environment schemes, and a compromise was 
reached whereby the exemptions only applied if the arable land on 
the farm was under 30 hectares.  
Measure content: The EFA measure was considered to have 
the greatest potential for delivering environmental benefits (Bureau, 
2013b; Polakova et al., 2011). Responsibility for diluting its content 
lay perhaps more with the Council than the Parliament, although 
the latter certainly made considerable efforts in this direction! Both 
institutions extended the list of practices that could contribute to an 
EFA and tried to ensure that agricultural production was permitted 
on these areas. The Council produced the longer list: green cover, 
catch crops, short rotation coppice in addition to the nitrogen fixing 
crops proposed by the Parliament. Most of these were agreed in the 
final deal. The Parliament tried to hold the line that no fertilisers or 
pesticides should be permitted on EFAs, but this did not make it 
through to the final agreement. Both institutions wanted to reduce 
the proportion of the eligible area subject to an EFA from the 
Commission’s proposed 7%. The outcome was 5%, proposed by the 
Council, with a possible increase to 7% from 2017. Significantly, the 
Parliament insisted this increase should be subject to co-decision.  
                                                        
16 The positions on the threshold for the EFA were: Parliament 10 hectares, 
Council 15 hectares. The final agreement reflected the Council’s position.  
17 E.g. farms with over 75% of land under grass, cultivated with crops under 
water, and in an agri-environment scheme. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  265 
 
The Parliament played an important role in averting an 
environmentally damaging intervention by the Council late in the 
negotiations, regarding the proposed weightings of actions eligible 
for EFA. The proposed weighting factors were eventually tabled by 
the Irish presidency during the final week of discussions on 
greening. The coefficients included some extravagant contributions 
of certain features that would have significantly undermined the 
area subject to an EFA and thereby their potential environmental 
impact.18 These figures were leaked and heavily criticised as yet 
another attempt by an Agriculture Council to reduce the 
environmental actions required of farmers (IEEP, 2013). The 
Parliament objected to the coefficients, arguing that these details 
were better suited for inclusion in the Commission’s delegated acts 
given the time required to ensure they were systematically based on 
evidence. The outcome was an empty table added as an annex to the 
regulation, stipulating which of the EFA elements would be subject 
to weighting coefficients but leaving the coefficients to be 
determined by the Commission. Given the importance of the 
coefficients for the impact of the EFA requirement, this arguably 
goes beyond the legitimate scope of delegated acts. However, time 
constraints, given the late stage at which this idea was introduced, 
removed the option for any viable alternatives. It is interesting to 
note that the Parliament and member states were highly active in 
seeking to influence both the coefficients and other details of the 
EFA measure in the delegated act19 in order to minimise the impact 
of EFA measures on agricultural production. The Parliament 
continued to exert pressure on the Commission, once the delegated 
acts were published in March 2014, by threatening to reject them if 
certain concessions were not made in relation to the greening 
                                                        
18 For example, it proposed that a single tree could count as 200 m2 towards 
a farmer’s EFA requirement and that one metre of hedge would count as 
25 m2 or 50 m2 if the farmer managed fields on both sides. 
19 Annex II of Commission Delegated Regulation(EU) No. 639/2014 
supplementing Regulation (EU) No. 1307/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under 
support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy 
and amending Annex X to that Regulation (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.181.01.0001.01.ENG). 
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measures. This pressure resulted in the commissioner announcing 
“that 1 hectare of a nitrogen-fixing crop such as alfalfa, clover or 
lupins can be equivalent to 0.7 hectare of EFA (rather than 0.3 
hectare in the original text) in order to make the option more 
attractive”. A formal proposal to this effect was published in July 
2014 and was cheered as a victory by COMAGRI Chairman Paolo 
De Castro (S&D). This stimulated strong objections from 
environmental NGOs.20 
The Parliament also made an important environmentally 
positive contribution in relation to the permanent grassland 
measure. In its negotiating mandate the Parliament had proposed 
that there should be a ban on ploughing carbon-rich soils, wetland 
and semi-natural grasslands and pastures in order to give them 
stronger protection. A similar requirement had been put forward by 
the Commission under cross-compliance but had been rejected by 
both institutions. The final agreement on this matter was much 
weaker than the original Parliament proposal21 and voluntary in 
nature, due to resistance from the Council (partly because of 
concerns from the presidency, amongst others, that it applied to 
carbon-rich soils already in arable production). Nonetheless, it 
provided the hook for a compromise proposal from the Commission 
for the voluntary protection of carbon-rich soils on permanent 
grassland outside of protected areas, which it could not otherwise 
have done. This was subsequently adopted. 
Equivalent practices and the use of national certification 
schemes: A third area that was perceived as having the potential to 
weaken the environmental credentials of the green measures was 
the proposal that member states could use national certification 
schemes to achieve the same (or greater) environmental outcomes 
as the standard three greening measures. The idea, first mentioned 
                                                        
20 Open letter from BirdLife and the European Environmental Bureau to 
Commissioner Cioloş (www.birdlife.org/sites/default/files/ 
attachments/Open%20letter%20Ciolos%20Delegated%20Acts%20-
final%20pdf%20version.pdf). 
21 Member states were given the option of designating additional areas to 
those protected under the habitats and birds directives which were 
considered environmentally sensitive and in which no ploughing of 
permanent grassland could take place, including permanent grassland on 
carbon-rich soils. 
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in the Commission’s concept paper, was extended by the Council to 
suggest allowing a national certification scheme to meet the 
greening requirements. This was claimed to allow the measures to 
be better tailored to local circumstances and increase environmental 
benefits of greening. However, it aroused deep suspicions that it 
would do the opposite, providing a loophole for member states to 
avoid demanding greening requirements.  
There were linked discussions about which practices could be 
considered ‘equivalent’ to the greening measures, within national 
certification schemes as well as agri-environment-climate 
agreements. A list of approved practices was produced by the 
Commission, which became Annex IX of the basic act. This reduced 
the flexibility and the potential loopholes of using national 
certification schemes and in so doing also appeared to relax initial 
Commission reticence over allowing such schemes to form the sole 
route to meeting a farmer’s greening requirement. However, this 
approach has also appeared to limit the extent to which member 
states are likely to choose this option.22 The Parliament played little 
part in this debate.  
Greening baseline and double funding: This issue occupied a 
great deal of lobbying activity and press coverage. The Parliament 
eventually voted against permitting double funding, but the 
Council rejected the Commission’s proposal that agri-environment 
activities funded via Pillar II should build on Pillar I greening as the 
environmental baseline. The alignment of Parliament and 
Commission on this issue meant that the Council was unlikely to 
win the argument, as this would have represented poor value for 
money and risked undermining trust from wider society, thus 
causing reputational damage. Added to this, there would have been 
a risk of challenge in the WTO, as it was counter to the EU Treaty23 
                                                        
22 Only five member states have chosen to use equivalent means of 
implementing the greening measures in 2015. The UK, for example, 
reached the view that the additional environmental benefit of a newly 
designed national certification scheme was not worth the complexity of 
control arrangements in the first year of implementing a new CAP regime, 
when paying agencies would already be under considerable pressure. 
23 See Article 111 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 of 25 
June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of 
the European Communities (OJ L 248, 16.9.2002). 
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and there were member states that could have been driven out of 
the qualified majority for the reform package if this were included. 
In the event, double funding was rejected and the final agreement 
made it clear that area-based environmental actions paid for under 
Pillar II agri-environment schemes must go beyond the greening 
actions under Pillar I.  
Penalties for non-compliance: In the trilogue the Parliament 
continued to try and reduce the penalties for non-compliance with 
the greening payments within Pillar I, by removing the link between 
non-compliance and receipt of the basic payment. The Commission 
stood firm against this proposal and, with the Council’s support, the 
Parliament approach failed. However, as part of the compromise, it 
was agreed that the maximum penalties for non-compliance would 
be scaled up over time, with no deductions from a farmer’s basic 
payments for the first two years. 
Pulling these outcomes together, the estimated combined 
effect of these decisions is: the exemption of 48% of arable land and 
88% of arable farms from the EFA measure; slightly smaller 
numbers from the crop diversification measure; and the permanent 
grassland measure only applies at the national or regional level 
(Brunner, 2013; Hart & Baldock, 2013; Pe’er et al., 2014). For the 12% 
of arable farms that are still required to take action, the EFA measure 
offers a much longer list of options from which member states can 
choose to meet the 5% requirement, some of which permit 
continued production, including with the use of fertilisers and 
pesticides in some cases. Furthermore, the exclusion of permanent 
crops from the greening requirements further reduces the reach of 
the green direct payments. Thus the original principle of greening 
that actions should apply across all types of farmland has been 
completely lost.  
Sadly, the only real environmentally positive outcomes of the 
negotiations are limited to the prevention of perverse amendments 
going through rather than any positive improvements to the 
proposals. It is remarkable that so much effort had to be deployed 
to remove features that so obviously offended basic principles of 
good public expenditure – such as the double payments for the 
same actions. This could, perhaps, have been a conscious 
diversionary tactic.  
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Naturally, both the Parliament and the Council voiced 
satisfaction with the outcome. Reactions from individual MEPs 
varied, with differences mirroring political interests. Overall, there 
was a general sense that they had been able to “improve the 
proposals while defending the Parliament’s mandate” (Spence, 
2013). Council President Simon Coveney stated that he had 
supported the Commission’s desire to “imbue the direct payments 
system with a stronger environmental character, and welcomed the 
balance struck between Member States, the EP and the Commission 
on the practical implementation of the three proposed greening 
criteria” (Anon, 2013b).  
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The principal conclusion of this chapter is that the likely 
environmental benefits of the Commission’s Pillar I greening 
proposals were drastically weakened in the political negotiation. 
The detailed analysis of the process suggests that the responsibility 
for this is shared between the Parliament and the Council. However, 
a lack of clarity and evidence from the Commission on the 
environmental benefits of their proposals made it difficult in 
practice to defend them rigorously. BirdLife International portrayed 
the outcome as a betrayal by both the Parliament and member states 
(Brunner, 2013). A more detached analysis of the negotiating 
mandates of the two institutions and the outcome of the final 
agreement suggests more Council amendments to weaken greening 
were adopted than were those of the Parliament, although the 
Parliament amendments also led to some fundamental weakening, 
particularly the exclusion of permanent crops from the greening 
requirements.  
Comparing negotiating mandates with the final outcome 
does not give the full picture. Given that the trilogues took place 
behind closed doors, it is difficult to ascertain how hard each 
institution negotiated on each point; it is likely that the process 
described above, of opportunistic support of amendments in the 
other side’s position, will have played a role. In addition, the 
procedural mix-up that led to the unclear Parliament negotiating 
mandate on the greening measures meant that the Parliament was 
likely to be sympathetic to the Council’s position in this area.  
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Working in concert with the Commission, both the Council 
and the Parliament managed to constrain some of each other’s 
amendments that would have weakened the greening measures 
even further. This was especially important in the rejection of 
double funding.24 The Commission managed, with half-hearted 
Council support, to retain the compulsory nature of the green 
measures by maintaining some link between non-compliance and 
receipt of basic payment; although in practice the limits on 
penalties, and the delays in their application, make it unlikely that 
many farms will suffer significant losses of their basic payment. 
More positively, regarding permanent pasture, the Parliament 
prepared the ground to allow member states to designate 
environmentally sensitive areas on which no ploughing should take 
place. However, this outcome is still considerably weaker than the 
cross-compliance GAEC standard proposed by the Commission to 
protect carbon-rich soils, which was rejected by both the Parliament 
and the Council.  
The Commission’s share of responsibility arose in three ways. 
First, apart from the EFAs, the greening measures in the legislative 
proposals were already weaker from an environmental perspective 
than those suggested in the original Communication25 (European 
Commission, 2010). Second, proposing that organic farmers should 
be considered ‘green by definition’ in the legislative proposals 
paved the way for arguments to include other types of land or 
farming systems under this principle. Third, the publication of the 
concept paper relatively early in the process demonstrated that the 
Commission was prepared to make concessions long before the 
negotiating mandates of the Parliament and the Council had been 
agreed. This opened the door for the Parliament and Council to 
push for greater changes than might otherwise have been the case. 
                                                        
24 Although, ironically, perhaps the January COMAGRI vote in favour of 
double funding had emboldened the Council to adopt the position in 
favour of double funding in the first place. 
25 The Commission’s 2010 Communication had suggested a crop rotation 
measure instead of the more limited crop diversification measure as well 
as a green cover measure on soils to avoid bare soil, particularly over the 
winter months. 
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In retrospect, perhaps it was premature to give so much ground so 
early in the negotiations. 
Various lessons can be drawn from this process. First, the very 
differing opinions between political parties in the Parliament and 
the ease of tabling amendments prolonged and complicated the 
process of developing the negotiating position. Thousands of 
amendments had to be reviewed, digested and consolidated into 
compromise amendments. Second, it was clear from the outset that 
supporters of strong greening of direct payments were in the 
minority, especially within COMAGRI, and therefore the 
environmental considerations that were the very purpose of the 
greening measures were drowned out by concerns about 
agricultural production effects. Where environmental interest 
groups made their presence felt, such as within the S&D group and 
the Greens, and via shadow rapporteurs from other Parliament 
committees, they helped resist some more extreme amendments. It 
was easiest to do this on issues – such as double funding – where 
there was a clear case that could be taken to a wider test of public 
opinion. However, they were less successful in other areas, such as 
reintroducing the green measures from the original 2010 
Commission Communication for green cover and crop rotation.  
It is interesting to conjecture if the outcome would have been 
different had the membership of COMAGRI been different26 or if 
the other Parliament committees had been allowed to play a more 
central role in the greening debate and take part on the trilogue 
discussions. Arguably, the political importance attached to 
COMAGRI membership by political groups has not yet caught up 
with the application of co-decision to the CAP. Increased 
involvement of opinion-giving committees, such as the 
Environment Committee in this case, is likely to have ensured that 
environmental concerns were less easily sidelined. This is 
something to be considered for the future. 
Third, with so much resistance to move away from the status 
quo coming from many MEPs, member states and a very effective 
farm lobby group, the introduction of strong greening measures 
within Pillar I was always going to be fraught with political 
                                                        
26 Unsurprisingly, COMAGRI had a significant bias towards agricultural 
producer interests.  
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difficulties and inevitably watered down. It is an achievement that 
the Commission’s original proposals for three green measures in 
Pillar I, funded using 30% of the direct payments budget, still stand, 
even if their content is far weaker than had been intended. Looking 
back at the history of innovation in the CAP, there is a pattern 
whereby a Commission proposal is often initially accepted in a very 
watered-down version only to be strengthened in later reforms. 
Perhaps greening will follow this path in the future. But, as 
Matthews (2013c) has commented: “[I]t could also be a fruitless path 
if there are real limitations to what can be achieved through 
greening direct payments in Pillar I.” 
More fundamentally, there were significant limitations to 
what could have been proposed for greening under Pillar I given 
the rules and controls that are associated with direct payments. This 
meant that the Commission’s proposals for crop diversification and 
maintenance of permanent grassland were not ideal 
environmentally, making them difficult to defend. The resulting, 
and understandable, lack of strong support from environmental 
stakeholders demonstrated weak points in the proposals that were 
subsequently exploited. This meant that there were few 
environmental interests in Council or Parliament that saw much to 
be gained from a protracted defence of proposals whose 
environmental delivery looked likely to be disappointing. It also 
limited alternative options for inclusion within Pillar I that could fit 
the Pillar I rules and approach and offer significant environmental 
gain. Alternatives that were available were all more radical and not 
seen as politically feasible. Those compatible with the Pillar I 
approach that were suggested (crop rotation, protection of semi-
natural grassland, for example) were rejected on a variety of 
technical and control grounds. In the end, the additional measures 
incorporated into greening, mainly within the EFA measure, nearly 
all weakened rather than strengthened the proposals.  
This unhappy story leads back to the crucial question: What 
are feasible and effective means of achieving environmental 
outcomes on rural land through measures under the CAP? 
Throughout the debate, commentators reiterated that the regionally 
differentiated, programmed, multiannual approach of Pillar II, 
which allows measures to be tailored to local needs and priorities, 
is a far more effective and ultimately efficient means of delivering 
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environmental benefits (see, for example, Matthews, 2013a; Hart & 
Baldock, 2011). Having attempted to green Pillar I and seen the 
resistance from farmer organisations and the extremely weak final 
outcome, it will be important not only to assess the level of 
environmental additionality that has been achieved via this route 
but also to apply the lessons from this reform process to the debate 
on the structure of the post-2020 CAP and how this can best be 
designed to ensure the long-term socio-economic and 
environmental sustainability of the EU’s rural areas. 
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11. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
CAPPING DIRECT PAYMENTS: 
APPLICATIONS IN – AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR – GERMANY  
AMANDA SAHRBACHER,  
ALFONS BALMANN AND 
CHRISTOPH SAHRBACHER 
his chapter investigates the positions and aims of those 
stakeholders involved in the decision to introduce a 
compulsory capping and degressivity of direct payments in 
the European agricultural sector. This measure brought the EU 
Parliament and EU Commission into opposition with the European 
Council. There, a small group of resolute opponents led by 
Germany faced a larger group of soft backers of compulsory 
capping who strategically supported capping in order to achieve 
concessions in other areas such as the external convergence of direct 
payments. A similar pattern was observed in Germany, where 
Eastern Federal States were determined to oppose any capping or 
degressivity of direct payments. Western Federal States supported 
this position as a counterpart to support greening. At first glance the 
final national implementation of a first hectare payment instead of 
capping and degressivity seemed more costly for Eastern Federal 
States. However, this was the price of maintaining political 
credibility and avoiding future possible increases in degression 
rates.  
T
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1. Introduction 
On 24 September 2013, the EU Ministers of Agriculture (Council) 
and the European Parliament ratified the political agreement on the 
reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP) that was 
established in June 2013 for the financial period 2014 to 2020 
(Council of the European Union, 2013b) and formalised in 
Regulation (EU) No. 1307/2013 on 17 December 2013 (EU, 2013). 
The agreement was the result of several years of negotiations on 
manifold levels. Not only had the number of member states 
increased in the previous 10 years, but the involvement of the 
Parliament through co-decision for many aspects of the CAP added 
another layer of complexity in the reform process.1  
One issue bitterly discussed during the negotiations was 
capping and degressivity of direct payments (DP) distributed 
within the first pillar of the CAP. The possibility of limiting direct 
payments (‘capping’) and/or decreasing payments from a certain 
level (‘degressivity’) was one of the bones of contention during the 
reform negotiations; countries and regions where large farms 
dominate the agricultural sector were the main opponents. 
Although capping was defined as optional in the agreement 
reached in the European Council on the multiannual financial 
framework (MFF) in February 2013, disagreements on modalities of 
implementation prevented a final compromise during the final 
trilogue meetings conducted between April and June 2013.2 Debates 
before and during the processing and negotiating phases of the 
reform, not only at the European level, but at the national levels as 
well, revealed a wide array of positions regarding the most suitable 
way to redistribute payments after the removal of modulation in 
2013.  
Those positions or justifications for or against capping and 
degressivity might have been motivated by different purposes and 
interests specific to each player around the table because capping 
and degressivity were not the only issues at stake. Indeed, member 
                                                        
1 Co-decision is now called “ordinary legislative procedure”. 
2 Trilogue negotiations are defined as “Informal meetings attended by the 
European Parliament, Council and Commission. Their purpose is to get an 
agreement (on a package of amendments or on the wording of laws) 
acceptable to Council and Parliament” (European Parliament, 2014). 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  279 
 
states’ and Parliament’s negotiators, national political parties, 
lobbies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) embedded in 
the reform process considered the result of the negotiations as a 
whole. As other issues such as the external and internal convergence 
of direct payments, greening or the future of common market 
regulations also had to be discussed, capping might be used as a 
bargaining chip. 
The objective of this chapter is to explore why compulsory 
capping and degressivity, still called for by European civil societies 
and advocated by European Commission’s legislative proposal in 
2011, has finally been turned into voluntary capping and the 
possibility to either introduce a redistributive payment for small 
farms or degressivity for large farms. Thus we review arguments 
and positions defended by the main actors on the specific issue of 
capping at the European level on the one hand, and at the national 
level in Germany (a key actor against capping) on the other hand. 
We implement an amendment analysis to understand which 
positions were defended in the Parliament within and between 
parties during the reform process. In the Council, several countries 
vehemently opposed the implementation of this measure. For 
example, Germany led the opposition to capping and degressivity 
during the reform process. However, strong structural differences 
between Eastern and Western Federal States provided ground for 
additional internal disagreements. An economic and political 
analysis provides elements to help the reader understand 
Germany’s position during the reform process, as well as the 
implications of the final national implementation of the Direct 
Payment Regulation. 
The first part of the chapter provides information on the 
political and institutional background of capping and degressivity. 
In the second part, the opinions and positions of different actors and 
coalitions are presented. The chapter concludes with a short 
overview of the final decisions and some reflections about the 
divisive debates on this issue.  
2. Some facts on capping direct payments 
The uneven distribution of direct payments between farms has long 
led to discussions between and within member states. Indeed, 
attempts to limit payments to large farms have been brought up in 
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all previous CAP reform rounds since the MacSharry reform (Agra 
Europe, 1991; European Commission, 1997; Hill, 2000). Since the 
Commission stated that 80% of its support was captured by 20% of 
its recipients, it introduced a proposal to gradually reduce 
compensatory payments for large farms (European Commission, 
1991); this proposal was eventually dropped by the Council 
(Swinbank, 2004). After repeated attempts to limit payments to 
large farms since then, a compulsory payment reduction of 5% for 
all farms receiving more than €5,000 was finally implemented from 
2005 onwards (modulation) in order to transfer funds from the first 
pillar of the CAP to benefit rural development policy (second pillar). 
The Commission proposed additional cuts for large farms to be 
included in the CAP’s 2008 ‘Health Check’ (European Commission, 
2007), but the idea was immediately fought by a coalition of 
countries led by Germany and including Great Britain, Sweden, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. This coalition’s 
objective was to keep modulation rates at the level of 5% until 2013 
for all farms. Finally, as a compromise, from 2009 onwards 
modulation rates were stepwise increased to 10% until 2012, and set 
4% higher for large farms (progressive modulation), in the belief 
that modulation would no longer be an issue in the next CAP 
reform. However, initiatives proposing a ‘fairer’ redistribution of 
direct payments did not vanish and capping and degressivity 
appeared in the discussions about the new reform.  
2.1 Wide public support to limit direct payments 
Between April and June 2010 the Commission organised a public 
debate about the future CAP (European Commission, 2010a). One 
of the conclusions was that the EU should “implement a fairer CAP 
– fairer to small farmers, to less-favoured regions, to new member 
states”, while bearing in mind that “the correct payment to farmers 
for the delivery of public goods and services will be a key element 
in a reformed CAP”. Whereas research institutes and think tanks 
advocated a phasing out of the first pillar of the CAP, some 
stakeholders favoured “putting a limit on CAP support that can be 
paid to farmers in any one year”, per hectare, labour unit or farm. 
The general public’s idea about payments for farmers was more 
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radical on this issue.3 Both limits on aids to large farmers as well as 
support towards mid-sized, small farms and disadvantaged hill and 
mountain regions had to be implemented. At the same time, the 
denunciation of ‘industrial farming’ emerged from respondents of 
a wide range of member states. In their opinion, “large agro-
industry groups and large farms/large landowners were 
excessively benefiting from the CAP”, and capping direct payments 
would be a solution limiting these benefits. 
In its conclusions on the debates and discussions around the 
future CAP, the Commission proposed dividing direct payments 
into a basic decoupled direct payment and a mandatory ‘greening’ 
component. The basic payment should provide “a uniform level of 
obligatory support to all farmers in a Member state (or in a region)”, 
but would be limited. Actually, an “upper ceiling for direct 
payments received by large individual farms (‘capping’) should be 
considered to improve the distribution of payments between 
farmers”, but in order not to penalise farms with high employment 
levels, salaries and social security payments would have to be 
deducted from the basic payment before being capped (European 
Commission, 2010b).  
2.2 Predicted impact of capping 
In the Commission’s legislative proposal published in October 2011, 
the article on capping was formulated as follows: 
Article 11 
Progressive reduction and capping of the payment 
1. The amount of direct payments to be granted to a farmer under 
this Regulation in a given calendar year shall be reduced as 
follows: 
- by 20% for the tranche of more than EUR 150 000 and up to 
EUR 200 000; 
- by 40% for the tranche of more than EUR 200 000 and up to 
EUR 250 000; 
- by 70% for the tranche of more than EUR 250 000 and up to 
EUR 300 000; 
- by 100% for the tranche of more than EUR 300 000. 
                                                        
3 Private persons voluntarily participating in the debate organised online 
by the Commission. 
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2. The amount referred to in paragraph 1 shall be calculated by 
subtracting the salaries effectively paid and declared by the farmer 
in the previous year, including taxes and social contributions 
related to employment, from the total amount of direct payments 
initially due to the farmer without taking into account the 
payments to be granted pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title III of this 
Regulation. 
3. Member States shall ensure that no payment is made to farmers 
for whom it is established that, as from the date of publication of 
the Commission proposal for this Regulation, they artificially 
created the conditions to avoid the effects of this Article (European 
Commission 2011a). 
Accompanying the regulation proposal, an impact 
assessment estimated the consequences of different CAP scenarios 
on European agriculture (European Commission, 2011b). In the case 
of scenario ‘MFF distribution key 1a’, capping as described above 
would release 1.3% of the total amount of direct payments at the EU 
level, equivalent to around €590 million.4 This was much less than 
the amount resulting from modulation (around €3 billion in 2013).  
Consequences for member states would be heterogeneous, 
though moderate (Table 11.1). Whereas most countries would be 
hardly affected, amounts capped in Bulgaria and the United 
Kingdom would be non-negligible (9.8% and 5.2%, respectively) 
and their impacts on farm incomes limited but not neutral. Some 
member states would not be affected at all, namely Belgium, 
Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Finland, Slovenia 
and France, while others such as Italy, Poland and Portugal would 
be only marginally affected.  
 
                                                        
4 With the attempt to apply a more equitable distribution of decoupled 
payments among member states, this scenario includes a proposal for 
redistribution where “Member States that currently have direct payments 
below the level of 90% of the average will close 1/3 of the gap between their 
current level and the 90% level” (European Commission, 2011c). 
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Table 11.1 Consequences of capping and degressivity on EU member 
states (‘scenario MFF distribution key 1a’) 
 Share of 
amounts 
capped in total 
first pillar 
payments 
Percentage 
change of 2020 
income 
compared with a 
no capping 
situation 
Bulgaria 9.8% -3.8% 
United Kingdom 5.2% -2.0% 
Greece 4.0% -1.1% 
Slovakia 3.1% -1.6% 
Romania 2.9% -0.9% 
Hungary 2.6% -1.0% 
Spain 1.5% -0.3% 
Czech Republic, Lithuania 0.4% -0.2% 
Germany 0.2% -0.1% 
Denmark 0.2% 0.0% 
Italy, Poland, Portugal 0.1% 0.0% 
Belgium, Cyprus, France, 
Estonia, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, 
Netherlands, Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, Slovenia 
0.0% 0.0% 
EU-27 1.3% -0.4% 
Source: European Commission, 2011b. 
The various impacts of capping and degressivity would be 
caused by the differing farming structures and labour costs of the 
member states. For instance, in some Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs), the farm structures inherited from the socialist 
era are dominated by large scale units.5 However, as salaries and 
wage levels are relatively low, these countries would have been the 
most affected by capping and degressivity, assuming the 
Commission’s impact assessment is correct. 
                                                        
5 CEECs are member states that entered the EU in 2004, and include Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, 
Cyprus and Malta, plus Romania and Bulgaria (entry in the EU: 2007). 
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2.3 Expected impacts in Germany 
Largely inherited from the former socialist era, eastern German 
regions are dominated by large farms, which is in contrast to 
western regions. In 2012, 70% of all German farms were smaller than 
50 ha and farmed some 22% of the utilised agricultural area. This 
share was much lower in eastern German regions, where 53% of the 
farms were smaller than 50 ha and farmed only 4% of the utilised 
agricultural area (UAA); farms operating on the remaining 96% of 
the agricultural land comprised, on average, 467 ha. These 
structural differences obviously have an impact on the distribution 
of direct payments, as shown in Figure 11.1. 
Figure 11.1 Share of total direct payments paid in eastern or western 
regions by direct payment class and share of farms in each class in 2012 
(in %) 
Western regions 
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Eastern regions 
 
Source: Nationale Umsetzung der Betriebsprämie, 2012. 
In 2009, Germany began phasing in a regional flat-rate 
payment system that was fully implemented in 2013. Since then, the 
amount of direct payments per farm is no longer linked to previous 
production, but rather to the UAA. Due to the important structural 
differences between eastern and western regions, the calculation of 
the flat rate payment also implied important regional differences 
(Table 11.2). 
Regarding the distribution of direct payments in 2012, it is 
important to note that: 
- the highest share of direct payments in eastern regions was 
paid to farms receiving payments above €300,000; and 
- in the western regions, almost 90% of direct payments were 
paid to farms receiving between €5,000 and €100,000.  
This means that capping and degressivity was an issue only for 
eastern Germany. The measure would have mainly affected large 
corporate or family farms there. However, the impact would have 
been limited because capping would only have been applied on the 
basic payment after subtracting salaries, not to mention adjustment 
reactions to set the capping ceiling higher, like intensifying animal 
production and hiring more paid workers (Sahrbacher et al., 2012). 
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Table 11.2 Average payments per hectare and average farm size in 
Germany in 2012 
 Average payment per ha: 
Average farm 
size (ha)2  First pillar1 Second 
pillar2 
Eastern regions 338 61 216 
Western regions 347 55 67 
Germany 344 56 74 
Note: Second pillar payments include payments to less favoured areas and 
agri-environmental measures. 
Sources: 1 Bundesanzeiger (BAnz), AT vom 11.09.2013, 
2 Buchführungsergebnisse der Testbetriebe 2012/13 (BMEL, 2013). 
Beyond discriminating between eastern and western farms by 
their size, capping uncovered another issue. Balmann & Sahrbacher 
(2014b) showed that in 2012-13 family farms in Bavaria (south-west) 
disposed of much higher amounts of equity capital per farm and per 
hectare compared to Saxony-Anhalt (east). Therefore, on average 
these farms seemed quite wealthy and hardly financially 
constrained in a region where off-farm opportunities offered real 
alternatives to farming. However, despite their wealth, Bavarian 
family farms’ profitability is quite low. On the other hand, large 
eastern family farms showed figures of high profitability of equity 
capital even though absolute equity levels were much lower than in 
Bavaria. This illustrates one of the core political issues implied by 
capping in a country where agriculture shows such distinctive 
economic features from east to west, namely, how to justify the 
removal of payments from relatively ‘poor’ farms located in 
economically weak regions? Consequently, how would an 
acceptable compromise look between ‘east’ and ‘west’, and at which 
economic and political price would it have to be defended at the 
European level? 
3. Positions on capping and degressivity 
Capping and degressivity were not the only CAP issues to raise 
discussions and debates in and between the Parliament and the 
Council. Indeed, negotiations on the MFF have played a major role 
on the future of the whole CAP package. As long as MFF figures 
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were not known, the Parliament had to negotiate based on 
negotiating mandates rather than a definitive position. Moreover, 
other important issues would have had impacts on the distribution 
of direct payments before any capping was applied. For instance, 
internal and external convergence between (especially between new 
Baltic member states receiving the least payment per ha and old 
member states) and within member states implied that an 
agreement had to be found on the distribution key of direct 
payments at the European level. Greening was disputed during the 
negotiations just as much on its extent as on its practical 
implementation. Finally, flexibility between pillars or support for 
young farmers rather concerned the national balance between the 
first and second pillar at the member state level, but any agreement 
would determine each pillar’s funding at the European level. 
Therefore, there were trade-offs between capping and other issues, 
the interplays of which are investigated in other chapters of this 
book. In the following we review the positions of member states 
inside the Parliament as well as positions inside Germany on the 
divisive issue of capping and degressivity. 
3.1 Positions of member states 
On 7 March 2011, the six Ministers of Agriculture from Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, Romania, Czech Republic and Slovakia signed 
a position paper in which they rejected any capping of direct 
payments (AgraEurope, 2011). In the signatories’ opinion, capping 
would contradict the CAP’s principles by discriminating between 
farms based on their size. Simplifying the CAP, as well as enhancing 
competitiveness and fairness would be incompatible with the 
introduction of capping. It was argued that there was no evidence 
that large farms would not be able to comply with high 
environmental requirements or provide fewer public goods than 
smaller farms. The introduction of such a ceiling would have had 
many disadvantages, for instance the differentiated treatment of 
farms by the CAP. Moreover, farms would have been either 
impelled to artificially split or prevented from merging in order to 
gain in competitiveness. Therefore, instead of providing support for 
agriculture or the protection of the environment, public money 
would be spent administrating the collateral consequences of 
capping. 
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This coalition could be extended to Sweden and the 
Netherlands.6 The Swedish opposition to capping is justified by a 
long tradition of “enhancing and endorsing structural change in 
agriculture” (CAP2020, 2008). Although Sweden would have been 
barely affected (Table 11.1), the country viewed capping as 
detrimental to structural development and advocated phasing out 
the DP. The ‘contra capping’ member state coalition therefore 
contained at least eight member states. 
In opposition were Bulgaria, Austria and Poland. Bulgaria 
defended capping and degressivity by arguing that barely more 
than 4% of their farms would receive 80% of direct payments. This 
argument was supported by a study of the Institute for Market 
Economics in Sofia, which stated that since 2005, the average size of 
farms larger than 100 ha has increased from 538.5 ha to 672 ha. Such 
figures indicate a tremendous land concentration, especially in the 
Danube plain, which would enrich landlords by millions and would 
indicate a wise reason to introduce capping in Bulgaria 
(AgraEurope, 2013a). 
Already favourable to modulation during the Health Check, 
Poland accepted the concept of determining upper and lower limits 
to direct payments at the farm level (CAP 2020, 2009). However, 
Poland’s objective was to defend a harmonisation of payment levels 
throughout the EU (Bureau & Witzke, 2010). Therefore, Poland’s 
efforts would rather concentrate on this issue, together with Baltic 
member states, which were the most disadvantaged member states 
in terms of DP per hectare. 
Austria pleaded for the introduction of capping and 
degressivity even though the country would have barely been 
affected (Table 11.1); only some 46 of their agricultural concerns 
would see their DP capped above €300,000.7 Austrian Greens would 
even support a much lower capping ceiling of €35,000.8  
Finally, France’s position was not strictly for or against 
capping. Other motives explain why its Minister of Agriculture 
proposed the introduction of the redistributive payment (also called 
                                                        
6 AgraEurope, Vol. 25/13, 17 June 2013, Länderberichte 35. 
7 AgraEurope, Vol. 10/13, 4 March 2013, EU-Nachrichten 4. 
8 AgraEurope, Vol. 08/13, 18 February 2013, EU-Nachrichten 2. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  289 
 
first hectare payment) in addition to capping and degressivity. 
Actually, France was still engaged in a historical scheme that 
perpetuated payment inequalities between farmers, thereby 
worsening gaps between field crops and animal husbandry, 
especially dairy farming. The French idea of a redistributive 
payment reflected a desire to compensate (small) French farmers 
orientated toward animal production for the expected losses in DP 
due to external convergence and the possible switch to a regional 
payment.9 In addition to this, France strongly supported 
maintaining market measures in the form of coupled payments to 
support those French animal-producing farms in need.10 
To sum up, there was no well identified group of member 
states wishing to support capping and degressivity to counter the 
strong ‘contra capping’ coalition that would be declared in the 
processing phase of the reform. Moreover, compared to other issues 
mentioned in the next section, defending capping was often not the 
first priority for member states who were in favour. As a result, the 
Council adopted a negative position towards capping and 
degressivity, which the Commission and Parliament would try to 
counterbalance during the negotiations.  
3.2 Positions and amendments in the European 
Parliament 
The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development 
(COMAGRI) was designated as being responsible for the 2013 CAP 
reform package on 25 October 2011. The committee’s three 
rapporteurs drafted 700 amendments to the Commission’s 
legislative proposal of 30 May 2012, of which 110 amendments dealt 
with the Direct Payment Regulation (amendments 35 to 38 on 
capping, European Parliament, 2012a). Four amendments on 
capping advocated an increase up to 80% on the tranche of more 
than €250,000 in direct payments, with capping at €300,000 “after 
application of the reductions for each tranche”, which reveals a 
more conservative position compared to the Commission’s 
                                                        
9 AgraEurope, Vol. 03/13, 13 January 2013, Länderberichte 29. 
10 AgraEurope, Vol. 11/13, 11 March 2013, Länderberichte 23. 
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proposal. Figure 11.2 provides an illustration of some proposals on 
capping and degressivity. 
Figure 11.2 Overview of proposals with direct payments before (X-axis) 
and after (Y-axis) capping and degressivity (in €) 
 
Source: EU (2013), European Parliament (2012a), European Parliament (2012b), 
European Commission (2011a). 
The other members of the committee utilised their possibility 
to table additional amendments. By 19 July 2012, 2,292 amendments 
had been tabled on the Direct Payment Regulation, of which 102 
concerned Article 11 (amendments 700 to 801, European Parliament 
2012b).  
The MEPs of the European Conservatives and Reformists 
Group (ECR) submitted the most amendments among the European 
groups. This group was rather divided, however, on the issue of 
capping, and the tabled amendments revealed the will to keep all 
options open. Actually, some MEPs considered that “the existing 
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system of degressive modulation [had] worked well and should be 
continued” and consequently rejected the article as a whole.11 
However, at the same time a weakened version of Article 11, similar 
to the former modulation but for large farms, was submitted. A 
voluntary degressivity and capping with payments reduced by 5%, 
10%, 15% and 20% would be applied to the entire direct payment, 
i.e. including the greening component, without the possibility of 
subtracting salaries before capping.12 The product was to be used in 
the member states to finance rural development policy (second 
pillar); the Commission proposal did not specify this issue.13 
Amendments by the Greens/European Free Alliance 
(Greens/EFA) looked similar to those of the Confederal Group of 
the European United Left-Nordic Green Left group (GUE/NGL). 
Both groups proposed greater reductions on modified tranches, 
namely 10% for payments between €25,000 and €50,000, 20% 
between €50,000 and €75,000, 30% between €75,000 and €100,000 
and 100% for payments above €100,000.14 The Greens/EFA argued 
that capping for farms receiving more than €100,000 or €300,000 
could be done with low social costs.15 Both groups would apply 
reductions only on the basic payment after subtracting all salaries 
(Greens/EFA) or subtracting 50% of salaries (GUE/NGL).16 
The three largest groups of the Parliament were internally 
split. In the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian 
Democrats, EPP), MEPs (most of them from Germany, but others 
were from Czech Republic, Romania, Italy and Latvia) rejected the 
entire article.17 Other MEPs suggested subtracting costs for farming 
                                                        
11 Amendment 715. 
12 Amendments 709, 781, 788, 721, 737, 744, 747, 752, 755, 756, 757, 761, 762, 
763, 772, 784. 
13 Amendments 789, 790, 798. 
14 Amendments 726, 727, 728, 734, 735, 740, 741, 746. 
15 “In 2010, only 0.41% beneficiaries received more than EUR 100 000/year 
as direct payments, which made up 16.22% of the whole direct payment 
budget line. Only 0.11% beneficiaries received more than 
EUR 200 000/year as direct payments, which made up 8.40% of the whole 
direct payment budget line”, Amendment 734. 
16 Amendments 741, 777. 
17 Amendments 703, 704, 705, 706, 713, 773, 787. 
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contractors, family labour or “profits shared among members in the 
case of an agricultural cooperative” together with salaries, taxes and 
social contributions before applying capping.18 The number of co-
owners of a farm should also be considered before applying 
reductions, as well as which product should stay in the member 
state and be used for financing measures of either the first or the 
second pillar.19 
The MEPs of the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE, MEPs of Germany and Denmark) 
rejected the article as a whole, saying that capping and degressivity 
would prevent “competitive structural development of the 
agricultural sector” and include an “additional administrative 
burden” as well.20 If at all, degressivity rates no higher than 4% 
above €300,000 could be applied, otherwise it would “penalise 
farmers who have chosen efficient business models and who have 
often invested significant amounts to rationalise, expand or adapt 
their holdings to structural change and to market conditions in 
order to remain competitive”.21 Subtracting salaries and wages was 
considered discriminatory towards partnerships and cooperatives 
and therefore legal forms should be considered before capping.22 
However, there were amendments in this group to cap payments 
from €250,000 (Ireland), or to keep the product of capping in the 
member state concerned (Spain).23 
The Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D) was the most split. Whereas some MEPs (UK) 
rejected the entire article because capping and degressivity were 
considered barriers to competitiveness and enlargement, thus 
provoking administrative burden and contravening “the principle 
of equal treatment of beneficiaries”, other MEPs (France and 
Belgium) would apply capping and degressivity on the whole 
payment with same rates on smaller tranches from €100,000, with 
                                                        
18 Amendments 775, 779, 783. 
19 Amendments 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 800, 801, 802. 
20 Amendments 701, 712. 
21 Amendments 722, 738, 749, 760. 
22 Amendments 768, 770, 769, 778, 701. 
23 Amendments 759, 797. 
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capping above €200,000.24 Spanish MEPs showed concern about the 
use of capping and degressivity funds as proposed by the 
Commission (subtracting not only salaries from the basic payment, 
but “profits shared among members in the case of an agricultural 
cooperative” as well).25 According to these MEPs, funds shall be 
“made available as Union support” and be used either in the second 
pillar, or “under the first pillar, in the form of direct payments or 
coupled aid to sectors in difficulty.”26 
This overview of European parties’ positions helps one 
understand the main motives for divergences caused by capping 
and degressivity inside the Parliament. On 18 December 2012, 
COMAGRI drafted 38 compromise amendments on direct 
payments, among which were none on capping and degressivity; 
this means COMAGRI followed the Commission’s initial proposals 
on this issue (European Parliament, 2012c). Following their vote on 
23-24 January 2013, MEPs of COMAGRI further endorsed the 
Commission’s proposals, albeit with some changes: capping was to 
be applied from €300,000 on the cumulated sum of reduced direct 
payments, capped money should be kept in the member states for 
use in the second pillar, cooperatives and groups of farmers were to 
be excluded, and costs for farming operations subtracted together 
with salaries. All other amendment proposals (further cuts, 
rejection) failed to win the support of a majority of MEPs in 
COMAGRI. Additionally, COMAGRI introduced the possibility for 
member states to grant a complementary payment for the first 
hectares, following the idea of the French Minister of Agriculture 
(amendments 15 and 61, European Parliament, 2013a). 
On 6 March 2013 European parties or groups of MEPs tabled 
additional amendments to the 98 amendments already contained in 
COMAGRI’s mandate proposal for negotiation; they had to be 
voted in the plenary on 13 March 2013 (European Parliament, 
2013a). Again, results of the roll-call votes regarding Article 11 
revealed that those additional amendments (rejection, optional 
                                                        
24 Amendments 700, 719, 730, 743, 751, 758. 
25 Amendment 782. 
26 Amendment 791. 
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capping and degressivity, further cuts) failed to get a majority.27 
Therefore, regarding capping and degressivity, COMAGRI entered 
the negotiation phase with a mandate adopted in the plenary that 
was similar to the proposal voted upon during the committee 
meeting in January (European Parliament, 2013b). Despite rather 
narrow room for manoeuvre due to past decisions of the European 
Council on the MFF, as well as ongoing parallel negotiations on its 
final figures (see next section), the Parliament tried to use 
COMAGRI to push capping and degressivity through the Council’s 
blockade during the trilogue meetings.  
3.3 Opinions and positions in Germany  
During the CAP negotiations, as the German Federal Minister of 
Agriculture Aigner (CSU party, Bavarian Conservatives) was set to 
defend a common position at the EU level, she had to define and 
discuss a mandate with the Agricultural Ministers of Germany’s 16 
Federal States (diverse parties). On the other hand, the main 
national parties had their own position on capping/degressivity, 
greening and other issues; these are shortly presented below. 
3.3.1 Overview of positions defended by main political 
parties 
Between 2009 and September 2013, Conservatives (CDU/CSU) held 
a majority, with 38% of the seats in the German Lower House 
(Bundestag). They were followed by Social Democrats (SPD), 
Liberals (FDP), Leftists (Linke) and Greens (Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen) with 23%, 15%, 12% and 11% of the chamber’s seats, 
respectively. The Greens strongly supported the introduction of 
capping and degressivity as contributing to a fairer distribution of 
DP. The SPD was not unanimous or determined enough to bring 
this issue into the foreground, as the party supported the gradual 
abandonment of first pillar payments to the benefit of the second 
pillar. On the other hand, the FDP, who were in government 
together with the Conservatives, were firmly opposed to any 
capping or degressivity they judged as inefficient and bureaucratic, 
or as supporting the same services that agriculture brought to 
                                                        
27 Amendments 105, 105rev, 130 142, 169, 198 tabled on European 
Parliament (2013a). 
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society. Leftists would not necessarily support capping and 
degressivity because it could penalise cooperatives, which are 
especially predominant in eastern German regions. 
The following section shows that political parties did not 
always adopt a ‘homogenous’ stance, especially through their 
representatives in the Agricultural Ministries of Federal States.28 
3.3.2 A common position regarding capping and 
degressivity between federal states 
Agricultural Ministers of Federal States generally meet twice a year 
in the framework of the Agrarministerkonferenz (AMK). After the 
AMK of 28 October 2011, which soon followed the Commission’s 
regulation proposal, the Agricultural Ministers from the respective 
federal states explicitly indicated in a common statement that all 
farms, independent of their size, contributed to the provision of 
public services. Therefore, the proposal to decrease or even cap 
direct payments for large farms would contradict the principle of 
‘public money for public services’, not to mention administrative 
costs (AMK, 2011).29 In the same document, these ministers 
appealed for the abolition of modulation, as well as for the approval 
of greening.  
However, this common position on direct payments did not 
exclude dissent. The minutes of the meeting reported some 
comments and statements made by individual or groups of federal 
states’ ministries. For example, whereas Schleswig-Holstein (west) 
insisted on the benefits of greening, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and 
Thuringia (east) confirmed their strict rejection of capping and 
degressivity of direct payments. The Ministers of Baden-
                                                        
28 This rough picture of parties’ positions does not reflect the wide range of 
dissent within some of them. For instance, Hans-Georg von der Marwitz of 
the CDU/CSU party was at least as determined to encourage capping and 
degressivity as the German government was to block it at the EU level. 
Elected in Brandenburg (east), von der Marwitz argued that the increasing 
renting/buying of land by non-local and non-agricultural investors would 
endanger rural areas’ viability. In his opinion, capping and degressivity 
would slow if not even stop this trend and should therefore be 
implemented (Marwitz, 2013). 
29 Top 2, Point 15. 
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Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate 
(Greens, west) stipulated that they would support capping and 
degressivity (because they wanted to contribute to a “socially fair 
distribution of direct payments”) if direct payments would be 
further distributed without explicit requirements regarding the 
provision of environmental and social services. 
The implicit agreement between the federal states’ 
agricultural ministers was therefore to reject capping and 
degressivity ‘in exchange’ for supporting greening. The ministers 
provided the German Federal Agricultural Minister Aigner with 
this mandate for negotiation in the Council. 
3.3.3 Disagreements between federal states in the last steps 
of the reform process 
However, as the MFF was defined on 8 February 2013, federal states 
were shown the actual reductions that German farmers would have 
to face in the next programming period. Even though those 
reductions were long expected, the German coalition based on 
‘greening yes-capping no’ became somewhat unstable. Actually, 
federal states led by Green Ministers (Baden-Württemberg, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein and 
Lower Saxony, all western federal states) considered the 
opportunity to use flexibility to transfer (not co-financed) funds 
from the first pillar to the benefit of the second pillar. Thus capping 
and degressivity were put on the table again, with the argument that 
“the unfair distribution of direct payments shall be mitigated”.30 
Eastern federal states’ ministers opposed any return of capping and 
degressivity on the national negotiation table, as this issue was to be 
considered a foundation of the German negotiating position defined 
in October 2011. It was argued that western regions would already 
turn good profit out of the second pillar.  
According to the minutes of the AMK on 12 April 2013, the 
consensus ‘greening yes-capping no’ again seemed to be well 
established, partially because of the possibility of introducing a 
redistributive payment as a last resort to capping and degressivity 
(AMK, 2013a). However, the flexibility issue again appeared on the 
                                                        
30 Green Agricultural Minister Christian Meyer, Lower Saxony (Agra-
Europe, Vol. 9/13, 25 February 2013, Länderberichte 35). 
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negotiation table. Green Ministers explicitly emphasised the 
shortfall expected in the second pillar, and therefore their wish to 
apply flexibility at a full rate (15%). On the contrary, CDU/CSU 
Ministers (Bavaria, Hesse and three eastern federal states), as well 
as an SPD Minister (Brandenburg) considered that the external and 
internal convergences of direct payments, as well as the 
introduction of the redistributive payment, were reasons enough 
not to further reduce the first pillar’s resources. A weak consensus 
was again found. 
At this point of the negotiations, the German rejection of 
capping and degressivity was admitted and further pushed through 
the negotiations at the EU level; this position was backed by the 
MFF agreement making capping optional in February 2013. 
However, the issue of flexibility from the first to the second pillar 
would still raise concern in Germany long after the last trilogue 
agreement on 24 September 2013. In any event, no definitive 
decision on the national implementation of the CAP was planned 
before the elections of the Lower House on 22 September 2013. 
Results of the election changed the political balance in favour of the 
Conservatives (CDU/CSU), who built a governing coalition 
together with the Social Democrats (SPD), whereas the Greens lost 
seats. At the national level capping was already long off the table; 
flexibility would soon follow. 
In summary, federal states formed coalitions considering 
their respective agricultural structures with the objective of 
reducing the potential losses encountered by the final outcome of 
the CAP reform. The implications of the national implementation of 
the direct payment regulation in Germany will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
4. Final negotiations on degressivity and capping 
4.1 A power struggle between the Council and the 
Parliament 
The linkages between the negotiations on the 2013 CAP reform on 
the one hand and on the EU budget on the other hand determined 
CAP reform outcomes to a large extent, and are further discussed in 
this book (Matthews, 2015: chapters 7 and 19, this volume). 
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However, the European Council’s political agreement on the MFF 
on 8 February 2013 certainly constituted a turning point for the 
CAP’s ‘square bracket issues’, among which was capping and 
degressivity. Actually, in the MFF conclusions it was mentioned 
that “capping of the direct payments for large beneficiaries [would] 
be introduced by Member States on a voluntary basis” (European 
Council, 2013); at this point capping was politically solved. On 18 
March 2013, the EU Agricultural Ministers reached agreement on 
the CAP reform regulations and the Council’s negotiating position 
was confirmed. The Council would defend a voluntary degressivity 
of direct payments above €150,000 (Council of the European Union, 
2013a). 
Despite the reduced negotiation room imposed by the MFF 
and time pressure, the Parliament was determined to enforce 
further compromises during the trilogue meetings that started in 
April 2013.31 However, in spite of a political agreement on CAP 
regulations and the MFF on 26-27 June, the Council did not change 
its position regarding degressivity, and received the vehement 
support of a number of Ministers of Agriculture, including the 
German, British and those of a dozen other countries.32 As an 
alternative to degressivity, the Council included the possibility for 
member states to introduce a redistributive payment with at least a 
5% national ceiling. On the contrary, the Parliament, supported by 
Commissioner Dacian Cioloş, still defended capping beyond 
€300,000, as well as higher degressivity rates.33 Considering these 
incompatible positions on capping and degressivity (among other 
issues), discussions were postponed to September 2013.  
On 11 September, COMAGRI’s rapporteur Capoulas Santos 
proposed either degressivity of 15% above €150,000, 25% (up to 
100%) above €300,000, or a redistributive payment with at least 15% 
                                                        
31 According to Matthews (2014), the Council adopted the view that it had 
no flexibility after MFF figures were defined. This made negotiations more 
difficult for the Parliament as co-legislator for CAP related issues in 
general, and capping and degressivity in particular. 
32 AgraEurope, Vol. 30/13, 22 July 2013, EU-Nachrichten 1. 
33 Dacian Cioloş would strongly support degressivity of 14% above 
€150,000 (AgraEurope, Vol. 27/13, 1 July 2013, EU-Nachrichten 1; 
AgraEurope, Vol. 29/13, 15 July 2013, EU-Nachrichten 3). 
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of the national ceiling. Again the Council rejected the proposal, 
which incited Paolo De Castro (negotiating team leader) to heavily 
criticise the Council’s refusal to comply with the funding principle 
of co-decision with the Parliament.34 As a last resort, the Parliament 
was able to use the final adoption of the MFF as a dead pledge, as 
there were still other issues pending in the EU budget. On 17 
September 2013, rapporteur Capoulas Santos submitted another 
compromise proposal with either degressivity of 5% above 
€150,000, at least 10% above €300,000, or a redistributive payment 
with at least 10% of the national ceiling. This proposal was also 
rejected. 
The final trilogue agreement on 24 September did not contain 
much change regarding issues pending since June. As suggested by 
Matthews (2014), even though Parliament negotiators only 
managed to win small concessions from the Council on those square 
bracket issues, their objective was to ensure that “policy content 
which should be legislated under co-decision is not determined 
solely by heads of state” (European Parliament, 2013c). Regarding 
capping and degressivity, in spite of efforts to find a compromise, 
the final result was far from the Parliament’s original proposals: 
either degressivity of 5% for direct payments above €150,000 after 
subtracting salaries (if wanted by the member states), or a 
redistributive payment with at least 5% of member states’ national 
ceilings. 
4.2 Germany: impacts and implementation of the 
redistributive payment instead of capping 
As a strict opponent to capping and degressivity, Germany opted 
for a redistributive payment: €50 per ha for the first 30 ha, and €30 
per ha for the next 16 ha (6.9% of the German national ceiling). Apart 
from this, 5% of resources of the first pillar were allocated to the 
second pillar, supplemented by €200 million per year to compensate 
for the general cuts decided in the MFF. However, the distribution 
of Pillar II resources remained unchanged between federal states 
(AMK, 2013b). 
                                                        
34 AgraEurope, Vol. 38/13, 16 September 2013, EU-Nachrichten 11. 
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Although it is in line with the long-standing agreement 
between the agricultural ministers of federal states, this decision 
was surprising. Because salaries could be deducted before 
degressivity would be applied, degressivity would have 
redistributed only about 0.6% of DP, while redistributive payments 
would have affected 6.9% (AgraEurope, 2013b). Whereas eastern 
German regions would have ‘only’ lost €15 million per year with a 
degressivity rate of 5% for DP above €300,000, all other options 
involving the redistributive payment would have implied higher 
losses to the benefit of western federal states, particularly Bavaria, 
Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. 
Balmann & Sahrbacher (2014a) estimated that the 
redistributive payment implied losses for eastern German regions 
of about €15 per ha UAA (about €85 million annually), whereas 
farms in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg would benefit from the 
redistributive payment by €10 per ha (€48 million annually). The 
reason is that in eastern Germany only some 13% of the UAA is 
eligible for redistributive payments compared to 70% in Bavaria. 
The undirected support of small farms would be to the benefit of (at 
least on average) relatively wealthy though not profitable farms 
located in wealthy and prospering regions at the expense of 
profitable farms located in economically weak regions where 
agriculture is one of the few job providers.  
Therefore a mild degressivity would have been a good deal 
for eastern German regions compared to the redistributive 
payment. There are certainly at least two reasons why Germany did 
not change direction during the negotiations. On the one hand, the 
German position was long grounded on the rejection of capping and 
degressivity, combined with the acceptance of greening. Ministers 
arguing against capping or degressivity were embedded in this 
position. Suddenly arguing for degressivity would have implied 
completely reviewing a long-standing argumentation and rather 
explaining why degressivity would be a good compromise, indeed, 
at the risk of endangering future mandates in eastern federal states. 
On the other hand, the maintenance of a position against 
degressivity and capping could be interpreted as a strategic choice. 
Eastern German ministers were possibly worried about future 
reductions of DP in the case of compulsory capping and/or 
degressivity: once they would be introduced, rates could simply be 
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increased in future CAP reforms.35 The price of the redistributive 
payment was seemingly not too high to pay in order to counter the 
possible eventuality of future payment reductions for large farms. 
These arguments are supported by the fact that even representatives 
of eastern German farmers did not oppose the redistributive 
payment.36 One reason for this support could have been that eastern 
German farmers were less concerned about the level of direct 
payments than about discrimination towards farm structures. 
5. Some lessons and conclusions  
The final outcome on capping and degressivity opened a wide range 
of possible payment reductions and/or redistributive schemes. Of 
the eight countries applying the redistributive payment (Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Germany, France, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Romania), Poland chose to apply capping (above €150,000) and 
Bulgaria chose additional payment reductions following tranches 
and capping above €300,000 (CAP2020, 2015). Hungary, Wales 
(UK), Italy, and Scotland (UK) chose payment reductions following 
tranches plus capping for payments beyond €176,000, €300,000, 
€500,000 and €600,000, respectively. Belgium (Flanders), Ireland, 
Greece, Austria and Northern Ireland (UK) chose to cap payments 
at €150,000. The other 15 countries chose to apply only the minimum 
reduction of 5% on directs payments beyond €150,000. The 
estimated product of these reductions is estimated at €558 million 
(for the period 2015-19) and would stay in the originating member 
states to fund Pillar II measures (European Commission, 2015). 
The commitment of MEPs to get the most possible benefits 
out of the negotiations considering the Council’s constant 
opposition to capping and degressivity paid off in the sense that one 
was adopted at all. It was already an achievement for the 
Parliament, even though a modest one, to make degressivity 
compulsory. On the other hand, there was certainly more to expect 
from the negotiations considering European citizens’ support for 
this measure. Therefore, this questions the actual ability of the 
Parliament to negotiate on equal footing with the Council on 
sensitive issues. Similarly, there were probably more resources 
                                                        
35 Agrarmanager (November 2013), p. 4.  
36 Agrarmanager (November 2013), pp. 104-105. 
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spent at the Council defending national interests rather than 
building a policy based on a common vision of a future European 
agricultural sector. 
Debates around capping and degressivity revealed political 
and strategic positions of groups or individuals who have expressed 
criticism of or support for these measures. Embedded in a complex, 
multileveled and multidimensional negotiation process, 
participants and stakeholders had to consider several important 
issues simultaneously and capping/degressivity was not a general 
priority. However, the measure was initially meant to improve the 
distribution of direct payments between farmers. Finally it is left to 
the member states’ discretion to decide what measure is more 
capable of reaching a better distribution of direct payments. As the 
redistributive payment will possibly have much higher distributive 
impacts than degressivity in those member states that will apply it, 
this certainly opens interesting research questions regarding future 
structural developments in Europe (Matthews, 2013). However, this 
greater flexibility somehow leads to a further loss of common 
ground regarding the way direct payments are distributed in the 
EU. There is now an additional difference between two identical 
farms located in two member states beyond natural, market and 
national institutional conditions, and this difference is due to the 
national implementation of a common policy. Prior to the reform it 
was justifiable to question the legitimacy of direct payments, 
especially regarding their distribution. Unfortunately, the outcomes 
regarding degressivity and the lack of a common vision at the 
European level have not helped clarify why and to what extent 
direct payments should be paid for. 
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12. CAP REFORM, 2005-14,  
AND THE MUTED ROLE 
OF THE DIS-UNITED KINGDOM 
ALAN SWINBANK* 
“We preserved the rebate, tied its demise to the CAP and 
agreed a break in the budget period when both could be reformed.” 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair writing in his memoirs about the 
outcome of the December 2005 meeting of the European Council 
Blair, 2010: 542. 
 
n 2003 the CAP underwent a significant reform (the so-called 
‘Fischler reform’), which was extended in 2004 to cover cotton, 
tobacco, olive oil and hops. In 2005 these new provisions – 
particularly the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) – were being 
implemented. Moreover, under Franz Fischler’s successor 
Marianne Fischer Boel, political agreement on a reform of the sugar 
regime was reached in November 2005 (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011: 
180). Despite this seemingly endless turmoil of CAP reform, the 
British government pressed for a new reform debate, published its 
“Vision for the Common Agricultural Policy” (HM Treasury & 
Defra, 2005), and in the European Council meeting of December 
2005 secured a commitment for the Commission “to undertake a 
full, wide ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, 
including the CAP, and of resources, including the UK rebate, to 
report in 2008/9” (Council of the European Union, 2005: 32; 2006: 
2). 
                                                        
* I am grateful to Jo Swinnen for encouraging me to write this chapter, and 
to Allan Buckwell, Wyn Grant, Martin Nesbit, and another, for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. Only I can be blamed for its contents. 
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José Manuel Barroso’s Bureau of European Policy Advisors 
(BEPA) responded to this invitation with enthusiasm, but the 
initiative petered out, and the CAP ‘reform’ package proposed in 
Barroso’s second term (2010-14), and then adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers in 2013, fell well short of 
the UK’s initial ambition. Moreover, when member states and 
regions published in 2014 their plans for implementing the revised 
direct payment provisions, the extent to which the UK’s devolved 
administrations – Scotland in particular – did not share London’s 
perception of the need for further CAP reform was made clear. This 
chapter attempts to explore the reasons leading to the UK’s failed 
policy initiative. 
1. Preparing the 2007-13 multiannual financial 
framework (MFF) 
In February 2004 the European Commission had begun the debate 
on the financial perspectives for the 2007-13 planning period. It 
proposed an unchanged limit on own resources (at 1.24% of the 
EU’s gross national income), and an average ‘appropriation for 
payments’ limit of 1.14% (European Commission, 2004: 29). Several 
member states thought this too large, and sought a reduction, and 
the debate spilled over into 2005 when Luxembourg took over the 
presidency of the Council of Ministers. Cuts were proposed, and it 
was suggested that the UK’s infamous budget rebate should be 
capped.1  
The UK welcomed the suggested cuts, but baulked at the 
suggestion its rebate should be capped. Hearl (2006: 54) reports that 
the British Prime Minister “attacked the common agricultural policy 
(CAP) as the basic reason for the ‘distortion’ in the budget which 
                                                        
1 In an unpublished document the Commission later noted, “The UK 
correction was introduced when more than 70% of the EU budget was 
spent on agricultural market measures. At the time, the United Kingdom 
was one of the least prosperous Member States...Today the UK is one of the 
most prosperous Member States and the share of... agricultural 
expenditure in the EU budget has decreased significantly” (European 
Commission, 2009: 30). For a brief overview of a rebate system “now so full 
of special cases that it is increasingly bereft of underlying principles and 
lacking in transparency”, see Begg (2009: 40). 
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had justified the rebate in the first place. Britain would veto any cut 
in the rebate unless farm subsidies were overhauled, something 
which French President Chirac predictably refused to contemplate 
‘under any circumstances’”. One complicating factor was that back 
in October 2002, prompted by German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac, the European 
Council had already agreed a ceiling for CAP expenditure 
extending through 2013; and in France this had been viewed as a 
“guaranteed envelope for CAP expenditures up to 2013” (Mahé, 
Naudet & Roussillon-Montford, 2010: 94). Jean-Claude Juncker, 
Luxembourg’s Prime Minister, who in 2014 was to become 
president of the European Commission, took personal charge of the 
negotiations; but the June 2005 meeting of the European Council 
“broke up in bitterness and recrimination. Juncker openly blamed 
the UK for the failure of the EU summit and of Luxembourg’s EU 
presidency itself” (Hearl, 2006: 55). Moreover, the rejection of the 
“Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” by the electorates of 
France and The Netherlands, days before the European Council 
met, had done little to cheer Juncker. 
The UK was about to take on the presidency, and Blair (2010: 
535-6) believed he could secure a better deal on the rebate if he was 
“in charge of the negotiations”. However, he was reluctant to have 
the issue discussed at the informal summit at Hampton Court on 27 
October (Blair, 2010: 540; Whitman, 2006: 61). Just prior to this 
meeting, Commission President Barroso suggested a five-point 
plan. This included the proposal that the 2002 agreement “on a 
budget for the Common Agricultural Policy until 2013, going hand 
in hand with a fundamental reform of agricultural policy, which is 
still being implemented…should be fully respected”; and, after 
commenting that there “is a broad consensus on the need for a 
fundamental review of the EU budget”, that “[t]he Union should 
commit itself to carrying out a comprehensive review of all aspects 
of the organisation of the EU budget – expenditure, revenue and 
structure – with a view to ensuring that the budget is equipped to 
respond to the challenges of the future” (European Commission, 
2005).  
The prime minister battled not just against the other member 
states, but within his own government too. Blair (2010: 542) reports 
that he “had the most frightful time” with Gordon Brown 
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(Chancellor of the Exchequer, and eventually Blair’s successor as 
prime minister), who “was essentially insisting that France accept 
the demise of the CAP, and in public statements was asserting this 
in terms that enraged the French”. But it was not just the French, of 
course, who were opposed to further fundamental reform of the 
CAP. In the event, the CAP was not reformed, and the British rebate 
(and those of other member states) was retained more-or-less intact.  
The political importance of retaining the rebate, the 2002 
commitment on the CAP budget for Pillar I through 2013, and the 
tight agreement for the 2007-13 MFF that emerged, resulted in the 
paradoxical outcome that the Pillar II spending on rural 
development was severely constrained, despite the UK 
government’s alleged wish to see Pillar II encouraged at the expense 
of Pillar I. For historical reasons the UK’s Pillar II allocation was low 
(House of Commons, 2007a: 21), and now widely perceived to be 
inadequate. Consequently, the UK asked to be allowed to transfer 
some of its Pillar I allocation to Pillar II (in a process known as 
‘voluntary modulation’), without the requirement for the 
government to match-fund the EU contribution. This was 
reluctantly agreed, to the displeasure of the Agriculture 
Commissioner, Mariann Fischer Boel, and the European 
Parliament’s Agriculture Committee. The opposition of the latter 
meant that the rules for voluntary modulation were only agreed 
over a year later (House of Commons, 2007a: 21). 
But what was also agreed (and subsequently endorsed by the 
European Parliament in the May 2006 inter-institutional agreement) 
was that the Commission was “invited to undertake a full, wide-
ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the 
Common Agricultural Policy, and of resources, including the 
United Kingdom rebate, and to report in 2008/2009”.2 
As Blair (2010: 535) reflected, “[T]he British rebate had 
assumed a mythical, almost cult status…The rebate was 
untouchable. To question it was to betray the nation.” It was a 
poisoned chalice that was passed from one prime minister to the 
                                                        
2 Declaration 3 attached to the inter-institutional agreement between the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary 
discipline and sound financial management, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C139, 14 June 2006. 
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next, facing the periodic settlement of the EU’s MFF. Blair thought 
he had broken the cycle with the promised budget review, but in 
fact the burden was passed on to David Cameron as he wrestled for 
a settlement for the 2014-20 MFF. 
2. The UK’s ‘Vision’ 
Days before the December 2005 meeting of the European Council, 
the British government published its “Vision for the Common 
Agricultural Policy” (HM Treasury & Defra, 2005). For some critics 
it was far from obvious why the document was released when it 
was. The House of Commons Select Committee with responsibility 
for examining Defra’s activities suggested: “The Government 
showed a naivety in believing its Vision document could be its 
catalyst to a reform agenda when it was introduced so near the end 
of its Presidency and without any programme in place to gain 
support for the British position…This approach was 
counterproductive and caused a negative reaction” (House of 
Commons, 2007a: 3). It was – suggested the Tenant Farmers 
Association – “hastily prepared in order to allow Ministers and in 
particular the Prime Minister to answer questions…on what the UK 
meant by further CAP reform particularly as the EU had just been 
through the most major CAP reform in its history” (House of 
Commons, 2007b: 113). 
The Vision’s executive summary reads that its aim was “to 
stimulate and help inform debate”. It focused “on where we need to 
be in 10 to 15 years’ time, and why”; but it did “not set out a route 
map for getting there. That must be the subject of debate across 
Europe and achieved through gradual and carefully managed 
change to give clear signals and time for farmers to adjust their 
businesses, not an overnight upheaval”. But what attracted critics’ 
comments were the statements that a ‘sustainable CAP’ would, inter 
alia, have “import tariffs for all farm sectors progressively aligned 
with the much lower level prevailing in other sectors of the 
economy; no price support, export refunds or other production or 
consumption subsidies; and EU spending on agriculture would be 
based on the current Pillar II and would support these objectives as 
appropriate, allowing a considerable reduction in total spending by 
the EU on agriculture and bringing this into line with other sectors” 
(HM Treasury & Defra, 2005: 3-4). 
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Within days of the Vision’s publication, the House of 
Commons Select Committee announced its intention of examining 
it (House of Commons, 2007a: 6). It met for a private briefing with 
HM Treasury and Defra officials, and with three academics, in May 
2006, and held its first public meeting in June. Evidence was taken 
from a number of individuals and organisations, including Mariann 
Fischer Boel in October 2006, but the committee’s report was not 
published until May 2007. Farmers and various organisations from 
the farm and wider rural sectors, and various environmental NGOs, 
were well represented among those giving evidence to the 
committee but, apart from a few academics, the wider public 
interest was not particular evident (House of Commons, 2007b). 
One conclusion that the committee drew from the evidence it 
received was that the government had published a document that 
was “heavily criticised for its lack of rigour and up-to-date statistical 
data”. Indeed, “The Government’s lack of analysis to underpin its 
proposals was both a practical and intellectual failing” (House of 
Commons, 2007a: 14). Mariann Fischer Boel had been particularly 
critical: she told the committee that “there was a complete lack of 
analysis” underpinning the paper (House of Commons, 2007b: 87). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) had, however, told the committee in January 2006 that 
OECD work had been “reported clearly, accurately and to the point, 
with appropriate nuances”, and overall found the “report very clear 
and well presented” (House of Commons, 2007b: 142-143). The 
committee did not draw the reader’s attention to the OECD’s 
comments.  
Despite the “complete lack of analysis” underpinning the 
government’s vision for the CAP, the Select Committee concluded: 
“The only long-term justification for future expenditure of 
taxpayers’ money in the agricultural sector is the provision of public 
goods”, and that “[f]urther reform of the CAP is very necessary” 
(House of Commons, 2007a: 46-7). And the online version of Farmers 
Weekly marked publication of the committee’s report with the 
headline: “MPs conclude that Europe should scrap the CAP” 
(Clarke, 2007). 
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3. The budget review 
Following the May 2006 inter-institutional agreement it was some 
time before the budget review began. In September 2007, however, 
a public consultation was launched that would “form an important 
basis for the Commission’s work on the review” (European 
Commission, 2007: 3). The document explained: 
The budget review is a unique opportunity for a thorough 
assessment of the EU budget and its financing, free from 
the constraints of a negotiation on a financial framework. 
It will take a long time horizon, to see how the budget can 
already be shaped to serve EU policies and to meet the 
challenges of the decades ahead. It will therefore not 
propose a new multi-annual financial framework for the 
period from 2014 – this task will be for the next 
Commission – nor the overall size and detailed 
breakdown of the EU budget. It will rather set out the 
structure and direction of the Union’s future spending 
priorities, assessing what offers the best added value and 
most effective results (European Commission, 2007: 2). 
Mariann Fischer Boel was quite clear that the ‘Heath Check’ 
she launched in November 2007 (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011: 188) was 
quite a separate exercise from the budget review. For example, in 
February 2007, she told a conference at Wageningen University that 
the Health Check would not be “about further fundamental reform. 
It will make sure that the reformed CAP is working as it should”. 
The Commission had, however, “begun some hard thinking about 
the future of the CAP as a whole”. With regard to this, she said, “I 
sometimes talk about having ‘one vision, two steps’. The first step 
is what I call the ‘CAP Health Check’, which relates to the CAP 
between now and 2013. The second is a look ahead to the CAP of 
after 2013, within a general review of the European Union budget” 
(Fischer Boel, 2007: 4).3 
                                                        
3 Thus I think Mahé, Naudet & Roussillon-Montfort (2010: 95) are mistaken 
when they write, “As requested in the Council decisions of 2005, the CAP 
of 2003 was re-examined over 2006 and 2007 in a process now called the 
Health Check”. As the European Commission (2005) had noted in October 
2005, “There is already a built-in agenda of sectoral reviews pre-
programmed for the coming years: for the operation of the CAP in 2008, 
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DG Budget (and its then Commissioner, Dalia Grybauskaitė) 
and the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA)4 then set about 
the budget review with enthusiasm. BEPA held a conference in 
April 2008, at which there was little enthusiasm for the CAP,5 
followed by a series of specialist workshops including one devoted 
to “Reflections on the Common Agricultural Policy from a long-
term perspective”.6 At another conference in November 2008, 
reporting on the findings of the public consultation, Grybauskaitė 
(2008: slide 6) referred to agriculture as one of the “hottest topics” 
of the consultation. 
In June 2008 the UK’s Treasury published its “Global Europe: 
vision for a 21st century budget”. In the foreword, then Chancellor 
of the Exchequer Alistair Darling wrote: “The EU needs a radically 
reformed budget. The budget review must be a genuinely 
fundamental, strategic and ambitious exercise to achieve proper 
and effective reform. The UK looks forward to taking an active part 
in the debate.” Moreover, the “re-orientation of the budget…must 
be in the context of a shift away from agricultural support” (HM 
Treasury, 2008: 3). 
But the effort petered out. Dalia Grybauskaitė resigned in 
February 2009 to become President of Lithuania; and the first 
Barroso Commission (2004-09) failed to report. Nonetheless, a draft 
report was leaked in October 2009. This leaked – but un-adopted – 
paper had some fairly robust comments to make about the need for 
CAP reform. It said, for example, that “the Commission considers 
that a root and branch reform of the EU budget is needed”. And 
later, “[F]urther reform and modernisation of agricultural spending 
is required to bring it fully into line with the principles of European 
                                                        
and for the Lisbon strategy in the same year. But a more over-arching 
review is also needed”. 
4 According to its Mission Statement, BEPA’s mission is “to provide timely, 
informed, policy and political advice to the President and Commission 
Services on issues relevant to the President's agenda and the future of 
policies in the Union” (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ 
policy_advisers/mission_statement/index_en.htm). 
5 For a record of the meeting see Larch (2008). 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/activities/ 
conferences_workshops/budget_review_workshops_en.htm. 
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value added, concentration on priorities and fairness...[T]he future 
reform of the CAP...must stimulate a further significant reduction 
in the overall share of the EU budget devoted to agriculture, freeing 
up spending for new EU priorities” (European Commission, 2009: 
5, 17). How much support this draft document had received from 
Commission President Barroso and others in the Commission is 
difficult to say, but it did contain a preface attributed to Barroso 
which said that it presented “the Commission’s vision for the EU 
budget reform” and that it should “form the basis for further debate 
with the European Parliament and the Council, with a view to 
preparing the next multiannual financial framework to be presented 
in principle in the first half of 2011” (European Commission, 2009: 
3). According to EurActiv (2009) Mariann Fischer Boel, the outgoing 
Commissioner for Agriculture, “denied ever having backed the 
draft communication, and referred to it as ‘a non-paper which 
should have been thrown in the bin’”. 
Thus it was left to the incoming College of Commissioners to 
put their stamp on the budget review, which was finally published 
in October 2010 (European Commission, 2010a), and to make their 
proposals for the 2014-20 MFF and post-2013 CAP. In practice, the 
Commission’s initial ideas for the post-2013 CAP, in “The CAP 
towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural resources and territorial 
challenges of the future” (European Commission, 2010b), were 
published soon after the budget review document, effectively 
conflating what the preface to the 2009 leaked paper had said would 
be a two-step process: first, the Commission’s reflections on the 
budget review, to which member states, MEPs, and interested 
bodies could respond, and then preparations for the 2014-20 MFF. 
So much for Tony Blair’s belief, as recorded in his 2010 memoirs, 
that he had “preserved the rebate, tied its demise to the CAP and 
agreed a break in the budget period when both could be reformed”. 
4. Changed circumstances: the commodity price 
spikes of the late 2000s 
Circumstances changed after the December 2005 commitment to 
undertake a budget review. Two particular aspects of the evolving 
world scene are especially relevant in the present context. First, 
world commodity markets experienced a price boom in 2007-08, as 
illustrated in Figure 12.1 for cereals and vegetable oils, with a 
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number of countries imposing export taxes or bans on sensitive 
products such as rice. Although the price spikes (in real terms) were 
much less pronounced than those of the early 1970s (Piesse & 
Thirtle, 2009: 120), this ‘world food crisis’ fuelled concerns about 
food availability and the appropriate role of governments in 
ensuring food security for their citizens.  
Figure 12.1 FAO monthly food price indices for cereals and vegetable oils, 
2001-14 (deflated: 2005 = 100) 
 
Note: For details of the composition of these two price indices, deflated by the 
World Bank Manufactures Unit Value Index (MUV), see the original source. 
The original data series had been deflated by the FAO so that 2002-04 = 100. I 
have rebased the series so that 2005 = 100. 
Source: Excel data file at 
www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/. 
In its 2010 reflections, for example, the European Commission 
(2010b: 5) commented that the CAP had to change to address new 
challenges, including “rising concerns regarding both EU and 
global food security”. Indeed, the European Parliament (2010: 18) 
had declared: “there should be a basic EU-funded direct area 
payment to all EU farmers in order to ensure the social and 
economic sustainability of the European agricultural production 
model, which [inter alia] should provide basic food security for 
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European consumers.” The author(s) of the leaked but un-adopted 
Commission text of 2009 had, however, taken a rather different 
position in opining, “Europe is well positioned to deal with these 
challenges, as its production capacity and purchasing power will 
continue to provide it with enough food at all times” (European 
Commission, 2009: 17-8). 
Whatever the merits of these arguments (Swinbank, 2012: 30), 
as Grant (2012: 433) observed: “The revival of food security 
narratives has certainly provide[d] a rallying point for those who 
would like to see traditional productionist approaches to 
agriculture restored.” The Scottish agricultural minister – who we 
shall meet later – remarked in January 2009: “Some of us have never 
subscribed to the view that food production…is for the market 
alone to deal with. But even for those who did perhaps, the events 
of 2008 forced them to acknowledge that a responsible government 
can never take food production and food security for granted” 
(Lochhead, 2009; original punctuation). Defra, wishing to show it 
was part of a responsible government, was forced onto the 
defensive; and in response produced a series of papers addressing 
the UK’s food security, e.g. Defra, 2008.  
Second, the potential unravelling and near collapse of the 
world’s financial system – particularly the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008, and the near exit of a number of EU member states 
from the euro as a result of their sovereign debt crises – reinforced 
the concerns of many critics of the neoliberal belief that freely-
operating markets were the most appropriate means to allocate 
resources.  
5. Eurosceptics, and the government’s isolation in 
Brussels 
In the UK’s May 2010 general election, the Conservative Party led 
by David Cameron won more seats in the House of Commons than 
any other party, but failed to achieve an overall majority. A coalition 
government, led by Cameron, was formed between the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, ousting Gordon Brown 
from 10 Downing Street. On the EU, the coalition partners had 
rather different perspectives. The Liberal Democrats, and 
particularly their leader (and now Deputy Prime Minister) Nick 
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Clegg, were decidedly pro-EU, whereas David Cameron led a 
divided party, with many of its members hostile to continued EU 
membership. Moreover, fears of voters defecting to the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) were a constant worry. UKIP 
“believes in Britain becoming a democratic, self-governing country 
once again. This can only be achieved by getting our nation out of 
the European Union and reasserting the sovereignty of 
Parliament”.7 In the 2014 European Parliament elections, UKIP 
topped the vote in Great Britain, i.e. excluding Northern Ireland 
where a rather different electoral system applied, at 27.5% of votes 
cast, with Labour at 25.4%, and the Conservatives at 23.9%.8 
The coalition agreement made no mention of the CAP, 
although it did say the new government believed “much more 
needs to be done to support the farming industry” (HM 
Government, 2010: 17). On the EU budget the coalition parties said 
they would “strongly defend the UK’s national interests in the 
forthcoming EU budget negotiations and agree that the EU budget 
should only focus on those areas where the EU can add value” (HM 
Government, 2010: 19).9 The government, nonetheless, was still 
pressing for CAP reform. In January 2011, for example, the 
government’s initial response to the Commission’s “The CAP towards 2020” (European Commission, 2010b) expressed concern 
about the Commission’s “lack of ambition”, and asserted: 
There must…be a very substantial cut to the CAP Budget 
during the next Financial Framework. Remaining 
spending must be prioritised wisely to ensure that CAP 
provides best value for taxpayers’ money, targeting 
measures effectively to deliver tangible outcomes. The UK 
believes that farmers do not want to rely on subsidies in 
                                                        
7 “What We Stand For” (www.ukip.org/issues).  
8 “UK European election results” 
(www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/vote2014/eu-uk-results). 
9 In addition the coalition government did commit to “examine the balance 
of the EU’s existing competences” (HM Government, 2010: 19). Defra took 
the lead on Agriculture (largely the CAP), and reported in 2014, after the 
outlines of the post-2013 CAP had been agreed (HM Government, 2014). It 
was largely a factual report of the views of those consulted, and appeared 
to attract little attention on publication. Whether it will have any lasting 
impact on the UK’s policy stance remains to be seen. 
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perpetuity: Expenditure in a significantly smaller CAP 
Budget should tackle the key objectives of encouraging a 
competitive, sustainable EU agriculture sector, reducing 
reliance on subsidies and focusing resources on the 
provision of environmental public goods” (Defra, 2011: 
102).  
But could the coalition government count on support in the 
Commission or in the European Parliament? The British 
Commissioner was Catherine Ashton.10 As High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy she had a high-
ranking position in the College of Commissioners, but unlike the 
commissioners responsible for the budget, trade, or the 
environment, her role did not lend itself to an involvement with the 
CAP (although in Barroso’s first commission she had briefly served 
as Commissioner for Trade following Peter Mandelson’s 
resignation from that post in 2008 (EurActiv, 2008)). 
Following the 2009 election to the European Parliament, 
MEPs from the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (otherwise known as the Party 
of European Socialists: PES) formed the two largest components 
with effective control of the Parliament and its committees. 
Although the British Conservatives had historically been associated 
with the EPP, on David Cameron’s instructions they left the EPP to 
form (the larger) part of the Alliance of European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR). Consequently, the leading partner in the UK’s 
coalition government had little influence in the European 
Parliament.  
British MEPs on the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) did, however, 
play a role. The one Liberal Democrat, for example, George Lyon, 
an MEP representing Scotland and a former President of the 
National Farmers Union of Scotland, was lead spokesperson for the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe in COMAGRI.11 He 
was the rapporteur for COMAGRI’s own-initiative report of June 
2010 on the “Future of the Common Agricultural Policy after 2013”, 
which argued in part that “since the CAP will have to confront 
                                                        
10 www.eeas.europa.eu/ashton/index_en.htm. 
11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Lyon_(Scottish_politician). 
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many challenges and pursue broader objectives after 2013, it is 
essential that the budget the EU allocates to the CAP is at least 
maintained at current levels” (European Parliament, 2010: 7). This 
was rather at variance with the British government’s stance on the 
CAP as expressed by Defra.  
Furthermore, David Cameron’s need to fend off his 
Eurosceptic critics led him to adopt policies that antagonised his 
European partners. For example, in December 2011 he was unable 
to commit the UK to a new treaty that the Eurozone countries, and 
most other member states, wished to conclude to combat the 
Eurozone crisis: a ‘fiscal compact’ on public sector spending. 
EurActiv (2011) suggested the UK’s “future as part of the EU [was] 
now put in question”. Then in January 2013, in the text of a speech 
circulated by 10 Downing Street, Cameron announced that – were 
the Conservatives to win an outright majority in the 2015 general 
election – he would seek to “negotiate a new settlement with our 
European partners….And when we have negotiated that new 
settlement, we will give the British people a referendum with a very 
simple in or out choice. To stay in the EU on these new terms; or 
come out altogether” (Cameron, 2013a). Quite what that would 
imply for British farm policy was, and remains, unclear (Swinbank, 
2014). 
David Cameron had little room for manoeuvre in the 
deliberations over the 2014-20 MFF. The Commission had certainly 
not proposed a CAP reform that reflected the UK’s repeated 
canvassing, and without the Commission’s support it would be 
fairly futile to persist in the face of opposition from many member 
states and MEPs. Instead, he had two priorities: to protect the rebate, 
and to secure some reduction in the overall budget. As he told the 
House of Commons on 11 February 2013 (following the meeting of 
the European Council on 7-8 February, which had set its imprint on 
the 2014-20 MFF (European Council, 2013)): 
Together with allies, many of whom like Britain write the 
cheques, we achieved a proper look across all the areas 
where spending in the Commission proposal could be cut. 
While there are areas where we could and should go 
further, not least on reforming the common agricultural 
policy and reducing the bureaucratic costs of the 
European Commission, we agreed a real-terms cut in the 
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payment limit to €908 billion…I wanted to set the limit at 
a level that would deliver at worst a freeze and at best a 
cut in actual spending over the next seven years. That is 
what this deal delivers – a real-terms cut…The only two 
sensible things we could do to protect the British taxpayer 
in these negotiations were to get the overall budget down 
and to protect what is left of our rebate…As for the rebate 
that this Government inherited, it is now completely 
untouched. As ever, throughout the negotiations the 
rebate was attacked repeatedly, but I successfully rejected 
all the calls for change, and under this Government the 
British rebate is safe (Cameron, 2013b). 
6. Defra and the devolved administrations 
The House of Commons, made up of members of parliament (MPs) 
elected from all parts of the UK, is both the legislative chamber for 
the UK and for England, as England has nether a devolved 
administration nor a parliamentary assembly, whereas Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland have both. Following the vote on 
Scottish independence on 18 September 2014, and the Scottish 
electorate’s decision to remain within the UK, the question of 
whether MPs representing Scottish constituencies should have the 
right to vote on legislation that would apply only in England has 
risen high on the political agenda. 
Another dimension of this issue is whether the offices of the 
UK state, located in Whitehall, such as the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), can effectively 
operate as both a UK and an English administration when devolved 
policy matters are at stake: agreeing on the details of CAP reform in 
Brussels, for example, when the devolved administrations have felt 
that these decisions impinged on their legitimate policy domain 
(Greer, 2005: 179). 
Midgley & Renwick (2012: 135) claim: “The Scottish National 
Party’s victory in the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary election…created 
a new dynamic in British politics and in the Scottish agricultural 
policy debate.” Its attempts “to fight against the dominance of the 
UK approach to agricultural policy…served to emphasise the 
difference of Scottish agriculture and the need for a distinctive 
Scottish policy” (Midgley & Renwick, 2012: 142).  
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Thus when Scotland’s farm minister addressed the Oxford 
Farming Conference in January 2009, he sought to distance himself 
from “the UK vision – commonly referred to as the DEFRA vision – 
for the Common Agricultural Policy”, that “the whole of the First 
Pillar should be phased out in the next few years. This is not Scottish 
Government’s vision…without ongoing direct support, farming in 
much of Scotland, and in many other marginal parts of Europe, will 
struggle simply to survive”. Later he declared:  
Agriculture may be devolved, but too often when DEFRA 
sneezes, Scotland catches a cold! And when the UK 
Treasury knock on DEFRA’s door, agriculture in Scotland 
takes a hit! For devolution to work properly, Scotland 
needs to know that when the UK Government is 
negotiating in the EU it does so on behalf of the devolved 
administrations too (Lochhead, 2009). 
Richard Lochhead retained his position as Cabinet Secretary 
for Rural Affairs and the Environment following the Scottish 
National Party’s outright electoral success in the 2011 Scottish 
election, and so it was he who had to interact with Defra ministers 
during the post-2013 CAP negotiations in Brussels and London, in 
the run-up to the Scottish referendum on independence in 
September 2014. Announcing – to the Scottish Parliament in June 
2014 – how Scotland intended to apply the post-2013 CAP, he 
remarked: “The new CAP is far from perfect...But at least it’s far 
better than was originally feared.” At the outset, he said, “[P]eople 
thought the CAP budget could be cut by as much as 30%”, but that 
“didn’t materialise”. And then, his next comment: “Thankfully, the 
UK government failed to abolish or phase out direct payments, on 
which our industry relies” (Lochhead, 2014). 
Clear differences emerged between the four parts of the 
United Kingdom as they announced their plans for implementing 
the new direct payments regime.12 All four announced their 
intention to shift money from direct payments to Pillar II, although 
in the case of Northern Ireland a demarcation dispute between 
                                                        
12 Material for this paragraph, and the remainder in this section, is drawn 
from Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (2014a & b), Defra 
(2013 & 2014), Lochhead (2014), Scottish Government (2014), Welsh 
Government (2014). 
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ministers meant they missed the EU’s notification deadline, and as 
a result there would be no transfer of funds in the first instance 
(Agra Facts, 2014). England, Wales and Northern Ireland decided 
not to apply the Small Farmers Scheme. 
England said it would not avail itself of the discretion to apply 
more restrictive rules to define ‘active farmers’, whereas Scotland 
planned to target support on “those who wear dirty wellies not 
comfy slippers”, and to exclude “sporting estates, whose principal 
activities are not farming” (Lochhead, 2014). On capping, England 
would simply apply a 5% deduction on payments in excess of 
€150,000, whereas Northern Ireland planned to cap payments at 
€150,000, Wales at €300,000, and Scotland at €500,000. 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland said they would not 
provide ‘voluntary coupled support’, although the last would 
review its decision before 1 August 2016. Scotland, whose 
agriculture minister “month after month…battled a UK 
Government that originally wanted zero coupled support… 
(Lochhead, 2014), planned an 8% coupling rate on beef across 
Scotland, with double payments on the farm’s first 10 calves, and a 
headage payment for sheep in the most disadvantaged regions.  
7. Concluding comments 
As illustrated by the preceding narrative, over the last decade 
successive British governments – if not the devolved 
administrations in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales – have 
championed further CAP reform, but without notable success. In 
December 2005 it did seem that Tony Blair had secured agreement 
for a fundamental review of the EU’s budget spending (including 
the CAP) and revenues (including the infamous British rebate) that 
would be undertaken before the EU’s institutions began their 
deliberations on the 2014-20 MFF, but that promise evaporated for 
a number of reasons.  
Despite a promising start, the European Commission failed to 
deliver its budget review on time. Market circumstances changed, 
emboldening supporters of the status quo, and the leverage that 
could have resulted from a successful conclusion of the Doha Round 
of trade negotiations in the WTO was lacking (Swinbank, 2015). A 
new commissioner, and the enhanced role of the European 
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Parliament following ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, changed 
the institutional dynamics of decision-making. The UK’s incoming 
coalition government in 2010 had so enfeebled itself in the EU’s 
corridors of power that it was probably unable, and unwilling, to 
press for its objective of a fundamental CAP reform if it was to retain 
the British rebate in the 2014-20 MFF, and a modicum of credibility 
for its EU policy. Many of the coalition government’s MPs in the 
House of Commons represented rural constituencies: they might 
have quite welcomed their government’s reluctance to press for 
radical CAP reform. Moreover, the London-based Defra did not 
have the full support of the devolved administrations, particularly 
in Scotland, and a referendum on Scottish independence was 
pending. 
For the moment it is too soon to say what the outcome of the 
British general election in May 2015 will be, whether there will be a 
referendum on the UK’s EU membership, or whether the UK will 
be a member of the EU for the next CAP reform debate in the late 
2010s. If it is still a member, the likelihood is that CAP reform and 
the British rebate will again dominate British thinking in 
deliberations on the post-2020 MFF. 
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13. COMAGRI AND THE 
‘CAP AFTER 2013’ REFORM: 
IN SEARCH OF A COLLECTIVE 
SENSE OF PURPOSE 
CHRISTILLA ROEDERER-RYNNING* 
1. Introduction 
The Lisbon Treaty significantly changed the rules shaping farm 
policy-making in the EU by introducing co-decision, now known as 
the ordinary legislative procedure. Bringing co-decision to 
agriculture was not simple, however. Constitutionally, there were 
still unsettled issues regarding the exact distribution of power 
between Council, Parliament and Commission, to be dealt with in 
the phase of implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Politically, many 
of the reasons for the longstanding hegemony of the Council in 
agricultural affairs remained. Farmers and rural constituencies 
sympathetic to farmers continued to be a significant electoral force 
in many European countries; and the EU remained the 
preponderant level of intervention in European agriculture, both in 
terms of regulatory scope and budgetary outlays. As a rare case of 
an EU ‘money policy’, the CAP has generated vested interests that 
resist retrenchment. In addition, new developments made the CAP 
an even more sensitive political area. The implementation of the 
                                                        
* The author acknowledges funding by the Danish Social Science Council 
(#11-104384). This study draws on interviews carried out between 
September 2012 and September 2014 in Brussels, at the European 
Parliament, the Commission, and various interest groups and non-
governmental organisations. The author thanks all those who participated 
in these interviews for generously sharing their time and insights. Alan 
Matthews, Alan Swinbank and Carsten Daugbjerg provided useful 
comments on various versions of the text.  
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Lisbon Treaty coincided with the start of the euro crisis. Many 
member states were hit by rising unemployment, while subject to 
growing pressure to reduce their public expenditure. This context 
made it difficult to sustain growing levels of CAP expenditure while 
fuelling redistributive conflict within and between the member 
states. In other words, farm issues acquired renewed politically 
sensitivity in the late 2000s, explaining the reluctance of many 
member states to involve the European Parliament in CAP affairs. 
The conditions were thus ripe for making the first reform of the CAP 
under the co-decision procedure a battleground of criss-crossing 
economic, political and institutional interests.  
This chapter explores how this battle played out within the 
European Parliament during the Cioloş reform and to what extent 
Parliament, and especially Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture 
and Rural Development (COMAGRI), was able to articulate and 
carry out a coherent vision for European agriculture. Parliament 
committees are nodal points in its legislative process: they have 
been called Parliament’s ‘legislative backbone’ (Westlake, 1994: 
191). We know that COMAGRI under the past leadership of 
committee chairs such as Friedrich-Wilhelm Græfe zu Baringdorf or 
Joseph Daul was able to assert itself in the policy process in spite of 
Parliament’s lack of power pre-Lisbon (Roederer-Rynning, 2003; 
Daugbjerg & Roederer-Rynning, 2014); and that it is primarily an 
interest-driven committee whose members tend to pursue 
particularistic interests responding to the specific needs of 
homogeneous electoral and interest constituencies (Yordanova, 
2009). Bearing this in mind, and given the role of national political 
sensitivities, it is interesting to examine what role COMAGRI 
played in the first CAP reform under co-decision. What were the 
lines of conflict about the CAP reform in the Parliament? Did co-
decision lead to a broader and more diversified political 
representation on COMAGRI? How did COMAGRI aggregate the 
contending positions?  
The chapter proceeds by providing an overview of the 
internal legislative process in the Parliament; outlining the division 
of labour between different Parliament committees during the ‘CAP 
after 2013’ reform; describing political representation in post-Lisbon 
COMAGRI; and, finally, tracing the process of aggregation of 
interests in the Parliament, distinguishing between the drafting and 
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amending phase, the phase of political compromises in committee, 
and finally the adoption of the Parliament mandate.  
2. Internal Parliament process in the CAP reform 
The CAP reform negotiations unfolded in three phases: agenda-
setting, from April 2010 to October 2011 (18 months), leading to the 
publication of the Commission’s legislative proposals; legislative 
deliberation in the Parliament and in the Council, from October 2011 
to April 2013 (18 months); and inter-institutional negotiations, from 
April 2013 to November 2013 (eight months). This study focuses on 
the second phase, looking at the formulation of the Parliament 
mandate and COMAGRI’s contribution to it (Figure 13.1). In the 
Parliament, this phase starts with the referral decision including the 
designation of a responsible legislative committee as well as the 
specific format of inter-institutional relations (first reading 
agreement or not). Referring legislative proposals to a committee is 
a structural choice with important consequences. Committees 
develop an “esprit de corps…over the years”, which not only explains 
why reforms of the Parliament committee system are notoriously 
difficult to carry out (committee members being “reluctant to see a 
merger with another committee”) (Corbett et al., 2011: 145), but also 
shapes how they frame a given “policy problem” (Gusfield 1980). 
Referral proposals are prepared by the Directorate-General of the 
Presidency in coordination with the secretariats of the stake 
committees, and announced in plenary by the presidency. In case of 
a disagreement, referral decisions are forwarded to the Conference 
of the Presidents, which must decide within six weeks upon a 
recommendation from the Conference of Committee Chairs unless 
the original recommendation endures (Corbett et al., 2011: 153).  
Standard referral decisions entail the designation of a lead 
committee, referred to as the ‘responsible committee’, usually with 
the designation of ‘opinion-giving committees’. Lead committees 
are responsible for putting forward Parliament legislative proposals 
in plenary and negotiating with the Council and the Commission in 
trilogues, while opinion committees may only submit amendments 
to be considered by the lead committee (but not the plenary) on 
those aspects of the text falling within their responsibility. In certain 
cases where the matter falls under the competence of two or more 
committees, the Conference of Presidents may decide to allow for 
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some degree of reinforced cooperation between these committees: 
ranging from the ‘association’ procedure (Rule 50) to the ‘joint’ 
procedure (Rule 51) depending on the degree of competence 
overlap and the importance of the matter. The role of opinion-giving 
committees under the standard and the associated procedures can 
be summed up using the distinction between at best ‘policy-
influencing’, in the former case, and ‘policy-making’ actors, in the 
latter case (Judge & Earnshaw, 2008). Therefore committee referral 
may be a conflict-ridden process. Once the referral process is 
completed, the legislative process in the Parliament takes place 
primarily in the lead committee, which is responsible for drafting 
Parliament amendments and adopting the mandate for inter-
institutional negotiations. In the case of the CAP after 2013 reform, 
however, the process was complicated by the decision in the fall of 
2013 to use the newly adopted Rule 70a of the Rules of Procedure 
(RoP). This rule conditions the opening of trilogue negotiations 
upon a mandate delivered by the Parliament’s plenary. 
The critical sequence of the CAP after 2013 reform in the 
Parliament thus unfolded between October 2011, when the referral 
decisions were made, and March 2013, when the plenary adopted 
the Parliament mandate. The four reports were drafted in the spring 
of 2012. They were amended in the summer of 2012 in the open 
amendment phase. Given the considerable number of amendments, 
MEPs and their staff then devoted a great deal of their time to 
boiling down the amendments to compromise amendments. This 
process was completed by the end of 2012, paving the way for a two-
step adoption of the mandate: first in the lead committee in January 
2013, and then in the plenary in March 2013. The whole process is 
summarised in Figure 13.1.  
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Figure 13.1 Legislative process in the European Parliament  
 
* The number of amendments includes the amendments submitted by the 
rapporteur (completed in early June 2012) and the amendments subsequently 
submitted by MEPs in the open amendment phase (deadline end of July 2012).  
12.10.2011: 
COM proposals
• COM(2011)0625 on direct payments
• COM(2011)0626 on single CMO
• COM(2011)0627 on rural development
• COM(2011)0628 on horizontal aspects
25.10.2011: EP 
referral
• COMAGRI designated as 'lead' with following 'opinion' committees:
• Direct payments: DEVE, ENVI, EMPL, BUDG, CONT, REGI
• Single CMO: DEVE, ENVI, EMPL, BUDG, REGI
• Rural development: DEVE, ENVI, EMPL, BUDG, CONT, REGI
• Horizontal aspects: DEVE, ENVI, EMPL, BUDG, CONT, REGI
Spring -Summer 
2012: drafting 
and amending 
process 
• Direct payments, rapp. Capoulas Santos, PT/S&D: 2292 amendments*
• Single CMO, rapp. Dantin, F/EPP: 1848 amendments*
• Rural development, rapp. Capoulas Santos, PT/S&D: 2127 amendments* 
• Horizontal aspects, rapp. La Via, I/EPP: 769 amendments*
Fall 2012: 
compromise 
amendments
• Direct payments: 38 compromise amendments in December
• Single CMO: 176 compromise amendments in December
• Rural development: 37 compromise amendments in December
• Horizontal aspects: 27 compromise amendments in December
Spring 2013: 
EP mandate
• 24.01.2013: COMAGRI vote
• 13.03.2013: Plenary vote on mandate for opening trilogue negotiations 
with Council and Commission
• April - September: trilogue negotiations
Fall 2013: 
Adoption of 
final texts
• 30.09.2013: COMAGRI vote on first reading
• 20.11.2013: Plenary vote and decision
• 17.12.2013: Final acts signed 30.09.2013: COMGARI vote on first reading 
16-17.12.2013: Final act signed. Final acts published in the Official Journal 
on 20 December 2013
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3. COMAGRI-ENVI division of labour 
The Parliament presidency announced committee referral decisions 
on the ‘CAP after 2013’ legislative package on 25 October 2011, in 
the plenary session immediately following the publication of the 
Commission’s legislative proposals. This announcement included 
the designation of COMAGRI as the ‘responsible committee’ on all 
four legislative proposals, and of different constellations of opinion-
giving committees for each of the legislative proposals (Figure 13.1). 
The referral process brought COMAGRI in conflict with the 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 
(ENVI) and the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT), which 
filed requests with the Conference of Committee Chair on 22 and 23 
November 2011 to be involved under Rule 50 on associated 
committees: on the Rural Development Regulation (both ENVI and 
CONT); on the Horizontal Regulation (CONT); and on the Direct 
Payment Regulation (ENVI). Eventually, an agreement was reached 
between the three committees and both ENVI and CONT withdrew 
their requests in March 2012. The conflict was settled by a decision 
to invite the ENVI rapporteurs (and presumably also the CONT 
rapporteurs) to the COMAGRI shadow rapporteurs’ meetings. This 
decision still secured ENVI’s participation in a crucial phase of the 
Parliament’s internal legislative process where political groups 
forge compromises, which determine the negotiating position of the 
Parliament as a whole. We know that the Council is particularly 
attentive to this phase, which informs the Council presidency of the 
alliances emerging between the shadow rapporteurs and the 
rapporteur and may be used to exert political leverage in the 
trilogue phase.  
In all, 21 ‘rapporteurships’ were subsequently allocated 
(excluding the shadow rapporteurs): four in COMAGRI, and 17 in 
the opinion-giving committees (see Table 13.1). In COMAGRI, the 
rapporteurships were equally divided between the two largest 
groups. S&D obtained the reports on the Direct Payment Regulation 
and the Rural Development Regulation: Luis Manuel Capoulas 
Santos, PT, was appointed rapporteur on both matters. The EPP 
obtained the reports on the Horizontal Regulation: Giovanni La Via, 
IT, was appointed rapporteur; and on the Single CMO Regulation: 
Michel Dantin, FR, was appointed rapporteur. 
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Taking the overall distribution of rapporteurships across 
COMAGRI and opinion-giving committees, the EPP secured 13 of 
the 21 rapporteurships (62%). In the opinion-giving committees, 
S&D secured two rapporteurships as compared with 11 
rapporteurships for the EPP. The overall EPP group of rapporteurs 
was by far the largest with seven MEPs, as compared with three 
MEPs for S&D, two for the Greens, and one each for ALDE and 
GUE/NGL. ENVI focused on the Direct Payments and Rural 
Development Regulations, disregarding the Horizontal and Single 
CMO Regulations. The allocation of rapporteurships revealed the 
respective strategic priorities of Parliament groups: S&D controlled 
ENVI; EPP controlled BUDG.  
The pattern of allocation of rapporteurships can usually be 
ascribed to varying mixes of expertise and resources available at 
committee level and political salience of the legislative proposals for 
the party groups. In this case, it is striking that S&D allocated two 
key COMAGRI rapporteurships to one individual, MEP Luis 
Manuel Capoulas Santos – a great responsibility and a formidable 
task, given the politically and technically complex character of these 
two files.  
4. Who is COMAGRI? 
In light of the pivotal role granted to COMAGRI in the legislative 
process of the CAP reform, it is interesting to examine in greater 
detail what kind of a committee it was after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty. COMAGRI is widely perceived as a committee 
close to the farming world. COMAGRI Chair Paolo De Castro 
himself described the seventh legislature committee as “45 full 
members and 45 substitute members, all of them very committed to 
its work. Many of these members have very close links to 
agriculture, through their origins or their previous activities.”202 At 
the same time, however, there is a perception that times are 
changing, and farmers might be losing their clout over COMAGRI. 
Past or current members of COMAGRI occasionally argue that the 
committee is now influenced by people who are more concerned 
with greening than farmers’ welfare or global competitiveness. 
                                                        
202 www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/agri/home.html. 
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How heterogeneous was COMAGRI’s membership in the seventh 
legislature?  
Parliament data on committee members in the seventh 
legislature can help us better understand the nature of political 
representation in COMAGRI. In order to capture the different ways 
in which COMAGRI members may relate to the ‘farming world’, we 
distinguish between three types of connection: ‘special interest’ in 
farming characterises the COMAGRI full members who have been 
members of farmers’ unions or cooperatives or have owned a farm 
or worked as farmer; ‘special expertise’ in agriculture characterises 
the COMAGRI full members who have held a ministerial or other 
public office in agriculture; finally, ‘other special expertise’ in 
agriculture characterises the COMAGRI full members with 
educational or occupational trajectories implying a clear and 
recognised expertise in agriculture (see Yordanova, 2009: 266 for a 
similar approach). Based on these categories, note that only three 
party groups have a majority of their full members on COMAGRI 
coming from outside the farming world: ECR, GUE/NGL and NI. 
On the whole, 31% of COMAGRI full members in the seventh 
legislature had a ‘special interest’ in agriculture and an additional 
24% had a ‘special expertise’ in agriculture (Figure 13.2).  
This is not new or unique to agriculture: already two decades 
ago, observers of the Parliament noted that “MEPs who are or were 
somehow attached to farming or a farming group [we]re more likely 
to be on the Agriculture Committee, as [we]re those MEPs coming 
from a peripheral state”; just like “lawyers and those with an 
attachment to human rights organizations are more likely to be 
members of the Legal Affairs Committee. And the Economics 
Committee tends to attract MEPs with business and labour union 
backgrounds” – in short, personal background is an important 
explanatory factor of committee assignment (Bowler & Farrell, 1995: 
231). Furthermore, it is difficult to derive any direct policy 
implication of this pattern of representation, as the consequences in 
practice depend on whether COMAGRI in practice functions as a 
homogenous committee of high demanders of status quo or actually 
incorporates rival interests and representation.  
340  COMAGRI AND THE ‘CAP AFTER 2013’ REFORM 
 
Figure 13.2 Farming background of COMAGRI full members by party 
group, seventh legislature 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Focusing on the two largest party groups, which together 
represented close to two-thirds of COMAGRI’s full members, the 
mix of competences and specialisation differed visibly. About 35% 
of EPP COMAGRI full members had been members of farmers’ 
unions or cooperatives, or were or had been farmers or owned a 
farm (‘special interest’), compared with only 8% in the case of S&D. 
S&D drew most of its special knowledge on agriculture from 
members having developed a special expertise in agriculture via a 
ministerial or other public office in agriculture or yet another 
occupational or educational background with a clear relation to 
agriculture (42% of S&D full members of COMAGRI). Conservative 
party groups, i.e. EPP, ECR and EFD, were better represented on 
this committee than in the plenary. In the seventh legislature, EPP, 
ECR and to a lesser extent EFD were better represented in 
COMAGRI than in the plenary. By contrast, S&D, ALDE, the 
Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL were all underrepresented in 
COMAGRI compared with the share of seats in the plenary, and this 
over-representation rose from the sixth to the seventh legislature 
(Table 13.2). 
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Table 13.2 Party group representation in COMAGRI and in the plenary, 
sixth and seventh legislatures 
Sixth legislature (2004-09)* 
Party Group Plenary % COMAGRI % 
EPP 288 36.7 34 37.4 
PES 217 27.6 23 25.3 
ALDE 100 12.7 8 8.8 
Greens/EFA 43 5.5 6 6.6 
UEN (later ECR) 44 5.6 8 8.8 
GUE/NGL 41 5.2 3 3.3 
IND/DEM/NA 52 6.6 9 9.9 
Seventh legislature (2009-14)** 
Party Group Plenary % COMAGRI % 
EPP 273 35.7 34 38.6 
S&D 196 25.6 22 25 
ALDE 83 10.9 8 9.1 
Greens/EFA 57 7.5 6 6.9 
ECR 57 7.5 8 9.1 
GUE/NGL 35 4.6 2 2.3 
EFD 31 4.1 4 4.5 
NA 33 4.3 4 4.5 
* Outgoing parliament. Data collected from hwww.europarl.europa.eu under 
entry “About Parliament” => “In the past” => “Composition”.  
** In the absence of available data on “Outgoing parliament” data are collected 
from http://www.europarl.europa.eu under entry “MEPs” => “Search” => 
“Advanced search”.  
Source: Author’s compilation.  
It is interesting to what extent the overrepresentation of 
conservative groups reflect the strategic priorities of the different 
Parliament parties with respect to agriculture. These discrepancies 
were larger than adjustments for rounded figures, which is 
methodologically considered to be an indicator of strategic 
priority.203 In the seventh legislature, the EPP and the ECR together 
secured four COMAGRI seats in excess of the expected distribution 
based on the composition of the plenary, while S&D and the 
Greens/EFA together were short of two COMAGRI seats (Table 
                                                        
203 Yordanova (2009) considers a two-seat discrepancy as so great as 
indicating “a deal between groups driven by their policy priorities.” 
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13.3). But in order to be meaningful, the analysis would have to 
include a qualitative analysis of the different parties’ ideological 
positions on agriculture. In COMAGRI, the left-right wing cleavage 
might not be so important, as most of the S&D in COMAGRI might 
be closer to their EPP colleagues on COMAGRI than their S&D 
colleagues on ENVI (interview, 3 December 2014). The fact that the 
S&D group secured the chairmanship of the committee could be 
seen as a partial compensation for the conservative tone of 
COMAGRI. The real cleavage is more likely between Green 
representations of agriculture and the more traditional 
representation of agriculture displayed in the large majority of 
COMAGRI members. 
Table 13.3 Distribution of COMAGRI seats based on party group size in 
the plenary, sixth and seventh legislatures  
Sixth legislature (2004-09), 91 COMAGRI seats 
Party Group Expected Observed Difference* 
EPP 33.3 34 + 
PES 25.1 23 -2 
ALDE 11.5 8 -4 
Greens/EFA 4.9 6 + 
UEN (later ECR) 5.1 8 +3 
GUE/NGL 4.7 3 -2 
IND/DEM/NA 6 9 +3 
Seventh legislature (2009-14), 88 COMAGRI seats 
Party Group Expected Observed Difference* 
EPP 31.4 34 +3 
S&D 22.5 22 - 
ALDE 9.5 8 -2 
Greens/EFA 6.5 6 - 
ECR 6.5 8 + 
GUE/NGL 4 2 -2 
EFD 3.5 4 0 
NA 4.9 4 - 
* Signs alone indicate a difference of one seat. Seats are rounded to whole 
numbers with a cut-off point at -.4. For example: 22.5 expected seats are 
rounded to 23 seats, whereas 31.4 expected seats are rounded to 31 seats. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Geographically, MEPs from member states supporting an 
interventionist CAP represented the largest part of the COMAGRI 
membership (54.5%), whereas countries generally viewed as having 
more liberal interests represented slightly less than 30% of 
COMAGRI. Countries in favour of an interventionist CAP include: 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Spain. Countries in favour of a 
more liberal CAP include: Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Germany is generally 
viewed as balancing between the two coalitions (Daugbjerg & 
Roederer-Rynning, 2014). Representatives from new member states 
made up 22% of COMAGRI, compared with 28.5% in the 
Parliament as a whole. This may be considered surprisingly low 
given the redistributive implications of the CAP: in comparison, the 
share of MEPs coming from the new member states reached 40% in 
the Regional Development Committee (REGI), a committee having, 
like COMAGRI, a redistributive remit involving the distribution of 
EU funds.  
Thus it appears on the basis of these preliminary data that 
COMAGRI in the post-Lisbon era was not a different committee 
from what it was before the introduction of co-decision. It had close 
connections to the farming world; and its centre of gravity lay, 
politically as well as geographically, around an interventionist and 
rather status quo-oriented interpretation of the CAP. None of this 
was new,204 which in itself is interesting given the significant 
institutional changes that inaugurated the seventh legislature. If 
anything, we may speculate on the basis of these data that the entry 
into force of co-decision in agriculture coincided with the renewed 
reassertion – rather than the lessening – of the farming profile of 
COMAGRI. More research into the farming background of 
COMAGRI ex ante/ex post Lisbon will be needed to ascertain this 
point. The policy implication of this overall pattern of 
representation depends on the extent to which non-farm interests 
are incorporated in the organisation of the legislative process in the 
Parliament.  
                                                        
204 For example, ALDE has been historically most under-represented in 
COMAGRI (see Yordanova, 2009: 258).  
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5. From 719 to 7,036 Parliament amendments 
COMAGRI had started to work on the CAP reform long before the 
Commission presented its proposals in October 2011, and even 
before the Commission launched its Public Consultation in June 
2010 leading to the publication of a Commission Communication on 
the CAP reform on 18 November 2010. These efforts materialised in 
a series of 2009 reports adopted by large majorities, not least the 
Lyon report (Crombez et al., 2012). The conditions for shaping the 
Commission’s views were favourable as the new Commissioner had 
urged his services – not just DG Agriculture and Rural 
Development’s services in charge of inter-institutional relations – to 
establish informal contacts with the relevant administrative units of 
the Parliament. The Commission’s Communication was said to refer 
specifically to ideas developed in COMAGRI, and the first deed of 
Commissioner Cioloş following the publication of the 
Commission’s Communication was to meet with the members of 
COMAGRI. After the November 2010 Communication, however, 
things turned less favourably for MEPs, as COMAGRI was 
decreasingly able to control internal divisions. The Dess report on 
the Commission’s Communication was perceived as articulating an 
idiosyncratic vision of the CAP reform out of line with the majority 
position and echoing national interests. The controversial report 
failed to receive the backing of Dess’s own group (EPP), of which he 
was political coordinator in COMAGRI. After a tortuous process 
(and many amendments) the plenary adopted the report in June 
2011 in a version more compatible with earlier COMAGRI reports. 
This pre-reform exercise highlighted how difficult it could be for 
COMAGRI to coordinate its position.  
The COMAGRI rapporteurs drafted their reports on the CAP 
reform in the spring of 2013. This phase was completed in early 
June. Together, the rapporteurs put forward 719 amendments to the 
Commission proposals: this was not a particularly high number of 
amendments given the scope and breadth of the proposed (four) 
legislative regulations. It was nothing in comparison with the 7,036 
amendments that MEPs subsequently submitted during the open 
amendment phase. The tenfold increase in amendments dismayed 
some in COMAGRI, who worried about negative implications for 
the credibility of the Parliament as a co-legislator. Besides 
underscoring the complexity of the Commission proposals, this 
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avalanche of amendments highlighted the heterogeneity of 
agricultural and national interests. They reflected intense lobbying 
by professional farmer organisations, the industry, and institutional 
lobbyists, as well as NGOs:  
COPA allied itself with upstream and downstream economic 
partners, such as European Crop Protection Association (ECPA), 
Fertilizers Europe, European Feed Manufacturers’ Federation 
(FEFAC), European Seed Association (ESA), but also CEMA 
(European Agricultural Machinery) and Food and Drink Europe, 
and the European Society for Agronomy (ESA). This constellation 
of interests mobilised on the theme of the promotion of European 
agriculture’s competitiveness, productivity, and global 
engagement, and focused significant parts of its argumentation on 
technical and scientific evidence. Given the diversity of agriculture 
in the EU, COPA ordinarily devotes much time to internal 
consensus building; this effort was even more pressing in the CAP 
reform, given the eminently redistributive dimension of the reform. 
Large industrial actors lobbied directly in supplement or 
replacement of COPA, using a variety of means including large 
public events such as large conferences organised by Syngenta 
together with the European Landowners’ Organisation (ELO).  
Institutional lobbyists were also active. National 
governments were involved in devising these amendments, 
sometimes through lobbying from the permanent representations, 
other times directly from the national capitals. A considerable 
number of amendments were authored by MEPs coming from the 
same national delegations but affiliated to different Parliament 
party groups (Olper & Pacca, 2015: chapter 14, this volume). The 
French government inspired an amendment introducing from 
scratch a new optional scheme into the Commission proposals, the 
so-called ‘redistributive payment’ allowing member states to 
redistribute up to 30% of their national envelope to support smaller 
farms through a “premium on the first 50 hectares of land”.205 The 
French introduced this proposal as a trial balloon before Council 
discussions as it appeared that the Commission was divided on this 
                                                        
205 French Agriculture Minister Stéphane Le Foll could draw on his 
experience as a former member of the European Parliament and 
COMAGRI (until May 2012).  
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issue and that opposition in parts of the Commission services had 
kept the issue off the agenda. This measure became a flagship 
redistributive measure of the Parliament, but it also testifies to the 
ability of coalitions of MEPs and national governments to set the 
agenda concurrently with the Commission.  
Perhaps a newer development is that NGOs, too, were 
actively lobbying in the drafting phase. Civil society activism 
materialised along two axes: a conservationist platform around 
environmental NGOs (eNGOs) such as BirdLife, European 
Environmental Bureau (EEB), World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
(IFOAM) and Friends of the Earth; and a rural platform around the 
Agricultural and Rural Convention (ARC2020) emerging at the end 
of 2009. These two platforms overlapped as many eNGOs 
participated in the ARC2020, but they tended to focus on different 
themes (conservation/good food – good farming) and target 
different actors. ARC2020 tended to focus mostly on farm policy 
actors, Commissioner Cioloş during the phase of public debate and 
COMAGRI during the legislative phase up to plenary vote in March 
2013. Environmental NGOs, on the other hand, focused more on the 
Parliament’s Environment Committee. These civil society coalitions 
built detailed common positions throughout the legislative process 
while seeking to raise awareness of the issues in the broader public. 
They participated in hearings and public events in the Parliament, 
proposed amendments to the Parliament reports and made specific 
voting recommendations ahead of the COMAGRI vote in January 
2013. Unlike the COPA constellation, NGOs had limited access to 
technical and scientific expertise and identify this comparative 
disadvantage as one of the factors that prevented them from 
exerting influence in COMAGRI.  
6. A COMAGRI compromise 
COMAGRI devoted the second half of 2012 to sorting out the 
amendments and working out political compromises in shadow 
rapporteurs’ meetings on the basis of lists composed with the help 
of the administrative staff of COMAGRI. On 6 November, the 
Parliament announced that the vote in COMAGRI, originally 
scheduled for late November 2012, was delayed by two months to 
23-24 January 2013, and it would be followed by a plenary vote 
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some time in March. The rules governing voting were further 
specified in late November. As mentioned above, the Parliament 
leadership chose to apply the newly adopted Rule 70a of the 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on the opening of inter-
institutional negotiations under the co-decision procedure. This 
new rule enabled the Parliament to open inter-institutional 
negotiations on the basis of a reinforced mandate, by requiring the 
Parliament plenary to adopt the negotiation mandate. 
There was a great deal of speculation as to why the process 
was so slow and delayed several times; certainly, delaying the vote 
had strategic and policy implications. Strategically, it made the 
Parliament more vulnerable to Council pressure by turning the 
Parliament into an ‘impatient legislator’. The entry into force of the 
reform was now postponed to 1 January 2015. With the end of the 
seventh legislature approaching (Parliament elections in May 2014), 
this meant that a CAP reform agreement had to be reached under 
the Irish presidency by the end of June 2013. This new timeline 
worked to the Council’s advantage due to the different institutional 
preferences of Council and Parliament.206 From a policy perspective, 
delaying the process also made it more difficult to push an agenda 
for reform. The delay entrenched the contingency of the greening 
agenda: the commitment to greening depended on the size of the 
overall envelope. It also enabled sceptics to suspend any 
meaningful talk on greening. Environmentalists were thus critical 
of this delay advocated by COMAGRI on grounds of stalled 
budgetary negotiations in the Council. 
In the absence of a November COMAGRI vote, the 
negotiations on forging compromise positions lasted until 
December 2012. The political landscape was difficult to navigate. 
COMAGRI was caught in overlapping lines of conflict involving: 
pro-environmentalists versus pro-producers; old versus new 
member states; large versus small farmers; free-trade versus 
interventionist member states; as well as farmers involved in 
                                                        
206 The Council generally seeks to avoid conciliation, which is 
institutionally less favourable to the Council due to its lack of 
administrative resources. The Parliament’s bargaining position is stronger 
when the Parliament can afford to wait, and negotiate under the shadow 
of conciliation.  
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producing different commodities. Furthermore, in view of the 
agreement reached during the referral process, COMAGRI had to 
involve ENVI rapporteurs in the compromise negotiations.  
The political groups were torn. ECR had to bridge a wide gulf 
of preferences between UK members and Polish members, not just 
on redistributive issues such as the capping of farm payments, but 
also on more ideological issues such as the appropriateness of 
greening the CAP. S&D lines of cleavage largely followed a North-
South opposition; S&D also had the added problem that it had to 
find a compromise between the widely different positions of its 
ENVI and COMAGRI rapporteurs. Groups dealt with internal 
divisions differently. Some, like the S&D group, sought to develop 
a line of compromise and win internal acceptance for this line. The 
S&D leadership was never quite successful in rallying the 
‘Northern’ group, which sought a more favourable representation 
of environmental concerns and formed an internal coalition, the 
‘Viking Group’, including British, Danish, Dutch, Swedish and 
some German MEPs. Conservative groups adopted a different 
strategy, which can be abbreviated as ‘choosing not to choose’. The 
ECR, for example, tabled competing (and sometimes mutually 
exclusive) amendments in order to keep all options open in the 
committee vote.207 This gives an indication of how difficult it was 
for some (most) Parliament groups more generally to develop a 
common position.  
Several mechanisms underpinned the emergence of 
compromises. Within COMAGRI, the groups that pushed for a 
more active reform agenda remained in a marginal position. The 
Greens/EFA MEPs never became consensus builders; from the 
perspective of environmentalist sympathisers, the Greens’ idealistic 
strategy in the CAP reform enabled adverse pieces of legislation 
from being passed. Some S&D MEPs in opposition to the 
                                                        
207 For example, on the greening model proposed by the Commission 
(Article 29, Direct Payment Regulation), ECR amendments aimed both at 
deleting the text proposed by the Commission (amendments 1244 and 
1245) and softening it (amendments 1258 and 1259). Similarly, regarding 
the Commission proposals on the principle of crop diversification (same 
text, Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a), the ECR presented no fewer than 
five amendments (amendments 1279, 1283, 1295, 1303 and 1307) pointing 
in different directions. 
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COMAGRI position on the CAP reform report being marginalised 
in their group, due to a combination of political and procedural 
manoeuvres. The marginalisation of ENVI also facilitated a 
compromise. Under the aegis of Dan Jørgensen and Karin 
Kadenbach (both from the S&D group), ENVI had played a key role 
in articulating an alternative set of proposals for the CAP with a 
view to improving the environmental aspects of the Commission’s 
proposals. However, its input did not have much influence on the 
final outcome of the CAP reform process in COMAGRI. In spite of 
the referral agreement, the ENVI rapporteurs were never 
meaningfully involved in the shadows’ meetings as their 
participation was internally contested in COMAGRI.  
Eventually, a common COMAGRI position emerged from 
these internal labours and 278 compromise amendments were 
tabled in December 2012, enabling to reduce considerably the 
number of Parliament amendments.  
7. The Parliament mandate 
The COMAGRI vote took place in 23-24 January 2013. After internal 
discussions as to the appropriateness of different voting methods, it 
was decided that the COMAGRI vote would take place by show of 
hands. Sometimes the political groups had been able to reach a 
compromise; other times, however, persistent disunity had led 
political groups to table concurrent proposals to vote. Observers 
report the vote as confusing: it went very fast and was hard to 
follow, causing uncertainty as to how the counting was done. On 
one of the issues where multiple proposals were on the table, one 
MEP changed his position in the process, leading to an inconclusive 
vote. This forced MEPs to revert to voting on the original 
amendments, which the two competing compromise amendments 
had enabled them to eliminate. MEPs did not have voting lists 
prepared on these highly technical amendments and had to take 
their cue from their respective group leaders. This was 
instrumentalised by the sceptical segment of the British press, which 
described the event as testimony to the fact that MEPs commonly 
vote on issues they don’t understand.208  
                                                        
208 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/9829032/Bingo-hall-
vote-caps-classic-piece-of-EU-double-dealing.html. 
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The vote was a difficult moment for most of the political 
groups. In the S&D group, an internal vote preceding the 
COMAGRI vote had resulted in a large minority (40%) opposing the 
compromises presented by MEP Capoulas Santos. A few issues 
remained contentious after the COMAGRI vote, either because no 
compromises could be found, or because the majorities were thin. 
These included: double-funding of farm activities; the greening 
model proposed by COMAGRI, including provisions enabling 
farmers to be called automatically ‘green’; the penalty for non-
compliance with the greening requirements, where a thin 
COMAGRI majority emerged in favour of reducing the penalty to 
the greening payment; the transparency on the names of the 
beneficiaries of CAP payments, where several member states in the 
Council insisted on the public disclosure of all beneficiaries 
(including Germany, where a national ruling compelled the 
government to do so); cross-compliance requirements, where 
COMAGRI amendments deleted existing binding references to the 
protection of ground water against pollution, minimum soil cover, 
soil erosion, ban on hormones in meat, registration of animals, 
animal diseases, the Pesticides Directive, the Water Framework 
Directive, the protection of wetlands and carbon rich soils, the Birds 
and Habitats Directive; the extension of the sugar quota system 
beyond the proposed deadline of 2015; the proposition to recognise 
inter-branch organisations; etc. 
Outside of the Parliament, the COMAGRI vote produced a 
clear pattern of reaction: approval of producer groups versus anger 
among eNGOs, who accused COMAGRI of being closed to civil 
society.209 In the period leading up to the plenary vote, these 
                                                        
209 Compare, e.g. WWF’s reaction: “The environmental community”, 
according to a key eNGO, “is alarmed that the European Parliament 
Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development has effectively stripped 
away any meaningful greening from the proposed CAP…COMAGRI has 
squandered a historic opportunity to support farming and environmental 
sustainability together and has lost all credibility” (“WWF Anger at EU 
Parliament COMAGRI Voting Decisions”,  www.wwf.eu/?207328/ 
WWF-anger-at-EU-Parliament-COMAGRI-voting-decisions--Double-
funding-goes-through); and COPA-COGECA’s “COPA-COGECA 
welcomes MEPs’ timely vote on future CAP and sees measures as step in 
right direction” (COPA-COGECA, Press Release, 23 January 2013). 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  351 
 
organisations put increased pressure on MEPs, using coordinated 
action in several member states to revert to the COMAGRI outcome. 
Their strategy was modelled from the previous reform of the 
fisheries, where a civil society campaign had enabled activists to 
reverse an adverse committee vote and muster an unexpectedly 
large victory in favour of a ban on overfishing and additional 
protective measures in plenary.210  
Many additional amendments were tabled between the 
COMAGRI vote of January and the plenary vote, often sponsored 
by other actors than the committee responsible (Table 13.4). The 
legislators considered sending the text back to COMAGRI in view 
of the large number of additional amendments and requests for split 
and separate votes.211 However, this was technically ruled out given 
that all amendments met the statutory requirement of being 
supported by at least one-tenth of the committee’s members. During 
the plenary, there were again requests to refer the matter back to 
COMAGRI. Before the vote on the Direct Payments Regulation, Sir 
Robert Atkins (ECR), supported by 40 MEPs, asked pursuant to 
Rule 175(2) that the proposals on all four CAP reform legislative 
dossiers be referred back to COMAGRI. The plenary rejected the 
request. John Stuart Agnew (Europe of Freedom and Democracy 
group) reiterated this request before the vote on the Single CMO 
Regulation.   
 
 
                                                        
210 http://cfp-reformwatch.eu/2013/02/parliament-adopts-cfp-reform-
position-with-strong-majority/. 
211 Rule 162 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure reads: “When more than 
50 amendments and requests for a split or separate vote have been tabled 
to a report for consideration in Parliament, the President may, after 
consulting its Chair, ask the committee responsible to meet to consider 
those amendments or requests. Any amendment or request for a split or 
separate vote not receiving favourable votes at this stage from at least one-
tenth of the members of the committee shall not be put to the vote.”  
  
352  COMAGRI AND THE ‘CAP AFTER 2013’ REFORM 
Ta
bl
e 1
3.
4 
A
m
en
dm
en
ts
 ta
bl
ed
 to
 th
e c
om
m
itt
ee
 re
po
rt
 o
n 
th
e C
A
P 
af
te
r 2
01
3 
re
fo
rm
, p
len
ar
y 
vo
te
 o
f 1
3 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
3 
 
(1
) 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 a
m
 
au
to
m
at
ic
al
ly
 
ta
bl
ed
 in
 
pl
en
ar
y 
(2
) 
A
dd
iti
on
al
 a
m
 
ta
bl
ed
 in
 p
le
na
ry
 
by
 p
ol
iti
ca
l g
ro
up
s 
or
 >
 4
0 
M
EP
s*
 
(2
a)
 
N
um
be
r o
f 
(2
) a
m
 
ad
op
te
d 
(2
b)
 
N
um
be
r o
f 
(2
) a
m
 
re
je
ct
ed
 
(2
c)
 
N
um
be
r o
f 
(2
) a
m
 
la
ps
ed
 
(3
) 
C
om
m
itt
ee
-
au
th
or
ed
 
am
 re
je
ct
ed
 
in
 p
le
na
ry
 
(4
) 
sp
lit
 
vo
te
s 
(5
) 
se
pa
ra
te
 
vo
te
s  
(6
) 
RC
V
 
D
ir
ec
t 
Pa
ym
en
ts
 
Re
gu
la
tio
n 
98
 
88
 (9
0%
) 
4 
66
 
18
 
2 
8 
15
**
 
63
 
H
or
iz
on
ta
l 
Re
gu
la
tio
n 
19
4 
22
 (1
1%
) 
3 
18
 
1 
17
 
2 
44
 
34
 
Ru
ra
l 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
14
2 
36
 (2
5%
) 
10
 
22
 
4 
0 
8 
8 
30
 
Si
ng
le
 C
M
O
 
34
9 
12
6 
(3
6%
) 
3 
86
 
37
 
1 
5 
10
5 
10
8 
To
ta
l 
78
3 
27
2 
20
 
19
2 
60
 
20
 
23
 
17
2 
23
5 
* P
er
ce
nt
ag
es
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 in
di
ca
te
 ra
tio
 o
f a
dd
iti
on
al
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 ta
bl
ed
 b
y 
po
lit
ic
al
 g
ro
up
s a
nd
 g
ro
up
s o
f a
t l
ea
st
 4
0 
M
EP
s (
2)
 /
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 (1
). 
**
 T
he
se
 a
re
 se
pa
ra
te
 v
ot
es
 o
n 
th
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 p
ro
po
se
d 
by
 th
e 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
. I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 th
er
e 
w
er
e 
se
ve
n 
se
pa
ra
te
 v
ot
es
 
on
 o
th
er
 p
ar
ts
 o
f t
he
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
te
xt
s. 
Th
es
e 
vo
te
s a
re
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
as
 se
pa
ra
te
 v
ot
es
 in
 th
e ‘
Re
qu
es
ts
 fo
r s
ep
ar
at
e 
vo
te
s’
 b
el
ow
 th
e 
vo
tin
g 
re
co
rd
s 
ev
en
 th
ou
gh
 th
ey
 d
o 
no
t a
pp
ea
r a
s ‘
se
pa
ra
te
 v
ot
es
’ i
n 
th
e 
ta
bl
e 
su
m
m
ar
is
in
g 
th
e 
vo
tin
g 
re
su
lts
.  
So
ur
ce
: T
he
 d
at
a 
ar
e 
co
lle
ct
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
m
in
ut
es
 o
f t
he
 p
le
na
ry
 s
es
si
on
, 1
3 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
3,
 A
nn
ex
: R
es
ul
ts
 o
f V
ot
es
, p
p.
 8
-4
5.
  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  353 
 
The plenary vote on the CAP reform was not comparable to 
the green landslide that had materialised, one month earlier, in the 
plenary vote on the fisheries reform. Large majorities were secured 
on the rural development dossier (556 for, 95 against) and the 
horizontal regulation (472 for, 172 against) in contrast to the Direct 
Payments Regulation (approved by 427, against 224) and the Single 
CMO Regulation (the most contested, with 375 in favour and 277 
against). The plenary corrected the recommendations made by 
COMAGRI on several points and adopted additional measures. 
Most important, it banned provisions for double-funding; 
reinstated some of the Commission’s greening model against less 
constraining COMAGRI provisions on ‘automatically green’ 
farmers;212 and partly reintegrated cross-compliance requirements 
(failed to reintegrate compliance with: the Water Framework 
Directive – lost with only nine votes; Protection of Wetlands and 
Carbon Rich Soils; and, unexpectedly, the Birds and Habitats 
Directive). The plenary initially supported additional support for 
the High Nature Value programme, but this was voted down after 
an electronic check, just as it had happened in COMAGRI in 
January. At the end of the day, the environmentalist forces in and 
outside the Parliament hailed it as “damage limitation”; producer 
groups were relieved by the “swift” adoption of a Parliament 
mandate.213  
8. Conclusion 
Although the shift to the new Lisbon set of rules was expected to 
affect the politics of agriculture in the Parliament, precisely what 
type of change would ensue had until now remained the object of 
speculation. National and sector-specific interests might be 
consolidating their position in farm politics using the Parliament as 
an extra channel of influence. Conversely, ideological cleavages 
might become more salient as increased Parliament powers in this 
area compelled the chamber as a whole and Parliament political 
groups to compete over a broad range of decisions, ranging from 
COMAGRI assignments to report allocation, through the 
institutional parameters of intra-institutional (between COMAGRI 
                                                        
212 But the COMAGRI position on the content of the greening remained.  
213 COPA-COGECA, Press release, 13 March 2013.  
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and other Parliament fora) and inter-institutional (between 
Parliament and other EU institutions) cooperation.  
The Parliament approached the ‘CAP after 2013’ reform from 
a conservative position, politically as well as institutionally. The 
features defining this position were: a default formula of committee 
referral granting COMAGRI the lead; the consolidated position of 
conservative party groups in the pattern of allocation of 
rapporteurships in the lead and opinion committees; and a 
segmented representation of EPP and S&D in the opinion 
committees, as the two largest political groups entrenched their 
influence in different committees, BUDG and ENVI, respectively. 
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, COMAGRI had long 
been shaped by a consensus about the importance of the CAP and 
defending the CAP against – as a seasoned observer of Parliament 
agricultural politics put it – other “political forces in the chamber” 
which consider the CAP “a policy of the past”, and that the time has 
come to “move to something else.”  
This remains the case today after the shift to co-decision. 
COMAGRI in the seventh legislature had close connections to the 
farming world; its centre of gravity lay, politically, around centre-
to-right farmer-friendly parties, and, geographically, around a 
group of countries traditionally favouring an interventionist 
interpretation of the CAP. In spite of the agreement reached 
between ENVI and AGRI, the participation of the ENVI rapporteurs 
in the COMAGRI shadows’ meetings remained internally contested 
in COMAGRI and was not allowed to have any policy impact on the 
emerging position of COMAGRI. The institutional segmentation of 
the legislative process in the Parliament supported this hierarchy of 
concerns between agricultural and industrial interests on the one 
hand, and environmental interests on the other hand, for the benefit 
of the former.  
Beyond these familiar features, a new political debate on the 
appropriateness and legitimacy of the specific forms of EU 
intervention in agriculture is emerging in the Parliament as a result 
of the shift to co-decision. This debate reflects the nascent 
mobilisation of reform-oriented groups at the intersection of the 
parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary arenas, and it cuts across 
established Parliament party groups. COMAGRI politics is not a 
simple conflict over the spoils of the CAP. Internal debates about 
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principled issues have developed in all groups, including the EPP 
and S&D, leading to the persistent articulation of minority and 
dissident positions. This development would probably not have 
taken place, had co-decision not been introduced.  
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14. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S 
POSITION ON MARKET 
REGULATION AND THE IMPACT 
OF THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
ALESSANDRO OLPER 
AND LUCIA PACCA 
1. Introduction 
The June agreement on the Single Common Market Organisation 
Regulation (alternatively, the ‘Single CMO’) of the CAP 2020 
reform, reached by the Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament, can be summarised in two main objectives.1 The first 
one is to contribute towards further market orientation of 
agriculture and farmer activities in a contest of increasing 
international pressure and competition. The second is to preserve a 
minimum intervention safety net to protect farmers from the 
growing uncertainty and instability of international markets.  
In the new Single CMO Regulation, these principles are 
included in the following policy instruments. With the objective to 
increase market efficiency and to reinforce the role of farmers along 
the food supply chain, the new CMO gives a central role to producer 
organisations (POs) and to inter-branch organisations (IBOs), from 
now on extended to every agricultural sector covered by the CMO.2 
                                                        
1 The new Single CMO Regulation related to Market Measures [(EU) No 
1308/2013] was approved in November 2013 by the Parliament and in 
December 2013 by the Council. 
2 The new regulation extends, in some sectors, the possibility for collective 
bargaining and, in all sectors, delivery contracts to producer organisations, 
their associations and inter-branch organisations. Moreover, it introduces 
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There will be a reorganisation with some (minor) changes of the 
standard public (and private) market intervention instruments, and 
the creation of a reserve for crises in the agricultural sector of €2.8 
billion (€400 million per year), outside the multiannual financial 
framework (MFF). This reserve could be used by the Commission 
as market support measures in response to market disruption 
related to animal diseases and/or loss of consumer confidence due 
to animal or plant health issues. The supply control measures in the 
sugar, wine and dairy sectors have been eliminated and, finally, 
there is an improvement of the schemes for (school) supply of milk 
and fruits for children, and the introduction of specific aids for food 
distribution in response to food security issues.  
The new Single CMO Regulation represents a long and 
complex document of 232 articles, 19 detailed annexes, and 184 
pages. However, to what extent it represents a true innovation of 
the CAP 2020 reform it is not immediately clear. The first impression 
suggests that the innovative contribution of the Single CMO 
Regulation is quite limited. Indeed, although some new safety 
instruments and the reinforcement of POs and IBOs have been 
introduced, in the end it represents a sort of revision and fine-tuning 
of regulations that were already in place in the CAP, without any 
substantial introduction of new instruments.  
The objective of this case study is to analyse the Parliament’s 
position on market regulation, taking also into consideration the 
extent to which the recent food crisis and the increasing volatility of 
international markets contributed, if anything, to affect the 
Parliament’s position and behaviour. From this perspective, a look 
at the explanatory statement that accompanied COMAGRI’s 
amendments to the Commission text clearly seems to show that 
COMAGRI’s justification was largely based on issues linked to 
external world dynamics. For example, the introduction to the 
explanatory statement is as follows: “The ever growing world food 
demand, the relentless internationalization of agricultural trade, the 
increasingly more visible effects of climate change, the structural 
rise in energy prices, and the gradual dwindling of water, 
biodiversity, arable land, and other natural resources: these 
                                                        
temporary exemption from certain competition rules during periods of 
severe market imbalance.  
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upheavals are all transforming the context in which European 
agriculture now has to operate” (COMAGRI Draft Report, 
2011/0281). Also relevant in this respect are the conclusions of both 
the Lyon and Dess reports (COMAGRI Draft Reports, 2009/2236 
and 2011/2051). They contained a number of relevant statements on 
food security, price volatility, market orientation and the 
sustainability of the CAP, which subsequently were used as the 
forerunners of the Draft Report on the Single Common Market 
Organisation (SCMO) file in the Parliament. For example, the Lyon 
report in the conclusions sets out five key building blocks that 
should shape the future CAP, namely “Food Security and Fair 
Trade, Sustainability, Agriculture across Europe, Biodiversity and 
Environmental Protection, and Green Growth”. 
In what follows, the Parliament position on market regulation 
will be investigated through an analysis of the amendments made 
by the Parliament on the Commission text. However, given the large 
number of Parliament amendments on the Single CMO Regulation,3 
to make the analysis tractable, we decided to select a key sample of 
Parliament amendments, by exploiting the so-called roll-call vote 
(RCV) data. Roll-call votes in the Parliament offer a wealth of 
behavioural data useful to study numerous issues focusing on the 
behaviour of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). 
Thus our basic information to analyse the Parliament position 
on market regulation will be based on roll-call votes made by MEPs 
on 83 amendments on the European Commission text proposal 
(COM (2011) 626) during the March 2013 plenary session.4 
The organisation of the chapter will be as follows. In section 2 
we justify the use of RCV data to investigate the main Parliament 
                                                        
3 Considering the Parliament plenary vote of March 2013 on the Single 
CMO Regulation (decision on the opening of interinstitutional 
negotiations), the total Parliament amendments voted on were 509. An 
important fraction of these amendments, 349 (68%), were put forward by 
COMAGRI. 
4 The amendments with a roll-call vote during the March plenary of the 
Parliament were 108, of which 21 lapsed. Of the remaining 87 RCVs, when 
accounting for the ‘split vote’, the ‘deleting amendments’ and the 
‘compromise amendments’, 83 (84 with the final vote) are usable for this 
analysis.  
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positions on the Single CMO. Section 3 gives a general background 
to the position of the Parliament on the Single CMO, focusing 
especially on the COMAGRI draft report amendments. In section 4, 
a detailed analysis of the amendments’ distribution and content will 
be carried out. Section 5 will analyse the behaviour of the 
Parliament, considering issues related to party versus national 
cohesion of the MEPs during the roll-call votes, as well as taking 
into consideration how frequently majorities are formed between 
different party groups. Section 6 draws the conclusions. 
2. Roll-call votes and Parliament behaviour 
The use of roll-call votes to analyse issues concerning the voting 
behaviour in the Parliament is a quite standard approach in the 
political science literature. Although roll-call votes represent only a 
fraction of total votes in the Parliament, raising potential selection 
bias problems (see Carrubba et al., 2006), many scholars have based 
their analyses on party group cohesion and competition in the 
Parliament using this particular form of vote (see, e.g. Hix, Noury 
& Roland, 2006; Kaniovski & Mueller, 2011). This is because data on 
roll-call votes are the only recorded information on voting 
behaviour of the Parliament, and thus usable for policy analysis. 
Indeed, in the Parliament most of the votes are taken by a 
“show of hands”. If the result is unclear, an electronic check may be 
carried out. This means that MEPs are asked to press a voting button 
(in favour, against or abstain), and the result is established 
electronically. This gives an accurate overall result, but the 
individual votes of MEPs are not registered. Just a small proportion 
of MEPs’ votes (roughly one-third of total votes) is performed by 
roll-call or recorded vote. This is similar to an electronic check, but 
in this instance the Parliament’s services also record which MEPs 
voted in which way. Under the current rule, a ‘political group’ or at 
least 40 MEPs can request any vote to be taken by roll-call.5  
Party groups call roll-call votes for a variety of reasons (see 
Corbett et al., 2000, for a discussion). If roll-call votes in the 
Parliament are called for strategic reasons, then the MEPs’ 
behaviour may be quite different in roll-call votes than in other 
                                                        
5 Note that from 2009, every European Parliament final vote has to take 
place through roll-call vote.  
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votes. However, as stressed by Hix, Noury & Roland (2006) and 
many others, regardless of the strategic reasons for calling them, it 
is reasonable to assume that roll-call votes are used for the most 
important decisions. Thus the underlying hypothesis is that 
analysing roll-call votes on the Single CMO amendments could give 
interesting insight to Parliament positions and political behaviour 
on market measures. 
Within the political science literature, three main explanations 
are normally highlighted to interpret the reasons why a European 
Party Group (EPG) calls for a roll-call vote (see Mühlböcky & 
Yordanovaz, 2012). According to the discipline model, an RCV may 
be used by an EPG as a party disciplining instrument. The signalling 
model predicts instead that EPGs request strategically RCVs to 
signal their already highly cohesive position on a particular issue to 
external audiences, i.e. a lobby. Finally, a further argument relies on 
the simple idea that, whenever the vote is ‘important’ or ‘salient’ for 
a party group, which could be for a mix of reasons, then an RCV is 
requested. Mühlböcky & Yordanovaz (2012) recently found 
substantial support for the latest explanation of RCV requests, 
namely that party groups call RCVs on more salient, and/or more 
contentious issues. 
In what follows, we are not directly interested in the reason 
why an EPG calls for an RCV. We simply take the different 
possibilities for granted and, by analysing the content of the key 
amendments on the Single CMO Regulation, we hope to gain some 
insight and to give a possible interpretation to the Parliament’s 
behaviour. 
3. Background on the COMAGRI and Parliament 
position on the Single CMO Regulation 
The position of the European Parliament on the Single CMO 
Regulation has been one of the most controversial across the four 
regulations related to the CAP 2020 reform. This clearly emerges in 
the final Parliament vote taken on 13 March 2013 on the “Decision 
on the opening of, and mandate for, interinstitutional negotiations 
on common organization of the markets in agricultural products 
(Single CMO Regulation).” The final vote on this regulation passed 
through a narrow majority of EPP and S&D MEPs (55% votes for, 
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41% against), largely because many MEPs from Germany, also 
member of the EPP, voted against.6  
One of the reasons for this narrow majority is the consequence 
of the COMAGRI position on the issue, largely driven by the ideas 
put forward by Michel Dantin, the Parliament rapporteur for the 
Single CMO Regulation.7 Mr Dantin (EPP, France), who worked in 
the past as leader of (regional) farm unions and as advisor of 
different agricultural ministers, has to be considered a direct 
exponent of (French) agricultural interests.  
Mr Dantin is a historical supporter of the so-called concept of 
‘agricultural exceptionalism’, the idea that, in agriculture, markets 
do not work well, and so they need to be strongly regulated by the 
states. Also as a reaction to the recent food crisis and the increased 
volatility in agricultural markets, one of the objectives of the 
COMAGRI rapporteur has been to propose many changes to the 
Commission text, aimed at reinforcing several market intervention 
mechanisms, partially eliminated or weakened over the last 20 
years.  
Many of the amendments to the Commission’s draft 
regulation made by Parliament come directly from the COMAGRI 
rapporteur,8 and follow two general rules (Matthews, 2012): to 
reinforce state assistance to farmers who operate in instable and 
                                                        
6 Specifically, out of 91 German MEPs present, 62 voted against. 
Interestingly, 16 out of 42 German MEPs of the EPP group, the European 
party that traditionally supports CAP issues, voted against. 
7 The shadow rapporteurs for the Single CMO Regulation were: Iratxe 
García Pérez (S&D, ES), Britta Reimers (ALDE, DE), José Bové 
(Greens/EFA, FR), James Nicholson (ECR, UK), Giancarlo Scottà (EFD, IT), 
Alfred Rubiks (GUE/NGL, LV).  
8 In particular, the rapporteur tabled 434 amendments (out of the total 2,596 
SCMO amendments – including compromise, plenary and opinion-giving 
committees – which is 16.7%). Out of these 434 amendments, 357 (82%) 
were adopted – either unchanged or in a compromise form – by 
COMAGRI. See Fertő & Kovács (2014), and the draft report by COMAGRI 
(2011/0281(COD), for further details. 
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volatile markets; to emphasise the legislative role of the Parliament 
with respect to both the Commission and the Council.9  
Mr Dantin’s amendments were largely directed to reinforce 
the market intervention of the CAP, especially by encouraging a 
stronger concentration of producers and a stronger role for supply 
management during market crisis situation, as well as by preserving 
certain supply control measures already in place, such as quotas in 
the sugar, milk and wine sectors. 
Concerning the role of producers in the supply chain’s 
management, Mr Dantin’s amendments were aimed at reinforcing 
their market power. To do this, they followed the strategy of making 
contracts compulsory in each member state, like those already 
existing in the milk sector. From his perspective, this contract 
should include specific conditions related to price, duration as well 
as quantity and quality requirements, and many other things 
regarding payments.  
Concerning intervention practices, the rapporteur’s position 
was that regulating supply and demand for agricultural products 
with only minimal ‘safety net’ mechanisms, such as the one put 
forward in the Commission proposal, cannot be sufficient to 
contrast the increasing volatility in food prices. Mr Dantin’s idea 
was to develop and reinforce instruments based on private supply 
management to increase the coordination of the various operators, 
giving them the option of withdrawing a product during bad 
marketing conditions. Furthermore, Mr Dantin’s report calls for a 
specific treatment of the farming and food supply chain, suggesting 
that agriculture must, to some extent, constitute an exception to 
competition law of the Treaty. 
Finally, with respect to specific intervention arrangements, 
the Parliament’s negotiating mandate also included the following 
proposals. First, it called for maintaining intervention in cereals for 
durum wheat and sorghum, abolished in the Commission text; it 
wanted public intervention to be available through the year and not 
for limited calendar periods; it proposed to raise the intervention 
price for beef from its current 70% of the reference price to 90% of 
the reference price; and finally, it proposed to raise the volume limit 
                                                        
9 More details of the position of the Parliament regarding a number of 
market measures can be find in Fertő & Kovács (2014, Annex II, p. 68). 
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for public intervention on butter from 30,000 tonnes to 70,000 
tonnes.  
Concerning the legislative role of the Parliament with respect 
to both the Commission and the Council, the Parliament 
amendments were largely aimed at increasing the Parliament’s 
decision-making power in several technical aspects linked, for 
example, to the management of the intervention mechanisms, until 
now largely under the control of the Commission and the Council.  
From this short summary of the COMAGRI position on the 
Single CMO Regulation, it emerges clearly that many of the changes 
requested to the Commission text were indeed justified by the 
recent food crisis and the growing instability of international 
markets. Thus, not surprisingly, the external context appears to be 
one of the drivers used by COMAGRI to justify the rationale of 
many of its amendments.  
4. An analysis of the Parliament position using 
roll-call vote data 
Table 14.1 is a summary of the distribution of the amendments with 
a roll-call vote.10 The distribution of the amendments by EPGs and 
COMAGRI confirms the fundamental role played by the latter in 
governing the Parliament discussion on the Single CMO 
Regulation, although the role of COMAGRI is underestimated in 
this selected number of amendments. Of the 83 amendments with 
an RCV, 31 (37%) were put forward from COMAGRI, 22 (27%) from 
groups of more than 40 MEPs, 14 (17%) from the ALDE, 7 (8%) from 
the GUE/NGL, 5 (6%) from the ECR and, finally, 4 (5%) from the 
GREENS/EFA group.  
                                                        
10 The full list of the roll-call votes used in this analysis is available upon 
request.  
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Table 14.1 Summary of roll-call votes on Single CMO amendments by 
Parliament groups and COMAGRI 
 
Notes: The total number of RCVs in column 5 is 84 (instead of 83), since it 
includes the RCV call on the final vote. 
Legend: ALDE/ADLE: Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe; ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists Group; EFD: Europe of 
Freedom and Democracy Group; EPP: Group of the European People’s Party 
(Christian Democrats); GUE/NGL: Confederal Group of the European United 
Left - Nordic Green Left; GREENS/EFA: Group of the GREENS/European Free 
Alliance; S&D: Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 
in the European Parliament. 
Source: Based on data collected from www.VoteWatch.eu. 
Interestingly, among the 83 amendments, COMAGRI’s 
showed an adoption rate of 97%, meaning that only one amendment 
from COMAGRI did not find any majority in the Parliament plenary 
vote.11 Meanwhile, the amendments raised by more than 40 MEPs 
or other EPGs were all systematically rejected. 
This result is not surprising, because the share of party groups 
in COMAGRI is close to the one in the plenary, so that when an 
amendment obtains the majority in COMAGRI, it has a high 
probability to obtain the same majority during the plenary session.  
Perhaps more interesting is to look at the distribution of RCVs 
across groups, reported in the last two columns of Table 14.1. From 
this perspective, the more active group at the committee level has 
been the GREENS/EFA, which accounted for by 55% of RCV 
                                                        
11 This refers to amendment number 109, finalised to establish “strategic 
stocks of raw materials for livestock feed” in order to prevent severe market 
imbalances and to guarantee the continuity of livestock sectors. 
No. 
Amendments
% 
Distribution
No. 
Adopted
%    
Adopted
No. RCV % RCV
ALDE/ADLE 14 17% 0 0% 0 0%
ECR 5 6% 0 0% 16 19%
EFD 0 0% na na 0 0%
EPP 0 0% na na 14 17%
GUE/NGL 7 8% 0 0% 8 10%
GREENS/EFA 4 5% 0 0% 46 55%
S&D 0 0% na na 0 0%
> 40 MEPs 22 27% 0 0% na na
COMAGRI 31 37% 30 97% na na
TOTAL 83 100% 30 36% 84 100%
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requests, followed by the ECR (19%), the EPP (17%) and, finally, the 
GUE/NGL (10%). 
Thus RCV activities have been particularly relevant for the 
GREENS/EFA, the ECR and the EPP, although with different 
meaning. For example, out of 14 RCVs called by the EPP, 13 were 
against amendments put forward by the ALDE. As it is well known, 
the ALDE group is traditionally against the protectionism of the 
CAP and, as such, of many COMAGRI amendments that, in the 
words of the shadow rapporteur from the ALDE (Britta Reimers, 
Germany), tried to reintroduce “Automatic purchase of agricultural 
commodities in the case of price drops and extended export 
subsidies risk taking us back to the bad old days.”  
The amendments on which the GREENS/EFA called for 
RCVs have a quite different content and rationale. On the one hand, 
20 of the GREENS/EFA RCVs were equally in support of (10) and 
against (10) COMAGRI amendments, suggesting that the GREENS 
played an active role during the committee discussion and 
formation of these amendments. On the other hand, the other RCVs 
from GREENS/EFA were all in favour of amendments put forward 
by MEPs or the ALDE group, the majority of which are related to 
the limitation of the use of export refund. Finally, and not 
surprisingly, the RCVs from ECR were all against COMAGRI 
amendments, but in favour of their one amendment.  
In general, as a matter of fact, when a party group calls for a 
roll-call vote on its own amendment, their members tend to respond 
following strictly the party line, a consistent behaviour with both 
the discipline and signalling hypotheses underlying the call of an 
RCV. 
Table 14.2 considers the distribution of RCV amendments by 
the different issues of the Single CMO proposal. The amendments 
with roll-call votes have been largely concentrated on Part I 
(Introductory Provisions) and Part II (Internal Market) of the 
regulation: alone, these issues absorbed 73% of the total RCV 
amendments. The remaining RCV amendments refer to Part III 
(Trade with Third Countries), 17%, Part IV (Competition rules), 6%, 
and Part V (General provisions), 5%. 
The 27 amendments on the introductory part of the regulation 
were raised by MEPs (14), COMAGRI (6), GUE/NGL (5), and 
GREENS/EFA (4). The amendments put forward by more than 40 
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MEPs were exclusively focused on the Recital of the Commission 
text, and on issues related to import duty and export refund. All 
these amendments push in a direction of more market liberalisation 
through the elimination of export refund, a more transparent 
management of the licenses and advance fixing of export refund.  
Table 14.2 Roll-call votes on Single CMO amendments by proposal issues 
(March 2013) 
 
Source: Based on data collected from www.VoteWatch.eu and (COM(2011)626). 
Also the amendments of COMAGRI were largely attached to 
the Introductory Provisions, although their content was quite 
different. Indeed, they have the clear objective of justifying 
protective measures for farmers, like the introduction of milk aids 
to producers who voluntarily cut production or the deletion from 
the Introductory Provisions of quota elimination in the sugar, milk 
and wine sectors. The GUE/NGL amendments had a similar 
purpose. Two of them added a new article (Article 7a) aimed at 
maintaining the quotas in the milk, sugar and wine sectors beyond 
2015. 
Number of 
Amendments
Amendments 
Distribution
PART I INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS 27 33%
PART II INTERNAL MARKET 33 40%
    Title I Market intervention 17 52%
        Chapter 1 Public intervention and aid for private storage 5 29%
        Chapter 2 Aid scheme 12 71%
    Title II Rules concerning marketing/producer organisation 16 48%
        Chapter 1 Rules concerning marketing
        Chapter 2 Specific provision for individual sectors 5 31%
        Chapter 3 Producer, interbranch and operator organisations  11 69%
PART III TRADE WITH THIRD COUNTRIES 14 17%
        Chapter 1 Import and export licences 1 7%
        Chapter 2 Import duties
        Chapter 3 Tariff quota management and special treatment
        Chapter 4 Special import provision for certain products 3 21%
        Chapter 5 Safeguard and inward processing
        Chapter 6 Export refund 10 71%
        Chapter 7 Outward processing
PART IV COMPETITION RULES 5 6%
PART V GENERAL PROVISIONS  4 5%
        Chapter 1 Exceptional measures 3 75%
        Chapter 2 Communication and reporting 1 25%
        Chapter 3 Reserve for crisis in agricultural sectors
PART VI DELEGATION OF POWER, IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS
TOTAL 83 100%
Roll-call Votes
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Quite surprisingly, the amendments of the GREENS to the 
Recital largely went in a direction of a more liberal agricultural trade 
policy, e.g. elimination of export refund, and also sensitive to the 
possible (negative) external effects of the market measures on least 
developing countries (LDCs). 
The amendments to Part II (Internal Market) of the regulation 
were largely raised by COMAGRI (18), once again with the clear 
objective of extending market intervention rules to production 
excluded by the Commission text, e.g. by extending rules for 
intervention to the livestock sector, as well as to durum wheat, 
sorghum, barley and maize production. Other important 
amendments by COMAGRI were intended to further reinforce the 
farmers’ position in the food supply chain (especially in the milk 
sector), to better defend the position of sugar producers, and to 
establish the European Food Price Monitoring Tool. These 
amendments to the Commission text have the clear objective of 
protecting farmers from the instability of world markets and were 
all approved in the plenary vote. 
The remaining amendments to Part II were raised especially 
by the ALDE group alone or together with the ECR group. Here, the 
content of the amendments is more ambiguous, sometimes aimed 
at constraining the possibility for market intervention, e.g. by 
setting maximum aid amounts for market withdrawal, sometimes 
intended to increase the possibility for market interventions, as in 
the case where inter-branch organisations are extended also to the 
olive oil sector. All these amendments were rejected. 
The amendments to Part III (Trade with Third Countries) 
were put forward especially by groups of more than 40 MEPs, 
without any univocal attribution to a specific political group. The 
majority of these amendments focused on export refund issues and 
rules by adding further details and constraints to the Commission 
text. For example, they asked more equilibrium in export refund 
distribution across sectors and across small versus big operators, or 
in the export refund for animals and beef that need to be in 
compliance with animal welfare regulations. It is quite informative 
to understand the GREENS position on this part of the regulation. 
Indeed, an amendment raised by this group was intended to add 
constraints to export refund in a situation where they can be 
harmful for LDCs’ local markets.  
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The residual amendments were raised on Part IV 
(Competition Rules) and Part V (General Provisions) mainly by 
COMAGRI. The amendments on competition rules were largely 
aimed at better defining issues related to the “relevant market” or 
the definition of “dominant position”, as well as to add exceptions 
for agricultural products to Article 101 of the Treaty, related to 
competition rules.12  
In sum, the analysis of the RCV amendments tends to confirm 
the key role played by COMAGRI in the Parliament position related 
to the Single CMO Regulation. COMAGRI was the author of the 
majority of amendments with a RCV, all but one of which were 
approved, and their content has been often aimed at reinforcing the 
“protectionist power” of market intervention put forward by the 
Commission text. At the same time, the key EPGs that more often 
formed the majority on the COMAGRI amendments – largely 
composed of S&D, EPP and EFD – systematically rejected both the 
amendments with a clear liberalisation content (proposed especially 
by the ALDE and ECR) and those with a more protectionist content 
(proposed especially by GUE/NGL and GREENS). A final 
interesting element that emerged from the analysis of the RCVs is 
the active role played by the GREENS. This activism came out first 
of all in support of some of the key amendments put forward by 
COMAGRI, revealing the important role of the GREENs during the 
formation of these amendments at the committee level. Moreover, 
the GREENS also proved to be the EPG that calls for the majority of 
RCVs during the plenary session. This appears partially in 
contradiction with overall GREENS behaviour. Indeed, the 
GREENS is the third-most successful Parliament Group (after EPP 
and EFD) in terms of amendments proposed and adopted in the 
final Single CMO Regulation. For this reason, and given the high 
level of party discipline within this group (see below), the higher 
frequency of RCVs could probably be interpreted using the 
signalling model. According to it, RCVs are requested strategically 
to signal to external audiences their highly cohesive position on a 
particular issue. 
                                                        
12 Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
prohibits cartels and other agreements that could disrupt free competition 
in the European Economic Area’s internal market. 
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5. Party discipline and coalition formation on 
Single CMO 
Previous studies of roll-call voting based on limited samples of 
votes, as in this analysis, have established that MEPs vote along 
transnational party lines more frequently than national lines and 
that the European party groups are less cohesive than parties in 
domestic parliaments (see Hix & Lord, 1997).13 It follows that EPGs 
that are transnational federations (such as the EPP, S&D, GREENS 
and ALDE) should be traditionally more cohesive than the groups 
that do not possess these complex external party organisations (such 
as the GUE/NGL, ECR and EFD). However, issues involving 
substantial cross-country redistribution (such as the Common 
Agriculture Policy and Structural Funds) tend to create cleavages 
within EPGs (see Faas, 2003; Hix, Noury & Roland, 2006), increasing 
the propensity of MEPs to vote also along national lines. 
At the same time, previous research has also showed that the 
left-right dimension is important in the formation of coalitions in 
the European Parliament (Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999). Moreover, Hix, 
Noury & Roland (2006) showed that the time variation in 
ideological distance between party groups is one of the main 
determinants of coalition formation. 
In what follows, we try to analyse the extent to which the 
behaviour of MEPs followed these patterns when dealing with 
issues related to the Single CMO Regulation. To start with, Figure 
14.1 shows the EPGs cohesion on the 83 RCVs considered in this 
analysis. Party cohesion is measured using the Hix, Noury & Roland 
(2006) agreement index.14 This index equals 1 when all the members 
                                                        
13 The EPGs that are transnational party federations (such as the EPP, S&D, 
GREENS and ALDE) are traditionally more cohesive than the groups that 
do not possess these external party organisations (the GUE/NGL, ECR, 
and EFD). 
14 Party group cohesion is measured using an ‘Agreement Index’ (AI) as 
follows: AI = ୫ୟ୶{ଢ଼౟ ,୒౟ ,୅౟}ି	భమ[(ଢ଼౟ା୒౟ା	୅౟)ି୫ୟ୶{ଢ଼౟,୒౟ ,୅౟}](ଢ଼౟ା୒౟ା	୅౟) . Where Yi denotes the 
number of Yes votes expressed by group i on a given vote, Ni the number 
of No votes and Ai the number of Abstain votes. As a result, the AI equals 
1 when all the members of a party vote together and equals 0 when the 
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of a party vote together and equals 0 when the members of a party 
are equally divided between all three of the possible voting options 
(Yes, No, Abstain). 
Figure 14.1 Voting cohesion of the party groups on the 83 RCVs  
 
Source: Own computation based on data collected from www.VoteWatch.eu. 
On the 83 RCVs analysed the (simple) average agreement 
index across all EPGs was 0.64. The higher cohesion, with an 
agreement index equal to 0.89, is reached by the EPP and this make 
sense, firstly because the EPP is an important transnational party 
that traditionally defends the CAP, and secondly because it was the 
party of the rapporteur from the COMAGRI on Single CMO. 
However, in contrast with the general prediction from previous 
studies, party groups that do not possess a consolidated 
transnational party organisation, as do the GUE/NGL, ECR and 
EFD, when voting on CAP issues, showed a quite different 
behaviour. Indeed, consistently with the expectations, the EFD 
group displays the lowest party discipline on the RCVs. However, 
the GUE/NGL and the ECR, with an agreement index of 0.84 and 
0.79, respectively, showed cohesion just a little below that of the 
EPP. Thus it appears that, when CAP issues are considered, 
                                                        
members of a party are equally divided between all three of these voting 
options. 
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ideological positions matter in affecting the MEPs’ behaviour. In 
line with this general rule, the GREENS, with an agreement index 
of 0.8, showed high party cohesion. However, this is not the case for 
other important transnational party groups such as the ALDE and, 
especially, the S&D, which showed very low party discipline on 
CAP issues.  
A possible interpretation of the deviation from the general 
rule of transnational parties can be found moving from party to 
country cohesion in the MEPs’ vote. 
Figure 14.2 Voting cohesion for member states on the 83 RCVs 
 
Source: Own computation based on data collected from www.VoteWatch.eu. 
Indeed, probably as an effect of the strong redistributive 
nature of the CAP, the voting behaviour of MEPs tends to be more 
concerned with country interests than with party line. This 
behaviour came out quite clearly from the analysis of Figure 14.2, 
which displays the MEPs’ agreement index measured across 
countries. The average country discipline of MEPs, equal to 0.68, is 
indeed slightly higher than the party discipline, a result in contrast 
with the most recent evidence on the average voting behaviour of 
the MEPs. Moreover, the country cohesion on Single CMO roll-call 
votes is higher than 0.90 for large countries, such as Spain, Italy and 
France, which, although for different reasons, are historical 
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supporters of the CAP. Similarly, the country cohesion of MEPs 
coming from countries traditionally against the CAP, such as 
Denmark and the UK, proves to be particularly high – close to 1 in 
the first case and to 0.9 in the second case – thus significantly 
stronger than the average party cohesion displayed in Table 14.1, 
which is always below 0.9. However, this rule does not apply to 
Germany, which, with the very low country cohesion index of 0.31, 
represents an important exception. 
Some further insight from the MEPs’ behaviour can be found 
when considering the coalitions that formed the majority on the roll-
call votes. Table 14.3 shows the proportion of times the majority in 
one party group voted the same way as the majority in another 
party group in the considered roll-call votes. The party groups in 
the table are ordered from left to right. Moreover, to better 
understand if ideology matters on CAP issues, we also displayed in 
red the hypothetical ‘centre’ of the political spectrum – here 
considered by the ALDE group.  
Table 14.3 Coalitions: Proportion of times the party groups voted together 
on Single CMO 
 
Source: Own computation based on data collected from www.VoteWatch.eu. 
As recently showed by Hix, Noury & Roland (2006), the a 
priori expectation is that coalition patterns should follow a left-right 
dimension. That is, the closer two party groups are to each other on 
this dimension, the more likely they are to vote together. For 
example, the EPP should be more likely to vote with the ALDE than 
the S&D and the S&D should be more likely to vote with the 
GREENS than the GUE/NGL (Radical Left) and with the ALDE 
than the EPP. Yet interestingly, when considering CAP issues this 
general prediction is systematically disregarded. 
GUE/NGL Greens S&D ALDE EPP ECR EFD
GUE/NGL -           0.286 0.357 0.107 0.357 0.143 0.333
Greens -           -           0.512 0.179 0.500 0.250 0.464
S&D -           -           -           0.214 0.940 0.560 0.869
ALDE -           -           -           -           0.250 0.214 0.214
EPP -           -           -           -           -           0.607 0.905
ECR -           -           -           -           -           -          0.619
EFD -           -           -           -           -           -          -           
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Indeed, on the left side, the GREENS voted more frequently 
with the EPP (0.5 times) than with the ideologically closer 
GUE/NGL (0.28 times), and they voted with the same frequency 
with the closer S&D and with the ideologically farther EPP (0.51 
versus 0.50 times). On the right side of political spectrum, the EFD 
voted more frequently with the EPP (0.9 times) and even with the 
S&D (0.87) than with the ideologically closer ECR (0.62 times), and 
so on. 
Interestingly, the most frequent coalition was the one between 
the EPP and S&D (0.94 times), confirming the notion that, on CAP 
issues, partisan voting behaviour from coalitions formed by the two 
most important EPGs still matters. That said, however, it also 
emerges that, when considering agriculture votes, coalitions formed 
between right-wing parties are systematically more frequent than 
coalitions formed between left-wing parties. This result confirms 
the idea that agricultural interests tend to be more frequently 
represented by the centre-right parties.  
6. Summary and conclusions  
In this case study, the Parliament’s voting behaviour on the Single 
CMO Regulation has been investigated using roll-call votes related 
to Parliament amendments on the Commission proposal. The 
analysis of this selection of amendments largely confirms the key 
role played by COMAGRI on the Parliament plenary vote related to 
the Single CMO Regulation. COMAGRI has been the author of most 
of the amendments with a RCV, and the majority of these have been 
approved. COMAGRI amendments often have a ‘protectionist’ 
nature when compared with the original proposal put forward by 
the Commission. At the same time, the key EPGs that more often 
formed the majority on COMAGRI amendments – largely 
composed by the S&D, EPP and EFD – systematically rejected both 
the amendments with a clear liberalisation content (especially from 
the ALDE, ECR or groups of MEPs), but also those with a more 
protectionist content (especially from the GUE/NGL and the 
GREENS).  
An interesting element that emerged from the analysis of the 
RCVs is the active role played by the GREENS group. Its active role 
came out first of all in support of some of the key amendments put 
forward by COMAGRI, thus giving an important contribution 
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during the discussion and the formation of the Parliament position 
at the committee level. Moreover, the GREENS group calls the 
majority of the RCVs during the plenary session, showing at the 
same time a high level of party discipline. The behaviour of the 
GREENS group during the plenary could be interpreted using the 
signalling model, namely as the tendency of a group to call 
strategically RCVs with the aim to signal to external audiences their 
discipline on particular relevant issues. 
The analysis of party versus country cohesion gives support 
to the notion that the MEPs, when they have to decide on policy 
issues with a clear redistributional nature, such as the CAP, still 
tend to vote in the interests of their respective country of origin. 
Among the 83 RCV amendments on the Single CMO, the country 
discipline often tends to be more important than party discipline. 
However, there are relevant exceptions to this general rule, and the 
most interesting one is that related to the behaviour of German 
MEPs, which instead showed one of the lowest levels of country 
discipline. From this perspective, a deeper investigation of roll-call 
votes related to the other elements of the Commission proposal on 
the CAP 2020 reform could be very useful to better understand 
whether, and for which member states, the country discipline still 
matters. 
As expected, the more frequent coalition was the one between 
the EPP and S&D, suggesting that on CAP issues, partisan voting 
behaviour from coalitions formed by the two most important EPGs 
still matters. However, it also clearly emerged that, when 
considering agricultural voting, coalitions formed by right-wing 
parties are systematically more frequent than coalitions formed 
between left-wing parties, confirming that right-wing party groups 
are the ones that take greater care of the agricultural interests. 
A final question is related to the extent to which the external 
conditions, such as food crisis and the volatility of international 
food markets, really have made the difference in affecting the 
Parliament position and, above all, the final decision. Not 
surprisingly, in the analysis of the MEPs’ behaviour, the role played 
by external conditions come out quite systematically in the 
justification of many amendments to the Commission text, and 
especially that of COMAGRI. Several key participants in the debate 
used this as a new and additional argument to make their case 
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stronger. So issues related to ‘volatility management’, ‘crisis 
cushion’, and so on (as well as food security, fair trade, climate 
change, environmental protection, and so on) represented in many 
cases the basis for justifying and motivating Parliament 
amendments. Yet the extent to which they actually have an effective 
innovative content and, more important, an impact in influencing 
the final legislation is less clear cut.  
In the end, the CAP political agreement on the Single CMO 
maintains with few exceptions, e.g. the risk management toolkit and 
the reinforcement of POs and IBOs, the current architecture of 
market management tools. In fact, the attempt to raise to different 
degrees the level of market support guarantees was largely resisted, 
and, more important, dairy quotas will be eliminated in 2015 and 
sugar quotas in 2017, although in the wine sector a system of 
production limitation is still in place. Thus all in all the ‘new’ 
common market organisation represents a sort of revision and fine-
tuning of regulations that largely were already in place in the CAP. 
Hence, the external conditions, although present in the ‘discourse’ 
of the CAP reform, do not appear to have changed significantly the 
final outcome. 
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15. PARLIAMENTARY AMENDMENTS 
TO THE LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSALS OF THE 2013 CAP 
REFORM 
IMRE FERTŐ AND ATTILA KOVACS 
he role of the European Parliament in the decision-making 
and legislation of the European Union has long been a subject 
of analysis in political science. A considerable part of this 
research agenda measures the relative power of the Parliament 
compared to the other two EU institutions that take part in EU 
legislation – the European Commission (EC) and the Council – (Hix, 
2002; Selck & Steunenberg, 2004; Greer et al., 2012), while others 
measure the power of the Parliament under different – consultation, 
cooperation, co-decision – legislative procedures (Earnshaw & 
Judge, 1997; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Kreppel, 2002). 
Treaties in recent decades have significantly changed the 
institutional balance in the decision-making procedures of the EU 
as well as the role and power of EU institutions in EU legislation. 
The Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of 
Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon were the key milestones in this 
process. The most important institutional change was the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1993, which introduced the co-decision procedure that 
made the Parliament a co-legislator, and the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
entered into force in 2009 and largely extended the scope of the 
policy domains falling under the co-decision procedure. 
Research was more intensive in the 1990s, when subsequent 
EU treaties reshaped the EU political landscape and attracted much 
scientific attention to this topic (Tsebelis, 1994; Scully, 1997; 
Crombez, 1997; Kreppel, 1999). Although the Treaty of Lisbon 
marks a key milestone in the evolution of the EU’s inter-institutional 
T
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setup, no extensive empirical research has been done on the impact 
of the Treaty of Lisbon on EU-level decision-making and, most 
concretely, on the legislative power of the EP.  
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon changed the influence and power of the 
Parliament in the common agricultural policy (CAP). More 
specifically we focus on the legislative influence of the Parliament, 
which increased owing to the changing in legislative procedure 
from consultation to co-decision, using the 2013 CAP reform as a 
case study.  
We compare the legislative instruments of the CAP of two 
consecutive EU programming periods, 2007-13 and 2014-20. The 
chapter is organised as follows. First, we provide a brief literature 
review on the role of the Parliament in legislative procedures. Then 
we describe the dataset, introduce our methodology and present 
our results. In the final section we conclude. 
1. Literature review on the Parliament’s role  
The European Parliament in its resolution stressed that the Treaty 
of Maastricht has major shortcomings because it “does not provide 
a real co-decision procedure, which would have meant that the 
Parliament and the Council would have had the same decision-
making powers over any legislative act, since the Council is allowed 
to act unilaterally in the absence of an agreement with the 
Parliament, and also applies this procedure only to a limited area” 
(IGC, 1992, Point 2. (c)). 
Steunenberg (1994) argues that the co-decision procedure 
does not really improve the Parliament’s position and it didn’t 
increase its power. In his opinion, under the co-decision procedure 
– similar to the consultation and cooperation procedures – the 
Commission is the most influential EU institution. Tsebelis (1995) 
and Tsebelis et al. (2001) state that at the end of the co-decision 
procedure, the Council can make a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offer to the 
Parliament. It gives the Council the agenda-setting power, which 
earlier belonged to the Parliament. Therefore, under co-decision, the 
Parliament’s power is decreased owing to the loss of its agenda-
setting power. Crombez (2000) points out that the co-decision 
procedure weakens the influence of the Commission, which may 
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weaken the power of the Parliament as well. It is because the policy 
position of the Parliament is generally closer to that of the 
Commission: representing EU-level interests contrary to national 
positions of the member states represented in the Council. Apart 
from the general influence of the Parliament, Neuhold (2001) and 
Yordanova (2010) analysed the role and legislative power of 
Parliament committees. They found the committees exert a huge 
impact on the legislative outcome. 
However, there is increasing research with opposite 
conclusions, namely that the Parliament gained significant power 
via the introduction and extension of the co-decision procedure. In 
many of its resolutions – IGC (1992); Parliament (1995); Parliament 
(2008) – the Parliament defined itself as an equal co-legislator with 
the Council under co-decision. The main conclusions of the related 
articles are summarised in Table 15.1.  
The previous research also raises an important question for 
empirical analysis: How can we measure the impact of the 
Parliament on legislative procedures? One of the simplest answers 
is to calculate the success rate of amendments. However, there are 
conflicting views of the applicability of the ratio of adopted 
Parliament amendments as an indicator of Parliament’s legislative 
power. Some papers argue that these success rates do not provide a 
well-founded argument to describe its legislative influence (Tsebelis 
et al., 2001; Shackleton, 1999). They claim that simple success rates 
do not give any information regarding the importance or weight of 
the Parliament amendment concerned. Tsebelis et al. (2001:576) 
point out that “counting success of amendments may not mean very 
much about the influence of different actors”. Shackleton (1999:5) 
also says, “[N]umbers [of successful amendments] alone do not 
offer an adequate view of the impact of the Parliament”.  
However, the majority of research analysing the Parliament’s 
amendments (Kreppel, 1999; Tsebelis & Kalandrakis, 1999; Kreppel, 
2002; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Lucic, 2004) justifies measuring the role 
and influence of the Parliament via the success rates of adopted 
Parliament amendments as well as the variables attributed to the 
amendments. The main research question of these analyses is what 
factors influence the adoption of Parliament amendments. The 
major findings are summarised in Table 15.2. 
  
382  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY AMENDMENTS TO THE 2013 CAP REFORM 
Ta
bl
e 1
5.
1 
Th
e r
ol
e, 
in
flu
en
ce
 a
nd
 p
ow
er
 o
f t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
Pa
rli
am
en
t (
EP
) i
n 
th
e c
on
su
lta
tio
n 
an
d 
co
-d
ec
isi
on
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
(c
on
cl
us
io
ns
 in
 it
al
ic
s s
ho
w
 th
e m
in
or
ity
 p
os
iti
on
s o
f a
ut
ho
rs
) 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
co
nc
lu
si
on
s o
f r
el
ev
an
t a
rt
ic
le
s 
C
on
su
lta
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
C
o-
de
ci
si
on
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 
A
rt
ic
le
 
M
ai
n 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 
A
rt
ic
le
 
M
ai
n 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 
W
es
tla
ke
 (1
99
4)
 
Th
e 
EP
 d
oe
s n
ot
 h
av
e 
a 
re
al
 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
po
w
er
. 
St
eu
ne
nb
er
g 
(1
99
4)
 
Th
e i
nt
ro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e c
o-
de
cis
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e d
id
 n
ot
 
in
cr
ea
se
 th
e l
eg
isl
at
iv
e p
ow
er
 o
f t
he
 E
P.
 
Ts
eb
eli
s (
19
95
) 
Th
e a
ge
nd
a-
se
tti
ng
 p
ow
er
 o
f t
he
 E
P 
de
cr
ea
se
s i
n 
th
e c
o-
de
ci
sio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e. 
Cr
om
be
z 
(2
00
0)
 
Th
e p
ow
er
 o
f t
he
 E
P 
ca
n 
de
cr
ea
se
 u
nd
er
 th
e c
o-
de
cis
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e. 
C
ro
m
be
z 
(1
99
6)
 
Th
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 E
P 
is
 w
ea
k.
 
C
or
be
tt 
et
 a
l. 
(1
99
5)
 
Th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
ra
te
s o
f E
P 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 a
re
 h
ig
he
r 
un
de
r t
he
 c
o-
de
ci
si
on
 p
ro
ce
du
re
.  
C
ro
m
be
z 
(1
99
7)
 
Th
e 
EP
 b
ec
am
e 
an
 e
qu
al
 c
o-
le
gi
sl
at
or
 w
ith
 th
e 
C
ou
nc
il.
 T
he
 E
P 
ha
s m
or
e 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
po
w
er
 u
nd
er
 c
o-
de
ci
si
on
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 c
on
su
lta
tio
n.
 
Ts
eb
el
is
 &
 
G
ar
re
tt 
(2
00
1)
 
Th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 E
P 
is
 
m
in
im
al
: t
he
 o
nl
y 
w
ay
 fo
r t
he
 E
P 
to
 
in
flu
en
ce
 th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
is
 to
 d
el
ay
 it
. 
Ja
co
bs
 (1
99
7)
 
U
nd
er
 th
e 
co
-d
ec
is
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
 th
e 
re
je
ct
io
n 
ra
te
s o
f 
EP
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 a
re
 lo
w
er
 th
an
 in
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 E
U
 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 
La
ru
el
le
 (2
00
2)
 
Th
e 
EP
 p
la
ys
 a
 m
in
or
 ro
le
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 
Sc
ul
ly
 (1
99
7)
 
Th
e 
co
-d
ec
is
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 E
P 
an
d 
th
e 
M
EP
s. 
Lu
ci
c 
(2
00
4)
 
Th
e 
ro
le
 o
f t
he
 E
P 
is
 m
od
es
t a
nd
 
lim
ite
d.
 
St
eu
ne
nb
er
g 
(1
99
8)
 
In
 th
e 
co
-d
ec
is
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
 th
e 
fin
al
 p
ol
iti
ca
l 
ou
tc
om
e 
is
 c
lo
se
r t
o 
th
e 
id
ea
l p
ol
ic
y 
of
 th
e 
EP
. 
  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  383 
Sh
ac
kl
et
on
 
(1
99
9)
 
U
nd
er
 th
e 
co
-d
ec
is
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
 th
e 
C
ou
nc
il 
ca
nn
ot
 
hi
nd
er
 th
e 
EP
 to
 in
flu
en
ce
 th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
, 
th
er
ef
or
e,
 th
e 
po
w
er
 o
f E
P 
in
cr
ea
se
s. 
Ju
pi
lle
 (2
00
4)
 
Th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
is
 a
n 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
ou
nc
il:
 th
e 
ro
le
 
of
 th
e 
EP
 is
 m
ar
gi
na
l. 
Ts
eb
el
is
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
1)
 
Th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
ra
te
s o
f E
P 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 a
re
 h
ig
he
r 
un
de
r c
o-
de
ci
si
on
 th
an
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 E
U
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 
Th
om
so
n 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
6)
 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
op
in
io
n 
on
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f t
he
 
EP
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 
Ts
eb
el
is
 &
 
G
ar
re
tt 
(2
00
1)
 
Th
e 
EP
 b
ec
am
e 
an
 e
qu
al
 c
o-
le
gi
sl
at
or
 w
ith
 th
e 
C
ou
nc
il 
un
de
r c
o-
de
ci
si
on
. 
K
ar
da
sh
ev
a 
(2
00
9)
 
Th
e 
EP
's 
po
w
er
 in
 th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
is
 v
er
y 
lim
ite
d.
  
H
ix
 (2
00
2)
 
Th
e 
Tr
ea
ty
 o
f M
aa
st
ri
ch
t a
nd
 th
e 
Tr
ea
ty
 o
f 
A
m
st
er
da
m
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
th
e 
po
w
er
 o
f t
he
 E
P.
 
Se
lc
k &
 
St
eu
ne
nb
er
g 
(2
00
4)
  
Th
e p
ol
ic
y 
po
sit
io
n 
of
 th
e E
P 
is 
clo
se
r t
o 
th
e p
ol
iti
ca
l o
ut
co
m
e u
nd
er
 th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e t
ha
n 
un
de
r t
he
 co
-
de
ci
sio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e. 
Se
lc
k 
&
 
St
eu
ne
nb
er
g 
(2
00
4)
 
Th
e 
EP
 c
an
 b
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 a
 re
al
 c
o-
le
gi
sl
at
or
.  
Th
om
so
n 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
6)
 
Th
e 
EP
 m
an
ag
ed
 to
 in
cr
ea
se
 it
s p
ow
er
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
tr
an
si
tio
n 
fr
om
 c
on
su
lta
tio
n 
to
 c
o-
de
ci
si
on
.  
Ju
pi
lle
 (2
00
7)
 
Th
e 
in
tr
od
uc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
co
-d
ec
is
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
re
su
lte
d 
in
 th
e 
en
ha
nc
em
en
t o
f t
he
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
po
w
er
 
of
 th
e 
EP
.  
So
ur
ce
: O
w
n 
co
m
po
si
tio
n.
 
  
384  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY AMENDMENTS TO THE 2013 CAP REFORM 
Ta
bl
e 1
5.
2 
Fa
ct
or
s i
nc
re
as
in
g 
th
e a
do
pt
io
n 
of
 th
e a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 o
f t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
Pa
rli
am
en
t (
EP
) 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 c
on
cl
us
io
ns
 o
f r
el
ev
an
t a
rt
ic
le
s 
A
rt
ic
le
 
C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
C
on
su
lta
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
C
o-
de
ci
si
on
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 
K
re
pp
el
 (1
99
9)
 
Fi
rs
t r
ea
di
ng
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 
  
  
C
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
Re
ci
ta
l a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 
In
te
rn
al
 u
ni
ty
 o
f E
P 
be
hi
nd
 th
e 
am
en
dm
en
t 
Ts
eb
el
is
 &
 
K
al
an
dr
ak
is
 (1
99
9)
 
Fi
rs
t r
ea
di
ng
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 
Lu
ci
c 
(2
00
4)
 
Fi
rs
t r
ea
di
ng
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 
N
on
-p
ol
ic
y 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 (l
es
s 
im
po
rt
an
t a
m
en
dm
en
ts
) 
K
ar
da
sh
ev
a 
(2
00
9)
 
  
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 su
pp
or
ts
 th
e 
EP
 a
m
en
dm
en
t. 
Th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
pr
op
os
al
 is
 o
f o
ut
st
an
di
ng
 
im
po
rt
an
ce
.  
Th
e 
EP
 c
an
 li
nk
 th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
pr
op
os
al
 to
 
a 
co
-d
ec
is
io
n 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
fil
e.
 
Th
e 
am
en
dm
en
t i
s t
ab
le
d 
to
 a
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
pr
op
os
al
 in
 th
e 
fie
ld
 o
f h
um
an
 ri
gh
ts
. 
Th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
pr
op
os
al
 is
 u
rg
en
t. 
Ts
eb
el
is
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
1)
 
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 
su
pp
or
ts
 th
e 
EP
 a
m
en
dm
en
t. 
  
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 su
pp
or
ts
 th
e 
EP
 a
m
en
dm
en
t. 
Sh
ac
kl
et
on
 (1
99
9)
 
  
Th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
ra
te
s o
f E
P 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
ta
bl
ed
 in
 a
 c
om
pr
om
is
e 
fo
rm
 a
re
 h
ig
he
r. 
So
ur
ce
: O
w
n 
co
m
po
si
tio
n.
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  385 
 
Although there is a wealth of literature on CAP reform, the 
role and legislative influence of the Parliament in the formulation of 
CAP has not yet been extensively analysed.  
Crombez & Swinnen (2011:23) evaluate the implications of the 
adoption of co-decision on CAP reform. They focus on the 
Parliament’s role in CAP legislation. In their paper they compare 
the consultation and co-decision procedures. Their conclusion is 
that “the move from the consultation to the co-decision procedure 
has led to a redistribution of formal legislative powers between the 
Commission and the EP.” They claim that with this legislative 
change, the “EP gains legislative influence over the policy 
outcome”. 
Swinnen & Knops (2012) analyse the Parliament’s role in the 
2013 CAP reform under the co-decision procedure. They claim that 
until the Parliament has significant capacities – primarily a staff 
with significant expertise – similar to the Commission’s and the 
Council’s, it will not be able to act as a real co-legislator. The lack of 
capacity and resources as well as the lack of traditions in the 
technical level working culture with the other two EU institutions 
jeopardise the Parliament’s ability to enforce its position during the 
2013 CAP reform. 
Roederer-Rynning et al. (2012) examine the circumstances 
under which the co-decision procedure has been extended to the 
CAP. In their paper they share the view that the Treaty of Lisbon 
increased the Parliament’s power both in budgetary and legislative 
terms.  
Greer et al. (2012) investigate the inter-institutional 
relationships of the three EU institutions in the field of the CAP. 
They claim that even after the introduction of the co-decision 
procedure, the Council remains the primary legislator in the CAP. 
Nevertheless, the Commission – mostly thanks to the high-level 
professional knowledge of its staff – maintains its influential role in 
the formulation of CAP legislation. Under the co-decision 
procedure, the Parliament will only gradually become an equal co-
legislator with the Council.  
These papers share the view that the Parliament became more 
powerful in the CAP legislative procedure after the Treaty of 
Lisbon; however, mostly due to capacity constraints, the Parliament 
is not yet an equal co-legislator with the Council. 
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2. Dataset 
The research is based on a newly elaborated dataset, which contains 
Parliament amendments tabled to eight legislative proposals related 
to the CAP. Most of these legislative proposals were in the EU 
legislative packages for the seven-year multiannual financial 
framework (MFF): four proposals relate to the 2007-13 MFF, another 
four relate to the 2014-20 MFF. These legislative instruments are the 
most important in the CAP as they define the rules for the use of the 
CAP budget for a seven-year EU programming period. These four 
regulations are the Direct Payment (DP) Regulation, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) Regulation, the 
Single Common Market Organisation (SCMO) Regulation and the 
Horizontal Regulation. 
The two consecutive EU programming periods also reflect 
two legislative procedures: the four regulations concerning the 
2007-13 term were adopted under the consultation procedure, and 
the four regulations relating to the 2014-20 period were adopted 
under the co-decision procedure. 
Table 15.3 The analysed legislative instruments of the CAP 
Common Agricultural 
Policy Regulation 
Consultation 
procedure 
Co-decision 
procedure 
2007-13 2014-20 
Direct Payment 
Regulation 
Council Regulation 
(EC) No 73/2009 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1307/2013 
EAFRD Regulation 
Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1698/2005 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1305/2013 
SCMO Regulation 
Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1234/2007 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1308/2013 
Horizontal Regulation 
Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1290/2005 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1306/2013 
Source: Own composition. 
In order to get a better understanding of the Parliament’s role 
in the 2013 CAP reform, it is necessary to have an overview of the 
steps of the legislative procedure with a focus on the intra-
Parliament phases of the process. 
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Figure 15.1 Legislative procedure in the 2013 CAP reform 
 
Source: Own composition. 
14. The Council adopts the final regulation
8. The rapporteur elaborates the compromise amendments 
9. Voting in the responsible EP committee (COMAGRI) on the 
draft report, open, compromise and OGC amendments - the 
Report of the committee is finalised
10. The COMAGRI, any EP groups or 40+ MEPs can table 
plenary amendments
11. The EP plenary votes on the COMAGRI Report - on the 
amendments in it - and on the plenary amendments: this is the 
negotiation mandate of the EP towards the Council
12. The EP enters into negotiations with the Council in order to 
finalise the text of the legislation (the representatives of the 
European Commission and the rotating EU presidency also take 
part in the negotiation rounds)
13. Once an agreement is reached with the Council, the EP 
adopts the final regulation 
The ordinary legislative procedure
1. European Commission tables its legislative proposal and 
submits it to the EP
St
ep
s o
f t
he
 le
gi
sla
tiv
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
in
sid
e 
th
e 
EP
2. Designation of the responsible EP committee (COMAGRI)
3. Designation of the opinion-giving EP committees
4. Designation of the rapporteur of the file
5. Elaboration of the draft report by the rapporteur 
6. Opinion-giving committees send their opinions to the 
responsible EP committee (OGC amendments)
7. Any MEPs can table amendments to the legislative proposal 
(open amendments)
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Regarding the 2007-13 EU programming period – under the 
consultation procedure –steps 1-11 (Figure 15.1) were the same for 
the CAP legislative process. But unlike the co-decision procedure, 
the Parliament did not enter into negotiations with the Council in 
the consultation procedure: the Council decided on the Parliament 
amendments without the involvement of the Parliament. 
Regarding each legislative instrument in Table 15.3, all the 
amendments tabled in the Parliament by any MEPs at any stage of 
the legislative procedure have been merged into the dataset. 
Amendments in this context mean textual amendments tabled to the 
original text of the legislative proposal highlighted by track 
changes.  
The total number of Parliament amendments tabled to the 
eight legislative proposals is detailed in Table 15.4. 
Table 15.4 The number and share of EP amendments tabled to the CAP 
legislative proposals 
Common Agricultural 
Policy Regulation 
Consultation 
procedure 2007-13 2013 CAP Reform 
Number of 
amendments % 
Number of 
amendments % 
Direct Payment Regulation 931 62.9 2,567 29.8 
EAFRD Regulation 426 28.8 2,471 28.7 
SCMO Regulation 98 6.6 2,596 30.2 
Horizontal Regulation 25 1.7 972 11.3 
Total 1,480 100 8,606 100 
Source: Own composition. 
Table 15.4 shows 30.2% of all amendments have been tabled 
to the Single CMO Regulation, followed by the Direct Payment 
Regulation (29.8%) and the EAFRD (28.7%), while only 11.3% of all 
amendments have been proposed to the Horizontal Regulation.  
Depending on the phase of the legislative procedure within 
the Parliament, in which the amendments were tabled, another 
categorisation of the amendments is also possible per Table 15.5. 
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Table 15.5 The number of EP amendments tabled to the CAP legislative 
proposals by type 
Type of amendment 
Consultation 
procedure 2007-13 2013 CAP reform 
Number of 
amendments % 
Number of 
amendments % 
Draft report amendments 185 12.5 711 8.3 
Open amendments 1,063 71.8 6,749 78.4 
OGC amendments 128 8.7 533 6.2 
Compromise amendments 45 3 279 3.2 
Oral amendments 3 0.2 0 0 
Plenary amendments 56 3.8 334 3.9 
Total 1,480 100 8,606 100 
Source: Own composition. 
Draft Report amendments are tabled by the rapporteur of the 
file as the initial phase of the legislative procedure in the Parliament. 
Then, any MEPs can propose amendments to the legislative 
instrument. These are the so-called open amendments. Besides the 
Parliament committee, which is responsible for elaborating the 
Parliament report – in case of the CAP, it is COMAGRI – other 
Parliament committees also have the possibility to express their 
opinions on the legislative proposals. These opinions mostly take 
the form of textual amendments, which are now called the 
‘amendments of opinion-giving committees’ (OGC amendments). 
Besides the vote in COMAGRI, the rapporteur of the file forms 
compromise amendments. These compromise amendments are 
mostly the combination of previously tabled draft report, open and 
OGC amendments. Oral amendments can be tabled by COMAGRI 
members just before the vote on the file in the COMAGRI meeting. 
After the COMAGRI vote, the file is tabled to the forthcoming 
Parliament plenary session. Before the plenary session, only 
COMAGRI, Parliament groups or a group of more than 40 MEPs 
jointly have the opportunity to propose plenary amendments. This 
categorisation of Parliament amendments makes it possible to 
calculate adoption rates of Parliament amendments of any type at 
any stage of intra-Parliament decision-making.  
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There are three stages of the legislative procedure: the first 
stage is the vote of COMAGRI on Parliament legislative 
amendments. The second stage is the decision of the Parliament 
plenary, and the last stage is the final joint decision of the Parliament 
and Council on whether the amendments are incorporated in the 
text of the final regulations. 
Table 15.7 contains the analysed Parliament amendments 
grouped both by amendment type and CAP regulation. 
As for the ‘draft report’ amendments, most (61%) have been 
tabled to the Single CMO Regulation, followed by the Horizontal 
Regulation, the Direct Payment Regulation and the EAFRD 
Regulation. Regarding the ‘open amendments’, most (32.4%) have 
been tabled to the DP Regulation, followed by the EAFRD, the 
Single CMO and the Horizontal Regulation. Most of the 
compromise amendments (63.1%) were proposed to the Single 
CMO Regulation; only 13.6% to the EAFRD and 13.6% to the Direct 
Payment Regulation; and 9.7% to the Horizontal Regulation. 
Concerning the amendments of opinion-giving committees, 49.5% 
were proposed to the EAFRD Regulation, followed by the Direct 
Payment Regulation (26.3%), the Horizontal Regulation (18%) and 
the Single CMO Regulation (6.2%). As for plenary amendments, 
47.9% were proposed to the Single CMO Regulation, followed by 
the Direct Payment Regulation (29.9%), the EAFRD Regulation 
(12.3%) and the Horizontal Regulation (9.9%). 
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3. Methodology 
In the amendment analysis, we applied the following definitions for 
the categorisation of Parliament amendments: 
- Agricultural policy amendments are those that are not 
institutional amendments.  
- CAP reform amendments are defined as those tabled to the 
new CAP reform items such as greening, young farmers 
scheme, small farmers scheme, etc., also when the 
Parliament’s position is a step back from the Commission 
proposal, i.e. amendments which aim at decreasing the 
ambitions of the Commission proposal, most often in the form 
of a more incremental introduction of certain measures. 
- Institutional amendments relate to the institutional and legal 
aspects of decision-making (comitology, delegated acts, 
implementing acts, delegated powers, etc.). 
- Compromise amendments are tabled by the rapporteur in a 
compromise format. Unless otherwise stated, in this chapter 
extracted compromise amendments are used. Extraction in 
this context refers to the methodology, when amendments 
“behind” one compromise amendment are taken into 
consideration (in official texts it is referred to as “Compromise 
amendment replacing amendment X, Y, Z.”) If one 
compromise amendment is adopted, the amendments 
replaced are also considered to be adopted. When two or 
more compromise amendments replace the same original – 
draft report, open or OGC – amendments, the number of draft 
report, open or OGC amendments is multiplied when 
calculating amendment success rates. This methodology 
makes it possible to apply a more sophisticated approach and 
to analyse some of the underlying tendencies in Parliament 
decision-making. Extracted compromise amendments also 
give a better picture on the role and influence of Parliament 
amendments. However, it should be noted that not all the 
compromise amendments are the combination of previous – 
draft report, open or OGC – amendments. These compromise 
amendments cannot be extracted and are analysed in their 
original form. 
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- Among the amendments in the Parliament negotiating 
mandate there are some – non-compromise – amendments, 
which encompass previous amendments, but not in a 
compromise form. When analysing amendment success rates 
during the Parliament internal decision-making, these 
amendments are also extracted. This is the reason – in some 
cases – for the seemingly contradictory figures between the 
calculation of thematic success rates and the success rates in 
the Parliament’s internal decision-making. 
- When analysing the amendments tabled by the OGCs, only 
amendments stipulated in the final committee opinion had 
been taken into account (no draft opinion amendments, etc.). 
In the amendment analysis, we considered a Parliament 
amendment adopted if at least part of it was adopted by COMAGRI 
or Parliament plenary or built into the final regulation. 
In this chapter, the word “co-decision” always reflects the 
“ordinary legislative procedure” as stipulated in the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
4. Analysis 
4.1 The increased role of the Parliament vis-à-vis 
the Council 
The legislative power of the Parliament is best reflected by its ability 
to influence the final policy outcome during the negotiations with 
the Council. Nevertheless, it is also worth seeing the internal 
evolution of decision-making in the Parliament. Table 15.8 contains 
the success rates of amendments in each of the three phases of 
decision-making. The final column shows what percentage of the 
total number of Parliament amendments was finally adopted by the 
Council and incorporated in the final regulations. 
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Table 15.8 The success rates of EP amendments by CAP regulation (% of 
adopted amendments compared to total) 
 Consultation procedure 2007-13 2013 CAP reform 
 
COMAGRI-
adopted 
Plenary-
adopted 
Final 
regulation 
COMAGRI-
adopted 
Plenary-
adopted 
Final 
regulation 
Direct 
Payment 
Regulation 
30.2 30.3 9.2 5.4 5 3 
EAFRD 
Regulation 36.9 36.6 11.5 18.6 18.6 13.6 
Horizontal 
Regulation 28 28 16 32.4 30 12.4 
SCMO 
Regulation 51 51 5.1 23.7 23.7 13.6 
Total 33.4 33.4 9.7 17.7 17.4 10.3 
Source: Own calculations. 
In the 2013 CAP reform, 17.7% of Parliament amendments 
were adopted by COMAGRI and 17.4% by the plenary, while 10.3% 
of all amendments were incorporated in the final regulations. Under 
the consultation procedure 9.7% of all amendments were 
incorporated in the final regulations, thus there was a slight increase 
in the Parliament’s power under co-decision. However, absolute 
figures show a more striking difference between the two legislative 
procedures: an approximate 10% under consultation means 140 
adopted Parliament amendments, while 10% under co-decision 
covers 860 adopted amendments. 
For the Direct Payments Regulation, the COMAGRI adopted 
5.4% of the amendments and the Parliament plenary adopted 5%, 
while 3% of all DP amendments were adopted in the end legislation 
and can be found in the final DP Regulation. In case of the EAFRD 
Regulation, both COMAGRI and the Parliament plenary adopted 
18.6% of the amendments; 13.6% of the amendments are 
incorporated in the final regulation. Regarding the SCMO 
Regulation, both COMAGRI and the Parliament plenary adopted 
23.7% of the amendments; 13.6% of the amendments are 
incorporated in the final regulation. Concerning the Horizontal 
Regulation, 32.4% of all amendments have been adopted by 
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COMAGRI and 30% by the Parliament plenary, while 12.4% of the 
amendments were incorporated in the final regulation.  
We can conclude that the Direct Payment Regulation has the 
lowest level of amendments adopted at all levels (COMAGRI, 
Parliament plenary, and final regulation). The Horizontal 
Regulation has the highest level of adoption within the Parliament 
followed by the SCMO Regulation. The adoption ratio of 
amendments in each of the final SCMO and EAFRD Regulations 
equals 13.6%.  
Table 15.9 contains the ratios of final incorporated Parliament 
amendments to the number of Parliament amendments in the 
Parliament negotiation mandate with the Council. These success 
rates of Parliament amendments, which show the power of the 
Parliament vis-à-vis the Council, are broken down by amendment 
type and CAP regulation. The main conclusion of this part of the 
analysis is that for the four CAP regulations, 59.2% of those adopted 
by the Parliament plenary were finally built into the final CAP 
regulations. This ratio is 60.2% for the Direct Payment Regulation, 
57.1% for the SCMO Regulation and 73% for the EAFRD. In the 
Parliament negotiation mandate 41.4% of the amendments can be 
found in the final Horizontal Regulation. So we can conclude that 
the Parliament managed to make almost 60% of the amendments in 
its position (Parliament plenary adopted amendments) adopted by 
the Council during the trilogue negotiations. It shows a significant 
increase under the co-decision procedure compared to the 
consultation procedure: this figure is practically doubled (29.1% 
under the consultation procedure). 
As for draft report amendments, 59.3% of the Parliament 
plenary adopted amendments – amendments in the Parliament 
negotiation mandate – were adopted after the trilogue negotiations 
and finally built into the final regulations. This ratio is 60.8% for 
open amendments, 66.3% for compromise amendments, 41.8% for 
the amendments of opinion-giving committees and 43.5% for 
plenary amendments. 
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Table 15.9 Success rates in the trilogue negotiations by amendment type 
and CAP regulation 
EP amendments in the final regulation compared to EP plenary-adopted (in %) 
Amendment 
type Regulations 
Consultation 
procedure 2007-13 
2013 CAP 
reform 
Draft report 
amendments 
DP 19.7 65.8 
EAFRD 41.2 80.3 
HR 50 42.1 
SCMO 16.7 59.7 
Total 23.3 59.3 
Open 
amendments 
DP 36.2 61.3 
EAFRD 32.2 74.2 
HR 75 40 
SCMO 3.3 55.6 
Total 32.5 60.8 
Compromise 
amendments* 
DP 7.3 68.6 
EAFRD 50 72.2 
HR n/a 44 
SCMO n/a 67.9 
Total 11.1 66.3 
OGC 
amendments 
DP 0 100 
EAFRD 11.1 48.3 
HR 0 40 
SCMO n/a 0 
Total 9.1 41.8 
Plenary 
amendments 
DP 13.3 25 
EAFRD 0 44.4 
HR n/a 71.4 
SCMO n/a 0 
Total 11.8 43.5 
Total 
DP 30.5 60.2 
EAFRD 31.4 73 
HR 57.1 41.4 
SCMO 10 57.1 
Total 29.1 59.2 
*All types of amendments are calculated with the extraction of the compromise 
amendments. Success rates of compromise amendments are calculated based 
on their original figures (non-extracted).  
Source: Own calculations. 
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Box 15.1 Policy amendments 
In the framework of the amendment analysis, we also categorised the 
amendments in the Parliament negotiation mandate by policy type. 
The results show that agricultural policy amendments in the four 
CAP regulations have been adopted by the Council at an above-
average rate (51.2%). With this rate of acceptance, we can conclude 
that the Parliament became a real co-legislator with the Council, i.e. 
if one player in a two-player decision-making process manages to 
make more than 50% of its positions adopted by the other, it can be 
considered to be a decision-maker on equal footing. The higher 
adoption rate was in the case of the EAFRD Regulation (57%), while 
the lowest was in the case of the Horizontal Regulation (40.2%). 
Table 15.10 Success rates of agricultural policy amendments 
EP amendments in the final regulations compared to EP negotiation mandate (in %) 
 
Direct 
Payments 
Regulation 
EAFRD 
Regulation 
SCMO 
Regulation 
Horizontal 
Regulation 
Total 
Total number of 
amendments 39.8 47.2 47.3 37.1 43.8 
Agricultural Policy 
amendments 49.2 57 54.7 40.2 
51.2 
CAP reform 
amendments 48.8 65.7 52.4 60 
56 
Source: Own calculations. 
Calculation based on non-extracted compromise amendments. 
As for “CAP reform amendments”, 56% of these amendments 
in the Parliament negotiation mandate were finally adopted by the 
Council. The highest acceptance rate was in the case of the EAFRD 
Regulation (65.7%), while the lowest was in the case of the Direct 
Payment Regulation (48.8%). 
 
In sum, our major findings are as follows. First, regarding all 
types of amendments, these ratios show significant increase 
compared to the consultation procedure. Second, the Parliament 
appears to be the most powerful vis-à-vis the Council concerning 
compromise amendments (66.3% success rate). The high success 
rates of both the compromise and the draft report amendments 
highlight the key role of rapporteurs. Third, amendments of 
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opinion-giving committees and plenary amendments have the 
lowest levels of success (41.8% and 43.5%, respectively), which 
might mean that these types of amendments had limited influence 
on the final policy outcome. Finally, more than 50% of the 
agricultural policy amendments and the CAP reform amendments 
in the Parliament negotiation mandate were incorporated in the 
final regulations, which appears to make the Parliament an equal 
partner with the Council during the trilogue negotiations. 
4.2 The role of Parliament rapporteurs 
There were three Parliament rapporteurs for the four CAP 
legislative proposals in the 2013 CAP reform: Luis Manuel Capoulas 
Santos for the Direct Payment and EAFRD Regulations, Michel 
Dantin for the SCMO Regulation and Giovanni La Via for the 
Horizontal Regulation. 
When making an amendment analysis in order to see the role 
of the rapporteurs, draft report and compromise amendments form 
the basis of analysis. In sum, the rapporteurs tabled 711 
amendments in their draft reports to the four CAP regulations, 
which is 8.3% of the total number of amendments. Additionally, 
rapporteurs tabled 279 compromise amendments during the 
legislative procedure, which is 3.2% of the total number of 
amendments. 
The influential role of the rapporteurs has already been 
highlighted in the analysis in Table 15.9. High adoption rates of 
draft report and compromise amendments show that rapporteurs 
had significant legislative influence during the 2013 CAP reform.  
When analysing the Parliament-Council relationship, we can 
see that almost two-thirds of the compromise amendments adopted 
by the Parliament plenary was finally incorporated in the four CAP 
final regulations. This ratio is 72.2% for EAFRD, 68.6% for Direct 
Payments, 67.9% for SCMO and 44% for the Horizontal Regulation. 
Regarding draft report amendments, the power of the Parliament 
vis-à-vis the Council as co-legislator is reflected in adoption rates for 
EAFRD (80.3%), Direct Payments (65.8%), SCMO (59.7%) and 
Horizontal Regulation (42.1%). Nevertheless, it is important to note 
here that high adoption rates of draft report and compromise 
amendments do not necessarily reflect the high personal legislative 
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influence of the rapporteurs, although they show the ability of the 
rapporteurs to build strong political consensus and backing behind 
these amendments.  
Based on the above figures we can draw the conclusion that 
the Parliament could most effectively defend its position during the 
trilogue negotiations over EAFRD. In this sense, the EAFRD and 
Direct Payments Parliament rapporteur (Capoulas Santos) and his 
negotiating team were the strongest during the trilogue 
negotiations, followed by Michel Dantin.  
When comparing the adopted draft report and compromise 
amendments to the total number of amendments we can see that 
78.6% of the draft report amendments were adopted by COMAGRI, 
and 77.5% by the Parliament plenary in March 2013; therefore, 46% 
of the draft report amendments – either solely or in a form of a 
compromise amendment – were integrated in the final regulations. 
These figures show that rapporteurs appear to have significant 
power in internal Parliament decision-making, and that draft report 
amendments are powerful. 
Table 15.11 The success rates of draft report and compromise 
amendments 
Adopted EP amendments compared to total (in %) 
  
COMAGRI-
adopted 
Plenary-
adopted 
Final 
regulation 
Draft report 
amendments 
DP 42.2 37.3 24.5 
EAFRD 83.6 83.6 67.1 
HR 96.1 93.1 39.2 
SCMO 82.3 82.3 49.1 
Total 78.6 77.5 46 
Compromise 
amendments 
DP 97.4 92.1 63.2 
EAFRD 94.7 94.7 68.4 
HR 100 92.6 40.7 
SCMO 92 92 62.5 
Total 93.9 92.5 61.3 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Regarding the draft report amendments, the highest adoption 
rates within the Parliament can be observed in the case of the 
Horizontal Regulation and the lowest in the case of the Direct 
Payment Regulation. Based on this, La Via can be considered the 
strongest rapporteur within the Parliament.  
When analysing the amendments in the final regulations, the 
Parliament was strongest concerning the EAFRD Regulation 
(67.1%) followed by the SCMO Regulation (49.1%). Based on this, 
Capoulas Santos and Michel Dantin can be considered the strongest 
rapporteurs. However, it should be noted that Capoulas Santos was 
weakest concerning the Direct Payment Regulation. 
 
Box 15.2 Compromise amendments 
If compromise amendments are not extracted, the following key 
pattern can be observed. For the four CAP regulations, there were 
279 compromise amendments, 93.9% of which were adopted by 
COMAGRI, 92.5% by the Parliament plenary – being part of the 
Parliament’s negotiation mandate – and 61.3% were adopted after 
the trilogue negotiations. Regarding the trilogue negotiations, the 
success rate is 68.4% for the EAFRD, 63.2% for the Direct Payment, 
62.5% for SCMO and 40.7% for the Horizontal Regulation. These 
adoption rates are the highest compared to any kind of amendment 
categories. As almost two-thirds of the compromise amendments can 
be found in the final CAP regulations, we can conclude that 
rapporteurs were powerful as they managed to formulate 
compromise amendments that have strong political support behind 
them. 
It shall be also noted that in the Parliament plenary, 63.9% of 
the draft report amendments were adopted in a compromise 
amendment form (352 out of 551 amendments). This ratio is even 
higher – 75.5% (247 out of 327) – when the draft report amendments 
are analysed in the final regulations. It means that draft report 
amendments had a higher chance of being adopted in any stage of 
the decision-making – plenary, final regulation – in a compromise 
amendment form. Therefore, it might be supposed that rapporteurs 
deliberately packed a high number of their ‘draft report’ 
amendments in a compromise amendment form to give them a 
greater chance of being adopted.  
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4.3 The relationship between the Parliament plenary 
and COMAGRI 
In this section we analyse how much the Parliament plenary was 
able to influence the final policy outcome and how much the 
Parliament plenary wanted to or could the change the position 
taken by COMAGRI. Table 15.12 contains the success rates of 
amendments in the Parliament plenary-COMAGRI relationship. 
Taking into account the total number of amendments tabled to all 
four CAP regulations, 96.4% of COMAGRI-adopted amendments 
were supported by the Parliament plenary. This figure is 89.2% for 
the Direct Payment Regulation, 99.8% for the SCMO, 98% for 
EAFRD, and 90.5% for the Horizontal Regulation. 
As for the total number of ‘draft report’ amendments, the 
Parliament plenary adopted 98.6% of those adopted by COMAGRI. 
Regarding open amendments, the Parliament plenary adopted 
94.8% of those amendments that were previously adopted by 
COMAGRI. Concerning compromise amendments, the Parliament 
plenary adopted 98.5% of those adopted by COMAGRI.1 As for the 
amendments tabled by the opinion-giving committees, the 
Parliament plenary adopted 98.2% of those adopted previously by 
COMAGRI. 
There were 334 amendments tabled to the Parliament plenary 
session, 47.9% of which were proposed to the SCMO Regulation, 
29.9% to the Direct Payment Regulation, 12.3% to the EAFRD and 
9.9% to the Horizontal Regulation. The Parliament plenary adopted 
6.9% of all plenary amendments. In the final regulations, 3% of all 
plenary amendments can be found. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 For these figures, Compromise amendments are not extracted. 
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Table 15.12 Plenary to COMAGRI success rates by amendment type and 
CAP regulation 
EP plenary-adopted amendments compared to COMAGRI-adopted (in %) 
Amendment type Regulations 
Consultation 
procedure 
2007-13 
2013 CAP 
reform 
Draft report 
amendments 
DP 95.7 88.4 
EAFRD 100 100 
HR 100 96.9 
SCMO 100 100 
Total 97.2 98.6 
Open amendments 
DP 96.6 88.2 
EAFRD 98.3 97.8 
HR 100 86.3 
SCMO 100 99.6 
Total 97.5 94.8 
Compromise 
amendments* 
DP 100 94.6 
EAFRD 100 100 
HR n/a 92.6 
SCMO n/a 100 
Total 100 98.5 
OGC amendments 
DP 42.9 100 
EAFRD 94.7 96.7 
HR 100 100 
SCMO n/a 100 
Total 81.5 98.2 
Total 
DP 95 89.2 
EAFRD 98.1 98 
HR 100 90.5 
SCMO 100 99.8 
Total 96.6 96.4 
Source: Own calculations. 
*All types of amendments are calculated with the extraction of the compromise 
amendments. Success rates of compromise amendments are calculated based 
on their original figures (non-extracted).  
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Table 15.13 The success rates of plenary amendments by CAP regulation 
Regulation 
Consultation procedure 
2007-13 2013 CAP reform 
Number 
of 
plenary 
amend-
ments 
Plenary-
adopted 
(%) 
Final 
regulation 
(%) 
Number 
of 
plenary 
amend-
ments 
Plenary-
adopted 
(%) 
Final 
regulation 
(%) 
DP 53 28.3 3.8 100 4 1 
EAFRD 3 66.7 0 41 22 9.8 
HR 0 0 0 33 21.2 15.2 
SCMO 0 0 0 160 1.9 0 
Total 56 30.4 3.6 334 6.9 3 
Source: Own calculations. 
In this section we can draw three conclusions. First, the 
Parliament plenary largely adopted the COMAGRI position. Only a 
very few number of COMAGRI-adopted amendments have been 
turned down by the Parliament plenary. It appears that the policy 
direction was set by COMAGRI and not by the Parliament plenary. 
Second, the success rates of Parliament plenary amendments are 
very low. It seems to indicate that the Parliament plenary does not 
greatly influence the Parliament’s policy direction. And third, there 
is not a real difference between the co-decision and the consultation 
procedures: first, under both legislative procedures the Parliament 
plenary overwhelmingly adopts the COMAGRI position, and 
second, the success rates of Parliament plenary amendments are 
very low.  
4.4 The role of opinion-giving committees 
There were five opinion giving committees (OGC) tabling 
amendments to the four CAP regulations: BUDG, CONT, DEVE, 
ENVI and REGI. OGCs tabled 533 amendments to the CAP 
regulation, which is 6.2% of the total number of amendments.  
Regarding the total number of amendments tabled by OGCs, 
the calculations show that 10.5% were adopted by COMAGRI and 
10.3% by the Parliament plenary, while 4.3% of the OGC 
amendments were adopted after the trilogue negotiations and 
therefore built into the final regulations. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  405 
 
Table 15.14 The numbers and success rates of OGC amendments 
EP 
committee 
Number and 
share of 
amendments 
Success rates - compared to the 
total 
Success 
rates 
Total 
number 
Share 
(%) 
COMAGRI-
adopted (%) 
Plenary-
adopted 
(%) 
Final 
regulation 
(%) 
Final to 
plenary 
(%) 
BUDG 47 8.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 100 
CONT 137 25.7 11.7 11.7 5.8 50 
DEVE 38 7.1 21.1 21.1 13.2 62.5 
ENVI 179 33.6 7.3 6.7 3.4 50  
REGI 132 24.8 13.6 13.6 2.3 16.7 
Total 533 100 10.5 10.3 4.3 41.8 
Source: Own calculations. 
OGCs had the highest influence on the Horizontal Regulation 
with an amendment success rate of 8.3% in the final regulation, 
followed by EAFRD (5.3%). Broken down by OGC, we can see that 
the BUDG committee had the greatest impact – highest adoption 
rate of amendments – on the EAFRD Regulation (4.4%). CONT and 
REGI had the highest level of influence on the Horizontal 
Regulation, with 16.2% and 3.1% of their amendments in the final 
regulation, respectively. DEVE and ENVI were the most influential 
in the EAFRD Regulation, with 38.5% and 4.1% adoption rates, 
respectively. 
We can draw four conclusions regarding the role and 
influence of OGCs in the 2013 CAP reform. First, the most active 
OGC was ENVI, tabling 33.6% of the total number of OGC 
amendments. Second, OGCs in general had minimal influence on 
the final CAP policy outcome: slightly more than 4% of the OGC 
amendments were incorporated in the final CAP regulations. Third, 
DEVE was the most successful OGC, as 13.2% of its amendments 
can be found in the final CAP regulations.2 Finally, OGCs 
                                                        
2 These results should be treated with caution, as 76% of them were 
amendments which had a minor connection to the most sensitive CAP policy 
issues. These amendments mostly contained references to developing or 
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influenced the CAP policy outcome in the Horizontal and EAFRD 
Regulations the most, but had a very minor influence on the Direct 
Payment and SCMO Regulations. 
5. Conclusions 
We investigated the role of the Parliament in the legislative 
procedure after the introduction of the co-decision procedure by 
using the amendment analysis of the CAP reform under two 
subsequent periods. Unlike previous research, ours provided an in-
depth analysis of CAP amendments with two novelties. First, the 
categorisation of Parliament amendments by type, and second, 
analysing the adoption of Parliament amendments in each of the 
three stages of the legislative process. 
The main conclusion of our analysis is that in the 2013 CAP 
reform, almost 60% of Parliament amendments adopted by the 
Parliament plenary were built into the final CAP regulations, 
compared to less than 30% under the consultation procedure. These 
results confirm the findings by Corbett et al. (1995) and Tsebelis et 
al. (2001) that adoption rates of Parliament amendments are higher 
under the co-decision procedure. 
Our results also show that agricultural policy amendments in 
the four CAP regulations have been adopted by the Council at an 
above-average rate (51.2%). These results are in line with the 
findings of Crombez & Swinnen (2011) on the CAP reform that the 
Parliament gains legislative influence in the move from consultation 
to co-decision procedure. Our results also support the conclusions 
of Roederer-Rynning et al. (2012) that the Treaty of Lisbon increased 
the influence of the Parliament in legislative terms in the CAP. 
In the Parliament-Council relationship, with adoption rates of 
Parliament amendments between 50% and 60%, we can conclude 
that the Parliament appears to become a real co-legislator with the 
Council, i.e. if one player in a two-player decision-making process 
manages to make more than 50% of its position adopted by the 
other, it can be fairly considered to be a decision-maker on equal 
footing. In the 2013 CAP reform, more than 50% of the agricultural 
                                                        
third countries, development cooperation or agreements in light of the CAP 
reform.  
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policy amendments and the CAP reform amendments in the 
Parliament negotiation mandate were incorporated in the final 
regulations, which appears to make the Parliament an equal partner 
with the Council during the trilogue negotiations. In general, this 
result reinforces the position of Crombez (1997) and Tsebelis & 
Garrett (2001) that the Parliament became a real co-legislator with 
the Council after the introduction of the co-decision procedure. 
These high adoption rates of Parliament amendments in the final 
regulation also confirm the findings of Steunenberg (1998), namely 
that the final political outcome is closer to the Parliament’s position 
under co-decision.  
The adoption rates of Parliament amendments by type reveal 
our main conclusion: the Parliament appears to act most powerfully 
vis-à-vis the Council regarding compromise amendments (66.3% 
success rate). The adoption rates of compromise amendments are 
the highest compared to any kind of amendment categories. The 
high success rates of compromise as well as draft report 
amendments highlight the key role of rapporteurs, primarily in 
gaining strong political support behind these amendments.  
Regarding the COMAGRI-Parliament plenary relationship 
and the role of the plenary amendments, we see that the Parliament 
plenary predominantly adopted the COMAGRI position. Only a 
very few number of COMAGRI-adopted amendments were turned 
down by the Parliament plenary, while a very few Parliament 
plenary amendments were adopted. It means that the policy 
direction is set by COMAGRI and not by the Parliament plenary. 
This reinforces the conclusion by Neuhold (2001) that the 
Parliament committees are the backbone of the Parliament decision-
making procedure. Our findings also support the findings of 
Yordanova (2010), namely that “when legislative acts are adopted 
in the Parliament plenary…they are largely based on the committee 
reports”.  
Finally, we have shown that the role of OGCs in the 2013 CAP 
reform is very limited. OGC amendments had the lowest level of 
adoption (41.8%) in the 2013 CAP reform. 
This research goes beyond existing literature, by categorising 
the Parliament amendments and analysing the adoption rates of 
amendments in each of the three stages of the legislative process. 
There are conflicting views among scholars of how much the 
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adoption rates of Parliament amendments could be used for 
measuring the legislative influence of the Parliament. This research 
aims to contribute to this debate via a more detailed analysis of 
Parliament amendments. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that without the analysis of 
the content of the amendments, we need to be wary of drawing 
strong conclusions regarding the increase of the legislative power of 
the Parliament. The authors share the view that the Parliament 
managed to increase its legislative influence under the co-decision 
procedure – see Table 15.1 and Roederer-Rynning et al. (2012) – and 
the amendment analysis presented in this chapter appears to 
underpin it in the case of the CAP. 
Future research should focus on analysing the content of 
amendments and weighting them regarding their importance in 
order to provide a more in-depth analysis of the change of the 
legislative influence of the Parliament after the extension of the 
ordinary legislative procedure to the CAP. Also, in order to know 
more about the legislative power of the Parliament, future research 
should place more emphasis on the Parliament-Council relationship 
in the legislative process, by analysing the factors influencing the 
adoption of the Parliament’s policy position – Parliament 
amendments – during the trilogue negotiations. 
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16. CO-DECISION AND THE CAP: 
AN UNFINISHED STORY – 
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT IN THE 2013 
REFORM 
LOUISE KNOPS AND 
MARIA GARRONE 
1. Introduction  
A new CAP entered into force in January 2015, as a result of a reform 
process concluded with a political agreement in 2013. Amongst the 
political economy factors which have shaped the outcome of this 
reform, the application of co-decision rules to agriculture certainly 
stands out as one of the most important. For the first time in the 
long-standing history of the CAP, and following the coming into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Parliament took 
part, on equal footing with the Council, in the decision-making of 
the policy which still represents close to 40% of the EU budget. This 
change of rules in a so-called ‘resistant-to-change’ policy area 
inevitably had consequences on the process of the CAP reform itself 
but also on the content of the new policy architecture. This first CAP 
reform under co-decision1 therefore provides an opportunity to 
look at these consequences, understand the Parliament’s new role 
in the process and draw lessons for the future. This was precisely 
the focus of a recent study commissioned by the Parliament itself 
                                                        
1 This procedure is formally called the Ordinary Legislative Procedure 
under the Lisbon Treaty, but will be referred to as co-decision throughout 
this chapter. 
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(Knops & Swinnen, 2014) of which this chapter provides some key 
insights and results.  
In particular, this chapter explores key dimensions of the new 
institutional setting that frames CAP reform, while shedding light 
on the remaining limits to the so-called ‘democratisation of EU 
agricultural decision-making’, resulting from the participation of 
directly-elected representatives in the process. These dimensions 
will be explored in sections 2, 3 and 4. Section 2 provides a brief 
literature review of studies analysing the impact of institutional 
change on policy outcomes, with a particular focus on co-decision. 
Building on the findings of Knops & Swinnen (2014), section 3 looks 
into the shifts in institutional dynamics which occurred under co-
decision, the emerging new inter-institutional working culture and 
finally the nature and scale of the Parliament’s legislative influence 
in its new role as co-legislator. Section 3 will conclude by looking at 
the overall Parliament performance in this first CAP reform under 
co-decision. Section 4 considers the complexity of co-decision and 
the political reality at EU level, as factors limiting the 
democratisation of agricultural policy. Section 5 concludes by 
providing a few lessons for the future. 
2. Literature review 
Several studies have investigated how the extension of co-decision 
rules has affected the distribution of powers between the three EU 
institutions. For example, Crombez, Knops & Swinnen (2012) 
argued that co-decision would bring a clear transfer of institutional 
powers from the European Commission to the Parliament and the 
member states inside the Council. Greer & Hind (2012) proposed 
four scenarios to describe the new inter-institutional balance 
achieved with co-decision: the conventional scenario, where the 
Parliament acquires more influence at the expense of the other 
institutions but is constrained by limited resources; the Council-
Parliament axis, where the Council fills the void created by the lack 
of Parliament resources; the Commission-centric model, where the 
Commission manages to extend its influence, and finally the status 
quo scenario, where the changes in decision-making rules produced 
stasis, a more protracted decision-making process that made reform 
more difficult by reinforcing the status quo.  
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Other scholars have tried to understand how the Parliament 
has exploited this new distribution to increase its influence on 
legislation (Shackleton, 2000; Corbett et al., 2003; Maurer, 2003). In 
some policy fields, the Parliament has been part of the decision-
making process for 20 years, since the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Burns, Rasmussen & Reh (2013) provide an 
extensive overview of the lessons that can be drawn from this co-
decision experience. In particular, they document how the 
introduction of co-decision affected the extent to which the EU 
constitutes a political system, the character of this system and 
whether it has contributed to increasing its democratic legitimacy. 
Until recently, only a few of these studies had investigated 
concretely how the extension of co-decision has affected the CAP, 
as no major reform had taken place under this procedure before 
2013. In recent years academics have made predictions on how co-
decision would impact the CAP and the likelihood of reform. 
Crombez & Swinnen (2011) suggested that the extent to which 
co-decision may influence the outcome of the 2013 CAP reform 
depends crucially on the structure of relative preferences for reform, 
e.g. the introduction of co-decision may reduce the prospects for 
CAP reform if the Parliament is seeking a lower level of reform than 
the Commission is. Combining a theoretical approach and 
preliminary empirical observations, Crombez, Knops & Swinnen 
(2012) tried to predict how the Parliament’s increased role would 
affect policy reform. They concluded that co-decision may lead to 
gridlock (no policy reform) if the Parliament does not agree with a 
qualified majority in the Council.2  
Roederer-Rynning & Schimmelfennig (2012) argued that co-
decision may equally strengthen reform or status quo by giving it 
the legitimacy of Parliament-backed legislation. Greer & Hind 
(2012) suggested that co-decision may encourage reform by 
broadening the agricultural policy agenda. This point was shared 
by Roederer-Rynning (2003, 2010) who argued that the new rules 
could bring new people into the Parliament’s Committee for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI), which would 
affect the power of vested interests and could make the CAP 
                                                        
2 Annex of this chapter provides a full picture of the co-decision process, 
step by step. 
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accountable to a wider constituency. However she, and others such 
as Swinnen & Knops (2012), also suggested that co-decision might 
slow the pace of reform by placing new technical and political 
constraints on the Commission’s right of initiative. Greer (2013) 
concludes that the 2013 CAP reform, rather than introducing new 
ideas into the policy, actually confirms the highly resistant-to-
change nature of the CAP. 
Another perspective on the matter was taken by Cunha & 
Swinbank (2011), who made interesting predictions on the way the 
internal functioning of the Parliament, in particular the relationship 
between COMAGRI and the plenary session, may affect the 
Parliament’s influence in the process. This perspective was broadly 
shared by Roederer-Rynning (2014), who focused on the 
Parliament’s internal dynamics to describe and analyse its influence 
on CAP reform. 
Finally, based on these various insights, Knops & Swinnen 
(2014) made a first attempt at analysing the impact of co-decision on 
the 2013 CAP reform and verifying some of the predictions made in 
years prior to the reform. Based on a series of interviews with a 
selection of key actors of the reform3 and the comprehensive 
amendment analysis of Fertő & Kovacs (2014), they analyse how the 
change of rules influenced the Parliament’s internal decision-
making, how it impacted the negotiations between the three 
institutions and how successful the Parliament was in fulfilling its 
role as co-legislator. The rest of this chapter builds on a few key 
findings of this study, while exploring some remaining issues.  
                                                        
3 For the purpose of the study a large number of key actors (34 in total) 
directly and indirectly involved in the preparation and negotiations of the 
2013 CAP reform were interviewed between 12 February and 2 April 2014. 
Nineteen experts were from the Parliament, accounting for 56% of the 
sample, and 15 from outside the Parliament (44% of total interviewees), 
coming from the Commission (7), Council (4) and civil society (4). 
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3. The first CAP reform under co-decision: inter-
institutional dynamics and legislative 
influence 
Many lessons can be drawn from the 2013 CAP reform. Given the 
length constraints imposed by this chapter, we select only four and 
address them in the rest of this section. 
First, one recurrent topic in discussions on the impact of co-
decision is the new inter-institutional balance struck by the 
Parliament, Commission and Council, as a result of the new 
procedure. In this chapter, we take the analysis one step further by 
looking at where, i.e. in whose hands, the new legislative 
competences actually lie.  
Second, given the new empirical evidence provided by the 
2013 CAP reform, we look at the extent to which the three 
institutions adapted their working culture to the new political and 
institutional reality.  
Third, within the new inter-institutional context, the ultimate 
objective of co-decision remains allowing the Parliament to have a 
greater say in the nature and direction of the policy. To what extent 
has this objective been achieved in the 2013 CAP reform? And to 
what extent was this influence ‘reformist’ or pro-status quo? Here, 
we take a closer look at the scale and nature of the Parliament’s 
legislative influence.  
Finally, this section concludes with an assessment of the 
Parliament’s performance in this first CAP reform under co-
decision.  
3.1 A new inter-institutional balance: dispersion or 
concentration of competences?  
The new inter-institutional balance achieved under co-decision is 
discussed in earlier work reviewed in section 2 of this chapter. The 
overall consensus seems to be that, while the Parliament is the 
overall ‘winner’ in the situation (since it enjoys legislative 
competences it never did before), several constraints have offset its 
newly acquired influence as co-legislator, e.g. an in-house resource 
deficiency compared to the other institutions. In this sense, they 
confirm earlier empirical observations which suggested that, in the 
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short term, the Parliament may not reap all the benefits of the formal 
increase of legislative influence.  
However interesting this finding may be, it does not identify 
exactly who, within and across the institutions, has benefitted or lost 
out from the new inter-institutional setting.  
At first sight, it would be legitimate to think that co-decision 
dispersed the EU legislative competences on agricultural policy, 
given the new participation of 751 members of the Parliament 
(MEPs) in amending and deciding the CAP’s future. This is 
undeniably one side of the story: there are more actors involved in 
the reform today than there were before. 
However, a closer look at the Parliament’s functioning – in 
isolation but also with regards to the two other institutions – 
indicates that a concentration of competences and influence has also 
been underway simultaneously to the relative dispersion induced 
by co-decision. In fact, in what follows, we show that a three-tier 
concentration can be observed under the new procedure. 
The first level of concentration takes place within the 
Parliament. Indeed, the idea that all 751 MEPs (actively) participate 
in the CAP’s future design is not accurate. Despite the final vote of 
all MEPs on a common Parliament position, the real decisions are 
made inside COMAGRI by its 44 members. As already pointed out 
by Westlake (1994), Parliament committees feature prominently in 
discussions of Parliament influence and have been described as ‘the 
legislative backbone’ of the Parliament. They perform the bulk of 
the Parliament’s legislative work, including debating legislative 
proposals, assessing policy options and orientations, and drafting 
the Parliament’s position. Consequently, the Parliament’s 
legislative influence rests in large part on the ability of its 
committees to deliver clear legislative positions (Roederer-Rynning, 
2014). 
The delegation of the bulk of the legislative work to 
specialised committees is no different than the functioning of 
national parliaments but is worth underlining when analysing 
precisely where the real decision-making lies under co-decision. In 
the case of the 2013 CAP reform, the Parliament’s share of influence 
and decision-making was clearly in the hands of COMAGRI 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  419 
 
members, in particular the rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs4 in 
charge of defining the Parliament’s official position on the CAP 
reform package and defending it vis-à-vis the other institutions (see 
Table 16.1).  
Table 16.1 Rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs for the ‘CAP after 2013’ 
legislative package  
 Direct payments CMO 
Rural 
development 
Horizontal 
Regulation 
Rapporteur Luis Manuel 
Capoulas 
Santos 
(PT/S&D) 
Michel Dantin 
(FR/EPP) 
Luis Manuel 
Capoulas 
Santos 
(PT/S&D) 
Giovanni 
La Via 
(IT/EPP) 
Shadow 
rapporteurs 
Mairead 
McGuinness 
(EPP) 
Iratxe García 
Pérez (S&D) 
Elisabeth 
Köstinger 
(EPP) 
Michał 
Olejniczak 
Wojciech 
(S&D) 
George Lyon 
(ALDE) 
Britta Reimers 
(ALDE) 
Marit Paulsen 
(ALDE) 
George Lyon 
(ALDE) 
Martin 
Häusling 
(Greens/EFA) 
José Bové 
(Greens/EFA) 
Alyn Smith 
(Greens/EFA) 
Bas Eickhout 
(Greens/EFA) 
Janusz 
Wojciechowski 
(ECR) 
James 
Nicholson 
(ECR) 
James 
Nicholson 
(ECR) 
Julie Girling 
(ECR) 
Patrick Le 
Hyaric 
(GUE/NGL) 
Alfreds Rubiks 
(GUE/NGL) 
Patrick Le 
Hyaric 
(GUE/NGL) 
Alfreds Rubiks 
(GUE/NGL) 
John Stuart 
Agnew (EFD) 
Giancarlo 
Scottà (EFD) 
Giancarlo 
Scottà (EFD) 
Giancarlo 
Scottà (EFD) 
 
                                                        
4 They are the MEPs who are in charge of presenting the first draft of a 
future Parliament position and leading the internal negotiations to bring 
the Parliament to a joint position. The shadow rapporteurs are the lead 
MEPs of the other political groups (other than the political group of the 
rapporteur) who are in charge of following the designated file. Together, 
the rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs form the Parliament negotiating 
team, in charge of negotiating a political deal with the Commission and the 
Council. 
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From 751, we therefore go down to 21 MEPs (see Table 16.1) 
who engaged the Parliament’s responsibility on the redesign of the 
CAP. This concentration was further enhanced in the case of the 
2013 reform by the joint rapporteurship of two crucial reports 
(Direct Payments and Rural Development) in the hands of one 
single MEP, L.M. Capoulas Santos. There are diverging views on 
this specific aspect of the CAP reform report allocation.5 However, 
whether this was positive or negative for the Parliament’s 
involvement as a whole is not really the question; the interesting 
point is that there was a large concentration of legislative power in 
the hands of one single rapporteur, in charge of two of the most 
fundamental pieces of the reform package. Box 16.1 illustrates how 
much more influence lies in the hands of the rapporteurs compared 
to the other COMAGRI members (Fertő & Kovacs, 2014).  
The second concentration of influence which took place under 
the 2013 CAP reform relates to the indispensable role of the 
Commission, both as facilitator to a political agreement between the 
Parliament and the Council, and as crucial source of resources and 
expertise, in particular to the Parliament. Given the relative 
asymmetry in the levels of in-house technical resources to deal with 
the complexity and scale of the CAP reform package, the Parliament 
partly relied on external sources of expertise (amongst which the 
Commission) to fulfil its role as co-legislator. Whilst before the 
reform, many scholars, such as Crombez, Knops & Swinnen (2012), 
would have expected to see the Commission role decrease with co-
decision, the Parliament’s resource dependency actually 
strengthened the Commission position.  
 
 
 
                                                        
5 Some argued that two reports were too much to handle for one 
rapporteur, not least because of physical limitations and the pressure 
imposed by an intense reform calendar. Others emphasised that having an 
overview of the issues relating to both direct payments and rural 
development ensured more consistencies between these two files, which 
are interdependent both in financial and political terms (Knops & Swinnen, 
2014).  
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Box 16.1 The draft reports in figures 
Given that the rapporteurs are in charge of drafting the first 
amendments to the Commission legislative proposals, they 
inevitably have an upper hand in orienting the Parliament’s position 
on a given policy package.  
In the 2013 CAP reform package, the rapporteurs introduced 
draft reports to amend the Commission legislative proposals on the 
four CAP reform basic regulations. These took the form of 711 
amendments – including amendments tabled to the recitals – which 
represents 8.3% of the total number of amendments.  
Broken down file by file, 102 draft report amendments were 
tabled to the Direct Payment Regulation, 73 to the EAFRD, 434 to the 
CMO and 102 to the Horizontal Regulation. In total, 78.6% of the 
draft report amendments were adopted by COMAGRI and 77.5% by 
the Parliament plenary in March 2013; they were therefore a part of 
the Parliament negotiation mandates. Ultimately, 46% of the draft 
report amendments – either solely or in the form of a compromise 
amendment – were incorporated into the final regulations. 
Source: The results of the amendment analysis undertaken by Fertő & Kovacs 
(2014). 
 
Furthermore, although the Commission may have lost 
ground vis-à-vis the two other institutions in the negotiations 
themselves (the most successful winning coalitions being the 
Parliament and Council together, without the Commission (Fertő & 
Kovacs 2014)), the Commission retains a crucial facilitator role, not 
the least because of its unique ability and expertise to draft 
alternative proposals in the negotiations and technical legislative 
acts in the last phase of the process, i.e. delegated and implementing 
acts.6  
                                                        
6 The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty also had an impact beyond the 
negotiations on the CAP reform basic acts, by making the distinction 
between delegated and implementing acts. With both, the legislator 
delegates to the Commission the power to adopt acts amending non-
essential elements of a legislative act. For example, delegated or 
implementing acts may specify certain technical details, or they may 
consist of a subsequent amendment to certain elements of a legislative act. 
The legislator can therefore concentrate on policy direction and objectives 
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Finally, a third level of concentration occurred within the 
Council. Whereas in previous rounds, each member states had a 
seat at the negotiation table, they are now represented by one single 
entity – the Presidency – mandated by the Council to negotiate with 
the Parliament, in view of reaching a political agreement. Although 
the Presidency cannot deviate from the negotiating mandate agreed 
upon by all members of the Council, once inside the trilogue room, 
it is the Presidency alone that defends this mandate against the 
Parliament. This is an evolution that large countries, such as 
Germany, had a hard time accepting, especially when the 
Presidency takes such a proactive role, as the Irish team did to 
finalise the 2013 reform. 
3.2 A new working culture?  
With co-decision, the new inter-institutional balance discussed 
above needed to be materialised in practice, via a new working 
culture between the three institutions. We discuss in what follows 
the extent to which this has been the case. 
In the context of the 2013 CAP reform, the working culture 
was naturally biased from the start towards the already well-
established working relationship of the Commission and the 
Council, which have been reforming the CAP for the past 50 years. 
Crombez, Knops & Swinnen (2012) described this institutional 
setting as an “executive bias”. Indeed, it can be argued that, under 
co-decision rules, there is a bias in favour of the executive branch of 
the EU decision-making apparatus, since legislation is negotiated 
by: a) a first chamber composed of national executives (the Council) 
and b) an under-resourced second chamber (Parliament) relying on 
the EU executive resources (the Commission’s). 
                                                        
without entering into overly technical debates. However, it is also 
acknowledged that delegation is sometimes “a case of entrusting politically 
delicate tasks to the executive” (European Parliament, 2008). There are, 
however, fundamental differences between delegated and implementing 
acts. The Parliament may reject delegated acts (but it cannot amend them). 
On the contrary, concerning implementing acts, the European Parliament 
is excluded from their adoption. Therefore, the choice between delegated 
and implementing acts represents a crucial decision (Knops & Swinnen, 
2014). 
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In terms of working practices, two sides of this “executive 
bias” were at play in the 2013 CAP reform. 
Firstly, it is very easy to understand how two institutions 
(Commission and Council), who have been working closely 
together for so many years, have developed a distinct way of 
interacting, which may be disrupted by the entry of a new actor (the 
Parliament). Information exchange and mutual understanding, at 
the formal and informal level, work better between the first two 
than with the third player.  
Secondly, looking at the nature of each institution, it is also 
quite clear that the inherently political character of the Parliament 
contrasts with the administrative and executive nature of both the 
Commission and the Council. Here again, it would be legitimate to 
expect that the two ‘administrative’ institutions have more in 
common between them, than with the political one. This ‘political’ 
isolation of the Parliament was particularly clear and problematic 
during the trilogue negotiations, where all negotiators did not enjoy 
the same level of decision-making powers. In particular, whilst the 
Parliament negotiator (rapporteur) is able to take clear political 
decisions (without needing to refer to a higher instance), the 
negotiating civil servants on the other side of the table (from the 
Council and the Commission) sometimes have to revert back to a 
higher political level for approval, since neither the ministers nor 
the commissioner themselves take part in the trilogues. This was 
certainly not favourable to the emergence of a new and balanced 
working culture between the three institutions. 
Nevertheless, despite the relatively unfavourable starting 
point described above, the Council, the Commission and the 
Parliament managed to adapt (to some extent) their working 
practices to the new setting, at least well enough to reach a final 
agreement. 
In their study, Knops & Swinnen (2014) reveal that there are 
different assessments and descriptions of how successful this 
adaptation applied in practice. These assessments naturally depend 
on the institutional point of view; each institution involved in the 
process tends to overrate its own performance and willingness to 
adapt, while underestimating the others’. Some actors in the 
Parliament may feel that inter-institutional communication was not 
optimal, in particular in terms of accessing important pieces of 
424  CO-DECISION AND THE CAP: AN UNFINISHED STORY 
 
expertise held by the Commission. Actors in the Commission, on 
the other hand, may argue that the Parliament was not proactively 
seeking contact or information and was therefore lagging behind on 
certain issues. From the Parliament’s point view, some members of 
the Council simply did not accept the new setting, while this was 
obviously not the viewed shared by the Council itself, especially 
when led by the Irish presidency.7 One area where the working 
culture was almost unanimously described as unsatisfactory was 
the episode of CAP reform delegated acts.8  
Finally, there seems to be a consensus across the institutions 
that: a) the informal working culture between the technical teams of 
each institution was working effectively and b) the Irish presidency 
made a conscious effort to adapt its strategy to co-decision, by 
proactively engaging with the Parliament even before the 
negotiations started. Both elements are recognised to have played a 
crucial role in securing a political deal in June 2013 and should 
therefore be considered as key elements in the emerging working 
culture between the three institutions. 
3.3 A status quo influence? 
A matter which triggered a lot of discussion prior and in the 
aftermath the reform was the nature and scale of the Parliament’s 
legislative influence on the policy content and architecture. This first 
reform under co-decision provided an opportunity to test some 
previous empirical predictions and a few additional observations. 
Over its history, the CAP has often been criticised for its 
resistance to change (Kay, 2003) and its tendency to favour farm 
interests over other interest groups. Farm unions have traditionally 
                                                        
7 The Irish presidency is said to have been very sensitive to the Parliament’s 
involvement in the reform (Knops & Swinnen, 2014). 
8 This episode revealed a lack of trust on both sides (the Commission and 
the Parliament), and a lack of understanding of the Commission’s and 
Parliament’s respective roles in this final phase of the process. The 
Parliament thought the Commission was going beyond the political 
agreement in the content of these acts, whilst on the Commission side some 
thought that the Parliament was not taking the process seriously enough 
or dedicating the necessary resources (Knops & Swinnen, 2014).  
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been known to fight for status quo positions in successive reform 
rounds. 
As detailed in section 2, many observers and scholars 
attempted to make predictions before the 2013 CAP reform on the 
nature of the Parliament’s legislative influence. Some predicted that 
the Parliament would reduce the opportunity for reform (by 
confirming the status quo bias of this policy field), while others saw 
in the Parliament a new force for change. The latter prediction was 
backed up by the idea that the increase in legislative influence for 
the Parliament would attract non-farm-related members to 
COMAGRI, thereby broadening the policy agenda of the committee 
and moving the policy away from its traditional status quo bias. The 
discussion on the COMAGRI membership is therefore crucial to 
understanding the nature and scale of the Parliament’s legislative 
influence, given that it is the COMAGRI members who have shaped 
the Parliament position and negotiation strategy in the process. 
On this particular aspect, Crombez, Knops & Swinnen (2012) 
already anticipated that COMAGRI was unlikely to push for more 
reform, given that its composition had remained largely dominated 
by farm-related members. They argued that “if traditional (pro-
status quo) agricultural interests find an echo in a more powerful 
COMAGRI, potential CAP reforms may become more difficult 
under co-decision”. This prediction was largely confirmed by 
Roederer-Rynning (2014), who describes the COMAGRI 
membership under the Seventh Legislature as mainly “farm-
connected”. She also finds that two political groups – the EPP and 
ECR, which are traditionally perceived to be closer to farm 
constituencies and interests – are over-represented compared to 
their share in the Parliament plenary (respectively 38.6% and 9.1% 
compared to 35.7% and 7.5% in the plenary).  
The interviews conducted in Knops & Swinnen (2014) also go 
in the same direction: they reveal no evidence that the COMAGRI 
membership has changed as a result of co-decision, which means 
that the prediction that the increase of influence would attract non-
farm-related members was wrong.9 This almost unchanged 
                                                        
9 In fact, this does not come as a surprise. Firstly, there is a natural tendency 
for MEPs with a specific technical or professional background to enter the 
corresponding committees. Indeed, given the growing empowerment of 
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membership in COMAGRI had implications for the nature of the 
Parliament’s legislative influence, which resulted in an overall 
resistant-to-change position on CAP reform. Indeed, the Parliament 
– and COMAGRI in particular – appears to have pushed for less 
reform than the Commission: 56% of respondents believed that the 
increase of legislative power in COMAGRI moved the CAP further 
away from reform (and closer to the status quo) and 44% believed 
that it enabled new values and new ideas to be reflected in the new 
CAP (see Table 16.2). 
Table 16.2 Impact of co-decision on policy content and the likelihood of 
reform 
Description of the CAP reform process 
(Response rate = 62%) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. The increase of power in COMAGRI has moved the 
CAP further away from reform (and closer to policy 
status quo)  
56% 
B. By giving more power to COMAGRI, new values and 
new ideas were represented and reflected in a new CAP 
44% 
Source: Knops & Swinnen (2014). 
This resistance to change was particularly striking in the case 
of the greening component, if change is understood as the reform 
options proposed by the Commission. The influence of the 
Parliament on the greening part of the reform is thoroughly 
documented in Hart (2014).  
 
                                                        
the Parliament in specialised and technical legislation, it is logical to expect 
MEPs with a farming background to represent a growing part of the 
COMAGRI membership (Roederer-Rynning, 2014). Secondly, the 
technicality of the files handled by the committee may act as a disincentive 
for MEPs with no farming background. Finally, it could also be argued that, 
paradoxically, the increase of power did not encourage members from 
outside the farming community to join the committee: with legislative 
power come responsibility, accountability and increased scrutiny by the 
public, all of which could be costly in electoral terms (Knops & Swinnen, 
2014). 
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Box 16.2 The nature of the Parliament’s influence from a comparative 
perspective 
The following concrete examples were alluded to in the interviews 
conducted by Knops & Swinnen (2014) to illustrate the nature or the 
specificity of the Parliament’s influence: 
On the CMO: Some recognised the important influence of the 
Parliament on this file, underlining the number of ‘new’ ideas 
introduced by the Parliament, in particular in terms of collective 
organisations of producers and other market intervention 
instruments. Others, however, described the influence of the 
Parliament on this file as the most conservative, “reverting to 
instruments of the past”. Notably, the Parliament managed to 
postpone the end of the sugar quotas until 2017.  
On Direct Payments: The Parliament’s position was described 
as being “concerned by the practicability and economic relevance of 
the regulation” or as being a “watering down” influence on greening 
(although not all shared this view), or even a renationalising 
influence, with regard to the increased flexibility given to member 
states for implementation. The Young Farmers’ Scheme was often 
cited as an area where the Parliament’s influence was decisive: it 
managed to impose the mandatory character of the scheme in the 
face of opposition from the Council, which wanted to keep it 
voluntary. The Parliament also managed to increase the number of 
eligible hectares from 25 to 90. As regards the Small Farmers’ 
Scheme, the Parliament also had a notable influence: the Council 
wanted to cap the lump sum at €1,000, while the Parliament 
proposed €1,500. The final outcome ended up being a compromise 
between the two: €1,250.  
On Rural Development: The Parliament’s influence was 
described as consensual but decisive with regard to the elimination 
of double funding and the ring-fencing of agri-environmental 
spending. 
On the Horizontal Regulation: The Parliament supported the 
efforts of the Commission on strengthening the accountability of the 
paying agencies. The Parliament also supported the Commission on 
a number of other issues aimed at strengthening the control systems 
(certification, possibility of suspending monthly payments, etc.). 
Finally, the Parliament added some elements to the Farm Advisory 
System, e.g. competitiveness, entrepreneurship, and to cross-
compliance, e.g. early warning system. 
Source: Knops & Swinnen (2014). 
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Fertő & Kovacs (2014) also show the rather status quo-
oriented position of the Parliament when compared to the other 
institutions. They provide an extensive picture of the differences 
between the institutional positions on some of the most important 
issues of the CAP reform package (see Box 16.2 and the Appendix). 
However, despite this general consensus on the nature of the 
Parliament’s legislative influence, this finding should be treated 
with caution: such influence varied on a case-by-case basis and there 
were instances when the Parliament introduced new elements of 
reform, compared to the initial proposals of the Commission.  
Trying to draw definite conclusions on the nature of the 
Parliament’s position and influence in the CAP reform process 
remains a highly delicate matter. Depending on one’s viewpoint 
and preferences, the Parliament’s position will be reformist or status 
quo-oriented.  
What is easier to describe, however, is the scale or magnitude 
of the Parliament’s influence in this reform, as it can be somewhat 
measured and quantified. In other words, whatever direction in 
which the Parliament tried to change (or not) the CAP, how much 
of its own position did it manage to impose in the negotiations? 
Fertő & Kovacs (2014) extensively document how the Parliament 
managed to play a pivotal role in amending the proposals and being 
part of the winning inter-institutional coalitions. In particular, they 
show that 44% of the total number of Parliament amendments in the 
negotiation mandate were accepted in the final outcome. They also 
reveal that the Parliament was more often engaged in winning 
coalitions than the Council (in 65.6% of cases for the Parliament, 
compared to 57% for the Council). What these figures show is that, 
whatever the nature of its influence, the Parliament managed to 
exert its role as co-legislator.  
The results of the interview process carried out by Knops & 
Swinnen (2014) confirm this view. As Table 16.3 shows, when asked 
to describe the role of the Parliament vis-à-vis the other institutions, 
almost 80% of respondents argued that they evaluated the 
Parliament as a ‘working Parliament’ as opposed to an 
‘antechamber to the Council’ (21%). None of the interviewees 
replied that the Parliament acted as a rubber-stamp institution 
endorsing the Commission positions.  
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Table 16.3 Role of the Parliament in the CAP reform 
Role of the EP in the CAP reform 
(Response rate = 59%) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. A rubber-stamp institution endorsing the 
Commission positions 
0% 
B. An antechamber to the Council 21% 
C. A working Parliament (able to amend and 
produce its own legislation) 
79% 
Source: Knops & Swinnen (2014).  
3.4 The first CAP reform under co-decision: A 
success story? 
If one takes a very broad perspective by looking only at the ultimate 
result, it would be legitimate to argue that co-decision worked, since 
an agreement was reached and a new CAP entered into force in 
January 2015. For some observers, this may be enough to argue that 
the Parliament faced up to its responsibilities and fulfilled its co-
legislator functions.  
In their study, Knops & Swinnen (2014) reveal a relative high 
average grade given by key actors and observers of the reform to 
grade the Parliament’s performance in its first co-decision 
experience on CAP: 4.85 on average (on a scale of 1 to 7) (see Table 
16.4).  
Table 16.4 Overall performance of the Parliament in its first CAP reform 
co-decision 
Interviewees 
Grade 1 (lowest) – 7 (highest) 
(Response rate = 79%) 
Average 
grade 
Average grade 4.85 
A. Parliament interviewees (response rate = 83%) 5.20 
B. Commission interviewees (response rate = 71%) 4.70 
C. Council interviewees (response rate = 50%) 5.00 
D. Stakeholders/Civil Society (response rate = 100%) 2.50 
Source: Knops & Swinnen (2014). 
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In the same vein, their interview results also reflected a 
general positive perception of the Parliament’s involvement as a co-
legislator in the overall CAP reform process. Table 16.5 indicates 
that more than two-thirds (70%) of interviewees thought that the 
Parliament’s involvement strengthened the accountability 
mechanisms on the CAP (and its democratic character).10 The 
increased transparency of the process11 and the increased public 
scrutiny over the reform were found to be the main reasons for this. 
Table 16.5 Assessing the impact of the Parliament’s role as co-legislator 
Overall assessment of the Parliament’s 
involvement as co-legislator (Response rate = 69%) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. Strengthened the accountability mechanisms on 
the CAP 
72.5% 
B. Raised obstacles to reform 7.5% 
C. Made the decision-making more efficient 5% 
D. Other 15% 
Source: Knops and Swinnen (2014). 
These findings tend to indicate that, despite the constraints, 
problems, shortcomings and difficulties encountered during the 
process, the general appreciation of the Parliament’s participation 
in the process was quite positive and that the Parliament’s 
performance was seen as rather successful.  
                                                        
10 However, in Knops & Swinnen (2014) it is noted that some interviewees 
selected this option by default and added a number of reservations and 
additional comments mostly on how much more accountable the process 
had really become. A related comment referred to the limitations imposed 
by the complexity of the reform. Many interviewees expressed concerns 
about the complexity of the legislation which had been adopted and the 
related difficulty of organising real scrutiny over it (see next section).  
11 As Knops & Swinnen (2014) point out, COMAGRI meetings where the 
proposals were debated and amended were open to the public; the 
attention of civil society actors and the public in general increased, and 
more documents could be circulated on a formal or informal basis. Plenary 
debates are also web-streamed. 
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Section 4 below provides a slightly more nuanced and critical 
appreciation of the Parliament’s relative ‘success’ in the 2013 CAP 
reform. 
4. The limits of co-decision: complexity and 
political reality 
Despite the relative success of this co-decision experience, 
numerous factors can be identified as having partly offset the formal 
increase of power enjoyed by the Parliament in the 2013 reform, 
amongst which the asymmetries in the levels of in-house resources 
of each institution. In this section, we take a slightly different 
approach by looking at two factors jeopardising the attainment of 
co-decision’s ultimate objective, i.e. increasing the democratic 
legitimacy of the CAP. We first look at the issue of legislative 
complexity before discussing the political reality at play at EU level. 
4.1 Democracy at the price of complexity 
Many observers and citizens saw the entry of the Parliament into 
the CAP arena as a sign of democratisation of agricultural policy. It 
is indeed undeniable that the EU decision-making process has been 
rendered more ‘democratic’ with the participation of Europe’s 
directly-elected representatives, compared to a situation where only 
unelected Commission officials and the ministers of agriculture 
would decide on the future of the CAP. Co-decision should 
therefore logically grant greater democratic legitimacy to its policy 
outcomes, not only because of the direct representativeness of the 
Parliament’s members, but also because of the Parliament’s specific 
role of democratic scrutiny over the other institutions, assigned by 
the Treaties (TUE Article 14; TFUE Article 223, ff.). 
However, this apparent democratisation should also be 
considered in the light of the practice of co-decision and the related 
legislative complexity, which can be noticed both on the procedural 
and legislative front.  
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Box 16.3 CAP reform under co-decision: A multi-staged and complex 
process 
12 October 2011: The Commission presented a set of legal proposals 
on the CAP, which served as a starting point for the negotiations 
with the other institutions. 
23-24 January 2013: COMAGRI voted on the four CAP reform 
regulations. 
8 February 2013: The Council reached an agreement on the 2014-20 
MFF. 
13 March 2013: The Parliament adopted its negotiating mandates on 
the four CAP reform Basic Regulations. 
19 March 2013: The Council adopted its general approach on CAP 
reform. 
25 March 2013: The Council adopted its mandates on the four CAP 
reform regulations. 
11 April 2013: The inter-institutional negotiations started with the 
opening of the trilogue meetings on the four CAP reform regulations. 
27-28 May 2013: An informal Council was held in Dublin as part of 
the negotiations on the CAP reform package. 
26 June 2013: A political agreement on the reform of the CAP was 
reached between the Commission, the Parliament and the Council, 
under the Irish presidency.  
20 November 2013: The Parliament approved the four Basic 
Regulations in a plenary vote.  
16 December 2013: The Council formally adopted the four Basic 
Regulations for the reformed CAP as well as the Transition Rules for 
2014.  
20 December 2013: The four Basic Regulations and the Transition 
Rules were published in the Official Journal. 
11 March 2014: The Commission adopted ten ‘Delegated Acts’ that 
clarify technical implementation details of the reform.  
7 April 2014: COMAGRI approved the Delegated Acts in its 
committee meeting of 7 April. The Parliament plenary did not object 
to these Delegated Acts in its last plenary session of the 2009-14 
legislative term (14-17 April 2014). The Council accepted these acts 
on 14 April 2014. 
Sources: European Commission website, www.capreform.eu; Matthews (2014). 
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Firstly, on the procedural front, Box 16.3 above gives a brief 
overview of the complex procedure: from the Parliament’s internal 
decision-making to adopt a common position, to the intense 
negotiations with the Commission and the Council to finalise a 
political deal and up to the final stage of adopting delegated acts. 
This procedural complexity reinforces the public’s perception of a 
distant and unaccountable EU political system, difficult to access 
owing to its numerous facets and channels of communication. 
Furthermore, the complexity of the co-decision process strengthens 
the impression of a lack of transparency, in particular during the 
trilogue negotiations – the decisive stage leading to a political deal 
– which all take place behind closed doors between the negotiating 
teams of the Parliament, Council and Commission, respectively. 
These negotiations are never open to external actors and the exact 
content of the discussions is not available to the public. This makes 
appropriate democratic oversight over what the negotiators 
actually defend during the trilogues virtually impossible. 
Secondly, complexity is also apparent on the legislative front. 
It is especially revealed by the vulnerability of the Parliament on 
highly complex and technical legislative issues, which only experts 
– not politicians – can fully comprehend. This raises the question of 
the limited in-house resources the Parliament relies on to deal with 
complex legislative content,12 and the relative incompatibility 
between the Parliament’s political nature and the technical nature 
of European legislation over which it is supposed to have 
democratic oversight. As suggested in Knops & Swinnen (2014), this 
complexity may contribute to a relative ‘technocratic drift’ in EU 
decision-making, i.e. a shift of power from the directly-elected 
members to experts. 
These two facets of the complexity linked to co-decision 
indicate two limits to the relative democratisation of agricultural 
policy achieved under the new procedure. Indeed, both the public’s 
difficult access to EU decision-making and the MEPs’ reliance on 
                                                        
12 The case of the CMO regulation could be mentioned here, as an example 
of legislative complexity: the new regulation adopted by the Parliament 
and the Council is contained in a long and complex document of 232 
articles, 184 pages and 19 annexes. To this must be added the second 
regulation adopted by the Council alone on the CMO issues regulated 
under Article 43(3) TFUE. 
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additional and external expertise work against the democratisation 
aim of co-decision. 
4.2 Co-decision in the face of political reality 
Co-decision is defined by the European Treaties – ratified and 
adopted by member states – and grants full legislative competences 
to the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. However, beyond 
the legal bases and rules of procedure, there is one factor that still 
seems to overrule the principles of co-decision: political reality. At 
EU level, EU heads of state and governments still have the last 
word, regardless of any Treaty provisions. 
This political reality was at play during the 2013 CAP reform 
process and can easily be demonstrated with two examples. Firstly, 
on the so-called ‘MFF-related issues’, heads of state stepped in the 
co-decision process on crucial issues (falling under co-decision), 
despite not having any mandate to do so. This aspect is thoroughly 
presented in Matthews’s chapter 7 of this volume. Matthews shows 
very clearly that, despite rules and procedures, the highest instance 
of political influence still resides with heads of state and 
governments, in particular when issues with financial implications 
are at stake.  
A second example of the political reality at play during the 
2013 CAP reform is the episode surrounding the ‘Article 43(3) 
issues’.  
Co-decision applies to all CAP-related issues, except for those 
enumerated in Article 43(3) TFEU: the measures relating to fixing 
prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations, and on the fixing and 
allocation of fishing opportunities are to be legislated separately via 
a regulation of the Council. Understanding and interpreting the 
scope of this exception has been a delicate matter. On the one hand, 
Article 43(3) implies that the acts adopted on this basis are no longer 
of a legislative nature but an executive one, and as such, must be 
regarded as a limitation of the Parliament’s legislative powers. On 
the other hand, the four points listed in Article 43(3) cover many 
issues regulated by the CMO basic act, including issues at the very 
core of it, which means that they should, logically, fall under the 
ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision).  
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This question naturally came to the fore before the CAP 
reform negotiations started and triggered an important inter-
institutional battle between the Parliament and the Council. 
Discussions on the legal basis of the CMO and whether or not 
Article 43(3) should apply were indeed very tense. The issue 
therefore remained unresolved throughout the CAP reform process 
and was left until the very last stages of the negotiations. The 
Parliament negotiators were faced with a ‘take it or leave it’ deal 
and were not in a strong position to block the whole agreement 
based on these issues only, given the high pressure to close the deal 
and the Parliament’s willingness to show that co-decision on the 
CAP could work. The Council eventually won the legal battle on 
these issues and two regulations were adopted: one of the 
Parliament and the Council, and another of the Council only.  
In conclusion, one could argue that, in both the MFF and 
Article 43(3) episodes, there was an asymmetry of power between 
the two co-legislators, which is in contradiction to the core 
principles of co-decision, i.e. the equal importance and involvement 
of both co-legislators in the process.  
5. Conclusions  
In this chapter, we provided a few insights on the role and position 
of the Parliament during the 2013 CAP reform process. We 
underlined the paradoxical concentration of legislative influence 
and competences which took place across the institutions and were 
in the hands of a few specific actors. We discussed the particular 
role played by COMAGRI members, especially the rapporteurs and 
shadow rapporteurs. We revealed that, despite the entry into the 
game of a new actor (the Parliament), the Commission remains in a 
strong position (not the least because of its expertise), and that the 
Council is now represented by one single entity during the 
negotiations (the Presidency), as opposed to enjoying the 
representation of each individual member state. This sheds light on 
where the decision-making and influence actually lie under the co-
decision setting.  
We also commented on the emerging working culture 
between the three institutions and we made an attempt at 
describing the Parliament’s legislative influence in the reform, both 
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in terms of nature and scale. A successful working culture will take 
time to materialise but there are already signs that the institutions 
are adapting to the new setting. 
As regards the nature of the Parliament’s influence, we 
confirm some of the anticipated predictions by underlining the 
rather status quo influence of the Parliament, although we consider 
this finding with caution and acknowledge the need to look at this 
dimension on a case-by-case basis. In terms of scale, we also suggest 
that the Parliament had a significant influence on the final outcome; 
it played a pivotal role in the negotiations and managed to get 
almost half of its negotiating mandate into the final texts.  
Finally, we addressed one final question which had remained 
so far unanswered: Was this first CAP reform under co-decision a 
success? One answer which can be given is that, ultimately, co-
decision ‘worked’; an agreement was reached and a new CAP 
entered into force. The findings of Knops & Swinnen (2014) also 
reveal a relative high ‘mark’ given by actors and observers of the 
2013 CAP reform to describe the Parliament’s performance.  
However, despite these relative indicators of success, 
numerous limits and areas for improvement remain. We identified 
two major limits to the current co-decision setting, both in terms of 
democratisation and materialisation of the Parliament’s new 
decision-making role, namely the legislative complexity induced by 
co-decision and the political reality at play at EU level. 
Furthermore, there are still areas of improvement for the 
Parliament to become a full co-legislator and for co-decision to work 
effectively. Some of these include working on the Parliament’s in-
house resources, which need to be adapted to its new legislative 
role, but without falling into the trap of increasing the technocratic 
character of EU decision-making. Improvements should also be 
made in inter-institutional relationships, especially when it comes 
to the understanding of each institution’s role and ensuring that an 
optimal working culture emerges. Transparency and 
communication towards the European public should be increased 
as a way to compensate for the complexity of the process both on 
the procedural and legislative front.  
To conclude, this first CAP reform under co-decision was 
only the first episode in what will surely be a whole new page in the 
history of Europe’s agricultural policy. If all stories have a 
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beginning and an end, the end of this ‘CAP and co-decision’ story 
certainly has not been written yet. 
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17. AN IMPERFECT STORM IN THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY 
JOHAN SWINNEN 
1. Introduction 
Previous chapters in this book have identified and analysed the 
factors that played a role in the negotiations and 2013 decisions that 
determined the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for 2014-20. In 
this chapter I attempt to integrate these insights into a 
comprehensive political economy framework to provide 
explanations and hypotheses for the choices that were made during 
the CAP decision-making process in 2009-13 (as I explain in chapter 
1, the term ‘reform’ is not a generally accepted description of the 
policy choices).  
The CAP is a complex set of policies and regulations. I focus 
here on four key aspects of the CAP negotiations: the budget, 
greening, external convergence, and market regulations.1 Each of 
those policy choices, and their implementation, has been described 
in some detail in other chapters of this book; to avoid repetition I 
will only refer to these specific chapters and to the Appendix of the 
book.  
My approach is therefore more conceptual than most other 
chapters in that I focus on a number of broader institutional, 
economic and political factors that can explain the general direction 
of the policy choices. The conceptual framework I adopt is a 
                                                        
1 For the negotiations on capping and degressivity, see Sahrbacher et al. 
(ch. 11). 
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combination of theoretical arguments that focus on the impact of 
political institutional arrangements on the decision-making (such as 
qualified majority voting (QMV) in the 2003 CAP reform and the co-
decision used now, based on e.g. Pokrivcak et al., 2006; Crombez & 
Swinnen, 2011) and more general political economy theories that 
attempt to explain how changes in market conditions affect political 
choices (e.g. Anderson et al., 2013; Swinnen, 1994) and the role 
played by individuals and specific interest groups.2  
Many traditional political economy models of agriculture and 
food policies focus on three types of agent: producers, consumers 
and taxpayers (see Gardner, 1987; Swinnen, 1994).3 Such a political 
economy framework is useful when thinking about the economic 
impacts and political aspects of agricultural and food policies. 
However, to analyse specific policy decisions it is useful to extend 
this framework to include the impact on and influence of other 
types of agents – such as environmental groups, landowners, etc. 
and of agenda-setters, such as the European Commission 
(Commission), and influential political actors, such as the 
                                                        
2 A related approach is the framework used by Grant (2008) that clusters 
the variables involved in terms of structure, agency and context. Structure 
includes the decision-making processes of the EU in relation to the CAP, 
but also the structure of the CAP itself and the way in which that has 
created an element of path determinism in its development. Agency 
focuses on the role of the actors involved, such as the Commissioner for 
Agriculture and Rural Development, the DG for Agriculture and the rest 
of the Commission, the European Parliament, the member states and other 
stakeholders. Context refers to contingent factors that were present in one 
period but not another, creating what political scientists call ‘policy 
windows’, which can create opportunities for change to be seized by policy 
entrepreneurs. 
3 Policy changes affect producer and consumer welfare and trigger political 
actions. Because of expenditures on social policies and agricultural/food 
subsidies, taxpayers have always been an important actor in food policy 
discussions. In the EU, with the shift from price and trade interventions to 
direct payments (in the 1990s), most of the support to farmers now comes 
through budget expenditures. In addition, the financial and economic crisis 
has had a major impact on taxpayers and member states’ budgets and on 
their fiscal policy. This affects their willingness to allocate funds to EU 
policies (such as the CAP and food aid) and to spend on domestic social 
policies. 
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Committee for Agricultural (COMAGRI) of the European 
Parliament (EP) and member states, either directly or through the 
Agriculture and Fisheries Council of the EU (Agriculture Council).4 
For example, in recent years landowners have lobbied intensively 
on EU farm policies as farm subsidies have shifted from price and 
trade interventions to land-linked subsidies, directly affecting land 
prices (Swinnen & Vranken, 2009; Ciaian, et al., 2010). 
Environmental groups have been increasingly vocal in agri-food 
policy debates (Hart, ch. 10). Several chapters in this book discuss 
the role played by the Commission, COMAGRI and the Council. 
The chapter is organised as follows. To put the recent CAP 
decision-making in perspective, it might be useful to first present a 
highly relevant comparative case with a very different reform 
outcome. I therefore start (in section 2) by summarising the political 
economy of the 2003 Fischler reforms using a similar political 
economy framework. This will serve as a reference point for 
interpreting the recent reform discussions and political choices. 
Section 3 will then present the main pressures, political actors and 
decision-making institutions involved in the recent reform 
discussions.  
Subsequently I discuss certain events that had a major impact 
on the political economy of the CAP negotiations. The first event, 
discussed in section 4, is eastern enlargement, which brought ten 
new countries to the CAP negotiation table and influenced the 
distribution of policy preferences and political weighting.  
Another major event was the spike in global agricultural and 
food prices, in 2007-08 and again in 2010-11. Paradoxically, after 
decades of EU reform to reduce the CAP’s (negative) impact on 
global agricultural and food prices, the world became concerned 
once more with the implications of high food prices. Following the 
price spikes of 2007-08, international organisations, NGOs and 
numerous experts pointed to the effects of high food prices on 
hunger and poverty. Their argument was that not only were urban 
consumers suffering from high food prices, rural households were 
                                                        
4 A related approach is by Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) and Swinnen 
(2015) who explicitly use a more disaggregated value chain approach in 
considering political economy effects and disaggregated policy impacts 
along the value chain. 
446  AN IMPERFECT STORM IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CAP 
 
hit too. They also argued that poor farmers were not benefiting from 
these high prices due to the imperfect price transmission of 
international prices and because many rural households were 
thought to be net food-buying households – arguments absent from 
the pre-2008 discussions (Swinnen & Squicciarini 2012).5 While the 
empirical support for these arguments was questionable, they did 
have a major impact on the policy debate (Guariso et al., 2014; 
Swinnen, 2011). In sections 5 and 6 we discuss the impact of these 
price changes on the CAP reform negotiations.  
In the final section (section 6) we summarise the key factors 
and how they influenced (or not) the CAP for 2014-20. 
2. A perfect storm in the Fischler CAP reform 
(2000-03) 
In Swinnen (2008a), I argued that institutional, economic and 
political factors came together around 2002 to create “a perfect 
storm” that led to the radical Fischler reforms in 2003. Here I 
summarise how each of these factors played a role and how they 
reinforced each other to lead to significant reforms. 
Crucial elements of the 2003 perfect storm were the changed 
institutional context of qualified majority voting, large external 
changes that moved policy preferences in a pro-reform direction, 
and a pro-reform and influential agenda-setter, the EU Commission 
(Cunha & Swinbank, 2011; Pokrivcak et al., 2006; Swinnen, 2008b).6  
                                                        
5 See Swinnen (2011) for a detailed review of this major turnaround in 
arguments and Swinnen et al., (2011) for a political economy explanation. 
6 The optimal reform context under QMV, as defined by Pokrivcak et al., 
(2006), is the combination of a) an external change that moves policy 
preferences in a pro-reform direction, b) that is sufficiently large and c) a 
pro-reform Commission. Such a combination leads to a ‘pro-reform bias’ in 
their theory. The intuition is that ceteris paribus, an external change that 
alters the political preferences of member states will lead to a demand for 
policy adjustments. Effective policy adjustments only occur if the change is 
large enough, because of the ‘status quo bias’. Under a qualified majority 
rule, an external change needs to be sufficiently large for a minimum 
coalition of countries (those required to form a qualified majority) to be 
better off with a policy change than with current policies. If an external 
change is sufficiently large, the final outcome will depend on the 
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2.1 The pressures for reform 
The main pressures for CAP reforms were trade negotiations (WTO 
and others), budgetary pressures, rising food safety and 
environmental concerns, and the forthcoming eastern enlargement. 
These elements, some traditional and others new, translate into 
increased pressure for change in the EU. Franz Fischler himself 
summarised these important developments by stating that “the 
CAP had lost its legitimacy among the EU public”. In particular, the 
CAP was increasingly seen as harming EU trade interests, having 
negative effects on the environment and failing to address the food 
safety concerns of EU consumers.  
These developments compounded calls for radical change to 
the CAP at a time when ministers of finance and other members of 
the European Commission were seeking budget cuts or 
reallocations within the EU budget. These were vital issues for an 
EU on the verge of eastern enlargement; a process that was expected 
to greatly increase the CAP budget without CAP reform to contain 
the costs. The structural funds were also likely to need extra funds, 
given that new member states had much lower incomes than the 
EU-15 average.  
2.2 The political actors 
These pressures were reinforced by the Commission pushing for 
CAP reforms (although not all Commissioners pushed in the same 
direction). Commission President Romano Prodi and several other 
commissioners wanted the share of the CAP in the EU budget to be 
reduced, and substantially so. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy 
wanted reform of the CAP so that the EU could take the initiative 
into the Doha round and not always be on the defensive. In 
addition, several crises in the late 1990s enhanced the Commission’s 
awareness of increasing consumer and environmental concerns 
                                                        
preferences of the Commission, which sets the agenda. Hence, if the 
Commission has strong pro-reform preferences, it can pick the strongest 
reform option that is possible within the policy range. This leads to what 
Pokrivcak and his colleagues (2006) call the ‘pro-reform bias’. Obviously, 
the opposite can also happen. Note that these arguments no longer apply 
in the same way after co-decision with the EP has been introduced (see 
Crombez et al., 2012). 
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about the EU’s agriculture and the food system. Agricultural 
Commissioner Fischler was moved to use the mid-term review 
(MTR) of 2003 to propose significant reforms of the CAP. 
Surprisingly, the food safety and environmental crises of 1999-01 
reinforced this agenda. The sense of urgency for a significant rethink 
of the CAP helped push the general political agenda closer to his 
personal preferences. 
Two enlargement processes influenced decision-making: the 
previous enlargement of 1995 with respect to EU member state 
preferences, and the imminent eastern enlargement with its likely 
altered future preferences and more difficult decision-making. First, 
the 1995 enlargement with Sweden, Finland and Austria reduced 
the vote shares of the established players in the EU. Second, 
anticipation of the eastern enlargement added a sense of urgency to 
the reform process. With ten east European countries joining, some 
of which had large agricultural sectors and even larger farm 
populations, the Commission realised that reform would not be any 
easier after enlargement.  
The 2003 discussions and political tactics also transformed 
stakeholder involvement and the ‘politics as usual’ approach of the 
CAP. Traditionally, the main pressure group involved in the CAP 
negotiations had been the farm unions, which urged their 
agriculture ministers and the Commission to obtain as much as the 
other ministers would allow. The negotiations, however, brought 
both consumer and environmental groups to the political table in a 
much stronger way than before. They were an element of Fischler’s 
strategy to secure support for his reforms by environmental 
organisations and consumer groups. As a result, discussions in the 
member states were much more balanced than in previous reform 
efforts, when farm unions dominated the debate. 
A potential source of opposition against the reforms, within 
the Commission, was in itself transformed. Administrative reforms 
and generational changes helped to overcome ‘traditional DG AGRI 
thinking’ among bureaucrats, as many of the old-style DG AGRI 
officials whose careers developed in the early years of the CAP were 
succeeded by younger people, such that thinking within DG AGRI 
was much more open to environmental and economic arguments. 
Friends and foes agree that Commissioner Fischler played a 
crucial role in the reforms. The combination of his experience (a 
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second-term commissioner with specific experience of the Agenda 
2000 reforms), his strategic vision, his political tactics and the 
Commission officials’ effort and preparation appear to have played 
a vital part. The reforms were prepared in relative secrecy by a small 
inner circle of officials while experts within the Commission 
administration calculated the potential effects of the reforms. 
Opponents appeared to have underestimated his determination to 
see through these reforms, or overestimated their own political and 
diplomatic strength and capacity to block them.  
2.3 The political institutions: Putting the votes 
together  
Besides enlargement, the most critical institutional changes were 
those to voting rules brought by the Single European Act, which 
introduced qualified majority voting for decision-making in EU 
policy where the unanimity rule had been used before. Fischler and 
his team expended much effort in putting together a winning 
coalition and breaking a blocking minority one.7 During the final 
Council meetings, Fischler’s experience and tactics again proved 
important, first to get the votes through the Agriculture Council and 
later to prevent Chirac from re-opening the decision by the 
agriculture ministers in the Council meeting with the heads of state 
and governments.  
                                                        
7 As explained in Pirzio-Biroli (2008) and Swinnen (2008a) the proposals 
initially faced a strong anti-reform group, which easily controlled a 
blocking minority with three large countries (France, Spain and Germany). 
Unexpectedly, the Iraq war played a decisive role. It made allies out of 
French President Chirac and German Chancellor Schröder in opposition to 
the reforms – despite the fact that Germany had earlier favoured reform. 
But Fischler used the Iraq alliances to manoeuvre Spain out of the anti-
reform group through UK Prime Minister Blair’s links to Spanish Prime 
Minister Aznar, for which Fischler paid a price in having to drop the 
capping of the subsidies (in order to convince Aznar through Blair) and by 
allowing regional instead of historically based payments (to secure German 
votes later).  
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2.4 Reforms to ‘save the CAP’ 
Finally, it is worth emphasising that Fischler and his team saw their 
reforms not as an instrument to reduce the importance of the EU’s 
agricultural policy, but as a way of saving it. While discussions on 
the importance of the reforms focus mostly on the 2003 reforms (and 
to some extent on the Agenda 2000 reforms), Fischler himself saw 
the achievements of the 2003 reforms as being much more in tandem 
with the 2002 budgetary agreement. Commission President Prodi 
and other commissioners and ministers of finance had targeted a 
30% budget cut of the CAP when the Prodi Commission took office. 
By proposing a series of bold reforms to reduce the negative effects 
of the CAP on the environment, on market distortions and on the 
WTO negotiations, and to enable the CAP to fit within a concept of 
sustainable rural development, Fischler and his team created a new 
‘legitimacy’ for the CAP and a new support base that would counter 
the demand for large budget cuts, in effect limiting the cuts planned 
for the next financial period (up to 2013). Fischler saw this as a major 
achievement of the reforms. From this perspective, they ‘saved the 
CAP’ (and its budget) instead of scrapping it. 
3. Pressures, institutions and agents in the 2009-13 
political negotiations 
There were similarities with the 2003 reforms but also significant 
differences, which affected the outcome of the 2009-13 CAP reform 
debate and negotiations, and thus the 2014-20 CAP. I will start with 
the pressures for change.  
3.1 Pressures for change  
There were several politically significant pressures for change (see 
Table 17.1 for a summary in the final section of this chapter). 
3.1.1 The budget 
Budgetary pressures were important for two reasons. One, there 
was the formal budgetary review, required as part of the 2005 
December Council conclusions. As Swinbank (2015, ch. 14) 
convincingly explains, the role of Tony Blair and the UK 
government was crucial in this: “the British Government pressed for 
a new CAP reform debate, […], and in the European Council 
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meeting of December 2005 secured a commitment for the 
Commission to undertake a full, wide ranging review covering all 
aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and of resources, 
including the UK rebate, to report in 2008/9”.8 While Swinbank 
goes on to argue that the impact of the UK government on the CAP 
has been very limited, it is an interesting hypothesis that, if it had 
not been for Blair and the UK government in 2005, there may not 
have been the substantial discussion and negotiations about CAP 
reform that we saw in 2009-13, although there would have been 
negotiations on the 2014-10 Financial Framework. 
The pressure to reduce CAP spending in the 2014-20 MFF was 
reinforced by global events after 2008. The financial and economic 
crisis caused major economic, and consequently budgetary, 
problems for governments in all member states. It put pressure on 
budgets as tax revenues declined and demands for social spending 
(including unemployment benefits) increased. Even as the financial 
and economic crisis constrained government budgets, social 
expenditure in the EU increased by approximately 7% between 2005 
and 2010 (Swinnen et al., 2014).9  
3.1.2 Eastern enlargement and (external) convergence of 
direct payments.  
From the moment of the new member states’ (NMS) accession in 
2004, there was a strong demand from their side for a more equal 
distribution of direct payments (DPs) across member states. As 
Figure 17.1 illustrates, the direct payments differed strongly across 
member states, and in particular between NMS and old member 
states (OMS). These differences could be partly justified by 
differences in incomes and (historical) productivity (as they had 
been during the accession negotiations) but were also due to the fact 
that the NMS were not at the table when the key budgetary and DPs 
decisions were taken in 2002 and 2003. Clearly, a convergence of 
DPs by reducing the gap between OMS to NMS was a key demand. 
                                                        
8 José Manuel Barroso’s Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA) 
responded to this invitation with enthusiasm, and organised a meeting on 
a new CAP reform in early 2009. 
9 Not surprisingly, there are large disparities among member states, but 
spending on social security benefits increased in almost all MS. 
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3.1.3 Public funds for public goods 
A factor that received much attention from both economists and 
ecologists was the need to link the DPs more closely to 
‘environmental’ or ‘public good’ objectives. Ecologists had long 
argued the need to use the DPs to reduce the negative impact of EU 
agriculture on climate change and to enhance biodiversity, etc. (see 
chapters 6, 10 and 20 by Potočnik, Hart and Buckwell, respectively). 
Economists saw this as the next step in the long-run reform path of 
farm support: from distortive interventions in the 1970s and 1980s 
to less distortive payments in the 1990s (after MacSharry) to 
decoupled payments in the 2000s (after Fischler) to (more) targeted 
payments in the 2010s, as reflected in the report by Bureau & Mahé 
(2008) and the statement of a group of “leading agricultural 
economists” (Anania et al., 2010). These objectives were 
summarised in the “public funds for public goods” statement.10 
Farm organisations were mostly opposed to these demands, 
however, as they saw them as additional constraints and as adding 
to their production costs. 
3.1.4 Price changes for food and agricultural commodities  
Unlike in 2003, high food prices and volatility weighed heavily in 
the public debate. After 2007 food prices spiked, food security and 
volatility became a major issue but the impact on the CAP was 
complex. Several issues were involved: first, with high prices it was 
less obvious for farmers to argue that they needed government 
support. Second, volatility induced demands for regulation markets 
and prices. Third, high food prices and (the prospect of) food 
shortages on developing countries shifted the debate on policies to 
stimulate environmental objectives rather than agricultural 
production.  
3.1.5 International agreements and trade partners: 
Pressure or constraint? 
One of the most important drivers of CAP reforms in the past was 
pressure from trading partners directly or within international trade 
                                                        
10 See also arguments made in the chapters by Potoznik (ch. 6) and Hart (ch. 
10). 
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negotiations (Josling, 2008; Moehler, 2008; Swinbank, ch. 8). 
International trade (negotiations) appears to have been much less 
an issue this time. Tim Josling argues in chapter 18 that the global 
trade negotiations, including the ongoing TTIP negotiations 
between the EU and the USA had little or no impact on the 2013 
CAP reform. Alan Swinbank in chapter 10 even asks: “Is the WTO 
no longer relevant for CAP reform?”  
The general perspective appears to be that the WTO was not 
important since the Doha Development Round (DDR) was stuck, 
with an uncertain outcome. In any case the expectations were that 
the 2003 CAP reforms had done enough to address possible DDR 
outcomes. I take a slightly different perspective here. While I agree 
that there was much less pressure to reform from the trade (in 
particular WTO) side than in the past, my hypothesis is that the 
trade agreements did play an important role in (implicit) counter-
pressure for a return to regulations in the aftermath of increased 
price volatility. In other words, the absence of pressure to reform 
from the international policy arena may cloud the fact that some of 
the international trade agreements (such as WTO) may have been 
an important factor in the background, in particular to prevent a 
return to market distortions (see also next section). 
In summary, there were several forces for change but also 
several factors that countered these: i) the fiscal pressures and high 
agricultural prices translated into pressure to reduce farm payments 
from the budget; ii) there was a clear demand from NMS (and 
particularly the Baltic states, where payments were lowest) for more 
equal payments; iii) there was pressure for a return to market 
interventions and regulation under the arguments to fight against 
price volatility; iv) the food price spikes in 2008 and 2011 supported 
the ‘productionist’ arguments not to impose (environmental) 
constraints on agricultural production; iv) while trade agreements 
(WTO) were almost absent from the debate they could still play an 
important role in constraining a return to market regulations and 
distortions. 
Overall, these pressures and constraints formed a complex 
mix – not unlike the situation in the early 2000s (2008b), but with 
different ingredients. However, the 2003 set of complex pressures 
turned into a significant reform path, with a clear strategic vision of 
the agenda-setters of where to go, a well thought out tactic of how 
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to get there, and an institutional process that was conducive to such 
an outcome. This was different during the 2009-13 CAP discussions. 
While, as in 2002-03, an attempt was made to create a coalition 
between keeping payments for farmers (farm organisations) in 
exchange for better targeting (economists) and more environmental 
benefits (ecologists), this was much less successful. There are several 
reasons for this. Among others, these include the preference of the 
agenda-setter; institutional changes that reduced the influence of 
the Commission; better preparation of those who opposed reform 
proposals/ideas; market forces that countered reform pressures in 
the political arena; etc.  
3.2 Political actors and decision-making 
mechanisms 
3.2.1 European Commission 
The European Commission was less of a pro-reform force than in 
2003. Several factors explain this changed role. 
First, unlike in 2003, the reform discussions were not 
launched because the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development wanted the reforms, but because the review was 
required as part of a political agreement between then Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and the other EU leaders in 2005. This was quite 
different from the MTR process, since in 2000 Commissioner Franz 
Fischler himself was the reason why the MTR was scheduled (a 
compromise obtained during the Berlin meeting of heads of state in 
1999). Most observers agree that Commissioner Cioloş was not a 
main driver of reform but a reluctant guide, or even follower.  
Second, Cioloş and his team were inexperienced. In contrast 
to Fischler who was in his second term and had learned from 
success, and especially failure, during his first term Cioloş was 
tasked with managing a reform debate almost from the moment of 
his appointment in 2010, without much experience at the EU level.  
Third, the relationship between the Commission and his 
cabinet on the one hand and DG AGRI on the other was quite 
different. Fischler was in continuous and close communication with 
(key parts of) DG AGRI staff and used their expertise and analytical 
capacity to assist him in the preparation of his reform ideas and in 
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assessing the impact of his proposals. The relationship between 
Commissioner Cioloş and his cabinet on the one hand and DG AGRI 
on the other hand was less collaborative (or, one could argue, more 
antagonistic). 
Fourth, the change in the decision-making instructions 
reduced the (potential) influence of the Commission. Institutional 
reforms that changed the decision-making procedures also played 
an important role earlier in affecting the outcome of the decision-
making. In the 2003 MTR the voting rules, in particular the use of 
qualified majority voting,11 also played an important role: Fischler 
and his team tried hard to put together a winning coalition and 
break a blocking minority coalition.  
It was not only the introduction of co-decision that reduced 
the influence of the Commission with respect to the EP and the 
Council (see next section), but also the decision-making by the 
heads of state and government (the European Council) on the MFF 
with several CAP aspects in the so-called ‘negotiation box’. As 
Matthews explains convincingly in chapter 7, this process enhanced 
the influence of the member states (through the European Council) 
on the final CAP decision, in particular since the Irish presidency 
considered CAP issues as non-negotiable in the final MFF 
agreement. Matthews also argues that the short final negotiation 
phase (imposed by the refusal of key actors (such as the EP) to fully 
negotiate until the MFF budget decisions were final) strongly 
favoured those preferring the status quo (for example, farm groups) 
and disadvantaged those who sought more radical CAP reform (for 
example, environmental groups on environmental regulations).  
3.2.2 Co-decision, the European Parliament and the 
Council 
The 2013 CAP decision-making was the first in which the European 
Parliament had co-decision power, and this obviously changed the 
rules of the game. In theory, this change in political rules could 
                                                        
11 The Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaties of Maastricht and Nice 
introduced qualified majority voting for decision-making in EU policy 
where the unanimity rule had been used before. In this respect, the 1999 
CAP reforms (Agenda 2000) was a watershed: for the first time a major 
country (France) was outvoted in relation to a major CAP reform. 
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dramatically reduce the influence of the Commission by curbing the 
influence of the agenda-setter in the process (Crombez & Swinnen, 
2011). Co-decision would thus cause a transfer of institutional 
powers from the European Commission (EC) to the EP and the 
member states (MS) inside the Council. However, this redistribution 
of power could be mitigated by factors such as the Commission’s 
dominance of analytical resources (Crombez et al., (2012); Greer & 
Hind (2012)).  
An additional factor was that Crombez & Swinnen (2011) 
argued that the extent to which co-decision would actually 
influence the outcome of the 2013 CAP reform depended crucially 
on the structure of relative preferences for reform. In other words, 
the introduction of co-decision could reduce the prospects for CAP 
reform if the EP was less pro-reform than the Commission or if it 
influenced the proposals put forward by the Commission. It could 
also lead to gridlock (no policy decision) if the EP did not agree with 
a qualified majority in the Council (Crombez et al., 2012); an 
outcome also depending on the distribution of policy preferences 
(Crombez & Hix, 2014).  
Several chapters in this book (e.g. Roederer-Rynning (ch. 13), 
Olper & Pacca (ch. 14), Fertő & Kovacs (ch. 15), Knops & Garrone 
(ch. 16)) as well as Knops & Swinnen (2014) discuss the actual 
impact of the co-decision procedure on the CAP outcome. 
Conclusions from these analyses are, first, that the predicted impact 
of a broader EP interest in CAP issues and on the composition of 
COMAGRI did not emerge in reality, and in the 2010-14 legislature 
the COMAGRI also had close connections to the farming world. 
Second, the EP and the Council preferences often differed from 
those of the Commission, and on several issues the EP and the 
Council found common ground to change Commission proposals 
(see the chapters by Bureau & Mahé, Hart, and Fertő & Kovacs, and 
the Appendix). This was particularly clear on the greening 
proposals where the EP and the Council were more status quo 
oriented than the Commission (“however prudent” the 
Commissioner already was, according to Bureau & Mahé (ch. 3)). 
Third, co-decision did not apply equally to all issues. De Castro & 
Di Mambro (ch. 5) stress the limited influence of the EP on the MFF 
(the budget) and on the CAP issues that were in the so-called 
‘negotiation box’, as explained above. Although the EP eventually 
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gained some concessions, its role of co-legislator was certainly 
diminished on these issues (Matthews, ch. 7). Fourth, the influence 
of the Commission was certainly weakened but not fully removed, 
among other things because of its domination in analytical capacity 
and expertise in the complexity of the policy and regulatory details 
(Knops & Swinnen, 2014). 
Finally, it may be useful to point out that the change in 
decision-making procedure also would have made it more difficult 
for a Fischler-type strategy that was partly based on a secret 
preparation that took the opponents by surprise (see Swinnen, 
2008b). This approach would have had far less chance of success 
because of the information and proposals that had to be revealed at 
various stages of the co-decision process with the EP. 
3.2.3 Lobby groups: The farm unions were present 
Many different interest groups were affected (at least potentially) 
by the ideas to change the CAP and therefore lobbied decision-
makers. This included (organisations and representatives of) 
farmers, tax-payers, consumers, the environment, the food industry, 
land owners, agribusiness, etc.  
In my 2008 book I raised the question: “Where were the farm 
unions?” in the 2003 MTR. I suggested that the EU farm unions may 
have had less impact on both the debates and the outcomes of the 
Fischler reforms than on any previous CAP policy decision. It 
appeared that farm unions were taken by surprise by the Fischler 
reform strategy; they faced a new political environment in which 
environmental groups, consumer groups, etc., were being taken 
seriously by political leaders.12  
This conclusion (or hypothesis) is not supported by the recent 
reform discussions. The two main lobby groups involved in the 
‘greening’ debate were the farm organisations and the 
                                                        
12 The latter hypothesis was consistent with the argument that a declining 
number of farmers in the EU-15 and growing citizen awareness and 
concerns about environment and animal welfare, may have reduced the 
power of farm unions on the CAP, both in terms of setting the agenda and 
influencing its outcome. However, declining numbers do not necessary 
imply a weakening of political influence, sometimes quite the contrary (see 
Anderson et al. 2013; Swinnen & de Gorter, 1993). 
458  AN IMPERFECT STORM IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CAP 
 
environmental organisations. The farm unions were very active and 
present – possibly having drawn lessons from the 2003 MTR.   
Instead it appears that the environmental organisations (EOs) 
were outmanoeuvred on several occasions. The EOs felt that the 
initial proposals tabled by the European Commission were much 
too weak going into the political negotiations to form the basis for a 
compromise (see the discussion in Erjavec et al. (ch. 9) and Hart (ch. 
10)). Second, they were much less influential in the co-decision 
procedure because the farm organisations succeeded in having their 
views well represented in the Agricultural Committee of the EP 
(COMAGRI) and because the Environmental Committee was 
largely sidelined in the CAP debate by COMAGRI (see the chapters 
by Knops & Garrone, and Hart). Third, they failed to influence the 
EP plenary vote to significantly alter the COMAGRI proposals – 
something they were successful at earlier in the EU fishery policy 
debate (Roederer-Rynning, ch. 13). Finally, the coalition between 
EOs and farm unions to secure CAP funds in exchange for more 
environmental conditions collapsed after the budget decision was 
made. After the budget decision when greening was no longer a 
requirement to secure a large budget, farm groups launched an all-
out offensive to (further) weaken the environmental conditions on 
direct payments (the greening conditionalities) and EOs were not 
able to muster sufficient political counterweight to stop them. 
4. Eastern enlargement and ‘external convergence’ 
Eastern enlargement brought several new aspects to CAP decision-
making: it significantly increased the number of decision-makers, it 
increased the heterogeneity of Europe and its agricultural and food 
systems, it introduced a set of different policy preferences into the 
political negotiations, and it changed the relative political weights 
of all member states. 
One of the obvious demands from the NMS was a more equal 
distribution of direct payments across member states (the so-called 
external convergence of payments). Existing differences in direct 
payments (DPs) could be partly justified by differences in incomes 
and (historical) productivity (as they had been during the accession 
negotiations) but were obviously also due to the fact that the NMS 
were not at the table when the key budgetary and DP decisions were 
made in 2002 and 2003. Clearly, because the NMS were now part of 
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the EU and the CAP decision-making process, where the future DPs 
were to be decided, the demand for external DP convergence was a 
key demand. However, an intriguing issue is the extent to which it 
seems to have played less of a role in the debates than one could 
have expected.  
There are several hypotheses to explain this. The first is that 
the OMS realised that the distribution of 2003 was too unfair for the 
NMS and not politically sustainable; it was more an issue of ‘by how 
much’ than ‘if’. The second argument is that with the pressure to 
reduce the overall reduction of the DPs several NMS were more 
focused on lobbying for the maintenance of the overall DP budget. 
They would be close to a new EU average under a reduced DP 
budget, and were more worried about seeing a reduction in their 
DPs because of the overall budget cut, rather than gaining from 
redistribution. The countries that were most disadvantaged in DPs 
were the Baltic states – and they lobbied intensely for convergence. 
The ultimate reallocation benefited them most (see Figure 17.1).  
Figure 17.1 Direct payments in the EU member states before and after 
CAP reform (€/ha) 
 
Source: European Commission. 
Another argument is that several NMS governments were 
under pressure from their farm lobbies to fight against capping. This 
applied in particular to those with a large share of (very) large 
farms, such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Hence, these 
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governments spent their ‘political capital’ more on lobbying to 
maintain the amount of DPs and to avoid capping (see ch. 13 by 
Sahrbacher et al.; and Sahrbacher et al., (2014)).  
A fourth argument is that, while the NMS were receiving 
lower DPs, if one compared the DP share to their share in gross 
value added (GVA) in agriculture, the gap closed markedly and the 
share of DPs in GVA for the NMS was by 2013 very close to that in 
the OMS – both were close to 23% by 2013 (see Figure 17.2a). 
Moreover, NMS were increasingly benefiting from large EU 
transfers under the CAP Pillar II (see Figure 17.2b) and structural 
and cohesion fund (SCF) support (see Figures 17.2c and 2d). Hence, 
from an overall budgetary support perspective, their 
(dis)advantaged position was quite different from considering the 
DPs alone. In fact, by 2013, the NMS and OMS both received around 
26 billion euro of structural and cohesion funds. Total EU support 
under the CAP and SCF was equivalent to around 0.6% of GDP in 
the OMS, but had risen from 1.7 % in 2008 to 4% in 2013 in the NMS 
(see Figure 17.2d). 
Obviously, all these elements of EU support were taken into 
account when discussing political priorities, and when trade-offs 
were made in the final political negotiations. 
Figure 17.2 EU budget for NMS: CAP and structural and cohesion funds 
2007-2013 (in billion euro and % of gross value added (GVA) and GDP) 
17.2a: CAP Pillar I (billion euro and % of agricultural GVA)  
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17.2b: CAP Pillar II (billion euro and % of agricultural GVA)  
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17.2c: Structural and cohesion funds (billion euro) 
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17.2d: Total budget for the CAP (pillars I and II) and structural and 
cohesion funds (billion euro and % of GDP) 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat. 
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5. Public funding for what? How global food 
price shocks transformed the CAP debate 
5.1 Prices and the political economy of food policies 
World market prices for major commodities, such as cereals, rose 
sharply in 2007-08 and in 2010-11. Figure 17.3 illustrates how global 
food prices increased by 50% in 2007-08 compared to the 2005 level. 
This rise coincided with a general rise in commodity prices, in 
particular of energy and metals. In the second half of 2008 food 
prices decreased sharply as one of the consequences of the global 
financial crisis. By 2009, the food price index had returned to much 
lower levels, albeit still much higher than in 2005. In 2010 and 2011, 
food prices rose again.  
The first food price spike coincided with the conclusion of the 
so-called Health Check reforms, with Commissioner Mariann 
Fischer Boel (Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development from 2004 until 2009) leading the policy proposals. 
The second price spike occurred when a new round of CAP reform 
discussions was launched, under the regime of Commissioner 
Dacian Cioloş (Commissioner since February 2010).  
Figure 17.3a illustrates how average producer prices in the EU 
followed a similar trend to global food prices, although the scale of 
these changes was much smaller than those of the global food price 
index. Compared to the 2005 prices, average prices for producers 
increased by around 20% in real terms in the first price spike and 
somewhat less during the second price spike. However, the average 
price change hides important differences between agricultural 
commodities. Figure 17.3b illustrates how in the EU cereal prices 
increased by 113%, five-times more than milk prices, which 
increased by 22% between the first quarter of 2005 and the first 
quarter of 2008. Overall farm incomes increased significantly during 
this period, as Figure 17.4 illustrates: average farm incomes were 20-
30% higher in 2011-12 than in 2008-09. 
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Figure 17.3 EU and global agricultural and food prices (2005-2013) 
17.3a: Food and farm price indices (2005=100; real prices) 
 
17.3b: Cereals and dairy price indices (2005=100; real prices) 
 
Source: Swinnen et al. (2014) based on data from FAO and EUROSTAT. 
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Figure 17.4 Index of real farm income per annual working unit 
(2005=100)  
 
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development, European Commission. 
5.2 Prices and the political economy of food policies 
It is well known that changes in commodity prices can have a 
significant impact on agricultural and food policies, which often 
respond to changes in food prices as such changes alter the political 
incentives for interest groups and for political decision-makers 
(Anderson et al., 2013; Swinnen, 1994, 2009). More specifically, 
agricultural and food policies shift as prices move since the 
incentives to lobby governments, and the incentives for 
governments to respond, change when economic conditions 
change. In other words, when prices go up producers turn to the 
market to increase their incomes and when prices fall producers 
turn to governments to assist them, and vice versa for consumers. 
This has been documented for many countries and historical 
periods (e.g. Olper, 1998; Swinnen et al., 2001; Swinnen, 2009), and 
the recent period of price spikes was no exception. In many 
countries high food prices triggered major policy reactions with 
food exporters imposing export taxes or outright bans and food 
importers lowering their import tariffs (Anderson et al., 2013; 
Martin & Anderson, 2010; Pieters & Swinnen, 2014).  
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5.3 The multi-dimensional political relationship 
between food prices and CAP reform 
Changes in food prices have affected various interest groups in the 
EU, including producers and consumers, and this has resulted in 
policy reactions through the political process. To understand the 
impact of the global food price changes on the CAP it is important 
to: a) see this in a broader perspective, meaning also to consider how 
other policies were changed in response to the price changes; and b) 
consider this as a multi-dimensional issue. It appears that 
agricultural and food price changes affected the political 
equilibrium on the CAP decision-making in (at least) three different 
dimensions: the level of the farm support, i.e. the budget (B); the 
environmental conditions on farms support, i.e. greening (G); and 
the nature of the farm support, i.e. market regulation or decoupled 
payments (R). These issues are obviously interrelated to some 
extent, but for didactic reasons, let us consider them as independent 
(orthogonal in mathematical terms) – which is not an unrealistic 
assumption.  
On each of the three dimensions one can think of farmers as 
having preferences opposed to those of other interest groups, more 
particularly taxpayers (dimension B), environmental organisation 
(dimension G) and a coalition of international trade partners and 
other EU (exporting) sectors that are against agricultural market 
interventions (dimension R). The increase in food prices is likely to 
have caused a shift in the equilibrium in dimensions B and G, while 
increased volatility affected equilibrium in the R dimension. I will 
first explain the B-G policy equilibria. The R dimension is discussed 
later. 
Figure 17.5 presents a two-dimensional model of the conflict 
of interests in the CAP reforms. The horizontal line represents the 
greening (G) issue where environmental interests (wanting more 
environmental regulations) are confronted with farmers interests 
(wanting less). The vertical line represents the budget (B) issue 
where taxpayer interests (wanting less CAP spending) are 
confronted with farmers’ interests (wanting more). Let the point 
(ܩ଴,ܤ଴) represent the political equilibrium before/without the price 
shock.  
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Figure 17.5 Impact of price changes on the political equilibrium for 
greening and budget 
 
Source: Author’s own configuration. 
What happens when prices increase? In terms of the budget 
(B), theory and empirical evidence suggest that there would be a 
shift towards less support for farmers as prices for their products 
and their market incomes increase, as explained above. Hence, one 
would expect a shift, as represented by the move from ܤ଴ to ܤ௉ in 
Figure 17.5. 
The impact on environmental regulations is more 
complicated and there are three partial effects involved. The first 
partial effect is a shift of the equilibrium towards environmental 
interests. As farmers earn more for their production with higher 
prices the impact of increased regulations on their welfare is smaller 
– at the margin and assuming concave utility function. This will 
reduce their opposition to increased regulations, and will thus 
induce a shift in the political equilibrium from ܩ଴ to ܩ௉ଵ.  A 
second partial effect is that with increasing prices for their products, 
farmers have more to lose from regulations that restrict their supply. 
This will induce them to oppose such regulations more firmly. This 
effect is represented in the move from ܩ଴ to ܩ௉ଶ. The third effect is 
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represented by the shift from ܩ଴	to ܩ௉ଷ. This is due to the increased 
opposition from food consumers, already hurt by high prices.13 
Environmental regulations that restrict production lead to lower 
supply and thus higher prices. Hence, as consumer welfare has 
declined with higher food prices, they increase their opposition to 
environmental measures that would further increase food prices 
(again at the margin and assuming concave utility functions).14 This 
is represented by the shift from ܩ଴	to ܩ௉ଷ.  
The net effect, from ܩ଴	to	ܩ௉, depends on the relative 
importance of these three sub-effects. The combined effect could be 
either positive or negative. In Figure 5, I have drawn the combined 
effect as a downward shift in the regulatory equilibrium: from (ܩ଴, 
ܤ଴) to (ܩ௉, ܤ௉) with ܩ௉ −	ܩ଴ = (ܩ௉	ଵ −	ܩ଴) + (ܩ௉ଶ −	ܩ଴) + 	(ܩ௉ଷ −	ܩ଴).  
In combination, this conceptual framework suggests that the 
food price increase caused a decline in the CAP budget and a lower 
level of environmental regulations (greening) than would have been 
the case without the price increases, represented by the shift from 
(ܩ଴, ܤ଴) to (ܩ௉, ܤ௉).  
This prediction seems to have been borne out in reality, but 
probably more so for the greening aspect than for the budget. The 
negative impact of the food price rises on the support for (or 
opposition to) greening is supported by arguments of various 
authors in this book (including, for example, Haniotis, ch. 4; Di 
Castro and Di Mambo, ch. 5; Matthews, ch. 7). Erjavec et al. (ch. 9) 
argue that the food price increases led to a decline in support for 
greening and for CAP subsidies overall, consistent with our 
prediction.  
However, while the impact on greening appears clear, the 
impact on the CAP budget is less obvious. There was a reduction in 
support to farmers in real terms and as a share of GDP, but not in 
                                                        
13 Figure 17.3 also shows how average food prices for consumers in the EU 
increased slightly over the 2005-12 period, with real food prices 5% higher 
in 2012 than in 2005. 
14 Note that this should not necessarily be interpreted that consumer 
organisations actively lobby against greening measures, but it could also 
be interpreted as that the ‘productivist’ perspective on the CAP became 
more generally accepted as a valid and important argument, or that their 
support for environmental measures became less important. 
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nominal terms (as is reflected in Figure 17.6). Even the decline in 
real terms is less than what many had expected (and feared or 
desired, depending on preferences). In fact, Matthews (ch. 7) argues 
that farm organisations were “surprised and delighted” with the 
original Commission proposal to keep the CAP budget in nominal 
terms. While the ultimate MFF agreement on the CAP budget is 
lower than what the Commission initially proposed, it is not that 
much lower.  
Figure 17.6 CAP budget 1990-2020 
 
 
What can explain the relatively limited reduction in the real 
CAP budget, despite budgetary pressures and increasing farm 
prices and incomes? Several additional factors appear to have 
played a role. First and foremost, as explained above, the link with 
the greening reforms in the MFF negotiations seems to have worked 
for saving the budget, but not for greening. At the start of the MFF 
negotiations the link and coalition was still there, however weak it 
was compared to the ex-ante proposals on greening. It was only 
after the MFF that the coalition completely collapsed.  
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Another reason is probably that, while average farm incomes 
increased (as Figure 17.4 illustrates), a significant number of 
European farmers, in particular dairy and livestock farmers, 
suffered from the increase in grain and feed prices. Their incomes 
fell significantly over the 2007-12 period. This is clearly illustrated 
in Figure 17.7, which presents the ratio of milk prices over animal 
feed prices. This ratio shows a consistent decline since 2005, with 
the 2012 ratio being 25% lower than in 2005: increases in dairy prices 
have been consistently offset by increases in animal feed prices. For 
these farmers, CAP payments were argued to be an important 
safety.15  
This sensitivity of EU farm incomes to price changes not only 
applied to the dairy and livestock farmers, but also to the crop 
farmers who gained from higher farm prices, but who saw their 
costs increase significantly. This is reflected in the strongly 
fluctuating grain/fertiliser price ratio in Figure 17.7, with significant 
downturns in 2008 and 2011, and the decline in average farm 
incomes over the 2007-09 period (Figure 17.4).  
The significant increase in prices and in average EU farm 
incomes between 2008-09 and 2011-12 thus hides significant 
heterogeneity, both across subsectors in EU agriculture and over the 
years. Clearly, those variations made farmers and decision-makers 
aware of the income effects of the CAP payments and aware that 
prices might not stay high forever, and that CAP payments could be 
an important safety net when markets and prices turned 
downwards (see also next section). It enhanced the pressure from 
farmers to keep the payments, and countered pressures explained 
above to cut the CAP budget significantly. 
As we explain in the next section, this volatility in prices and 
farm incomes also induced demands for (a return to) more market 
regulations.  
                                                        
15 Many studies and reports on the impact of the CAP on farm incomes are 
static studies, which ignore the second-order effect of the CAP on farmers’ 
costs. This is surprising since it is now very well known that CAP subsidies 
and payments increase farmers’ costs (see e.g. Ciaian et al., 2010) and the 
2013 reform of the CAP is unlikely to have a major impact on that (Ciaian 
et al., 2014). Hence the dynamic income effects are likely to be quite 
different from static estimates.  
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Figure 17.7 Evolution of the ratio of cereal over fertiliser prices and the 
ratio of milk over animal feed prices in the EU27 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
5.4 Price volatility and the 2014-20 CAP: A return to 
intervention or not?16  
Figures 17.3, 17.7 and 17.8 illustrate the volatility in different price 
indicators, with EU price volatility typically lower than global price 
volatility indicators. There was more volatility in the producer price 
index and little volatility in the food consumer price index in the 
EU.  
Food price volatility influenced the discourse of interest 
groups and policy-makers, however generally without 
fundamentally altering their policy proposals. For example, COPA-
COGECA (2011), the main EU farmers' organisation, argued that 
                                                        
16 As explained in the introduction, the arguments that high food prices 
(which were induced by the spike in agricultural commodity prices) had 
negative impacts on the poverty and hunger in the world were brought 
forward (and forcefully so) after the EU had gone through decades of 
reforms to reduce the CAP’s (negative) impact on global prices (Swinnen, 
2011; Swinnen & Squicciarini, 2012).  
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despite high prices, farmers lose out because of volatility, high input 
prices and “food chain imbalances”. They and other interest groups 
asked for a more interventionist reaction, moving away from the 
long-term liberalisation strategy for the CAP.  
By contrast, the European Commission used the price 
volatility as a motivation for its overall reform (liberalisation) 
strategy. In 2008 the so-called Health Check reform of the CAP 
included several minor measures that were linked to the price 
changes, such as the abolition of set-aside and the gradual increase 
in the milk quotas before their abolition in 2015. At the same time 
the Commission confirmed that the agenda would stay on course to 
a more market-based CAP. The reforms further decoupled support 
and reduced intervention in markets for pig meat, cereals (barley, 
sorghum, wheat) and for dairy products (butter and skimmed milk 
powder). Similarly, in response to the crisis in the dairy sector17 the 
so-called Milk Package of 2010 (which entered into force in 2012) 
did not include measures which directly intervened in the markets 
despite considerable pressure of dairy organizations. This, 
according to the Commission, aimed to “modernize, simplify and 
streamline the CAP and remove restrictions on farmers, thus 
helping them to respond better to signals from the market and to 
face new challenges” (European Commission, 2008c).  
A similar argument was used by Commissioner Cioloş in the 
CAP reform proposals. He used price volatility as a justification to 
maintain the CAP payments (as ‘safety net’) to protect farmers 
against price volatility: “Farming is more and more exposed to high 
market volatility. (…) Therefore I will propose in the new CAP 
reform to maintain direct payments in order to give basic financial 
                                                        
17 Grain prices are output prices for grain producers, but are input prices 
for livestock producers. The grain/fertiliser price ratio in the EU has 
evolved similarly to global grain/fertiliser prices, with a rapid increase in 
2006 and 2007, a strong decline in 2008 and significant growth in 2010. The 
grain/fertiliser price ratio has been very volatile over the 2005-12 period, 
with an average positive (15%) effect. By contrast, the milk/ animal feed 
price ratio has been less volatile and has shown a consistent decline since 
2005, with the 2012 ratio being 25% lower than in 2005: increases in dairy 
prices have been consistently offset by increases in animal feed prices.  
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security to our farmers, without distorting international markets” 
(European Commission, 2011b).18 
The European Parliament (and the Council) preferred a more 
interventionist approach and favoured more market regulation. 
This was also evident in other issues such as the European 
Parliament’s reactions to the Commission’s proposals in the 
Communication on “A Better Functioning Food Supply Chain in 
Europe”, regarding relationships between the CAP and competition 
policy rules,19 and in the discussion on ending the sugar quota.20 
However, by the end of the legislative process, the 
Commission’s proposals had been significantly amended but 
nonetheless substantially adopted.21 In terms of impacts on global 
                                                        
18 The proposal included some measures that directly concern food price 
volatility, such as a new ‘Crisis reserve fund’ of €3.5 billion and the 
introduction of a ‘crisis management toolkit’ that would include funds for 
crop and weather insurance, and an income stabilisation option (that 
would allow a pay-out (up to 70% of losses) from a mutual fund if income 
drops by 30%). The official aim of these instruments was to respond rapidly 
to an extreme event of price volatility (European Commission, 2011c).  
19 With respect to competition policy, the European Parliament was in 
favour of allowing more far-reaching exceptions to the general competition 
rules than the EC proposes. These exceptions could allow producer 
organisations to manage their supplies by fixing prices or setting quotas for 
a relatively large share of the agricultural production. 
20 The difference in approach and discourse between the EC and European 
Parliament was also revealed in the debate on the end of sugar quotas. The 
EC often confirmed the ending of the sugar quota regime by 2015. 
However, key members of the European Parliament, e.g. Michel Dantin 
(French Member of the European Parliament and key figure of the 
Agricultural Committee), argued that the extension of this regime was 
crucial to stabilise markets at a time of increasing price volatility, a position 
backed by the major sugar producing countries. Interestingly, those against 
the extension of sugar quotas put forward the opposite argument, saying 
that, considering rising demand, maintaining sugar quotas would be 
completely counterproductive in the context of price volatility (Matthews, 
2012). Hence, both groups argued that their solution would improve the 
competitiveness of the sugar sector. 
21 Anania and Pupo d’Andrea (ch. 2) conclude that an evaluation of the 
CAP from the perspective of a further market orientation shows mixed 
results: the elimination of the sugar and milk quota was confirmed, but on 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  473 
 
markets (and thus on global food security), despite new arguments, 
and some recoupling, Matthews (2014) concluded that the CAP 
reform does not fundamentally alter the trend followed by the EU 
over the past two decades.22 Price volatility was used as a 
justification to move towards more market liberalisation in the 
agricultural sector and reduce intervention mechanisms, and as a 
justification to maintain existing CAP payment (as a ‘safety net’) to 
protect farmers against price volatility.  
Several authors in this book consider this status quo outcome 
as one of the main achievements of the 2013 reform in the area of 
market orientation of the CAP (e.g. Bureau & Mahé (ch. 4) and 
Swinbank (ch. 8)).23 Bureau & Mahé (ch. 3) conclude that “the 
Commission managed to resist most of the bad ideas floating 
around … some of which could have been particularly damaging, 
in particular regarding market management and price support”.  
While the WTO was not (or not often) mentioned in this 
debate, it is my hypothesis that it still played an important role in 
this. Although Alan Swinbank (ch. 8) argues that “What is perhaps 
more surprising – given that the [WTO] Doha agreement has not yet 
locked-in past CAP reforms -- is that the EU did not significantly 
reverse its policy decisions of the last decades”, in his detailed 
analysis he documents the role of WTO constraints in this debate. 
For example, both in the Commission’s 2010 communication “The 
CAP towards 2020”, in the EP’s response to this document, and in 
the Commission’s 2011 Impact Assessment that accompanied the 
2011 CAP proposals, WTO constraints and green box compatibility 
was raised in several places to motivate certain proposals (see 
Swinbank, ch. 8 for details).  
                                                        
the other hand the liberalisation of vine planting was reversed, there was 
an increased amount of coupled support, and competition laws had been 
waived to allow some producer actions to constrain supply. 
22 That said, there was still considerable uncertainty as many of the 
implementation details were left to the member states at the end (see 
chapters 2 and 3). 
23 Obviously, these evaluations depend on the perspectives of the authors 
and those who favoured more regulated markets see this as a negative 
element of the reform – or something to address in the future (see the 
discussion in De Castro and Di Mambo, ch. 5).  
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In summary, during the price spikes the EU has (a) reaffirmed 
the engagement of the EU towards an open trade policy – also by 
underlining the harm done by the restrictive export policies 
implemented by some countries in response to price volatility – and 
(b) stayed mostly on course with its reform proposals in specific 
sectors such as dairy and sugar (phasing out the quota regime), 
despite a slight change in argumentation, i.e. by also linking the 
motivation to price volatility (European Commission, 2008c).  
That said there is a significant amount of recoupling allowed 
that is to be determined at member state level (which varies between 
0% and 20% between member states – see Anania & Pupo 
D’Andrea, Table 4 for details). Moreover, not all sectors stayed on 
course towards liberalisation. A return to regulation is obvious in 
the EU’s wine policy where the 2008 decision to liberalise the 
vineyard planting rights system was overturned and a new set of 
regulations on planting rights introduced before the liberalisation 
was implemented (Deconinck & Swinnen, 2013; Meloni & Swinnen, 
2015).  
5.5 Other EU policy reactions 
Note that the EU also adjusted the existing CAP and its 
implementation (to the extent possible) during the price spikes. For 
example, the European Commission undertook some quick changes 
to the CAP market management measures, such as the relaxation of 
several restrictions to increase the supply of food: intervention 
stocks were sold, the 10% obligatory set-aside for farmers was 
suspended in 2008, most import duties on cereals were lifted 
following a decision of the Council on 20 December 2007, and milk 
quotas were increased by 2% as from 2008 (European Commission, 
2008a). 
Besides the CAP, there were other policy responses by the EU 
and its member states to the food price changes.24 These include 
                                                        
24 The initial EU-level response to the price spikes in 2007-08 was set out in 
three communications published by the EC in 2008 and 2009 (European 
Commission, 2008a; 2008b; 2009a), which structured the EU response to 
price volatility around three sets of actions: i) actions to mitigate short and 
medium term effects of the food price shock (e.g. aid programmes for EU 
citizens, tackling speculation on food commodities); ii) actions to increase 
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changes in social policies, regulations of biofuels25 and financial 
investments in food commodity markets, food and development aid 
both within and outside the EU (see Swinnen et al., 2014 for a more 
detailed analysis). Most social protection policies, such as 
unemployment benefits, pensions and disability payments are the 
responsibility of the member states. The increase in food prices 
induced pressures from consumers, particularly the poorest, to 
increase social spending at a time when they were also hurting from 
the economic crisis and rising energy prices.26 Social expenditures 
in the EU increased by approximately 7% between 2005 and 2010. 
During the same episode, food aid to the poor also became the 
subject of a political fight between the EU and the member states.27 
                                                        
agricultural supply and ensure food security in the longer term (e.g. 
sustainability of EU biofuel policy, investment in agricultural research, 
etc.); and iii) actions to tackle the global effects of price rises on the poor 
(e.g. promoting open trade policy, development aid). At the same time, 
several initiatives were taken at the member state level. 
25 With growing critique of its biofuel policy, the EU proposed what the 
press and the industry have qualified as a policy U-turn on biofuels. From 
strongly encouraging this sector through binding targets and blending 
mandates, the EU is now backtracking on this policy option and seeks to 
minimise the use of food crop-based biofuels. 
26 Increases in other prices, such as for energy and transport, reinforced this 
pressure. At the same time social security systems were affected by the 
financial and economic crisis. The financial and economic crisis had two 
(opposite) effects on social spending. On the one hand, the negative impact 
on government budgets increased pressure to cut expenditure. On the 
other hand, with higher unemployment, expenditure on this type of social 
benefits is expected to increase. 
27 Since 1987, the EU has had a food aid programme to support the poor 
and the needy of Europe. The first version of this scheme consisted of the 
distribution of stocks of surplus food. However, reforms of the CAP in the 
1990s and 2000s reduced the amount of surpluses in the EU and lowered 
intervention stocks. The food aid scheme was revised in 2008 to make it 
easier to access products from the open-market. In 2010, the EC put a 
ceiling of €500 million per year on the EU's contribution to the scheme. In 
2011, in the midst of financial and economic turmoil, the EC proposed a 
drastic cut to the scheme’s budget: from €500 million to €112 million 
(European Commission, 2011a). Aid organisations argued that it is 
precisely at times of rising food prices that such programmes are most 
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6. Summary and conclusion: An imperfect storm in 
the political economy of the CAP 
Table 17.1 summarises the arguments explained in this paper. In 
2000-03, both the pressures for change, the political actors and 
changes in decision–making institutions were conducive to reform 
(represented by “+” in the table). The combination of these factors 
contributed to a perfect storm that resulted in the radical Fischler 
reforms (Swinnen, 2008). The factors included the institutional 
introduction of qualified majority voting, large external changes 
that moved policy preferences in a pro-reform direction and a pro-
reform agenda-setter, the EU Commission. In addition, key internal 
changes in the EU and its institutions boosted the chance of reform 
and the EU Commission itself was strongly in favour of significant 
reforms.  
The 2009-13 CAP reform negotiations were quite different. 
Table 17.1 summarises the key factors in the political economy of 
the four CAP elements that are the focus of this chapter (the budget, 
greening, external convergence, and market regulations).  
Decision-makers faced several pressures and constraints. 
These included pressure to reduce the budget for farm payments 
because of fiscal pressures and the need to fund other EU policies; a 
demand from NMS (and particularly the Baltic states where 
payments were lowest) for more equal distribution of direct 
payments; and (future) WTO agreements, which constrained 
market interventions. From 2008 onwards agricultural and energy 
commodities prices peaked, soon followed by financial and 
economic turmoil, which created upheaval in commodity markets, 
government budgets and the world’s economies, also inside the EU. 
 
                                                        
needed. A proposal to remove the member states’ co-financing 
requirements to the scheme, and make it exclusively EU financed was 
opposed by several members states (Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Sweden, the UK and Czech Republic), who argued that ‘social policy’ is a 
national competence. An agreement was reached to maintain the level of 
funding for the scheme (€500 million) for 2013 only and to shift this 
consumer support programme from the CAP to the EU social and poverty 
reduction policy. 
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However, this did not translate into reinforced pressures for 
reforms. While these economic developments had a significant 
impact on the CAP debate they did not necessarily reinforce existing 
pressures; in some aspects the opposite happened. Increased price 
volatility induced pressure for a return to market interventions and 
increased opposition to budget cuts as the CAP was presented as a 
safety net for farmers. Higher food prices supported the 
‘productionist’ view that agricultural production should be 
encouraged, not constrained, e.g. by environmental regulations. In 
addition, a series of institutional changes politically mitigated the 
pressures.  
Reforms were further hampered by institutional constraints 
and the absence of a decisive guide. The pressures and constraints 
were a complex mix, but the situation in the early 2000s was also 
complex (Swinnen, 2008b). However, the 2003 set of pressures 
turned into a significant reform path, with a clear strategic vision on 
the part of the agenda-setters of where to go, a well thought out 
tactic of how to get there, and an institutional process that was 
conducive to this outcome. This was quite different in the 2009-13 
CAP discussions.  
As in 2002-03, an attempt was made to create a coalition 
between keeping CAP payments for farmers (farm organisations) in 
exchange for better targeting (economists) and more environmental 
benefits (ecologists). The coalition worked for saving the budget, 
but not for greening or better targeting. While there is a reduction 
in real terms, the budget for the CAP was largely saved, despite 
budgetary pressures and increasing farm prices and incomes. Why 
was this? One factor is the initial link with the greening reforms. 
This link, albeit already fairly weakened, still held during the MFF 
negotiations when the budget was decided. Another factor is the 
volatility in agricultural prices and the heterogeneous impacts of the 
price changes for EU farmers. The sensitivity of EU farm incomes to 
price changes not only applied to dairy and livestock farmers, who 
suffered from increased costs, but also to other farmers who saw 
significant fluctuations in their incomes. Those variations made 
farmers and decision-makers aware that prices would not stay high 
forever, and that CAP payments would be an important safety net 
when markets and prices turned downwards. 
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After the MFF had fixed the budget, the ‘budget for greening’ 
coalition unravelled and many greening requirements were relaxed. 
There were probably several reasons for this: a less committed and 
less strategic Commission, the reduced influence of the Commission 
with co-decision with strong opposition in the EP and among 
member states in the Council, and better preparation and lobbying 
strategies by those who opposed reforms. Opposition from farm 
organisations received extra ammunition as commodity price 
increases gave strength to the ‘productionist’ argument that the 
food supply should not be constrained by extra regulations – an 
argument that found much support in the Council and the EP’s 
COMAGRI. 
Regarding market regulations, the increased price volatility 
induced demands for more regulation, including the maintenance 
of supply controls in dairy and sugar. However, DG-AGRI and the 
Commission motivated their support for DPs as a safety net 
approach – an insurance against volatility, and one in line with the 
decades-long strategy towards liberalisation – consistent with their 
commitment to WTO and possible future accords. Here, despite 
some re-coupling, the status quo was seen as an important positive 
achievement by those favouring the CAP’s market orientation (and 
a failure by those wanting more regulation of markets and prices).  
Eastern enlargement enhanced the influence of the NMS and 
reduced the gap in direct payments per hectare, particularly in the 
Baltics where DPs were the lowest. External convergence occurred 
and was most significant for those NMS were the gap was widest, 
but the total redistribution was limited because the NMS already 
benefited strongly from various other transfers such as Pillar II 
payments and structural and cohesion funds – in particular in 
relation to their contribution to value added and GDP.  
In summary, the 2013 CAP decision included a relatively 
small budget cut, a realignment of DPs ‘from West to East’, 
increased flexibility in the implementation of the policies and the 
allocation of funds, and relatively minor changes in environmental 
and market regulations. Different pressures and institutional 
changes partially offset rather than reinforced each other. In other 
words, this resulted in an imperfect storm in the political economy 
of the CAP, in which various elements were mixed but did not 
reinforce each other, and which resulted in relatively small changes.  
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18. CAP REFORM, THE US FARM 
BILL AND THE TTIP 
TIM JOSLING* 
his could have been a very brief contribution to the volume 
on CAP reform. The ongoing Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations have virtually no 
substantive connection with the 2013 CAP reform or indeed with 
the 2014 Farm Bill in the US. End of story. But such a statement 
would in itself be quite remarkable in the context of US and EU 
trade relations over the past five decades. Why is there so little 
connection? How have we come to a position that a significant 
agricultural policy reform effort in the EU, three years in the 
making, is somehow disconnected from a path-breaking effort to 
create a transatlantic marketplace free of trade barriers and 
regulatory divergences? And, how is it possible that the US 
negotiators have made no attempt to use the TTIP as a way of 
shaping the CAP, long a target of mainstream farm opinion? So the 
topic is indeed worth a discussion, even if the bottom line is 
predictable. 
1. The CAP at the centre of transatlantic tensions 
To answer the “why?” question requires some historical 
perspective. US-EU tensions over agricultural policy have their 
origins in the early 1960s, when the new European Economic 
Community was in the process of establishing the CAP.1 US 
political and economic interests were at variance: strong support for 
                                                        
* The author would like to thank Alan Swinbank for helpful comments on 
a draft. 
1 The development of EU-US trade relations in agricultural and food 
products is the topic of a forthcoming book (Josling & Tangermann, 2015).  
T
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European integration initially masked the threat to US export 
interests in agricultural products. The Chicken War of 1963, which 
was triggered by the EU introducing its new trade barriers on 
poultry meat, was a ‘shot across the bows’ and tested the ability of 
the GATT to mediate such bilateral trade tensions.2 The GATT was 
not up to the task and political distrust increased. The EU and the 
US were on a collision course. The Kennedy Round brought out 
some fundamental differences in the approach to world markets for 
agricultural goods. The US wanted trade barriers to be reduced but 
the EU preferred to manage international trade. But the Kennedy 
Round yielded no breakthrough in terms of agricultural trade rules, 
though it successfully reduced tariff levels for manufacturing 
goods. The CAP was still the major stumbling block to reconciling 
US commercial interest with EU political imperatives. 
The bilateral tensions in agricultural trade were 
overshadowed in the tumultuous 1970s by the chaotic situation in 
commodity, oil and financial markets. Both the EU and the US 
continued on separate paths as they sought to deal with 
macroeconomic as well as agricultural market problems. In 
agriculture the situation was made worse by irresponsible EU 
decision-making, leading to even higher support prices. Currency 
fluctuations also played their part in increasing the support gap. 
When world prices dropped the CAP was left high and dry. Both 
the EU and the US suffered during the 1980s from bloated 
agricultural budgets and weak world demand. A trade war began 
through competitive export subsidies. GATT litigation was used in 
an attempt to settle the problems but many of these survived the 
decade. At least for one year (1985) the EU overtook the US in 
agricultural export earnings and the US surpassed the EU in 
agricultural budget cost – a function of the strong dollar.  
A gruelling GATT Uruguay Round finally brought the two 
protagonists together and enabled them to forge an agreement to 
discipline domestic policies. The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
established rules on market access, export competition and 
domestic support; began the process of reducing tariffs and curbing 
export and domestic subsides; and provided a forum (the 
Committee on Agriculture) for discussion of differences of 
                                                        
2 For much more detail on this early dispute see Talbot, 1978. 
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interpretation. It increased transparency by obliging countries to 
notify the Committee of the conformity of domestic farm policy 
with the agreed rules. The WTO also replaced an unsatisfactory 
dispute settlement mechanism and brought clarity to the question 
of health and safety regulations. Disputes about farm policies across 
the Atlantic became rare after 1995 and an uneasy truce emerged, as 
both the EU and the US shifted to direct payments away from price 
supports (as described in Swinbank, 2015: chapter 8, this volume). 
The transatlantic tensions in agricultural and food products at 
present are largely confined to different health standards and 
regulations on livestock additives.  
The agricultural part of the TTIP negotiations is therefore 
focusing on these regulatory issues, such as hormone use in 
livestock, chlorine washes for chickens, place names for cheeses, 
and biotech food approvals. Governments on both sides of the 
Atlantic are trying to find a way to achieve regulatory coherence 
without appearing to lower standards. But these issues are neither 
the subject of CAP reform nor covered in US farm legislation. They 
are the province of regulatory agencies that are more or less 
independent of farm interests. Hence the current irrelevance of CAP 
reform to the TTIP is a combination of farm policy reforms on each 
side of the Atlantic, a more stable trade relationship built on the 
WTO AoA, and a shift in focus to food regulatory issues as bilateral 
trade irritants. 
2. Farm policy reforms reduce trade tensions 
The successive reforms of both the CAP and the US farm legislation 
have played a major part in reducing transatlantic trade tensions. 
Swinbank (2015: chapter 8, this volume) chronicles the importance 
of the 2000 and 2003 CAP reforms in allowing the EU to free itself 
from the imposed limits of the WTO support reduction schedules. 
The same changes have led to a dramatic reduction in bilateral 
tensions over agricultural policy. Though these CAP reforms were 
greeted with some scepticism initially in the US, the determination 
with which they have been carried out appears in sharp contrast to 
the wavering of US policy over the same time period. After having 
led the way toward direct payments less closely tied to production 
in the 1996 Farm Bill the US introduced emergency (price-linked) 
payments in 1998, when prices on world markets fell, consolidated 
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them in the 2002 Farm Bill (as countercyclical payments), took a 
small step sideways in 2008 and has finally abandoned decoupled 
payments in 2014 (Zulauf & Orden, 2014). Indeed, it can now be 
reasonably said that the CAP is in the lead in the search for a farm 
policy that provides a stable environment for farming and is 
minimally disruptive to trade.  
Though both the EU and the US have moved away from price 
support and market intervention, the chosen instruments that 
replace them are different. In the EU the new instruments include 
the basic payment (a modification of the existing direct payments), 
a ‘green’ direct payment to encourage actions deemed 
environmentally beneficial, and a payment to support farming in 
‘areas of natural constraints’. The US has chosen to concentrate on 
farm income insurance, with a number of different instruments 
available to protect farmers against risk. So far, the instruments 
chosen have not themselves elicited much criticism across the 
Atlantic. Not only are the incentives to production more difficult to 
measure, they may work in unfamiliar ways. EU environmental 
constraints would tend to lead to a reduction in crop intensity 
whereas US crop insurance could expand production by shifting the 
burden of risk. So the US farmer could in principle welcome the 
focus of the CAP on green measures and be content to rely on crop 
insurance should there be any untoward external impact on prices. 
For similar reasons, these payments are less visible to agricultural 
politicians. It is easier to complain about higher prices under the 
CAP than to criticise enhanced safety nets and strengthened rural 
development programmes. 
3. WTO rules provide framework for improved 
relations 
It would be misleading to suggest that all transatlantic tensions 
relating to domestic farm programmes are resolved. But they are 
contained in an institutional framework that allows governments to 
resist domestic pressures for greater protectionism. The search for 
expanding sales abroad continues, particularly in the US, with a 
focus on access to Asian markets. But with the glacial progress in 
the WTO Doha Round the focus has turned to bilateral or mega-
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regional trade agreements for expanding markets.3 Export subsidies 
and similar policies have mostly evaporated in recent years, in part 
because of the higher prices on world markets since 2007 and in part 
because the notion of payments from the budget that benefit 
overseas consumers at the expense of domestic consumers has lost 
some of its political appeal. Though there is the opportunity to 
restrict export subsidies in bilateral agreements such as the TTIP, it 
is usually considered better to continue to seek a multilateral 
agreement to ban such market-disturbing policies. 
With respect to domestic support, i.e. policies that operate 
within the borders, the Doha Round is still regarded as the 
appropriate location for continuing the process of reduction of trade 
distortions. Even the possibility that the Doha Round might never 
be completed does not seem to have been enough to justify putting 
domestic farm policies on the TTIP agenda. It is inherently difficult 
to restrain subsidies to producers of those goods sold within a free-
trade area (FTA) but allow subsidies to producers of the commodity 
or good if sold outside the area. The rationale is that no government 
is likely to be willing to tighten constraints on domestic farm 
programmes in a bilateral agreement when the rest of the world 
would gain advantages but offer nothing in return. The counter 
argument is that subsidies to agricultural producers in an FTA 
partner will generally have economic impacts on intra-FTA 
agricultural and food trade and be a source of political friction. The 
argument for raising the issue in bilateral talks is essentially the 
same as that which led domestic support to be included in the 
Uruguay Round. Removing tariffs may not be enough to open up 
                                                        
3 Bilateral agreements are often the building blocs of mega-regional 
agreements, such as the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), in which most 
partners already have separate trade agreements with one or more of the 
other partners, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 
which includes Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries and the 
six states with which ASEAN has existing free-trade agreements (including 
China, Japan and Korea). In this respect the TTIP is unusual: it is a bilateral 
trade agreement but will join two markets that already are linked through 
trade agreements with a large number of other markets. Whether this will 
in effect consolidate the markets in which the US and the EU have 
preferences remains to be seen. For a fuller discussion of these issues in the 
context of Latin America see Josling et al., 2014. 
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markets if some producers are blessed with subsidies. Addressing 
the levels of subsidies may eventually be necessary if the FTA is to 
lead to satisfactory conditions of competition in the internal bilateral 
market.  
Should the EU and the US keep domestic programmes off the 
table so as to be able to give them up in the Doha Round in exchange 
for market access abroad? Perhaps, but the reduction in price-based 
domestic support by the EU and the US is a rapidly-depreciating 
asset for negotiations with other countries. Few believe that there 
will be a reversion to the policies of the 1980s. It could be tempting 
to liquidate those negotiating assets in a bilateral deal while they 
still have some political value. 
4. Nature of the TTIP avoids underlying issues 
The main reason why agricultural policies are not under discussion 
in the TTIP has to do with the nature of the prospective agreement 
itself. There will naturally be a market access component to the TTIP 
that will have to include agricultural products. Particular sectors of 
US agriculture would like better access to EU markets, including 
beef producers, and some EU sectors such as producers of dairy 
products would hope to gain sales in the US markets.4 But these are 
in many ways side issues in a bilateral context. The main focus will 
be on the regulatory tensions that have irritated agricultural and 
food sectors in the US and the EU. Does this mean that the 
underlying tensions over agricultural policy have gone away? Not 
necessarily. It may be that some fundamental issues will still remain 
at the end of the negotiations. The strong political support for the 
opening of the negotiations came with a target date for completion 
that did not allow enough time to resolve all the issues in 
agricultural and food trade. The likely outcome of the TTIP will be 
to start a process of reconciliation and conflict control in areas of 
diverse and conflicting regulations. The major stumbling blocks are 
likely to be livestock growth promoters, the approval of biotech 
varieties of cereals, the tighter restrictions on the use of place names 
for foods and the hygienic standards of poultry-processing plants. 
The public is aware of each of these issues and the room for any 
longer-term resolution of the disagreements is slight. So setting up 
                                                        
4 See European Parliament (2014) and Josling & Tangermann (2014). 
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processes for handling such disagreements may be all that can be 
realistically achieved. And even that could be undone by 
legislatures when they come to endorse a political agreement. 
If this cautious conclusion proves correct, several underlying 
tensions will remain. These include the attitude of the public to the 
adoption of scientific advances; the degree of public confidence in 
the scientific and regulatory agencies to provide the level of food 
safety desired; and the extent to which the developed countries can 
or should shape their policies to meet the challenge of climate 
change. 
If the current divergence between the attitude of the public 
and the majority of politicians in the US and the EU to the spread of 
biotechnology continues, then cost differences between the US and 
the EU will become a significant factor in competition, and this will 
be exacerbated by the open transatlantic market. At the risk of 
oversimplification, the US public believes that technology, making 
use of advances in such areas as genomics and nano-science, is to be 
welcomed and encouraged. Though there are opponents, they have 
had little impact on policy. In the EU the situation is the reverse: 
caution replaces optimism and scientific advances are hindered. It 
is not difficult to see this attitudinal split within the transatlantic 
partnership as causing more tensions in the future rather than less. 
And the CAP is almost painfully neutral on these matters, including 
funds for research and competitiveness but not establishing clear 
priorities for the future of farming. Attempts to blur the distinction 
between the two pillars may solve a political problem but makes the 
CAP look rudderless. 
Similarly, the divergence between the public willingness to 
accept the role of science in food regulations is also likely to be 
widened, and create more problems in an integrated market. Of 
course, better consumer information would help, but that begs the 
question as to who should provide the information if public 
agencies are seen to be untrustworthy. On climate change, the 
scientific establishment appears to be believed more in the EU. So 
we have an odd situation. The US public accepts biotech and trusts 
regulators to manage health risks but sees the scientific consensus 
on climate change as a threat to competitiveness. The EU public 
rejects biotechnology (in food, though not in medicine) and distrusts 
regulators and their scientific advisors but is convinced that climate 
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change is for real and that policies should reflect the need to 
ameliorate conditions. It is difficult to imagine these perceptual 
differences coexisting in a single transatlantic food market, at least 
without some retreat on the part of regulators. CAP reform did not 
advance the ball, and neither did the recent Farm Bill. If the TTIP 
could make any progress in this area its impact on EU and US 
agriculture could actually be more fundamental than tinkering with 
marginal reforms to the direct payments and adding new insurance 
options for farmers. 
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19. REFLECTIONS ON THE CAP 
POST-2014  
ALAN MATTHEWS 
1. Introduction 
At the time of preparing this chapter (December 2014), the process 
of implementing the 2013 CAP reform is underway. It is proving to 
be a difficult process for national administrations and farmers alike.  
The introduction of the new direct payments regime was 
already postponed one year to 1 January 2015 in view of the delays 
in approving both the basic and implementing legislation. Yet 
farmers claim that they still do not know all the rules needed to 
implement the new policy (COPA-COGECA, 2014). In November 
2014 the agriculture coordinators from the European Parliament’s 
four main political groups urged Agriculture Commissioner Phil 
Hogan to postpone the introduction of greening measures for a 
further year to allow farmers and member states more time to 
correctly implement the complex environmental rules and to reduce 
the likelihood of penalties.1 Commissioner Hogan did not accede to 
this request when he met with the Parliament’s Committee on 
Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) on 3 December 
2014, pointing out that he was not prepared to change a policy that 
had not even entered into force yet. However, he has stated that 
there would be a degree of flexibility to facilitate the 
implementation of greening measures, and he pointed out that no 
penalties would apply to farmers in breach of their greening 
obligations in the first two years. For those countries transitioning 
from the historic model of direct payments to their farmers, the 
transition may not be completed until 2019, towards the end of the 
                                                        
1 www.farminglife.com/news/farming-news/hogan-urged-to-postpone-
greening-1-6447569. 
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current multiannual financial framework (MFF) period. The same 
timeframe is envisaged for external convergence, involving the 
redistribution of direct payments from member states with above-
average per hectare payments to member states with payments per 
hectare below the EU average. 
The process of programming the new rural development 
programmes (RDPs) has also suffered significant delays. The first 
three RDPs out of 118 expected were not approved until mid-
December 2014, and the great majority of the new RDPs are not 
expected to be approved until mid-2015. Changes in common 
market organisations are also being phased in over time. The 
abolition of dairy quotas takes place on 1 April 2015, while the 
elimination of sugar quotas will not take place until 1 October 2017. 
Thus full implementation of the 2013 CAP reform is being phased 
in at least over a four-year period. 
2. The commissioner’s mandate 
Although the implementation phase of the 2013 CAP reform is not 
yet completed, it is worth reflecting on what might lie in store for 
the CAP in the years ahead. Commission President Juncker’s 
mission letter to the incoming Commissioner for Agriculture and 
Rural Development emphasised the role that agriculture and rural 
development could play in delivering on the jobs, growth, 
investment and competitiveness agenda that he has placed at the 
centre of his presidency (Juncker 2014). He also charged him with 
“reviewing the potential for further simplification in the areas of 
direct payments and in particular as regards greening, rural 
development, quality policy and the fruit and vegetables scheme.” 
Other priorities specifically mentioned included renewing efforts in 
the agricultural sector to contribute to energy efficiency and 
emissions reductions, and contributing to the 2016 review of the 
MFF by identifying ways of further increasing the focus of the CAP 
on jobs, growth, investment and competitiveness. 
In his confirmation hearing before the Parliament, 
Commissioner Hogan emphasised his commitment to the 
simplification agenda (Hogan 2014a). He proposed to develop a 
simplification and subsidiarity strategy for the CAP within the first 
year of his mandate. He also committed to reviewing the design of 
direct payments policy after one year’s experience with the reform, 
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including the arrangement on greening and ecological focus areas 
(EFAs), which links to a commitment made by the previous 
Commission (see below). He suggested reviewing the legislation on 
geographical indications with a view to further harmonisation and 
simplification, and examining the potential to simplify the fruit and 
vegetable scheme. Significantly, he also proposed to have a mid-
term review of the CAP once there is sufficient data, which was the 
first explicit mention of a mid-term review of the 2013 CAP reform 
(Ragonnaud, 2014).  
Commissioner Hogan has frequently mentioned the 
importance of stability and predictability for farmers, and the need 
to avoid continual changes of the rules. He thus sees simplification 
not as a ‘big bang’ at a point in time, but rather “a constant flow of 
smaller and larger actions aimed at making the lives of farmers and 
other operators easier” (Hogan, 2014b). However, he has also 
recognised that simplification is anything but simple. Many 
previous efforts have been made to simplify the CAP, yet the 
consensus seems to be that the policy has become even more 
complicated over time.2 On the one hand, the purpose of many rules 
is to ensure that EU taxpayers’ money is efficiently spent and to 
limit the opportunities for fraud. Many of the rules are put in place 
in response to the regular criticisms of the European Court of 
Auditors in relation to CAP spending. On the other hand, the 2013 
CAP introduced an unprecedented amount of flexibility for 
member states in how they implemented CAP rules. Already, 
farmers in some member states complain that their governments are 
implementing the rules more strictly than in other countries and 
putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Restoring an even 
greater degree of subsidiarity to member states, even if it leads to 
more effective decision-making, can also mean that the common 
agricultural policy becomes even more uncommon. Navigating 
these conflicting objectives in pursuing his simplification agenda 
will not be an easy task for the new commissioner. 
                                                        
2 See the DG AGRI web page on simplification 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/simplification/index_en.htm. 
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3. Legislative trigger points 
Apart from the commissioner’s political commitment to deliver this 
simplification strategy within one year of taking office, the 2013 
CAP legislation sets out specific dates that trigger a review of 
current regulations. 
The earliest of these is contained in the declaration by the 
Commission on EFAs associated with the approval of the 
implementing legislation for the 2013 CAP reform:3  
The Commission undertakes to thoroughly evaluate the 
experience with the implementation of the obligations on 
Ecological Focus Areas (EFA) as part of the ‘greening’ 
obligations, after the first year of application. In particular, 
the Commission will ensure that the administrative 
burden for Member State authorities and producers 
arising from the application of EFA is kept to an absolute 
minimum and that procedures are simplified, including 
those on ditches. The situation in terms of a level playing 
field due to the implementation of EFA in different 
Member States will also be examined and addressed if 
necessary. Should the requirement to meet the EFA 
obligations result in a noticeable reduction of the 
production potential of the EU, the Commission will 
revise the relevant delegated act.  
This declaration was a concession to those member states and 
MEPs concerned that the greening measures would take land out of 
production. The spirit of this declaration runs counter to the 
commitment in the 2013 direct payments regulation that the 
Commission would present an evaluation on the implementation of 
the new EFAs by 31 March 2017 accompanied, where appropriate, 
by a proposal for a legislative act to increase the arable area covered 
by EFAs from 5% to 7%. Should the Commission decide, in its 
review of the first year of operation of EFAs in early 2016, that EFAs 
have had a negative impact on agricultural production, it would 
seem highly unlikely that it would then proceed, in the following 
year, to put forward legislation to increase the EFA area from 5% to 
7% of the relevant eligible area. 
                                                        
3 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/newsroom/161_en.htm. 
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Furthermore, Commissioner Hogan indicated, in his first 
meeting with COMAGRI in December 2014, that he intends to 
widen this review of EFAs to other aspects of the direct payments 
rules. “We should seize the opportunity to also simplify the other 
rules of the new direct payments regime, provided that we do not 
re-open the basic policy decisions of the 2013 reform in this area…” 
(Hogan, 2014b). What remains unclear at this stage is how these 
early reviews of the direct payments and greening rules will feed 
into the promised mid-term review of the CAP, which seems likely 
to get under way in parallel with the mandated mid-term review of 
the MFF in 2016.  
The mid-term review of the MFF is the result of a ‘revision 
clause’ in the current MFF whereby the Commission will present a 
review of the functioning of the MFF towards the end of 2016, taking 
full account of the economic situation at that time. The Commission 
had declared that this review would focus mainly on the 
functioning of the global margin for payments in order to ensure 
that the overall payments ceiling remains available throughout the 
period and on the particular requirements of the Horizon 2020 
programme.  
However, in his political guidelines for the next Commission 
presented to the Parliament last July, Commission President 
Juncker seemed to go further by stating, “The mid-term review of 
the Multiannual Financial Framework…should be used to orient the 
EU budget further towards jobs, growth and competitiveness” 
(Juncker, 2014). Recall that President Juncker, in his mandate to the 
new agriculture commissioner, specifically identified as one of his 
tasks “[c]ontributing to the 2016 review of the Multiannual Financial 
Framework by identifying ways of further increasing the focus of 
the CAP on jobs, growth, investment and competitiveness.” This 
mid-term MFF review could thus provide the opportunity to review 
the new CAP regulations. We discuss below whether this mid-term 
review of the CAP might be mainly a housekeeping exercise or an 
opportunity for a more radical shift in direction. 
Another possible trigger point is contained in the new 
horizontal regulation that requires the Commission, as part of the 
extended common monitoring and evaluation of CAP policy 
instruments, to present an initial report on the performance of the 
CAP by 31 December 2018 and a second report by 31 December 
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2021. The first performance monitoring report might feed into the 
process of defining the CAP budget in the next MFF and possible 
revisions in the accompanying CAP regulations.  
4. Link with the next MFF 
The 2013 CAP reform had been well flagged. Even as the 
discussions on the CAP Health Check were underway in the 
Council on the basis of the Commission’s proposals published in 
late 2007 and before the passage of the legislation implementing the 
Health Check reforms in January 2009, the French presidency 
circulated in July 2008 a paper for the informal Annecy meeting of 
agricultural ministers in September 2008 initiating a debate on the 
future of the CAP. Subsequently, in 2009 and early 2010 under the 
Czech, Swedish and Spanish presidencies, Council meetings were 
devoted to specific fundamental aspects of the future of the CAP: 
direct aid schemes, rural development and market management 
instruments, respectively. At Dacian Cioloş’ hearing before the 
European Parliament as Commissioner-designate for Agriculture 
and Rural Development in January 2010, he explicitly proposed a 
post-2013 reform taking new market realities into account. He also 
recognised that the debate on the future CAP and the talks on the 
post-2013 financial perspectives were closely linked.4  
This close linkage in the 2013 CAP reform with the MFF 
programming cycle has raised expectations that future CAP reforms 
would also be synchronised with the agreement on the next MFF. 
This would move the EU closer to the US model where a new farm 
bill is negotiated every five years. However, the relationship 
between CAP reform and MFF negotiations has often been 
asynchronous in the past, and budget considerations have not 
always been the driving factor.  
For example, the 1993-99 MFF (known as the Delors II 
package) was launched in February-March 1992 in two papers 
entitled “From the Single Act to Maastricht and Beyond: the Means 
                                                        
4 COMAGRI, Hearing with Dacian CIOLOŞ, Commissioner-designate for 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Written answers sent by Mr Dacian 
Cioloş, Notice to members CM\800542EN.doc, European Parliament, 
http://www.event.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/static/commissioners/
answers/ciolos_replies_en.pdf. 
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to Match our Ambitions” (COM(92)2000) and “The Community’s 
Finances Between Now and 1997” (COM(92)2001). By this stage, the 
MacSharry CAP reform which had been launched a year earlier in 
1991 was well underway and was concluded in July prior to the 
agreement on the MFF at the European Council meeting in 
Edinburgh in December 1992.  
There was a much closer relationship between the Agenda 
2000 CAP reform and the negotiation of the 2000-06 MFF. The 
Commission proposal “Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider 
Union” (COM(97)2000) presented in 1997 built on the Commission’s 
1995 Agricultural Strategy Paper to the Madrid European Council, 
which examined various options for the CAP to deal with the 
forthcoming eastern enlargement. The Madrid Council at the same 
time requested the Commission to prepare a new financial 
framework, which resulted in the launch of Agenda 2000. The 2000-
06 financial framework was agreed by the European Council at the 
Berlin meeting in March 1999 and the new CAP regulations were 
adopted shortly afterwards in May 1999. 
The Fischler 2003 reform (which led to the introduction of 
decoupling) and the 2008 Health Check were not particularly 
informed by budgetary issues, as the financial envelope for the CAP 
for the period 2007-13 had been agreed at the October 2002 
European Council. Following the fundamental reform of the first 
pillar of the CAP in 2003, it had been assumed that the major focus 
for policy reform in the new financial period would be rural 
development and an updated rural development regulation was 
agreed in 2005. However, this was followed by a revised 
consolidated single common market organisation (CMO) regulation 
in 2007 as a result of the simplification agenda and then by the 2008 
Health Check that resulted in revised regulations for direct 
payments, the single CMO and rural development in 2009.  
With the 2013 Cioloş reform a link between CAP reform and 
the negotiation of the next MFF was reintroduced. This CAP reform 
coincided with the preparation of the 2014-20 MFF and indeed was 
driven, to some degree, by the need to defend and maximise the 
share of the CAP in that MFF (Matthews, 2015: chapter 7, this 
volume). If this link were to continue for the next MFF period, then 
the schedule for approving the current MFF gives us some idea of 
the timeline to expect. 
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For the current MFF, the Commission forwarded its proposal 
to the Council and Parliament in June 2011. The European Council, 
having failed to reach agreement at its meeting in November 2012, 
finally decided on its common position in February 2013. This left 
sufficient time for the Council and Parliament to reach agreement 
by July 2013 to allow the Parliament to give its consent to the new 
MFF, which entered into force on 1 January 2014.  
According to the 2013-20 MFF regulation, the Commission 
should present its proposal for a new MFF by 1 January 2018, which 
would be a half-year earlier than was the case for the current MFF. 
If the same timetable were followed on the next occasion, this would 
imply that the European Council would decide its position around 
the middle of 2019. The negotiations between the Council and 
Parliament to ensure the Parliament’s consent to the MFF would 
then take place during the latter half of 2019. However, the lifespan 
of the current Parliament expires in May 2019, and a new Parliament 
will be constituted after elections on 1 July 2019. Thus a new 
Parliament will be asked to give its consent to the next MFF and not 
the current Parliament elected just last year. This may complicate 
the timing of any CAP reform linked to approval of the next MFF. 
If the Commission were to put forward proposals to revise the CAP 
regulations by the end of 2017 to coincide with the new MFF 
proposal, the current Parliament might give an initial response but 
it would most likely be the Parliament elected in 2019 that would 
conclude the co-decision process (see below). 
5. Another grand CAP reform? 
There are thus a number of opportunities in the legislative calendar 
during the current MFF for the Commission to propose another 
reform of the CAP. These include the 2016 mid-term review of the 
MFF as well as the legislative preparation for the next MFF due to 
be presented by the end of 2017. We have also seen that there are 
deadlines built into the CAP legislation itself requiring a review of 
CAP regulations, including the review of EFAs scheduled by end-
2017 and the first performance monitoring report by end-2018. 
There are also the trigger points set out in the commissioner’s 
political commitments, including the commitment to propose a 
simplification and subsidiarity strategy by the end of 2015, a 
commitment to review direct payment rules in early 2016, and a 
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commitment to a ‘mid-term review’ of the CAP at some unspecified 
date. 
Will the new commissioner take the opportunity of one of 
these trigger points for a ‘Hogan reform’ of the CAP? Below, I 
consider the political economy arguments that point to limited 
rather than radical change in the next set of CAP proposals. But it is 
possible that this discussion could get very confused because people 
have very different interpretations of what they mean by ‘reform’. 
Reform means change, but change is, in itself, an ambivalent term. 
There are at least two dimensions of change that should be 
highlighted: the distinction between ‘grand reforms’ and ‘fine-
tuning’, and the direction of reform. 
The mandate given to the Commissioner-designate for 
Agriculture and Rural Development by Commission President 
Juncker on his appointment emphasised implementation of the 
recent CAP reform, further simplification and prudent management 
of financial resources as his key tasks. The new commissioner 
already has a busy programme of CAP legislation in his period of 
office. A Parliament briefing to prepare COMAGRI MEPs for the 
confirmation hearings lists some of the dossiers he must address 
(Weissenberger, 2014). Implementing the newly-reformed CAP 
includes some specific challenges, such as the adaptation of the 
dairy sector to the end of quota system, answering recent strong 
criticisms from the EU Court of Auditors on EU financial support 
for the wine sector, and addressing the current crisis resulting from 
the Russian ban on imports of EU farm products. Other priorities 
include international negotiations covering agricultural goods, such 
as those relating to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) or within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
as well as policies on cultivation and use of genetically modified 
organisms and on the use of hormones or cloning in animal farming. 
Further, if it turns out that instruments in the new CAP are 
insufficient to address some emerging or unexpected problems, one 
would expect the Commission to respond by proposing new 
legislation.  
Arguably, however, all of these issues amount to ‘fine-tuning’ 
of the CAP rather than adding up to a ‘grand reform’. While it may 
be hard to draw the distinction, ‘grand reforms’ in the past have 
significantly altered the balance of the two CAP pillars, changed the 
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design and the distribution of direct payments, introduced new 
policy objectives for the CAP, or modified the degree of public 
intervention in agricultural markets. Nothing in the president’s 
mandate or the Parliament’s proposed agenda for the new 
commissioner hints at changes of this kind. 
The second definitional issue concerns the content of any 
future ‘grand reform’. Reform is a value-laden term that positively 
denotes significant change in line with the observer’s preferences. 
But one person’s reform may be another person’s regress, as 
evidenced by the debate over whether it is appropriate to describe 
the 2013 CAP package as a ‘reform’.  
Until the Cioloş CAP package, there had been a certain 
trajectory of CAP reform towards what economists consider less 
distorting and more market-oriented policy instruments. The 
MacSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms replaced market price support 
with coupled direct payments, while the Fischler 2003 reform and 
the Fischer Boel Health Check replaced coupled by decoupled 
payments and set a date for the final elimination of supply controls 
on milk, sugar and vineyard areas.  
From this perspective, a true reform in 2013 would have 
followed the advice of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) agriculture ministers in 2010 and moved 
from untargeted decoupled direct payments (which can only be 
justified as an interim, transitional measure) to targeted transfers 
designed to achieve specific objectives (OECD, 2010). The Cioloş 
reform made some moves towards greater targeting (it might be 
better to call it differentiation) of direct payments while also 
distributing them more evenly across member states and among 
farmers. It confirmed the elimination of supply management for 
milk and sugar and introduced measures to give producers greater 
bargaining power in the supply chain. It paid greater attention to 
increasing the competitiveness of EU agriculture, through new 
measures and greater resources for innovation and limiting the 
future use of export subsidies.  
It responded to calls for greater subsidiarity by providing 
greatly increased flexibility to member states on how they want to 
implement the CAP, albeit at some risk to the cohesion of the single 
market. It also avoided responding to calls that would have 
reversed the reform process to date, such as introducing price-
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dependent countercyclical direct payments or significantly raising 
safety net intervention prices. 
However, the 2013 CAP package also enlarged the scope for 
recoupling of direct payments, did not forbid the use of export 
subsidies, and maintained expenditure on largely untargeted direct 
payments at the expense of Pillar II funding. Also, the greening 
proposals adopted have been heavily criticised as yielding very 
limited benefits for the environment due to the shallow nature of 
the measures and the large number of exempted farmers, despite 
the allocation of 30% of the direct payments budget as a ‘green 
payment’. At the same time, if farm prices fall (perhaps as a result 
of slowing global trade) and margins come under pressure, the 
commissioner will face calls to raise intervention prices, reintroduce 
export subsidies, propose a voluntary buy-out scheme in the dairy 
sector and move back towards a more regulated market.  
Thus an important issue for the incoming commissioner’s 
term in office is not only whether he will propose a ‘grand reform’ 
but what direction would it take? Answering these questions 
requires an understanding of the political economy around another 
CAP reform. 
6. The political economy of further CAP reform 
The 2013 CAP reform itself left many stakeholders dissatisfied. 
There will be pressure to reopen some of the compromises made as 
part of that reform (Buckwell & Baldock, 2014). New member states 
will be hoping to complete the process of external convergence of 
direct payments. Environmental groups, disappointed by the 
outcome on CAP greening, will be hoping to build on the modest 
new instruments introduced by the 2013 CAP reform to push for a 
greater focus on public goods. Farm groups will push for stronger 
market crisis instruments and less regulation of farming practices. 
Public policy analysts will continue to question the basic rationale 
for uniform decoupled direct payments.  
However, these pressures for further reform to some extent 
work in opposite directions and thus tend to cancel each other out. 
There are also other arguments that suggest a limited appetite for 
reform in the current MFF period. The new commissioner has 
emphasised the importance of stability and predictability for 
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farmers. Neither did the Commission President Juncker’s mission 
letter call for a further round of reform. Member states are 
completely absorbed by the process of implementing the 2013 
reform, fearful of the additional complexity and of the prospect of 
payment disallowances if they get it wrong. 
The reformist camp, always a minority among the member 
states, appears to have lost much of its momentum and cohesion 
during the 2013 CAP negotiations (with the UK, in particular, 
preoccupied with other issues). It is also likely that the greater 
flexibility member states now have to implement the CAP will sap 
the reformist zeal. Member states that wish to move the CAP in a 
more targeted direction to focus on public goods now have 
considerable scope to do that within the current CAP framework, 
even if the same flexibility allows other member states to move in 
the opposite direction. Why waste political capital advocating for 
further CAP reform when the possibilities are already in your own 
hands? 
In this context of ‘reform fatigue’, it is probable that only a 
rapid change in external circumstances would trigger another 
‘grand reform’. The 2013 CAP reform was clearly influenced by 
external events, in particular the high and volatile prices on global 
food markets, which changed the terms of the debate on the future 
CAP by elevating the ‘food security’ argument at the expense of the 
‘public goods’ one. Unexpected external events could also be 
important in shaping the Commission’s next CAP proposals.  
The WTO, which had an important influence on earlier CAP 
reforms, is unlikely to be a significant driver of further reform even 
if the Doha Round unexpectedly returned to life, although the CAP 
remains vulnerable to a challenge regarding the ‘green box’ status 
of the single payment (Swinbank, 2015: chapter 8, this volume). 
Global food prices are forecast to remain at historically high levels, 
but also to be more volatile, which will continue to feed into the 
‘food security’ narrative for more support for EU farmers.  
The EU’s next energy and climate package now being 
negotiated will affect agriculture in various ways, including the 
support given to agriculture-based biofuels, the way emissions from 
land use and land use change are addressed and the scale of the 
demands on agriculture to limit emissions. Although the European 
Council has agreed headline targets for emission reductions for 
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2030, the treatment of agricultural emissions within these targets 
still remains unclear.5  
Also, biodiversity loss, water pollution, soil erosion and 
resource waste and inefficiency will continue to play a role in setting 
the agricultural policy agenda, but the new Commission may well 
argue that these are matters where member states, in the first 
instance, must respond by making use of the instruments that are 
already available. 
Finally, the state of the EU economy towards the end of the 
decade will influence the overall resources available for the next EU 
MFF. This, in turn, will shape the share of the CAP in that MFF. If 
the Commission were to seek additional resources for 
competitiveness and infrastructure projects by cutting back on the 
CAP budget more severely (as recommended in the leaked but 
discarded first draft of the Commission’s mandated budget review 
half way through the 2007-13 MFF),6 this might be sufficient to 
trigger a more fundamental review of CAP instruments and 
policies, although whether the outcome would be a move in the 
direction of greater reform remains an open question. 
7. What are the prospects for the next CAP 
reform? 
Against this background, what are the prospects for the next CAP 
reform? Some optimists among environmental NGOs already see a 
possibility that the promised mid-term review could build on the 
greening measures, not only moving to the 7% figure for EFAs but 
also extending obligations to more farmers and even introducing 
additional measures. It is hard to see the political appetite for such 
an initiative.  
Also, although it will be possible to measure the impact of 
EFAs on land use and agricultural production during their first two 
years of operation by early 2017, when the Commission is due to 
                                                        
5 http://capreform.eu/agriculture-in-the-2030-climate-and-energy-
package/. 
6 A copy of this leaked version is available at www.pouruneautrepac.eu/ 
wp-content/uploads/2009/11/draft-document-reforming-the-budget-
oct-2009.pdf-0. 
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report on the operation of this requirement, measuring their 
environmental impacts (or lack thereof) is going to take much 
longer. Indeed, the extension of EFAs to 7% of arable land in 2017 
cannot be taken for granted and could well be postponed to the next 
revision of the CAP regulations in connection with the MFF. 
It seems plausible that the Commission would first make 
proposals to revise the CAP regulations as part of its MFF proposal 
to be made before the end of 2017. One of the lessons from the recent 
CAP reform was that the Parliament was unwilling to engage in 
trilogues with the Council until it knew the outcome of the MFF 
figures for the CAP. I have argued that this position greatly helped 
the more status quo-oriented voices in that debate and weakened 
the position of those pushing for a stronger focus on greening the 
CAP (Matthews, 2015: chapter 7, this volume). The Parliament will 
be strongly tempted to adopt the same position in the next set of 
negotiations as the same arguments would apply. However, the 
current Parliament’s term comes to an end in May 2019. Assuming 
that the European Council’s MFF figures would not be known until 
mid-2019, this strategy would mean that the current Parliament 
would forego its chance to decide the nature of the next CAP reform. 
Under that scenario, it would be up to the new Parliament to agree 
on the new CAP regulations through co-decision in the second half 
of 2019 or early 2020.  
An alternative scenario would see Commissioner Hogan 
converting his ‘mid-term review’ in 2016 into a more far-reaching 
review of the CAP regulations. This would imply discussions taking 
place on the future CAP already in 2015, with almost no information 
available on the impact of the 2013 reform and with no clear idea of 
the macroeconomic and budgetary context for agricultural policy in 
the years after 2020. It is hard to see the merits of this option 
compared to waiting until at least the end of 2017 or even later to 
activate the process. 
Whatever the timing, the current evidence suggests that these 
new CAP regulations will largely roll the existing rules over, 
perhaps tweaking the external convergence formula under pressure 
from the new member states and making other minor changes. 
There appears to be little appetite for further substantial steps 
towards a more targeted CAP focused on the delivery of public 
goods. On the contrary, the specific mandate given to 
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Commissioner Hogan by the commission president is to increase 
the focus of the CAP on “jobs, growth, investment and 
competitiveness”. This sits well with the expressed views of the 
commissioner himself, and is a more likely direction for the next set 
of CAP reform proposals. 
But up to four years could pass before the commissioner 
makes his proposals, and a lot can happen in that time!  
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20. WHERE SHOULD THE CAP GO 
POST-2020? 
ALLAN BUCKWELL* 
he breadth of the necessary stakeholder consultation and the 
length of the EU political decision-making process mean that 
early thinking on the next CAP reform has to commence as 
soon as the last reform is decided. Consideration of the range of 
pressures likely to confront EU agriculture into the 2020s, their 
origins in market failure, market imperfections and missing 
markets, and their generally transboundary nature lead to the 
conclusions that the EU will continue to require agricultural policy 
and there are sound reasons for it to be a common European policy. 
The variety of challenges confronting agriculture and problems 
with the current CAP are such that it is hard to see any single or pair 
of dominating ideas emerging to define the shape and content of the 
next reform. This suggests that it is more likely to follow the 
example of the last two reforms as incremental evolutionary change 
rather than a big-bang radical restructuring.  
1. Why it isn’t too early to start thinking about the 
next reform  
Discussions about the future of the post-2020 common agricultural 
policy (CAP) started in late 2014 in different parts of Europe as a 
new commissioner for agriculture and rural development took up 
his post and the implications of the final version of the 2014-20 
reform became more apparent. This chapter draws on some 
exploratory dialogues in and beyond the Institute for European 
                                                        
* This chapter started out as a think piece first drafted by Buckwell & 
Baldock (2014) for the IEEP website, benefitting from insights from Martin 
Nesbit and Kaley Hart. The modifications since that posting and full 
responsibility for this version are the author’s. 
T
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Environmental Policy (IEEP) in that period. It provides reflections 
both on what to expect and what might be most welcome in any 
future CAP, if indeed the CAP will survive into the third decade of 
this century. The incredible adaptability, and thus durability, of the 
CAP, and its Treaty basis, suggest that it is a safe bet that it will 
survive another decade. Seeking to ensure that it better serves the 
interests of the EU citizens is the prime motivation for this article.  
It might seem premature to be raising questions in early 2015 
about the future of the CAP beyond 2020. After all, the full 
implementation of the most recent reform, which runs until the end 
of 2020, only commences in January 2015, and new rural 
development programmes always take a long time to develop and 
disburse funds. Three reasons are offered for starting to think about 
the next reform now:  
i) With full co-decision it now takes three years to conduct a 
serious reform from a first communication, such as a Green 
Paper, to full implementation readiness.  
ii) Experience suggests that genuine reform requires a broad, 
shared understanding of the purpose and direction of a new 
policy. It takes several years to prepare the ground and 
assemble the EU-wide evidence to back sound reform 
proposals.  
iii) In any case, the mid-term review of the multiannual financial 
framework (MFF) during 2016 and the mandated reviews of 
ecological focus areas (EFAs), the fruit and vegetable regime 
and geographical indications will raise questions potentially 
central to a new CAP in the next few years. Well prepared 
proposals from the Commission should be on the table in 
2018.  
It also seems plain that the Cioloş reform has opened, but by 
no means completed, several adjustment paths within the policy. 
Redistribution and better targeting of support payments and further 
transformation of the policy to confront the pervasive market 
failures surrounding agricultural land management, especially the 
delivery of environmental public goods, are launched in the current 
reform, but none is taken more than a third of the way. In the 
process, the policy has become considerably more complex and 
there are strong political pressures – notably in the mandate that 
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Commission President Juncker gave Agriculture and Rural 
Development Commissioner Hogan1 – to simplify the policy.  
2. Will there continue to be justification for a 
grand policy for agriculture and rural 
development?  
With a policy so strongly entrenched as the CAP it is very tempting 
to start the consideration of the next stage of its evolution by listing 
its current shortcomings. This should be resisted, precisely because 
it is exactly where the EU institutions will start. Rather, we should 
start by asking whether and why we need a European agricultural 
policy by examining its justification and looking at the challenges 
facing EU agriculture that may demand collective policy action. It is 
suggested that the prime challenges facing post-2020 EU agriculture 
are those listed in Table 20.1.  
Table 20.1 Expected challenges facing post-2020 EU farming  
1 Achieving productivity gains 
2 Hence alleviating low farm incomes – cost price squeeze 
3 Coping with market volatility 
4 Survival of the marginal areas – land 
abandonment/population outflow 
5 Assisting restructuring: food chain, tiny holdings, new 
entrants, aged farmers 
6 Providing environmental protection for: soil (fertility and 
erosion); water (quantity and quality); biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, e.g. pollination and cultural landscape 
7 Mitigating and adapting to climate change (reducing GHG 
emissions; coping with change in temperature, precipitation, 
extreme events, plant and animal disease) 
8 Bioenergy contribution 
9 Food safety and authenticity 
10 Safeguarding animal welfare  
11 Waste and residues utilisation 
12 Diet and health/nutritional quality of food 
                                                        
1 European Commission (2014).  
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The first five of these challenges have been subjects of the 
CAP since its inception. The others have been added as 
considerations in the CAP progressively since the mid-1990s, 
particularly through the programmed schemes of the second pillar, 
although the last has received one-third of the resources and 
attention.  
The challenges are transcribed into the following familiar mix 
of broad European rural policy objectives: 
 to maintain resilience and improve agricultural productivity 
to help ensure food security for citizens at a lower resource 
cost;  
 to help agriculture improve its environmental performance;  
 to contribute to reasonable living standards for primary 
producers who will have to cope with continuing volatility in 
markets, including that arising from the effects of climate 
change, and; 
 to assist the development of rural areas, especially remote and 
marginal areas.  
Yet, these challenges themselves partly arise because 
agriculture continues to undermine its own sustainability by 
degrading natural capital – pollinators, soil fertility, biodiversity, 
water and air quality and contributing to harmful climate change. 
Helping improve the resource efficiency of food production and 
thus its financial viability for the future whilst at the same time 
restoring and maintaining rural natural capital should be core 
functions of agriculture beyond 2020 and reflected in the objectives 
of the CAP.2  
Simplistic claims about the EU needing to increase production 
to feed the world should be avoided, but Europe’s contribution to 
overall supplies may have to grow in the coming decades and this 
is an additional reason to build production systems and 
accompanying skills that are robust, resilient and in tune with 
environmental and social demands in Europe.3  
                                                        
2 Another way of expressing this is that EU agriculture should be steered 
onto a path of sustainable intensification, RISE (2014). 
3 Global food security raises issues about governance, food access and food 
consumption patterns, which are far wider than simply increasing the 
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There will continue to be difficult questions concerning the 
optimal structure of EU agriculture. There is still a strong political, 
and it could be said, romantic, attachment to a highly fragmented 
structure of family farms.4 There seems to be reluctance to accept 
that most larger agricultural holdings are also family-based, and 
distrust of larger corporate farming structures. So there is little 
consensus about how much restructuring, rationalisation and 
consequent decline in smaller farm employment is desirable and 
acceptable. Although seldom explicitly acknowledged, the CAP’s 
role has generally been to slow the outflow of labour from 
agriculture; this should surely be balanced by a more vigorous role 
in creating viable new jobs in the food system and rural 
environmental management.5 Part of this structural challenge is 
finding routes for farming to thrive whilst sandwiched between the 
highly concentrated upstream supply industries (fertilisers, 
machinery, crop protection and plant breeding) and the only 
slightly less concentrated downstream food processing and 
distribution sector.  
In addition to its prime function of food production, 
mainstream agriculture will continue to have a wider role in 
contributing to the EU bio-economy and the circular economy. This 
includes renewable energy production, reducing waste, and 
recovering and recycling biomass and crop nutrients. Getting the 
right balance between agriculture, forestry and other land uses will 
be increasingly important, as will be the management of soil and 
soil carbon. The proportionate contribution of agriculture and land 
use change to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions may well increase 
in the future, so the pressure to curb these emissions will grow. 
                                                        
quantity of food output, and even less about food output in the EU. But 
equally, it is inconceivable that EU agricultural policy could ignore food 
security altogether. 
4 This was especially evident in many of the events and articles that 
emerged during the 2014 UN International Year of Family Farming, e.g. 
European Network for Rural Development (2013). 
5 This is certainly an aspect where there will still be strong divergences 
between the needs of the older and some newer member states lasting 
through the 2020s. 
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If these are not already a complex enough set of 
considerations, the policy must also contribute to high standards of 
food safety and authenticity, improved animal welfare and of 
course healthy and nutritious diets that, in turn, could change quite 
significantly. Accompanying these objectives could be a 
continuation of the strong emphasis on “jobs and growth” that was 
the central priority of the Commission president in his letters to the 
commissioners for the period 2014-19, including both Hogan 
(agriculture) and Georgieva (budget).  
This brief overview of the likely challenges facing EU 
agriculture at the end of this decade serves already to indicate that 
a sector that manages a high proportion of the territory and thus the 
natural environment, and that also provides a high proportion of 
the food needs of the population, is bound to present some difficult 
interactions and choices. It is important to note that perceptions of 
which of these considerations is the most important vary. It is not 
clear at all that there is a consensus in EU society about which of 
these challenges should be considered the top priority. Indeed, 
strong interest groups have developed to articulate alternative 
positions – most strikingly, the farmers who want to focus on food 
productivity and production, and environmentalists who are 
concerned that too much agriculture is already at, or approaching, 
environmental limits.  
However, a common feature of the issues concerning land 
management and food production is that they are replete with 
market failures, market imperfections and uncertainties. In nearly 
every one of the challenges discussed here there is a strong public 
interest that seems unlikely to be met by the market alone. These 
form the strong justification for continued public policy 
arrangements for EU food production and rural land management. 
The next questions are whether the most appropriate policy 
response is at EU or member state level and its resemblance to the 
existing CAP. This is the subject of the next section. 
3. Will we still require a common EU agricultural 
policy? 
For a certain period in the development of the CAP, it seemed that 
the need for a commonly financed and administered policy for the 
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EU rural areas was diminishing. The successive reforms of 
MacSharry (1993), Fischler (1999 and 2003) and Fischer Boel (2007) 
transformed the CAP away from essentially a regulatory 
framework for agricultural commodity markets, which in a single 
market necessitated common support measures, common prices 
and shared 100% EU financing. The reforms were accompanied by 
a system of direct payments in Pillar I that were very explicitly 
calculated as compensation for the cuts in support prices. These 
payments were complemented, after the Agenda 2000 reform, by 
regionally defined, menu-driven, co-financed, multiannual, rural 
development programmes under Pillar II.  
The policy evolution for roughly a decade and a half, from the 
early 1990s to the late 2000s, could therefore be characterised as a 
slow transformation process from a set of universal, obligatory, 
100% EU-financed, agricultural commodity support measures 
towards a more market-oriented, decoupled, decentralised, and co-
financed6 rural development approach. Some interest groups and 
one or two member states indeed advocated the logical conclusion 
to this process.7 This was to recognise that compensatory payments 
should be transitional and ultimately phased out, leaving the 
regionalised and co-financed rural development measures as the 
core of the policy. If this had come about, or if it comes about in the 
future, then it would logically be accompanied by a debate about 
the extent to which a common policy, and especially common EU 
financing, was still justified.  
However, the strategic policy path of moving from a 
commodity support policy towards a more differentiated and 
                                                        
6 The fact that the Pillar II measures were mostly co-financed was a matter 
of important principle for many. The idea is that member states will pay 
more attention to the value for public money of these more discretionary 
measures if they have to find part of the financing themselves. However, 
this high principle has been sacrificed when expedient to do so (as 
exemplified by the UK in relation to voluntary modulation).  
7 Agricultural economists as a profession were strongly (though of course 
with some dissenters) inclined to advocate the elimination of direct 
payments – no groups should be compensated indefinitely for policy 
change. See, for example, Reform the CAP (2009). The UK and Sweden 
were the member states most inclined to argue that Pillar I should be 
diminished and phased out, see HM Treasury & Defra (2005).  
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programmed rural development and environmental land 
management policy was, at best, weakly established and accepted. 
Unsurprisingly, the major direct beneficiaries of the support system, 
i.e. farmers, have strenuously resisted any hint that the 
compensatory payments might be transitional and ultimately 
phased out or, for example, converted into bonds. And fatally for 
the compensation view of direct payments, the candidate member 
states in Central and Eastern Europe fought hard for, and won, the 
battle to be included in this ‘compensation’ even though their 
accession involved nothing for which compensation was justified. It 
was therefore no surprise that in the first real reform undertaken in 
the EU of 27 members, and under a commissioner from a new 
member state, the principal issue was the redistribution of the funds 
for the direct payments rather than their phasing out. In the Cioloş 
reform, the drift of resources from Pillar I to Pillar II was halted and 
for some member states reversed, and the extent of allowing the 
recoupling of measures back to agricultural commodities widened. 
Thus the previous strategic reform direction has ground to a halt or 
even reversed.  
Interestingly, the eastern enlargement that introduced much 
greater heterogeneity into the farming systems, structures and 
range of natural, economic and social conditions, also introduced in 
the Cioloş reform considerably more national flexibility. This 
showed up as the wide range of choices available to the member 
states in the way that the measures in both pillars of the CAP could 
be implemented.8 On the face of it, therefore, the CAP that will 
operate until 2020 will contain a wide variation around the member 
states and regions in support levels and detailed operation of 
support measures in both pillars. With the final disappearance of 
the remnants of the commodity regimes (milk and sugar quotas), it 
might be argued that these arrangements, whilst still operated as a 
common policy framework under common EU regulations, are in 
fact highly differentiated national policies.  
                                                        
8 The very nature of Pillar II has always allowed wide discretion and thus 
variation amongst member states; the Cioloș reform introduced similarly 
wide flexibility in Pillar I measures. This shows up, for example, in the 
definitions of ‘active farmer’, the regionalisation of payments, the extent to 
which large payments are curtailed and small payments enhanced, the 
greening measures, and the extension of coupled payments.  
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However, starting from the present realities, the jump from 
differentiated implementation of a common basket of measures, 
which is still to a great degree financed from the EU budget, to 
nationally defined and financed agricultural policies is a jump too 
far. In the current era in which there is a general suggestion that the 
EU is trying to do too much, however logical it might seem to some 
to put agricultural and rural policy into the category of things the 
EU is doing that should be repatriated to the member states, this is 
not in the realm of feasible options.9 Indeed, the arguments in 
principle for action at EU level are strong. This speculative overview 
chapter is not the place for a rigorous analysis. These issues are 
examined in some detail in the evidence collected in the UK under 
an exercise conducted by the British government in 2012-14 to look 
at the ‘balance of competences’ between the EU and a member 
state.10 The broad conclusion was:  
The debate on EU competence for agriculture as set out in 
the evidence submitted was strongly supportive of EU 
competence in relation to the Single Market for 
agricultural goods and to the EU’s role in negotiating 
global trade deals for agricultural goods. 
The review continued, “In the main, respondents thought that 
EU-level action was appropriate for agriculture.” But there were 
also strong criticisms that “the CAP remains misdirected, 
cumbersome, costly and bureaucratic.” It is therefore of interest that 
even in the member state generally associated as having the most 
hostile attitude towards the CAP it is not argued that it would be 
better if agricultural policy were devolved to the member state level.  
Why not? Because the heterogeneity of European agriculture, 
environment and rurality, the complexity of arranging pan-
European policy measures that work, and the departures from 
commonality on the recent reforms are outweighed by the 
interaction of four factors: 
 The overwhelming suspicion that outside a common policy it 
would be impossible to prevent un-level playing fields 
developing as some member states inevitably found ways to 
                                                        
9 Not least because it would demand treaty change. 
10 See the final report of the UK Government (2014), “Review of the Balance 
of Competences between the United Kingdom and the EU: Agriculture”.  
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support their agriculture more generously than others. This is 
tantamount to saying that there is no confidence that the 
Commission would have the powers and ability to enforce 
state aid rules for the agricultural sector. This seems an 
extreme position. However, there is no doubt that even with 
a common policy there are still heart-felt arguments from 
producers in some countries that they are penalised vis-à-vis 
producers elsewhere in the Union.  
 The land management sector is characterised by pervasive 
market failures, mostly, but not only, with respect to 
environmental concerns – soil, water, climate, biodiversity 
and cultural landscape. For all but the first and last of these 
they involve for most (but not all) member states 
transboundary effects. This is already reflected in that these 
issues (except soils) are managed under EU environmental 
directives. Thus it makes sense that the complementary 
actions under agricultural and rural policy are also managed 
at EU level. 
 The fact that there is a strong connection between the 
production of the marketed agricultural outputs of the sector 
and the non-marketed environmental services that are or 
could be produced on farms.  
 There has always been at the very least a hope that the CAP 
as a significant, although falling, user of the total EU budget 
serves some degree of solidarity and cohesion within the EU. 
That is, it transfers resources towards less developed, more 
marginal producers and regions. The extent to which this is 
so is highly dubious, but several of the attempts in the Cioloş 
reform to redistribute support and better target the measures 
at least set out with this general objective.  
It is suggested that these four factors combined with the fact 
that the existence of a common agricultural policy is, and has been 
since the Treaty of Rome, written into the Treaty, mean that there 
will still be an EU common agricultural policy in the 2020s. Even if 
a fragmentation of the eurozone, or a British exit, or measures to 
prevent these things from happening, were to necessitate a Treaty 
change in the next five years, it is judged to be extremely unlikely 
that removing agricultural policy from the Treaty lies in the bounds 
of political feasibility.  
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4. What are the options for reform? 
To this point, the conclusions are, first, that there will continue to be 
significant challenges confronting post-2020 European agriculture, 
which by virtue of their association with externalities, missing 
markets and market imperfections deserve a collective or policy 
response. Second, this should continue to be a policy response at the 
European level. Thus as long as there is a Treaty basis for a common 
agricultural policy, this will form the legal framework for this 
policy. There is, however, no necessity that future agricultural 
policy has to be the same as the current CAP. It has proved an 
extremely resilient and flexible framework that has survived the 
growth of the EU from 6 to 28 members, under several different 
currency regimes, a switch from a net import to a net agricultural 
export stance, and a complete transformation from a commodity 
support policy to a complex set of agricultural, environmental, 
territorial and social measures. It is evident that the unchanged 
Treaty objectives of the CAP that have survived since 1957 are not a 
constraint on the measures actually deployed under this policy. 
In what directions could reform take the policy? A zero-based 
review might come up with seven conceivable versions of a CAP for 
the post-2020 era. These are summarised in Table 20.2. The first four 
describe radical redefinitions of what the policy could primarily be 
about. They show the prime focus could be: agricultural adjustment; 
the food chain; rural land and resource management; or rural 
society. The next three options listed are progressively less 
ambitious, more incremental or evolutionary reforms of current 
policy. The table offers a brief descriptive account of each option. 
Just as in the Commission’s 2011 Communication that 
preceded the Cioloş reform, these are not spelled out in detail, but 
offered to stimulate debate about the character and principal 
objectives of the policy. The first four options represent a distinct 
narrowing of the focus of the policy to test what it is really mostly 
about. What is the most important thing we are trying to achieve 
with this policy? Each of the radical options, if taken at face value, 
would require a significant dismantling of existing policy measures. 
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Table 20.2 Options for a post-2020 common agricultural policy 
A 
R
ad
ic
al
 re
fo
rm
 
Policy for agricultural adjustment 
No enduring annual payments, only transitional support for, say seven 
years, for restructuring and refocusing for life without subsidy, 
environmental performance within legislative standards, coping with 
natural and market volatility, managing the market power imbalance with 
the up and downstream sectors, and delivering locality and quality. 
Provide mostly investment, restructuring, advisory and training help. 
B Policy for the food chain 
Stronger focus on integrating and rebalancing farming structures into 
local and/or national and international food chains, with strong focus on 
waste reduction, improving diet and health (plus elements of option A?).  
C Policy for rural land and resource management 
Focus on the environmental market failures/public goods and climate 
mitigation and adaptation, which explicitly embraces supporting and 
regulating, as well as provisioning cultural ecosystem services. Will 
therefore include energy, forestry, wetlands, cultural landscape and rural 
recreation.  
D Rural social policy 
Direct payments only on social (including income if explicitly tested) or 
territorial solidarity grounds. Repatriate greening and Pillar II to member 
states, much smaller budget, stronger enforcement of environmental 
regulations, enhanced state aid rules. 
E 
Ev
ol
ut
io
na
ry
 re
fo
rm
 
Major switch to rural development 
Scale back direct payments to the minimum, retain and enlarge rural 
development to include proper greening and whichever measures in 
options A to D can be agreed. (This essentially builds on the Commission 
Communication 2011, third option.) 
F Redistribution and rebalancing  
As now but insist on co-financing either all measures, or no measures (i.e. 
treat both pillars the same) more redistribution of direct payment funds – 
but based on objective criteria, more targeting of direct payment e.g. 
means-tested. Switch greening to Pillar II with its funding.  
G Further improvements on Cioloş reform 
Elements of option F plus: 
- innovation for sustainable farming, water, energy, waste 
- reconsider risk management measures to substitute basic payments 
- more effective cross-compliance 
- more appropriate principles for ‘high nature value’ farming support 
- finding ways to delivery landscape/catchment scale management  
- increased farmer self-administration via cooperatives 
- more emphasis on results-based payment schemes 
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These really would be strong simplifications of what the 
policy is trying to achieve, and therefore would offer significant 
simplification of the measures. This illustrates that if (as is likely) we 
persist in a policy for a heterogeneous EU-28 with multiple 
agricultural, food, environmental and social objectives, then we 
should not be too surprised that this results in a policy of immense 
complexity. The presumption would be that whatever is chosen as 
the prime objective of the CAP amongst these radical options, the 
other objectives would be pursued by national policies. Of course, 
this would raise issues of fair terms of competition. 
All the radical options A through D explicitly involve the 
removal of most or all direct payments. In reality this would 
inevitably require an adjustment period or perhaps a revival of the 
Tangermann ‘bond’ idea as an exit route for these payments. This 
step would also demand an answer to the question: how, in the 
absence of direct payments with cross-compliance, do we get 
respect for the statutory management requirements and good 
agricultural and environmental conditions?  
Of course, the options listed in Table 20.2 could no doubt be 
much extended by others with more creativity and imagination than 
the author. However, experience of the EU agricultural policy 
debates of the last five decades suggests that significant groups 
could be found to support each one of the general directions 
suggested by the options listed. This is exactly what was noted at 
the consultative conference that Commissioner Cioloş held in July 
2010 soon after his appointment. There was little or no consensus 
about the top priority challenge that the policy confronted; no 
consensus on what was the most important problem with the CAP 
as of 2010; thus no consensus on the principal characteristic of the 
reform direction. It is suggested that this was in contrast to the 
situation that applied prior to the 1993 MacSharry and the 2003 
Fischler reforms.  
5. What are the weaknesses of the current CAP? 
However radical, the next CAP reform will have to build upon the 
existing policy so the shortcomings and strengths of the CAP as 
modified by the Cioloş reform will be a crucial departure point at 
some stage in the debate. However, the different interest groups 
have quite different perceptions of these shortcomings and 
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strengths. Many will point to the continued lack of justification for 
the current level and distribution of the basic support payments. 
Others will emphasise the lack of progress in delivering the 
protection of biodiversity, water, soil, climate and cultural 
landscapes. Still others will say the policy does not do enough to 
help the industry restructure and innovate or to survive without 
dependency on public subsidy and without degrading the natural 
environment. The principal direct beneficiaries of the CAP, farmers, 
complain of its complexity and associated bureaucracy, unevenness 
and unfairness of support, and lack of help in dealing with volatility 
and the market power of the food industry. These problems of the 
current CAP as seen by certain interest groups are summarised in 
Table 20.3. 
Table 20.3 Principal problems of the current CAP (from the perspective 
of…) 
1 Perpetuated, untargeted payments (taxpayers/efficiency) 
2 Unfair distribution of supports (the poorest farmers) 
3 Poor help with volatility, market power and lower standards 
abroad (farmers) 
4 Environmental measures are not delivering (society/green 
NGOs) 
5 Complexity, cost-raising bureaucracy (farmers and 
administrators) 
6 Deterrence of needed structural change (potential investors) 
7 Poor value for money (VFM) in many rural development 
measures (taxpayers) 
8 Insufficient help with innovation (farmers and society) 
9 Over-constrained by benefit distribution (reformers) 
About the only proposition on the CAP that commands near 
universal agreement (but that has also quite explicitly been part of 
the CAP debate for well over a decade) is the complaint that levels 
of complexity in the CAP seem excessive both for farmers and 
administrations in the member states.11 It is worth pointing out that 
not all the complexity surrounding agriculture emanates from DG 
                                                        
11 Matthews (2015) provides a pithy summary of the attention devoted to 
simplification since the early 2000s. 
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Agri; much comes from the Sanco, Environment, Climate, and 
Energy DGs. However, simplicity per se can never be a prime 
purpose of public policy. The structural heterogeneity in EU 
farming, which itself is based on the heterogeneity of physical, 
biological and climatic features of Europe, plus the intrinsic 
connection between the production of market goods (food) and 
non-market services (good environmental land management), 
create a certain unavoidable complexity. Highly targeted policies 
sensitive to local conditions have their place and will be needed. 
Also, monitoring and evaluation are not a luxury, however 
exasperating to farmers and administrations. But many might agree 
that the way in which the CAP caters to so many special interests, 
and often incorporates measures to smooth the sometimes 
uncomfortable impacts of previous reforms, is itself a driver of 
complexity.  
One lesson is that these issues demand collaborative thinking 
across organisations, public and private, spanning the full range of 
issues that should be feeding into the CAP. This list is long and 
includes food, soil, water, biodiversity, climate, energy, diet, health, 
food safety, animal welfare, competing land use such as forestry, 
economic growth and employment, competition, and trade. Is it 
reasonable to expect a sectoral and territorial policy affecting this 
range of issues ever to be simple? 
6. Lessons learned from past reforms 
These are numerous and analysts all have their favourites. One is 
that there must be substantive drivers to create impetus for reform 
in a domain where the status quo is strongly entrenched. This does 
not mean that national governments need to be enthusiastic, but 
successful reform requires strong, clear leadership from 
somewhere. Few were ready to support Fischler’s clear steer 
towards payment decoupling at the time of the 2003 mid-term 
review, especially at the beginning. In 2010-13, by contrast, the 
Commission seemed less confident in its exchanges with the 
European Parliament and apparently more ready to cede ground, 
including on points where the Parliament’s Committee on 
Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) had advanced 
proposals that did not withstand much technical scrutiny.  
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Future strong leadership is likely to require a determined 
push from a set of interested commissioners embracing agricultural, 
regional, environmental, energy/climate and budget policy. A 
solitary agricultural commissioner, however brilliant, will struggle 
to break any moulds.12 This is even more the case since other DGs 
will be looking for a slice of the CAP budget and could be pressing 
their case with some force in what could be a tighter economic 
climate as new MFF is sketched out starting in 2016.  
Distributional issues, especially the gains and losses per 
member state, are always critical in CAP debates and it is easier to 
formulate and negotiate proposals that do not disturb the status quo 
too much. However, this can be a stifling constraint on new 
approaches and the capacity to pursue changing objectives. It 
should be remembered that distributional adjustments between 
member states can be managed outside the CAP, not only within it.  
7. The context in which the reform debate takes 
place and in which the next policy will operate  
Apart from proximate geopolitical threats (e.g. Ukraine, ISIS) the 
EU itself is going through a difficult period economically, with the 
continuing debt and low-growth crises affecting both eurozone and 
non-eurozone members. There are also political strains of holding 
together the current membership of both the eurozone and the EU 
itself whilst maintaining the defining principles of the single 
market. None of these issues will disappear quickly. In particular, 
the current focus on jobs and growth is likely to remain critical in 
the background of the MFF review. It is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the EU budget share of the CAP beyond the current 
financial perspective is bound to fall under scrutiny – not least 
because it is not clear how direct payments contribute to EU ‘jobs 
and growth’. This is the strongest candidate to be the defining 
pressure for post-2020 reform. Adjustments in future agricultural 
                                                        
12 Especially so since the new feature of the Juncker Commission of having 
project teams of commissioners within the College grouped around the 
four themes: Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change 
Policy, Jobs, Growth, Investment & Competitiveness, Digital Single Market 
and A Deeper and Fairer Economic and Monetary Union. See European 
Commission (2014a). 
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policy may be precipitated to accommodate trade agreements (see 
Swinbank, 2015: chapter 8, this volume; and Josling, 2015: chapter 
18, this volume). The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), if it is agreed, could put the focus both on 
vulnerable sectors such as beef producers, and on food and 
agricultural standards that Europeans broadly support. However, it 
is suggested that these will not produce the kind of CAP reform 
pressure that was experienced in the late 1980s.  
Since the commodity price spikes from 2007-08 there has been 
a broad view that the global market context in which EU 
agricultural policy will be operating is one of tight markets and 
generally high prices.13 This was particularly premised because of 
the apparent new reality of much higher energy, and thus fertiliser, 
prices. It is not clear if the unpredicted collapse in oil prices in the 
second half of 2014 is an aberration that will be short-lived or 
whether it could persist for several years. But, paradoxically, it 
appears that whether commodity prices are high or low, European 
farmer organisations are adept at wheeling out arguments for the 
continuation of generous public support.14 At times of low prices 
they plead poverty, and when prices are high they argue that 
impending food insecurity necessitates investment in farming! 
The Commission’s 2014 market outlook15 for the next decade 
shows a continuation of cereal prices “above historic averages but 
significantly below the 2010 and 2012 peaks” but with considerable 
volatility, as indeed is being witnessed for oil and dairy products.  
The pressure seems likely to be most acute in arable areas, 
especially if more food crops are directed into bioenergy supply, 
despite the Commission’s signals that this is not appropriate post-
2020. Indeed, livestock numbers may well continue to fall, and land 
may continue to be abandoned from active cultivation and 
                                                        
13 Higher, that is, than the lows achieved after a century of secular decline 
in real agricultural commodity prices by the end of the 20th century.  
14 These arguments, in any case, are invariably conducted in terms that are 
too coarse: high grain prices create severe difficulties for the livestock 
sector in which feed represents a significant part of total costs. And even in 
the arable sector, what matters is the relativity between the high grain 
prices and energy, fertiliser and other costs.  
15 See European Commission (2014b). 
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agricultural use. This would point to greater focus on raising arable 
yields and converting permanent grassland to crop production, 
accentuating environmental pressures. Gathering evidence on these 
potential dynamics and their implications will be an important 
element of the preparations for new policy formation.  
8. In summary, what could be the broad elements 
of the next reform debate?  
Drawing these reflections together, the following conclusions are 
suggested. 
 The challenges facing the complex mix of farming, food 
production, food security and dietary health, the rural 
environment and rural society and the controversies 
surrounding this nexus will mean there is still a need for 
significant public policy action under what we loosely term 
agricultural policy. 
 Strong principles as well as inertia in the institutional decision 
structures of the EU dictate that this agricultural policy will 
continue to be an EU competence post-2020. 
 There is no consensus about a particular aspect of the CAP 
that is highest in priority for radical change. Hence there is no 
neat catch-phrase (such as market orientation, or decoupling, 
or move to public-good provision) that will characterise the 
next reform direction at the centre of the debate. 
 Therefore the next reform, like the last, but unlike the step 
changes set in motion under MacSharry and Fischler, will be 
a pragmatic set of adjustments to the current structures and 
measures, without a big guiding principle.  
The author’s preferences would include some of the following as 
key elements.  
 A significantly lower CAP budget.  
 Sustainable land management in a European and global 
context is more clearly defined with a more explicit focus on 
the public good to be pursued through the CAP.  
 The politics and mechanics of focusing the support that is 
available on those who most justify it. These will be mainly 
outside the core productive areas and farms, and those 
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genuinely delivering and incurring costs for sustainable land 
management. The current compensation rationale for Pillar I 
payments is obsolete in this respect.  
 A market safety net apparatus, involving intervention in 
extremis and also encouragement of farm level insurance, will 
continue with a small share of the budget; but with risks of 
more volatile expenditure commitments and pressures for a 
more common approach than the current one driven by 
member states.  
 Cost effective and administratively feasible environmental 
land management will be a core issue. This requires more 
discussion on how to incentivise farmers to manage the 
environment better, with more cost-effective measures and 
without obsessive bureaucracy. This may involve more 
collective/cooperative delivery, payments by results, 
landscape/catchment scale approaches, with greening 
absorbed into voluntary, programmed, multiannual schemes.  
 It should also involve more creative thinking about how to 
maintain accountability and rigorous auditing of real results 
on the ground without micro measurement or driving 
farmers and governments into risk-adverse behaviour with 
easy to measure but not very useful commitments.  
 Further emphasis on innovation and modernisation of 
mainstream agriculture so it becomes a sector that can operate 
within legislative environmental standards without annual 
subsidy, with the potential for greater emphasis on 
improving farm uptake of the fruits of research solutions for 
sustainable gains in productivity and yields.  
 At the same time there could well be countervailing pressure 
for addressing more issues by reverting to market regulation 
(with a less direct cost on the EU budget) rather than through 
CAP payments. This should be resisted, as it would be a 
reversal of the most important reforms of the last 25 years.  
 The solutions to these challenges may not all be ‘common’ in 
the sense that all producers are treated in the same way. For 
example, quite different actions may be needed in the prime 
agricultural producing areas relative to the more 
economically marginal but environmentally sensitive areas, 
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especially those associated with high nature value farming. 
The current distribution of funding between farms should not 
be treated as a sacred cow.  
 The architecture of the CAP deserves scrutiny, especially the 
value of maintaining two pillars with their associated 
different funding rules that have inhibited the expansion of 
rural development.  
 If the environmental movement is sufficiently disillusioned 
with the CAP, as could well occur, they could argue for a large 
slice of the funding to be transferred to a new environmental 
fund with different rules and administered by different 
authorities. The interests of those who support the focus of a 
significant component of funding on rural areas could 
diverge.  
Achieving a more satisfactory post-2020 CAP will also require 
different ways of working by the European institutions. The new 
groupings of commissioners could mesh in different ways. On a 
positive reading it could provide a stronger basis for the 
Commission to work more effectively for reform with more inputs 
to CAP redesign coming from the Agriculture, Environment, 
Energy, Sanco, Regio and Climate DGs. How to get a parallel 
broadening of the inputs into the detailed policy formation in the 
Parliament (where COMAGRI, with a high level of farming interest 
representation, has dominated the debate) and in the Agriculture 
Council is less clear. Current studies on the political economy of the 
latest reform could help further innovation in future rural policy 
formulation.  
Another vital ingredient will be the assembly of a stronger 
evidence base on the workings of the current policy – in particular, 
how ‘greening’ delivers on its stated objectives – and the challenges 
the policy faces in the future. There is little recent evidence on the 
full impacts of many policy measures, including Article 69 
measures, and cross-compliance and a lack of certainty about key 
issues – for example, the weight to be given to stronger, more 
focused farm advice and technical support as opposed to subsidies. 
For all these reasons, preparations for a new reform cannot begin 
too soon. 
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21. IS THERE A NEED FOR A 
MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE 
2013 CAP REFORM? 
ROLF MOEHLER 
1. Mid-term review of past common agricultural 
policy 
Unlike US farm bills, EU regulations on the CAP are not limited by 
a term. As there is no term, there is no mid-term review. The EU 
budget’s multiannual financial framework (MFF), however, does 
have a term, of seven years, and it is in the context of the MFF that 
the term ‘mid-term review’ was, eventually, coined. The 1993-99 
and 2000-06 MFFs did not have mid-term reviews. Rather, in both 
inter-institutional agreements in which these MFFs were laid 
down,1 the Commission was requested to submit a report on the 
application of the agreements when necessary but at the latest when 
submitting a proposal on the next MFF. However, in March 1999, 
when deciding on the 2000-06 MFF, the European Council singled 
out the CAP. Specifically, while endorsing the Agenda 2000 CAP 
reform, the European Council asked the Commission to submit a 
report in 2002 on the development of agricultural expenditure, 
accompanied, if necessary, by appropriate proposals.2 This was a 
concession to Prime Minister Tony Blair to help him face up to critics 
of the CAP at home. On this basis, in 2003-04, Commissioner for 
Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries Franz Fischler, in 
addition to the review of agricultural expenditure, launched and 
                                                        
1 The Lisbon Treaty replaced inter-institutional agreements with 
regulations. 
2 Presidency Conclusions of the Berlin European Council, 24-25 March 
1999, paragraph 21. 
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achieved the most far-reaching CAP reform since the 1992 
MacSharry reform, as it decoupled direct payments from 
production. The European Council, taking up farm ministers’ 
conclusions, had only asked Fischler to follow the oilseeds and beef 
market and within two years submit a report with any appropriate 
proposals.  
This series of events apparently led the European Council, in 
2006, to include for the first time in an MFF the requirement for a 
comprehensive mid-term review. The 2007-13 MFF proposal invited 
the Commission to undertake a full, wide-ranging review of all 
aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and submit a report in 
2008-09.3 Before embarking on the review of the CAP as requested 
by the European Council in 2005, Commissioner for Agriculture and 
Rural Development Mariann Fischer Boel first launched a reform of 
the sugar market organisation in 2005, followed by a reform of the 
fruit and vegetables sector in 2007 and the wine sector in 2008. In 
parallel she started her ‘Health Check’ reform of the CAP that, in 
2008, completed the decoupling move Fischler had begun. 
2. Review commitments of the 2013 CAP reform  
The Council Regulation on the 2014-20 MFF invites the Commission 
to submit a review of the MFF by the end of 2016.4 Before 1 January 
2018 the Commission has to present a proposal for a new MFF. But 
the MFF Regulation does not mention a specific review of the CAP. 
In the European Council’s February 2013 conclusions on the 2014-
20 MFF no mid-term review of the CAP was requested. The 
Agriculture Council has also been silent on this point.  
However, commitments were made during the legislative 
process on CAP reform to review specific points. Thus on 2 April 
2014 the Commission promised to evaluate ecological focus area 
(EFA) obligations after the first year of application, i.e. after 31 
December 2015. In addition, Article 46 Reg. 1307/20135 mandates 
the Commission to submit an evaluation report on the requirement 
of farmers holding more than 15 hectares of arable land to keep an 
                                                        
3 Inter-Institutional Agreement, Declaration 3, OJ 2006, C 139/1. 
4 Article 2 Regulation 1311/2013, OJ 2013 L 374/884. 
5 OJ 2013 L 347/608. 
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EFA of at least 5% of this land, and to propose increasing the EFA 
to 7% of arable land.  
Furthermore, Article 110 Regulation 1306/20136 on the 
financing, administration and control system of the CAP establishes 
a monitoring and evaluation procedure that ought to measure the 
performance of the CAP, in particular direct payments, market 
measures and rural development measures. The Commission shall 
present a first report on the implementation of this procedure and 
first results by December 2018. A second report, including an 
assessment of the CAP, shall be presented by 31 December 2021. 
This monitoring and evaluation of the CAP may prove very useful 
but will rather be an end-term than mid-term review, as 
Parliamentary elections will be held in spring 2019 and the mandate 
of the Commission ends on 31 October 2019.  
In his opening speech to his hearing before the Parliament’s 
Agriculture Committee Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development Phil Hogan committed to extensively screen CAP 
legislation for what can be simplified and where more subsidiarity 
can be applied, and thus develop a CAP simplification and 
subsidiarity strategy. Against this background he promised, 
referring to the commitment of the previous Commission, after one 
year of experience with the reform to review whether the CAP, in 
particular as regards direct payments, is designed in a way that is 
properly applied in practice.  
3. Implementation of review commitments 
Thus there is no shortage of review commitments, but it is less clear 
how they fit together. The 2015 Commission Work Programme does 
not clarify the situation either, as it only states that CAP 
simplification efforts will be launched in 2015.7 But in another 
speech to the Agriculture Committee, on 3 December 2014, 
Commissioner Hogan again made it clear that simplification is a top 
priority for him in 2015. He sees simplification as a constant flow of 
smaller and larger actions aimed at making life easier for all 
concerned. This simplification process will embrace the review of 
                                                        
6 Ibid. 
7 COM (2014)910 final. 
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the direct payments, including EFAs. When revising implementing 
regulations of the CAP reform the Commission will simplify them 
as much as possible. The commissioner did not mention the 
performance reports due by the end of 2018 and 2021, respectively, 
in either of these speeches. 
In the short term the focus is on direct payments, in particular 
on EFA, as the Commission is committed to presenting a report on 
EFA in early 2016 and another report on the possible extension of 
EFA by 31 March 2017. The commissioner’s remarks on 3 December 
2014 may suggest that the report on EFA in early 2016 may cover 
the whole of the direct payments scheme. The Commission will also 
have to follow closely the development of the milk and sugar 
markets once quotas are abolished on 31 March 2015 and on 30 
September 2017. The review of the rules on geographical indications 
to which the commissioner referred in his Agriculture Committee 
hearing, and which should bring about more harmonised rules for 
all the sectors concerned, is now part of his 2015 simplification 
strategy. It is not clear when the results of the commissioner’s 
screening process of agricultural legislation will be available, 
though his previous remarks suggest that they will not lead to a 
major Commission initiative but rather feed into the continuous 
process of simplification. Should he nevertheless plan a major 
initiative on simplification, he could do so when the MFF mid-term 
review is due before the end of 2016 or wait for the end of 2017 when 
the Commission has to report on the MFF’s implementation and to 
submit its proposal on the 2021-27 MFF. The last opportunity would 
be to wait until the end of 2018, when the first report on the 
performance of the CAP is due, but such a report would look rather 
like a farewell statement, as the impending end of the Commission 
mandate. 
A review of the fruit and vegetables market organisation is 
scheduled for 2018, as the Commission committed at the June 2014 
Council meeting to submit proposals, a commitment Commissioner 
Hogan referred to at his hearing. Furthermore, by the end of 2018 
the Commission has to present its first report on CAP performance.  
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4. Is there a need for a comprehensive mid-term 
review of the CAP? 
To answer this question a brief look at the CAP reform process since 
the 1992 MacSharry reform may be helpful. In the early 1990s the 
CAP had again come up against an impasse. Despite the 1988 
budgetary reform it ran the risk of breaching the budgetary limits 
again and pressure to reform the CAP was mounting as the 
Uruguay Round was in a stalemate over agriculture. The 1999 
Fischler reform had two objectives: to prepare the CAP for EU 
enlargement and for the continuation of the negotiation over 
agriculture as agreed in the Uruguay Round. The 2003-04 Fischler 
reform broke new ground in strengthening the EU position in the 
Doha Round negotiations by bringing direct payments into the safe 
haven of the ‘green box’. Reform of the sugar, fruit and vegetables, 
and wine regimes was in line with the Fischler reform, which was 
completed by the ‘Health Check’ initiated by Commissioner Fischer 
Boel. The 2013 reform fits into this pattern as it made the CAP still 
more market-oriented by eliminating mandatory private storage 
aid, relegating export subsidies to crisis situations and giving a new 
push to the endeavours of previous reforms to make the CAP more 
environment-friendly and more responsive to climate change 
concerns.  
Thus the CAP has become more market-oriented than ever. 
Market price support by way of public intervention or private 
storage aid as well as export subsidies have become part of a safety 
net that can be activated in case of crisis but – with the exception of 
intervention for wheat, butter and skimmed milk powder (SMP) – 
are no longer tools of daily market management. With the exception 
of vine planting rights, production quotas will be eliminated by 
2017. Direct payments provide the farmer with income support and 
the freedom to respond to the market when taking his production 
decisions. Support for rural development starting with the 
MacSharry reform helps farmers become or remain competitive, 
protect the environment, mitigate climate change and keep the 
countryside viable. By ‘greening’ direct payments Commissioner 
Dacian Cioloş made the CAP more acceptable to the broader public. 
That helped to preserve financing of the CAP in the new MFF. 
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This means that the reform process towards a more market-
oriented CAP has largely run its course. It still needs to be carried 
forward, but the measures to be taken are of limited scope. On 
market price support there is still mandatory intervention for 
wheat, butter and SMP. In times of high prices this has no impact in 
practice. Nevertheless, it would be preferable to activate 
intervention buying in case of crisis only. To scrap export subsidies 
would be premature as long as there is a glimmer of hope of having 
a more comprehensive agreement on export competition including 
export credits, export credit insurance and state enterprises on 
which a broad consensus existed in 2008 when the negotiations 
broke down. 
At the end of the implementation period direct payments will 
be more uniform than before the reform despite the option given to 
member states to apply special rules on young and small farmers 
and farmers in areas with natural constraints. They should be kept 
and not be replaced by countercyclical payments as the 2014 Farm 
Bill has done in the US.8 However, more convergence between 
member states should be pursued. Funds available for direct 
payments should be reduced in favour of rural development, and 
the possibility to transfer funds from rural development to direct 
payments should be reversed. Recoupling with production should 
be reduced with a view to eliminating it. Last but not least, it should 
be clarified that keeping land in good agricultural and 
environmental condition without production entitles a farmer to the 
30% green payments. As the text of Regulation 1307/20139 stands 
now production is required for entitlement to the green payments. 
This is incompatible with the WTO ‘green box’ rules on direct 
payments. 
Once the rural development programmes of member states or 
regions have been adopted by the Commission experience will 
show whether the reforms serve their purpose. Reviewing rural 
development should be reserved to the evaluation process. They are 
                                                        
8 V.H. Smith (2014), “The 2014 Agricultural Act: U.S. Farm Policy in the 
context of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement and the Doha Round”, Issue 
Paper No. 52, ICTSD, Geneva, June, p. 5 sq. 
9 OJ 2013 L 347/608. 
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not suited to a mid-term review unless obvious shortcomings 
require immediate action. 
Although further reform as suggested above is limited in 
scope, the chance to persuade the Parliament and the Council to 
accept them are slim if they are presented as a mid-term review. 
They touch upon issues that have been hard-fought during the 
legislative process in 2013. Neither the Parliament nor the Council 
will easily accept reopening these debates. They may have a better 
chance if they are presented as a proposal to fit the CAP for the next 
MFF. 
For the new commissioner none of the motivations behind the 
past reforms are still pressing, aside from the need to secure 
financing in the next MFF. Therefore, there is no apparent need for 
a mid-term review. Launching such a review without a pressing 
need could even be counterproductive if the movement is seized by 
those who push for a less market-oriented CAP. The call for higher 
intervention prices as a response to the market disturbances 
triggered by the Russian import ban does not augur well.  
Another important factor is the length of time CAP reform 
will take under the Lisbon Treaty with the full involvement of the 
Parliament. If the 2013 reform is of any guidance, the legislative 
process will take two years – three if there is a public consultation 
beforehand. It might be possible to reduce this time frame further if 
no new instruments, such as ‘greening’, in the 2013 reform are to be 
adopted. This means that the CAP proposal for the 2021-27 MFF has 
to be submitted in 2017. It makes little sense to launch a mid-term 
review in 2016 when the decisive proposal for the CAP under the 
next MFF has in any case to be made just one year later.  
Simultaneous decision on CAP reform and on the MFF has 
not been the rule prior to 2013. But there is little doubt that when 
approaching the 2021-27 MFF the Commission has to bring the CAP 
up to date. Otherwise, financing the latter could be at risk. The 
Commission will have no choice but to propose a further greening 
of the CAP, particularly to submit proposals on how to bring 
agriculture under the EU programme of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission reductions. In its meeting in October 2014 the European 
Council called for the sustainable intensification of food production. 
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The Commission has to flesh out this programme before 2020.10 But 
this is not enough. The Commission should push for a still more 
market-oriented CAP even if there is no longer any external 
pressure to do so. Reducing direct payments and enhancing rural 
development may be an option for consideration. 
5. The call for simplification and subsidiarity in 
the CAP  
Commissioner Hogan’s commitment before the Agriculture 
Committee to simplify the CAP and give member states more room 
for manoeuvre in implementing the CAP is a particularly complex 
mission, and his comments at the committee’s hearing and in 
December 2014 left little doubt that he is well aware of this. 
One of the objectives Commissioner Cioloş had set for his 
reform project was simplification. It is obvious that this objective 
has not been achieved. To the contrary, the 2013 CAP is more 
complicated than its predecessor. Although the discrepancy of the 
level of direct payments between member states will be reduced by 
2020 and uniform payments per member state or by region will be 
in place, more types of direct payments, e.g. for young and small 
farmers, have been created. The rules on EFAs will be a challenge to 
apply in practice; they are well intentioned but by no means simple. 
These examples leave no doubt that simplification is not a technical 
exercise but a political choice. The complexities of the new rules are 
due to the negotiation process between the Council, the Parliament 
and the Commission. Reducing them inevitably reopens this 
process.  
Subsidiarity in the CAP is an even more elusive concept than 
simplification. In the first place the CAP guaranties the single 
market for agricultural products. This means common rules that 
member states have to apply and enforce. Market intervention and 
rules on external trade have to remain prerogatives of the Union. 
This leaves direct payments and rural development as areas of more 
discretion for member states. On direct payments the 2013 reform 
has, regrettably, given member states the possibility to use funds 
                                                        
10 Conclusions of the European Council on 23-24 October 2014 (EUCO 
169/14), paragraph 2.14. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2014-2020 CAP  539 
 
assigned to rural development to top up direct payments. It has also 
given much more leeway in applying direct payments to certain 
categories of farmers and in defining EFA requirements. Within 
certain limits member states can decide on recoupling aid. It is not 
obvious that we could go much further without ripping up the CAP. 
More recoupled aid runs counter to the basic need of the CAP 
to become more market-oriented and to be in conformity with its 
WTO obligations. Topping up direct payments by member states by 
using funds for rural development or from their own budget runs 
the risk of opening a Pandora’s Box even if it is done within strict 
limits of Commission oversight in order to avoid distortion of 
competition. A better way to reduce disparities between member 
states would be a continuation of the harmonising process started 
by the 2013 reform. 
6. Possible scenarios 
CAP reform is likely to need the support of public opinion to secure 
its financing. This means that CAP reform in political terms is linked 
to the adoption of the 2021-27 MFF. A complicating factor is that the 
terms of the Parliament and the Commission are incongruous with 
that of the MFF. The current MFF expires at the end of 2020, whereas 
the Parliament faces elections in May 2019 and the mandate of the 
Commission expires at the end of October 2019. However, as the 
Commission has to present a proposal on the next MFF before 1 
January 2018, neither the Commission nor the Parliament can leave 
the question of a new CAP reform to its successors. 
Against this background two scenarios are feasible. 
In the first scenario, during 2016 (the year the MFF mid-term 
review is due), the Commission will present the results of its review 
of the reform’s functioning, particularly its rules on direct 
payments, followed by an initiative to further simplification and 
subsidiarity. Proposals for the post-2020 CAP could follow in 2017, 
preceding or in parallel to the presentation of the new MFF. 
The second scenario would also deal with any shortcomings 
of the 2013 reform in 2016 but combine any new initiative on 
simplification and subsidiarity with proposals for the post-2020 
CAP in 2017, which could also take into account first results of the 
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monitoring and evaluation process as established by Regulation 
1306/2013. 
7. Conclusion 
There is no obvious need for a mid-term review of the 2013 CAP 
reform. But the Commission has to submit its ideas on post-2020 
CAP when making its proposal on the 2021-27 MFF in 2017. The 
post-2020 CAP should further reduce market price support while 
keeping direct payments decoupled from production. Direct 
payments should be reduced to make more funds available for rural 
development. To win over public opinion again, further greening of 
the CAP will be crucial. Agriculture will have to come more 
effectively under the EU GHG emission programme. 
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om
 
20
18
 
5 
%
, 7
%
 fr
om
 2
01
8 
26
 
In
te
rn
al
 
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
 
Pa
ym
en
t e
nt
itl
em
en
ts
 
U
ni
fo
rm
 u
ni
t 
va
lu
e 
ha
ve
 to
 
be
 re
ac
he
d 
by
 2
01
9 
Sa
m
e 
as
 E
C
 
po
si
tio
n 
bu
t w
ith
 
po
ss
ib
ili
ty
 to
 
de
vi
at
e 
by
 2
0%
 
fr
om
 th
is
 v
al
ue
 +
 
20
19
 le
ve
ls
 c
an
’t 
be
 m
or
e 
th
an
 3
0%
 
ov
er
 2
01
4 
le
ve
l 
U
ni
fo
rm
 u
ni
t v
al
ue
 
ha
ve
 to
 b
e 
re
ac
he
d 
by
 
20
19
 +
 in
cr
ea
se
 b
y 
1/
3 
fo
r p
ay
m
en
ts
 w
ho
se
 
un
it 
va
lu
e 
in
 2
01
4 
is
 
lo
w
er
 th
an
 9
0 
%
 o
f t
he
 
na
tio
na
l o
r r
eg
io
na
l 
un
it 
va
lu
e 
A
ll 
fa
rm
er
s b
el
ow
 9
0%
 o
f 
na
tio
na
l a
ve
ra
ge
 m
us
t g
et
 a
 
pa
ym
en
t i
nc
re
as
e 
of
 a
t l
ea
st
 1
/3
 
of
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
of
 th
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